Money and finance in Hong Kong by Stammer, D. W.
I 
! 
MONEY AND FINANCE IN HONG KONG 
SUMMARY OF THESIS 
This thesis is a study of the workings of the system of money 
and finance in Hong Kong and, mor e specifically, of the adaptation 
of the system of money and finance during the recent period of rapid 
economic growth. The objects of the study are : to set out how the 
rapid industrialisation and economic growth have been financed; to 
examine whether the financial system itself has changed in important 
ways during the rapid economic growth (which involves an outline of 
the financial structure of the entrepot economy); and to see whether 
the financial system might have facilitated or restricted the economic 
growth . An attempt is made also to establish the relevance of Hong 
Kong's financial experience to other developing economies. 
It should be stressed that the thesis is concerned with the 
financial system and not, as is more usual in studies of this sort, 
only the financial institutions and the capital market. From this 
broader approach - which involves a discussion of the foreign 
exchange markets, the unorganised market and the · public finances -
emerges a more complete picture of the way in which economic growth 
has been financed. 
Chapter 1 is concerned with the economic development itself and 
with describing the present structure of the Hong Kong economy. 
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The second chapter sets out the development and operat i on of the 
financial system of the entrepot economy. The chapter looks in turn 
at currency arrangements, the exchange banks, agency houses and the 
system of public finance. 
Chapter 3 looks at the currency system and the foreign exchange 
markets of the post-war economy. The strengths and weaknesses of the 
sterling exchange currency system - the currency standard still adopted 
in the Colony - are outlined. 
The commercial banks are by far the main institutions of the 
Hong Kong financial system. The structure, operations and growth of 
the banking system are discussed in Chapters 4 to 6. The banking 
system is shown to have developed considerably in structure, assets 
and liabilities, and stability. The role of the commercial banks as 
mobilisers of local savings and suppliers of loanable funds to local 
businesses is stressed. 
Chapter 7 demonstrates that the main cause of variations in the 
money supply is still the balance of payments; that the Government 
could, if it wished, exercise some influence over the money supply; 
and that the monetary system is not necessarily a disadvantageous one 
from the point of view of economic development. 
As yet, there has been relatively little development of non-
bank financial institutions. Chapter 8 offers an explanation of 
this limited development and describes the existing system of 
intermediaries. The agency houses have contributed most to 
industrialisation. 
Chapter 9 outlines the public finance system. The ma in changes 
in the public finance system have been the introduction of direct 
taxes and the Government's increasing involvement in the provision 
of housing. Several ways in which the public finance system has 
facilitated economic growth are shown in the final section of the 
chapter. 
Chapter 10 brings together the little information available on 
three important sources of investment funds : capital inflow, 
retained earnings and the unorganised market. An interesting and 
most important characteristic of the Hong Kong financial system is 
found to be the mobility of funds on the unorganised financial 
market. 
Hong Kong does not have an official central bank. The main 
arguments for and against the establishment of such an institution 
are outlined in Chapter 11 . 
Chapters 12 to 14 point to the level of investment in the 
several sectors of the economy, they describe the way this 
investment has been financed , and they seek to evaluate whether, in 
general, the supply of investible funds to each of the main sectors 
has been adequate, in volume and type. Chapter 12 shows that despite 
the overall shortage of long term funds there has been a large 
investment in utility services and infrastructure: the utility 
companies have been well placed to obtain funds even from the narrow 
local share market, and there has been considerable investment of 
public funds in infrastructure. The commercial banks have financed 
industrial development (described in Chapter 13 ) to a rather 
surprising extent. Investment in manufacturing industry has depended 
also on foreign capital and retained earnings. Foreign trade has 
been well placed to obtain commercial bank finance. The main sources 
of funds for building construction (Chapter 14) have been capital 
inflow , the Government, the unorganised market and the smaller banks. 
Chapter 15 summarises the development of the financial system 
from one servicing the entrepot trade to the present time, it 
suggests that the financial system has been, in some ways, a leading 
factor in the economic development, and proposes one or two ways in 
which lessons of the Hong Kong financial experience might have a 
more general applicability. 
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PMF~R 
The relationship between financial development and economic 
growth has been studied mainly in the context of developed 
countries. 1 Even in these cases, relatively little attention ha s 
been paid to the form and direction of the relat ionship. Thus it 
has recen tly been claimed that 
1 
An observed characteristic of the process of economic 
development over time, in a market -oriented economy 
using the price mechanism to allocate resources, is an 
increase i n the number and variety o f financial 
institutions and a substantial rise in the proport ion 
not only of money but also of the total of all financial 
as sets relative to GNP and t o tangible wealth. However, 
the ca ,msal nexus of this relationship between financial 
development and economic growth has not been fully 
explored either t heoretically or empirically .2 
A proliferat ion of the number and variety of financial 
institutions and a substantial rise in the ratio of money 
and other financial assets relative to total output and 
tangible wealth are apparently universal characterist ics 
of t he progress o f economic development in market-oriented 
economies. This is an empirical generalisation to which 
the his torical record admits no exceptions to date. The 
causal nexus of this relationship is by no means clear, 
however. Does it run from financial institutions to 
industrialisation or, on the contrary, does the process of 
industrialisation throw up a wake of financial institutions, 
like a s teamship cruising in calm waters? .. . [for example] 
Gurley and Shaw have had a great deal to say about the 
prol iferation of financial intermed iaries and t heir 
importance for monetary policy in highly developed 
economies , but even in their work, stimulating and 
perceptive though it is, the financia l institutions 
themselves are considered to be mere automatons, appearing 
to supply the demand for financ ial assets me chanically.3 
See, for example, the work of J.G. Gurley and E.S. Shaw, including 
' Financ i al Aspects o f Economic Development ', American Economic 
Review, September 1955, and 'Financial Structure and Economic 
Development', ecdnomic Development and Cultur al 'Change, April, 1967. 
2 
Hugh T. Patrick, 'Financial Development and Economic Growth in 
Underdeveloped Countries', Economic Development an d Cultural Change, 
J an uary 1966, p . 174 . 
3 
Rondo Cameron and Hugh T. Patrick, 'Introduct ion' in Rondo 
Cameron (ed.), Banking in the Early States of Industrialisation, 
New York : Oxford Unive rsity Pres s , 1967, pp.l, 7 . 
The nexus b t we .n economi c development and he financ ia l 
sector can take a var i e y of f orms . Cameron and Patr ick sugg st 
the following t hr ee ' ype -cas s ' : 
(1) the case in whi h inadequate finance restric ts or 
hinders i ndus ria l and commercial deve lopment ; (2 ) he 
case in which t he inancial system is purely permissive 
and accommoda e s a ll 'credi t -worthy' borrowers ; and 
f i na lly (3) t he case in wh ich financial institutions 
either a ct iv l y promote new investment opportuniti s 
or encourage applicants for finance to come f orward , 
provide them with advice and extra services, e t c.l 
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Th most common v i w appears to be that the financial syst m 
has a 'demand - foll owing' relationship to e conomic growth ; t ha t 
t he financia l system 's omehow accommodates - or, to th x t ent 
that it malfunctions, i t restricts - growth of real per capita 
2 
output. 1 For example, 
It seems to be the case that where enterprise leads f inance 
follows. The sam impulses with in an economy which set 
enterpr ise on foo t make owners of wealth venturesome, and 
when a strong impulse to invest is fettered by lack of 
finance, devices are invented to release it . . . and habits 
and institutions are deve loped.3 
Less at tention has been given - in academic discussions if not 
by policymakers 4 - to a possible 'supply-leading ' relations h ip, in 
which the financ i al sector actively contributes to economi c growth. 
Th is might come a bout, for example, because the financial system 
efficiently trans fer s resources to the modern sectors , and 
encourages and s timulates entrepreneurial response in t he sec tors 
of mor e rapid developmen t . 
Of cours e , 'in actual-. practice, there is likely t o be an 
interaction of supply-lea ding and demand -following phenomenon •5 
1 
2 
3 
Banking in t he Early Stages of Industrialisation, p.2. 
Hugh T. Pa trick, op . cit . , p.174, 
Joan Rob inson, 'The Generalisation of the General Theory ' in 
The Rate o f In t r es t and Other Essays, London: Macmi llan, 1952 , 
pp.86-7, cite d Hugh T- Pa t r ick, op. cit . , p . 174 . See als o W.A. 
Lewis, The Theory of Ee nomic Growth, London: Geor ge Allen and 
Unwin , 1955 , Chapter v. 
4 
Hugh T. Patri k , op. cit ., p.1 75 . 
5 
lb id . , p . 17 7 . 
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artd the financial syst m 'may be simultaneously growth- induced and 
growth-inducing, but wha t really matters are the character of its 
services and t he efficiency with which it provides them. •1 
This thesis is a case study of the relationship be t ween 
economic development and the financial system. In the t wo decades 
since the Second World War Hong Kong has changed from an entrepot 
trading centre to a significant industrial producer. This 
experience gives rise to a number of questions relevent to the 
general theme which has been outlined. How far and in what way 
was the financial system of pre -war Hong Kong geared to t he needs 
of an entrepot trading centre? How far did this financial system 
hamper or promote post -war industrial development? How was the 
process of industrialisation financed? How and in wha t ways did 
the institutions of private finance and the methods of public 
finance adapt themselves to the changes in the economi c structure ? 
How complete and adequate has this adaptation been? And, more 
briefly, how far is it possible to generalise from the experience 
of Hong Kong? How far has it had unique features, both favourable 
and unfavourable, which make it unlikely that significant lessons 
can be drawn from it for other industrialising countries? 
Because its economic transformation and growth have taken 
place within a very s hor t period, the Hong Kong economy is a most 
suitable one in which to make this type of inquiry. But the study 
has been hampered at all stages by the paucity of Hong Kong 
statistics: there are , for example, no official estimates of 
2 
national income, saving and investment, or the balance of payments. 
As a result, this thesis relies fairly heavily on unofficial 
estimates and qualitative analysis . 
l 
2 
Rondo Cameron and Hugh T. Patrick, op. cit., p ,3 , 
Compare, for examp l e , the present study with Robert L, Bennett, 
The Financial Sec or and Economic Development: The Mexican Case, 
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1965 . 
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Even at thee p nse of aggravating the diffi cult ies of inad quate 
statistical gr ounding, t h study has not been confined o banks and 
other institutions of t he organised money and capital mark Some 
attempt at comprehensiv ness has been made by covering, on the one 
hand, the unorganised mark , the role of self -financ and h 
foreign exchang mark t, and, on the other hand, the publ ic 
finances of Hong Kong. I is hoped that the advantages of this 
wider approach in prov i ding a rounded picture of all aspects of 
financial development outweigh the disadvantages of f requently 
rather shaky evidence. 
Chapter 1 brie fly traces economic development from t he Colony's 
establishment as a centre for entrepot trade in 1841, to 1967, and 
outlines the present structure of the economy. The financial system 
of the entrepot economy is discussed in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 to 
10 focus on the sources of funds and the operation of t he mone tary 
system in the post -war period. Since virtually all public spending 
in Hong Kong has been £inane d from revenue, the Chapter on the 
public finances, Chapter 9, discusses also the expenditure side of 
Government finance. The uses of funds and the adequa cy of the 
financial system are studied in Chapter 11 to 14. Chapter 15 
sUIIUnarises the main changes in the financial system over the past 
two decades , it outlines ways in which the financial system has been 
a leading factor in the rapid economic development experienced and 
the ways in which the financia l system may have restricted economic 
growth, and it looks , briefly , at the relevance of the Hong Kong 
experience to oth r developing countries. 
This thesis is a product of my studies during the period June 
1965 to May 1968 wh n I was a postgraduate student in the 
Department of Economics in the School of Pacific Studies of t he 
Australian National University. I am grateful to t he University for 
the postgraduate scho larsh ip it awarded to me, for the research 
grant which enabled me to spend ten months in Hong Kong (May 1966 
to March 196 7) and for t he f avourable conditions under which my 
research was carried out. 
vii 
Professor H.W . Arndt supervised this study . His interest and 
advice ar e much appreciated. 
I was assisted in Hong Kong by a number of individuals and 
several organisations . I had useful discussions with officers of the 
Financial Secretar iat , commercial banks, trading firms, commercial 
enterprises and the stock exchange, and with staff of the Banking 
Commissioner's office and the office of Exchange Control . It would 
take several pages to thank individually all those who assisted and 
this I will not attempt, but I acknowledge my appreciation to them 
all . 
Some special thanks are due. Dr and Mrs Paul Luey did much 
to ensure the comfort and well being of my wife and myself, and 
were generous in their hospitat!i.lity and introductions. The 
University of Hong Kong provided me with office accommodat ion and 
use of its library. Professor Ronald Hsia of the University's 
Department of Economic and Political Science took a close interest 
in my work. On a number of occasions I discussed my study with 
Mr Leo Goodstadt of the Far Eastern Economic Review. Dr J.R. Jones 
and Mr Ng Kwok Leung kindly made available unpublished material 
covering, respectively, a history of the Hongkong Bank and present 
financial arrangements. The senior undergraduates of the 
Department of Economics and Political Science at the University of 
Hong Kong and the students of Form IIC at Ying Wah College 
entertained my wife and myself on several most enjoyable 
occasions . 
The thesis was typed by Mrs Ina Guenot and Mrs Ann Newsome, 
to whom I express my thanks . 
My wife Lee assisted by recording statistics, reading drafts 
and checking this typescript. Her encouragement and patience 
helped make the period of research enjoyable and interesting . 
CURRE CY AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Except where otherwise s tated, currency re fe rs to the Hong Kong 
dollar. Prior t o November 1967 $16 = £ stg l; $5.71 = US$1. 
Since November 1967 $14. 55 = £ stg l; $6.06 = US$ 1. 
FEER: 
HS: 
SCMP: 
Hongkong Bank: 
Far Eastern Economic Review . 
Hong Kong St andard. 
Sou h Ch ina Morning Post. 
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. 
viii 
CONTENTS 
Preface 
Currency and Abbreviat ions 
List of Tables 
List of Charts 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF HONG KONG 
Economic development in the period 
1841 to 1941 
The economy, 1941 to 1945 
The Hong Kong economy, 1946 to 1967 
Hong Kong's political arithmetic 
MONEY AND FINANCE IN THE ENTREPOT ECONOMY 
The early financial system 
Currency 
Bank i ng 
The agency hous es and other commercial 
institutions 
Governmen t finance 
THE CURRENCY SYSTEM AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
MARKETS 
The establishment of the present currency 
system 
Legal tender in post-war Hong Kong 
The foreign exchange markets 
The currency system and foreign exchange 
markets: a comment 
THE COMMERC IAL BANKS - I: ORGANISATION 
Bank numbers 
A classification of commercial banks 
The banks and t he money market 
Competi t ion between banks 
ix 
Page 
iii 
viii 
xii 
xv 
1 
1 
7 
7 
20 
23 
23 
24 
33 
43 
47 
55 
55 
63 
77 
88 
94 
94 
98 
108 
111 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 7 
Chapter 8 
Chapter 9 
THE COMMER.CIA. BA KS - II: ASSETS AND 
LIABILITIES 
Liabilities 
Assets 
Bank interest rates 
THE COMMERCIAL BANKS - III : THE STABILITY 
OF THE BANKING SYSTEM 
The 1961 banking crisis and the 
Tomkins Report 
The 1964 Banking Ordinance 
The 1955 banking crisis 
The commercial banks and the 1967 
disturbances 
The present stability of the banking 
system 
THE MONEY SUPPLY 
Components of the money supply 
Variations in the money supply 
Money supply and the balance of payments 
Government inf luence on the money supply 
The money supply and economic growth 
THE NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The housing finance institutions 
The stock exchange and the new issues 
market 
Insurance companies 
The merchant houses 
The co-operative societies and marketing 
organisations 
Hire purchase 
Conclusion 
THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC FINANCE 
Government revenue and expenditure 
Budget ba lances 
Governmen t borrowing 
X 
Page 
ll5 
ll8 
125 
135 
142 
143 
144 
147 
152 
153 
155 
155 
160 
166 
174 
177 
180 
182 
189 
198 
203 
207 
2ll 
213 
214 
216 
235 
239 
The Dev lopment Loan Fund 
Post -war developments in the public 
finance system 
The public finance system: an evaluation 
Chapter 10 OTHER SOURCES OF FINANCE 
Capital inflow 
Retained earnings 
The unorganised market 
Chapter 11 THE NEED FOR A CENTRAL BANK 
Discussion on the need for estab lishing 
a central bank 
Is there a case for establishing a 
central bank? 
Chapter 12 THE ADEQUACY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM - I: 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Water supply 
Power 
Transport 
Communications 
Pub 1 ic works 
Port facilities 
Chapter 13 THE ADEQUACY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM - II: 
INDUSTRY AND TRADE 
Industry 
Trade 
Chapter 14 THE ADEQUACY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM - III: 
CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER SECTORS 
Chapter 15 CONCLUSIONS 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
i 
Pag e 
241 
244 
245 
251 
251 
261 
263 
265 
266 
270 
283 
284 
28 7 
294 
297 
298 
300 
304 
304 
320 
325 
334 
345 
1.1 
1. 2 
1.3 
1.4 .A 
1. 4 . B 
1. 5 
1. 6 
1. 7 
2 . 1 
3 . 1 
3.2 
3 . 3 
3 . 4 
3 . 5 
3 . 6 
3 . 7 
3 . 8 
3 . 9 
4 . 1 
4 . 2 
5 . 1 
5 . 2 
LIST OF TABLES 
Population, shipping tonnage and government revenue, 
selected dates 
Hong Kong external trade , interwar period 
Hong Kong annual foreign trade, 1947 to 1967 
Estimates of Hong Kong gross domestic product, 
1947-64 
Gross domestic product at factor cost, by industry 
of origin, 1961-62 
Registered and recorded factories and numbers 
employed, 31 March 1967 
Industrial establishments classified by number of 
employees, 31 March 1967 
China's estimated foreign exchange earnings in Hong 
Kong , 1966 
Government revenue and expenditure, percentage 
distribution, selected years, 1880 to 1937 
Exchange Fund: assets and liabilities, 1937 to 1940 
Hong Kong dollar - sterling exchange rate, 
1935 to 1940 
Banknotes outstanding by bank of issue, selected 
dates, 1948 to 1967 
Exchange Fund: assets and liabilities, 1955 to 
1967 
Government currency issue, 31 March 1967 
Government currency notes and coinage funds, 
combined balance sheet, 1956 to 1967 
Currency on issue , 1946 to 1967 
Free exchange market: selected exchange rates, 
1960 to 1967 
Gold prices, 1947 to 1967 
Number of banks licensed to operate in Hong Kong 
and number of banking offices 
Licensed banks by size of paid up capital , 30 
August 1966 
Hong Kong commercial banks: deposits and assets 
1954 to 1967 
Hong Kong commercial banks : assets and liabilities 
1960 to 1967 
xii 
Page 
3 
3 
8 
9 
9 
13 
16 
22 
50 
59 
59 
67 
70 
73 
74 
75 
84 
86 
97 
99 
116 
117 
5 . 3 Commerc al banks: rate of increase in deposits 
and advances 
5 . 4 
5.5 
5 . 6 
5.7 
5.8 
5 . 9 
5.10 
7 . 1 
7 . 2 
7 . 3 
7.4 
7.5 
8.1 
8.2 
8.3 
8.4 
8.5 
8.6 
8.7 
8.8 
9.1 
Value of cheques cleared through Hong Kong Bankers' 
Clearing House 
Hong Kong Government, bank deposits held in Hong 
Kong 
Per Capita bank deposits , selected countries, 1960 
and 1966 
Commercial bank loans and advances, by industry 
groups, 1965 to 1967 
Commercial bank loans and advances as per cent of 
national income, selected countries, 1960 and 1966 
Three month deposit rates , selected dates 
British banks, rates of interest charged on 
advances, selected dates 
Volume of money, 195~ to 1967 
Currency as per cent of money supply, selected 
countries, 1960 and 1966 
Money and quas i-money: per cent of gross domestic 
product, selected years 
Annual variations in mo~ey supply, 1955 to 1966 
Annual var i ations in money supply, 1956 to 1967 
Hong Kong Housing Authority, financial and other 
details, selected years, 1957 to 1967 
Hong Kong Housing Society, financial and other 
details, selected years, 1957 to 1967 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, number of companies 
listed, 1957 to 1967 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange , public company capital 
raisings, 1958 to 1966 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, public company capital 
raisings, 1958 to 1966, by industry groups 
Insurance companies operating in Hong Kong, country 
of incorporation and business transacted, 31 March 
1966 
Co-operative societies: number, membership and 
financial information, selected years, 1953 to 
1967 
Co-operative societies: number, membership and 
financial information, 31 December 1967 
Government r evenue and expenditure as proportions 
of gross domestic product, selected years, 1950-51 
to 1964-65 
xii 
Page 
118 
119 
121 
124 
128 
131 
139 
141 
158 
159 
160 
162 
164 
184 
187 
194 
195 
196 
200 
209 
210 
217 
9 . 2 
9 . 3 
9 . 4 
9 . 5 
9 . 6 
9 . 7 
Government current revenue and current expenditure 
as proportions of gross domestic product, 36 countries 
grouped by per capita income , and Hong Kong, 1950 to 
1959 
Government revenue and expenditure , 1947-48 to 1967-68 
Government revenue, selected years, 1947-48 to 1967-68 
Government expenditure, selected years, 1947-48 
to 1967-68 
Profits tax : cases assessed and net tax chargeable, 
selected years, 1950-51 to 1966-67 
Profits tax: demand notes by trade group ings , 
selected years, 1961-62 to 1966-67 
9 . 8 Salaries tax payable by a married man with two 
children 
9 . 9 
9.10 
9.11 
9 . 12 
9 . 13 
10.1 
12 . 1 
12 . 2 
12.3 
12 . 4 
12 . 5 
12 . 6 
12 . 7 
13 . 1 
13 . 2 
Salaries tax: cases assessed and net tax chargeable 
selected years, 1950-51 to 1966-67 
Public debt, selected years, 1948 to 1967 
Public works non-recurrent expenditure, selected 
years, 1950-51 to 1966-67 
Government liabilities and assets, selected years, 
1948 to 1967 
Development Fund and Development Loan Fund, assets 
and revenL~account, sel ected years, 1957 to 1967 
Balance of trade and net change in identifiable 
foreign reserves, 1955 to 1966 
Royalty charges , major public utility companies 
Public util ity services, selected years, 1948 to 
1967 
Water authority: financial details, selected dates 
1952 to 1966 
Electricity charges , 1959 and 1967 
Balance sheet information, public utility companies, 
selected post-war years 
Kowloon-Canton Railway, revenue and expenditure, 
selected years, 1947-48 to 1967-68 
Post Office, revenue and expenditure, selected 
years, 194 7-48 to 1967-68 
Indicators of fixed capital investment in industry, 
1956 to 1967 
Nominal capital of newly registered companies , by 
industry groups, 1962-63 and 1965-6 
xiv 
Page 
217 
218 
219 
220 
224 
225 
226 
227 
232 
233 
237 
243 
252 
284 
285 
286 
288 
290 
296 
298 
305 
308 
13 . 3 
13 . 4 
14 . 1 
14 . 2 
14 . 3 
1.1 
1. 2 
2 . 1 
2 . 2 
5.1 
7 . 1 
Commercial bank loans for manufacturing industry 
selected dates, 1957 to 1967 
Manufacturing firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, selected financial information, 1957, 
1960 and 1966 
Cost of new building work completed , Urban area, 
1950-51 to 1966-67 
New housing provided by type , 1960 to 1967 
Hong Kong Land , Investment and Agency and Hong Kong 
Realty and Trust, Selected Financial Information 
1957 to 1966 
LIST OF CHARTS 
Retail price index, 1947 to 1967 
Index of average daily wages , including fringe 
benefits, 1958 to 1967 
London silver prices, 1870 - 1935, pence per oz . , 
. 925 fine , and market rates of exchange , pence per 
Hong Kong dollar 
Government revenue, 1861 to 1940 
Bank Rate and leading Hong Kong interest rates , 
1958 to 1967 
Commercial banks: net foreign a s set s and cash, and 
local earning assets , 1955 to 1967 
7 . 2 Balance of payments adjus tment to a fall in export 
receipts 
8 . 1 
8 . 2 
8 . 3 
Stock exchange, turnover , 1948 to 1966 
Far Eastern Economic Review, share price index , 
1962 to 1967 
Government revenue and expendi t ure, 1947-48 to 
1967-68 
xv 
Page 
309 
3 11 
326 
327 
33 1 
18 
18 
29 
53 
136 
170 
173 
190 
190 
221 
Chapter 1 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF HONG KONG 
This is a study of money and finance in Hong Kong and, more 
s pe ci f i cally, of the adapta tion of the system of money and finance 
during the recent period of rapid economic development. In this 
chapter a short account is given of the economic development itself. 
Because t he chapter seeks only to give a general background for the 
remainder of this study and not a detailed and balanced account of 
the Colony's economic history, a somewhat disproportionate emphasis 
is given to topics such as veriations in the price level and the 
structure and problems of industry . 1 
Economic Develo pment in the Period 1841 to 1941 
The demand by British merchants that a colony be established on 
the China coast, preferably on an island which could be protected by 
the British navy, arose from the severe restrictions - on travel, 
shipping, commercial contacts and the export of silver - imposed on 
foreign merchants by the imperial Chinese Government . The growth of 
the opium trade in the early nineteenth century both strengthened the 
foreign traders financially and caused the Chinese authorities to 
renew their attempts at controlling the foreign merchants. The seizure 
by the Chinese of opium chests belongong to Western merchants led to 
war between China and England. Hong Kong was occupied by the British 
in 1841. 2 In the 1842 Treaty of Nanking the Island of Hong Kong was 
ceded to Britain in perpetu~ty, 'It being obviously necessary and 
1 
The most thorough account of t he Colony ' s economic development is 
E . F. Szczepanik, The Economic Growth of Hong Kong , Oxford University 
Press, 1958. See also Chiu Tze Nang , ' Hong Kong: a Study in Port 
Development', Ph . D. th sis , University of London , 1963 . 
2 
Th e Island of Hong Kong was described by the then Foreign Secretary 
as ' a barren island with hard ly a house on it '. 
1 
2 
desirable that British subjects should have some port whereat they 
may careen and refit their ships when required and keep stores for 
that purpose'. The Colony was enlarged in 1860 by the acquisition 
of the small Kowloon peninsula. In 1898 the 'New Territories' of 
365! square miles was leased from China for 99 years, giving the 
' Colony a tota l land area of a little less than 400 square miles. 
Hong Kong was declared a free port as early as 1841, and freedom to 
reside and t rade was promised to Chinese merchants. 1 
The Colony's long-term growth was more or less ensured by its 
excellent harbour, convenient location, free port status and the 
security offered by the British military and naval presence. After 
the Taiping Rebellion and Arrow War, it became the headquarters for 
most Western merchants operating in China. These and later disturb-
ances also encouraged the movement to Hong Kong of a large number of 
Chinese . In the second half of the nineteenth century , too, the 
Colony became a staging centre for Chinese emigration to South East 
Asia and the goldfields. Some ir-dication of the growth of Hong Kong 
is given in Table 1.1. 
No statistics on the level or direction of Hong Kong's trade 
were collected until 1918 (a nd, as an economy measure the collection 
of these statistics was suspended from 1925 until 1930). Throughout 
the period of the entrepot economy, China was the Colony's main 
trading partner, 2 but trade not connected with China slowly increased 
in importance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
In 1918 China took 53 per cent of exports and provided 15 per cent 
of imports. In 1938 the China trade involved some two-fifths of 
Hong Kong's imports and exports. The Colony's trade with China in 
the interwar period is summarised in Table 1.2. With the development 
of Shanghai and other ports on the China coast, Hong Kong assumed a 
1 
2 
Chiu Tze Nang, op. cit . , p.73. 
As a commi ttee reported in 1935: 'As a community and as a trad e 
centre [Hong Kong] is a portion of China from which it is separated 
by political barriers.' Report of the Commission Appointed .. . to 
Enquire i rr to the Causes and Effects of the Present Trade Depression ... , 
Hong Kong Government Printer, 1935, p.71. 
Table 1.1 
POPULATION, SHIPPING TONNAGE AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE, 
SELECTED DATES 
Population Shipping tonnage Government Year 
'000 entering harbour revenue 
'000 $'000 
1844 19 189 30 
1851 33 377 44 
1861 119 1,310 611 
1870 124 n.a. 844 
1881 160 6,412 1,324 
1891 225 10,279 2,025 
1901 301 14,599 4,214 
1911 464 20,491 7,497 
1921 625 24,360 17, 728 
1931 840 38,933 33,147 
1947 1,750 16,435 164,325 
1961· 3,133 18,399 1,030,448 
1966 3,785 25,623 1,784,282 
n.a. :::: not available. 
Sources: 1844 to 1947 - C.F. Joseph Tom, The Entrepot 
Trade and the Monetary Standard of Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong: K. Weiss , 1964, Appendices 2 and 4; 
Historical and Statistical Abstract of the 
Colony of Hong Kong, 1841 to 1930, Hong Kong: 
Noronha and Co., 1932 . 
1961, 1966 - Ho~g Kong, Annual Report. 
less important position in China's foreign trade: in 1890, 55 per 
cent of China's imports and 37 per cent of her exports passed 
3 
through Hong Kong; in 1913 Hong Kong conducted approx imately 40 per 
cent of China's foreign trade and in 1934 approximately one quarter. 
Economic growth was disrupted by a number of commercial crises, 
many of which, especially in the twentieth century, were caused by 
political events in China. The early connnercial confidence collapsed 
Table 1.2 
HONG KONG EXTERNAL TRADE, INTERWAR PERIOD 
($ million) 
1918 1924 1931 
Imports from China 57 89 223 
Total imports 367 629 803 
Exports to China 224 364 343 
Total exports 424 592 664 
1937 
592 
1004 
205 
863 
Source: C.F. Joseph Tom, The En repot Trade and the 
Monetary Standards of Hong Kong, Hong Kong : 
K. Weiss, 1964, Appendix 7. 
4 
in 1844, after which trade conditions were depressed for a decade . 
A severe commercial and financial crisis brought on by the failure 
in India of a number of important Eastern houses interrupted the 
new period of prosperity in 1866, and again recovery was slow , The 
opening of the Su ez Cana l i n 1869 and the telegraphic link with the 
East i n 1871 provided a major fillip to the Eastern trade but the 
overtrading which resulted led to a further commercial depression. 
About the s a me t ime , variation s in silver prices first affected 
1 Eastern trade. In the late 1880s, there was a rapid expansion of 
commerce and considerable speculation in land and public companies, 
The world depression of the 1890s had relatively little effect on 
the China trade. Hong Kong is considered to have reached a peak in 
2 its prosperity about the tµrn of the century. 
The 1911 revolution in China resulted in a further period of 
rapid migration3 and inflow of capital into Hong Kong, and brought 
about a new building boom which continued, with a short slump in 
1925-26, until 1932. During the fi~st world war the volume of 
trade fell because of the shortage of shipping, but traders benefited 
from increased commodity prices . Political factors caused serious 
trade disruptions in the 1920s : there was a shipping strike in 1922 
and, far more seriously, a general strike and economic boycott of 
Hong Kong in 1925 and 1926, which virtually cut Hong Kong from its 
economic hint~rland. In the 1930s the general world depression, 
Chinese tariff measures anq silver price fluctuations adversely 
affected trade. A new trading and speculative boom occurred iri t~e 
late 1930s, mainly under pressure from the inflow of population and 
capital whi c h followed the outbr eak of the Sino-Japanese war. 
1 
2 
Se e below , pp.28- 32. 
L .A. Mills, British Rule in Eastern Asia, Oxford University Press, 
1942, p.324. 
3 
The Hong Kong population had a strong migratory charqcter: political 
events in China or an increase in the prosperity of the Colony brought 
rapid immigration, while the return of stable conditions in China or 
a trade depression in Hong Kong resulted in a fall in population. 
Ev en in the 1930s few Chinese conside r ed themselves permanent resi-
dents of Hong Kong. See ibid . , p.387. 
Manufacturing activity was of relatively little importance . 
From the beginning there was some development of industries con-
nected with the er.trepot trade, and Hong Kong rapidly became one 
of the most important centres for shipbuilding and repair in the 
East . The firs t shipyards were established in 1843 and in the 
5 
1860s two large yards were built. A naval dockyard was constructed 
in 1898. In 1908 the Swire group's 'Taikoo' dockyard was completed. 
Most ships were for the coastal or Eastern trade, but in 1939 and 
1940 several vessels of 10,000 tons were const ructe d , Facilities 
for sh ip repair and overhaul developed in line with the volume of 
trade and cha nges in ship design and size. A number of Chinese-
owned yards built and repaired smaller vessels. Two other industries 
which developed to meet the demar.ds of the shipping services using 
the port were rope making a nd sugar refining; these, too, were owned 
by Brit i sh merchants. 
The only important manufacturing concerns not associated wi th 
shipping were a cement works and a c0tton spinn ing mill both set up 
in 1899 . The latter , a J ardine Matheson enterprise, was not success -
ful, and the 55,000 spindles were moved to Shanghai . From t he 1870s 
there was some development of light industry, mainly food process-
ing, carpentry , and rattan ware, by small Chinese businesses, but 
there was not the es tab lishment of large factories at the turn of 
the century that occurred in Shanghai. The first world war gave a 
fill ip to the light industries, especially food processing . In the 
1920s a number of small, Chinese-owned businesses producing footwear, 
torch cases and cheap tex tiles were set up. The boy cott in 1925 
and 1926 and la ter the growth of protect ionism in China and other 
Far Eastern markets and the world depression, all adversely affected 
1 
these indust r ies, and many closed d9wn. The domestic market was, 
1 
Chinese tariff barriers were especially seen as a limitation on 
manufacturing development : ' We are of the opinion, however, and all 
t he evidence we have had bea rs this out, that industry of Hong Kong 
cannot develop much beyond its present stage e x ce pt in as much as it 
can form an economic part of the whole industrial development of South 
China and even t o some e tent of North China. ' Report of the Commis -
sion Appointed ... to Enquire into the Causes and Effects of the Present 
Trade Depression ... , p . 80 . 
6 
of course~ very small, and there were virtually no local raw 
materials. The system of Imperial tariff preference established 
after the Ottawa Conference stimulated production of several goods, 
especially footwear and cheap textiles, but in the mid-1930s locally 
produced goods were less than 10 per cent of total export s and there 
was much pessimism abou the future development of manufacturing 
industry . 
External circumstances made the period 1937 to 1941 one of 
rapid industrial growth. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war 
a number of Northern Chinese manufacturers moved their businesses to 
Hong Kong; at the same time, Japanese competition in South China 
markets was greatly reduced. The European war led to a greatly in-
creased demand for the products 0f the Colony's heavy and light 
industries . In the two years to mid-1941 employment in registered 
factories rose from 50,000 to 90,000 (about half the workforce 
b . . · 1 ) 1 eing in cotton texti es . Most manufacturing enterprises were 
small family owned businesses, usually without modern equipment or 
specially designed premises. 
There were groups of fishermen based on Hong Kong Island at 
the time of the arrival of the British, and the fishing population 
increased steadily to 1941. In 1939 some 2,700 fishing junks 
operated. Generally, the fishermen had a very low standard of 
living and a 'hidebound allegiance to a centuries-old tradition' . 2 
There was no Government assistance or control over fishing activi-
ties, The acquisition of the New Territories brought the Colony an 
establish d and largely peasant agricultural population. The 
Government attempted to interfere with this population as little 
as possible : Chinese land tenure system was maintained, and virtually 
no attempt was made to d velop agricultural techniques or marketing 
arrang m nts . 
l 
2 
FEER, 12 March 1947, p , 13 6. 
Administrative Report for the Year 19 39 , Hong Kong Governme nt 
Printer, p.12. 
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Th rol o f the Governme nt in the e conomic system was , as in 
th postwar pe r iod , veYy much a la issez f aire one . Th activ i ties 
o f the Gove rnme nt i n the entrepot economy are descr i bed i n th f o l -
l owing hapter. 
Th Economy, 194 1 to 1945 
During the J apanes e occupation , December 1941 to August 19 45 , 
trade v irtually ceased, most commercial institutions su s pend e d 
operations, manufacturing concerns, especially those in heavy in-
dustry, closed down , and the population fell to around 600,000 . 
British- owned enterprises were take n over by the Japanes e mi litary 
d . . . 1 a min i stration . Many Chinese-owned businesses moved their opera-
tions to the interior , A large number of buildings in the Colony 
were seriously damaged . About 80 wrecks were left in the harbour, 
A planning unit was established in London in 1943 to prepare 
f or the Colony 's reconstruction and developme nt after t he war. The 
military administration which governed until May 1946 set up a 
Department o f Supp l ies , Trade and Industry to regulate s upplies o f 
food and raw materials. This body f unctioned as the 'principal 
2 
trading organ isation of Hong Kong' . Private trade re-commence d 
under licence in November 1945, but the Department continued its 
operations f or some years. 
The Hong Kong Economy, 1946 to 1967 
Today , with almost two-fifths of its workforce engaged in 
manufacturing industry, and with a national income increasing at 
more than 10 per cent a year, Hong Kong is one of the world's most 
industr ialis d and rapidly devel oping economies. Over the postwar 
p riod e ·por ts of locally manu fac ture d goods have risen from less 
than on - tenth t o four-fifths of the Colony's total export trade. 
1 
The Hong Kong Gov rnmen t in 1948 d ec ided against paying compensa-
tion for war damage or confiscation, largely because the rehabilitation 
o f i ndustry and comm rce did not appe ar seriously restricted by a lack 
o f financial resources. 
2 
Hong Kong Gen ral Chamb r of Commer ce , History 1861-1961 , p . 66. : 
Some i ndication of postwar economic development is given i n Tables 
1 1. 3 a nd 1.4 . 
Table 1.3 
HONG KONG ANNUAL FORE IGN TRADE, 1947 TO 1967 
($ million) 
Domesti c Re-exports Total 
exports exports Imports 
£.o.b. f.o.b. f.o.b. c . i.f. 
f 
1947 n . a . n . a. 1, 21 7 1,550 
1948 n.a. n.a. 1, 583 2,078 
1949 n . a . n.a. 2,319 2,750 
1950 n .a. n. a . 3,716 3,788 
1951 n.a. n.a. 4,433 4,870 
1952 n.a. n.a. 2,899 3,779 
1953 n . a. n.a. 2,734 3,873 
1954 863 1,553 2,417 3,435 
1955 1 ,003 1,531 2,534 3,719 
1956 1,115 2,095 3,210 4,566 
1957 1,202 1,864 3,016 5,149 
1958 1 ,260 1,728 2,989 4,594 
1959 2,282a 995 a 3,277 4,949 
1960 2,867 1,070 3,938 5,864 
1961 2 ,93 9 991 3,930 5,970 
1962 3,317 1,070 4,387 6,657 
1963 3,831 1,160 4,991 7,413 
1964 4,428 1,513 5,940 8,707 
1965 5,027 1,802 6,828 9 ,274 
1966 5,730 1,833 7,563 10,097 
1967 6,701 2, 081 8,782 10,450 
n.a. not available. 
a Division of total exports between domestic export s 
and re-exports before 1960 is not strictly compar-
able with later figures. 
Source: Hong Kong Annual Report, various numbers. 
In 1949 and 1950 a large-scale migration foll owed Communist 
successes in the Chinese civil war: in the year to June 1950 the 
population of the Colony increased by more tha n a fifth. The re-
establishment of stabl conditions in China led to a 10 per cent 
fall in population in 1951. Immigration cont rols were introduced 
for the first time in 1950, but were not strictly enforced until 
1959, ollowing a further period of rapid migrat ion from China. 
The population of th Colony in D cemb r 1967 wa s 3.88 mil l i on and 
1 
No offic i al est imates of the national i ncome have been made. A 
Government-sponsored s t udy of the Colony's na tional i ncome in 1960 
to 1962 has been undertaken by E.R. Clang. Th results of this 
study were published, unoff i c i a lly , in FEER, 26 May 1966 . 
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Table 1.4.A 
ESTIMATES OF HONG KONG GROSS DOMESTIC PRODU CT, 1947-64 
($ million) 
1947 
1948 
1949 
195 0 
195 1 
195 2 
195 3 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
195 8 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
Rane 
1, 715 - 1 , 805 
1,945-2 , 050 
2,565-2 , 700 
3,070- 3 , 230 
3, 140- 3 , 305 
2,950-3,055 
3,045 - 3 ,205 
3,265-3 , 440 
3,5 90- 3 , 780 
3,955- 4,160 
4,225-4, 465 
4,500- 4 , 735 
5,025-5 , 290 
5,745-6,045 
6,545 -6, 885 
7,360-7,745 
8,390-8,830 
10,000-9,500 
Source: K.R. Chou, The Hong Kong Economy, Hong Kong: 
Academic Publications, 1966. 
Table 1.4.B 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST, BY INDUSTRY OF ORIGIN 
1961-62 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Mining 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles 
Footwear , wearing appare l 
Wood products, furn iture and fittings 
Paper, etc. 
Chemicals , non-metallic, mineral products 
Metals except machinery 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Manufacturing, other 
Construction 
Public utilit i es 
Transport, storage, communications 
Wholesale and re t a il t rade 
Banks and other f inancial institutions 
Insurance 
Re al estate 
Property ownership and rental 
Serv i ce s 
Public administration and de f ence 
Gr oss ~omes tic prod uc t, va lue 
Source : KEER, 26 May 1966, p.424. 
Per cent of 
total GDP 
3.4 
0.3 
3.7 
1. 8 
6.3 
2.6 
0.9 
1.8 
3 .5 
2.3 
3 .1 
~ 
21. 9 
6.2 
2.5 
10.1 
19.7 
5.8 
1.1 
1. 9 
8.5 
~ 
61. 2 
~ 
100.0 
$6,37 2 million 
9 
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was increasing at a r ound 3 per cent per annum, As well as being 
considerably enlarged, the population has now become a settled one, 
More than hal f of he present resid e nts were born locally. Children 
under fifteen make up 41 per cent of the population , compared with 
27 pe r cent i n 1931. 
(a) Entrepot Trade, 1945 to 1967. Despite the war - damaged 
economy, continuing shortages and controls, and disruptions in 
China, the entrepot trade was quickly re-established after 1945 . 
Trade was encouraged by the Colony ' s political stab il ity and security, 
the end of extra - territorial rights in China, and the stable currency 
and free foreign exchange market. 
The expansion of trade was especially rapid in the period 1946 
to 1951 , when exports increased approximately six times and imports 
more than five times. Virtually all the trade in this period was 
of an entrepot type : locally produced exports probably accounted 
f or only 10 pe r cent of total exports in 1947, and 5 per ce nt in 
1950 . 1 
Trade cont i nued to increase rapidly after the establishment of 
the Communist Government in China, and a very marked trade boom 
developed in 1950 and 1951 from Chinese purchases and stockpiling 
after the outbreak of the Korean war. This boom reached its peak 
in the first few months of 1951 when, for a brief period, the Colony 
ran an export surplus, These conditions ended suddenly with the 
imposition , in December 1950, of a United States prohibition on trade 
with China (for a while this applied also to U.S. trade with Hong 
Kong) and, in May 1951, of a United Nations embargo on the export 
of a wide range of strategic goods to China . Trade was further 
disrupted,first, by the announcement that the United States Treasury 
would ree z all U.S. do l lar balanc s used in trade or payments with 
a Communist Chinese resident or agency, and secondly, by the Chines 
reaction to the United Nations embargo, which was to reduce trade 
with those countri snot supplying it with goods. These measures 
1 
Chiu Tz Nang, op. cit , p.236 , 
11 
reduced Hong ong's entr epot trad with China - the mainstay of its 
economy for mar than a century - t o virtually nothing and naturally 
led to a considerab l e pessimism about the economic future of the 
Co l ony ; onf idence returned only with the increasingly apparen t 
success of local industry . The value of re - exports in 1967 was 
still only hal th 951 level. 
China's purchases from Hong Kong fell by two-thirds in 1952 
and have , s i nce 1954, been relatively unimportant (exports to China 
are now only 1 per c nt of the Colony's total exports , compared 
with two-thirds in 1951) . And there is at present only a small re -
export trade in Chinese goods, most of which is handled by official 
Chinese agencies. But China has continued to supply a large part 
of Hong Kong's imports : most of the Colony's food is imported from 
China, and there are considerable purchases of consumer goods, 
cem nt, metal and water. 
Re - e ports for the pas t few years have constituted about 22 
per cent of total exports . Profits from the entrepot trade and its 
associated services contri?ute significantly to the Colony's balance 
of payments . A wide variety of factors is responsible for the year 
to year fluctuations in the entrepot trade, including exchange 
restrictions and tariffs in the major importing countries, and war-
1 induced demands . 
(b) The Growth of Manufacturing Industry. The recovery of 
manufacturing industry was at first restricted by shortage of 
machin ry , raw materials and skilled labour, and by Chinese import 
and exchange restrictions . Until 1 949 there was little evidence 
that industrial development would depart from prewar lines. At the 
end of 19 48 shipyards we re again virtually the only large -s cale 
manufactur ing ent rprises and most light industry manufacture took 
place in tenem nt- tyl premises . It was in the 1950s that the 
economi transfor mation first became apparent and since this date, 
1 
The Vietnam war brought a 50 per cent increas in the entrepot 
rade in the irst f w months of 1967 . 
i ndu strial growth has been rap i d - the value of locally-produc d 
exports increased more than twelve i mes i n he period 1952 to 
1967 . 1 
The foundat ion of the modern industrial sector came with the 
est blishment in the late 1940s of a number of co t ton spinning 
mills . Between 1947 and the end of 1950, twelve of these mills 
with a total capacity o f 1 88 , 000 spindles were set up, all by 
Shanghai text ile industrialists, 2 who were attracted to Hong Kong 
by conditions of pol i tical stability, a strong and convertible 
currency and the laissez fa ire economi c system. Equipment was of 
modern design, hav i ng been, in many cases, ordered for Shanghai 
plants and then diverted to Hong Kong . This entrepreneurial group 
was supplemented by skille d labour and a large inflow of capital, 
also largely from Shanghai, and a very large influx of unskilled 
labour. Yarn was marketed in South and East Asia. By 1967 there 
were 33 cott on s pinning mills with 767,000 spindles. There has 
been a continu ing replacement of equipment and a high utilisation 
f h . 3 rate o mac i nery. 
Other branches of the text ile industry developed more slowly . 
2 
One o r two weaving mills were set up, also by Shanghai industrial-
ists , in 1949 and 1950. There was a more rapid expansion of weav i ng 
capacity late in the 1950s, In both weav i ng and knitting there have 
been a large number of small mills, producing mostly lower quality 
l ines for sale locally, while product i on fore port is undertaken 
mainly by th e relatively few larger firms. Garments manufacture 
expanded rapidly in the late 195 0s : in the three years to March 
1 
Th re have been nos rious short-term fluctuations in the Colony' s 
conomic growth since the mbargo-induced slump of the early 1950s. 
How ver, th w r signs Lhat the rate of new investment in industry -
and in bu ilding onstru tion - was r e du ced in the period 1965 -67 . 
Se e blow , Tabl s 13 .1 and 14.1 . 
2 
On of th s mil ls was own d by th Ka doorie family. The remainder 
w re Chin se-owned. 
3 
For e xampl , i n 19 63 th aver a g ut i l isation rate for spi nd les i n 
Hong Kong was 8,100 hou , compar d with 6,400 in the United States, 
4,800 in Jap n, 4,100 in Aus t ralia and 2,400 in t he Un ited Kingdom. 
Sourc : Hong Kong T xt i l Facts, Hong Kong Governm nt Print r, 1964 . 
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1960, registered employment in garm nts factories rose five times 
to 48,000 . Small businesses played an important part in this ex-
pansion. Many textile mills are now fully integrated enterprises. 
There has been, in some sectors of the textile industry, over-
expansion of capacity and a shortage of a number of grades of 
labour , while production in many lines has been restricted by 
international marketing agreements. Table 1 . 5 on the distribution 
of the industrial workforce shows the continuing dominance of the 
textile industry . Textile exports account for more than half of 
the Colony's locally-produced exports. 
Table 1.5 
REGISTERED AND RECORDED FACTORIES AND NUMBERS EMPLOYED, 
31 MARCH 1967 
Manufacture of textiles: 
Cotton spinning 
Wool spinning 
Weaving 
Knitting 
Other 
Total 
Footwear, wearing apparel, made up textiles: 
Footwear 
Garments 
Gloves 
Other 
Total 
Food manufacture 
Rubber products 
Metal products 
Manufacture of electrical apparatus, 
machinery: 
Transistor radios 
Electrical appliances 
Other 
Total 
Shipbuilding and r pa ir 
Plastic goos 
Photographic and opti c 1 goods 
Other 
TOTAL 
Factories 
33 
10 
300 
591 
467 
1,401 
96 
1,092 
92 
300 
1,480 
512 
235 
1,460 
63 
73 
142 
278 
37 
1,468 
23 
3, 741 
10 ,635 
Number 
employed 
'000 
21 
3 
32 
33 
12 
101 
2 
65 
7 
5 
78 
9 
10 
35 
20 
6 
9 
35 
11 
51 
3 
99 
432 
and Source: Commission r of Labour, .§!~t!::..:!:.i ~s=-=~s~o~n:.....::~~ ~ ~ :.:.::....1-;.;.:;.~~..;...;.;~ 
Wag Changes, March 19 67. 
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The fi rst larg plastics f a ctory was set up b y a firm from 
Sha nghai in 1947. In the lat 1950s there wa s a rapid expansion in 
1 
the output of plastic flowers and t oy s. Between 1957 and 1960 re -
c o rded mployment in the pl a stic goods industry rose almost twenty 
times. The a se with wh ich b usinesses can be esta blished in this 
industry led to a serious overproduction of plastic goods in 1961 
and in 1965 =66. 
Sh i p - breaking and steel rolling is the one heavy industry . 
This industry , which supplies mainl y the local c onstruction trade, 
expanded r a pidly until the early 1960s, when there was increased 
foreign competition in the sale of steel rods and bars. 
Sev eral new industries have been established in the 1960s, in -
cluding the manufacture of transistor radios, electrical appliances 
and cameras. In each of these industries many of the early firms 
2 established did little more t h an as semble imported components; 
later, sev eral large and well organised businesses were set up. 
( c) The Structure of Hong Kong Indust r y. A main eature of 
Hong Kong ind ustry is tha t it i s highly e xport =oriented: probably 
95 per cent of manufac tured goods are sold overs eas . The local 
mar ke t is, of course, b y no means insignificant , especially for low 
cot consumer g oods, but e v e n were local businesses to capture that 
pa rt of the home market at presen t s upplied largely with Chinese and 
Japanese goods, total industrial output would rise on ly a few per 
c nc . Tarif .s could, therefore, do litt le to assist local industry. 
f ldb . h 3 Most manu a ctured e xpor ts are han d e y export - import ouses, 
and prod uct ion i s mainly t o spec ifications received from overseas 
buyers . 
1 
Pl stic flower produ c t ion shows how qu i ckly an industry can become 
establ i shed i n Hong Kong. In the three years to 1960 exports in-
creas d ram zero to $ 150 mi l l ion, 
2 
Thus many of the a rl transi stor rad io factories were 'little more 
than a store room, an assemb l y room and a dispatch room' . ~' 
2 1 F bruary 1963, p. 4 12 . 
3 
The Economist Intell ig nc Un i t suggests in i ts report, Industrx 
in Hong Kong, Hong Kong : SCMP, 1962, p . 8, that the export-import 
firms han dl 'at least t hree quar t rs and perhaps more' of Hong Kong 
xpor ts. 
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Th majoricy of manufacturing bus iness s are owned by Ch inese . 
I nnnigrants rom Shanghai still dominate cotton spinning , weaving 
and finis hing, whil non=Shanghai Chins are more dominant in ood = 
processing, metal manufacture and, to a less er extent, in garment 
k . 1 ma 1ng . Few industr ial c oncerns are or ganised as publi c companies , 
v n though some represent investments of as much as $7 0 million . 2 
In mos t cases management i s highly centralised in the hands of the 
founder . Hong Kong i s ' a soc i e ty wedded to the one =man=show con= 
cep t of industry 13 in which management 'tends to be individual and 
4 persona l '. 
Table 1 . 6 shows s ometh ing of the s ize distribution of bus i = 
nesses engaged in manufacturing activi ty , and po in ts to the 
numerical importance of the smaller enterpris es . In 1967 only 10 
5 per cent of manufactur ing businesses employed more than 100 workers . 
But t hes e larger factori es emp loyed t wo=thirds of the total recorded 
workforc e and it has been sugge sted that in most lines of industr y 
the larger fi r ms are responsible fo r an even higher proportion of 
6 
e xports. 
There has been a rapid establ ishment of new businesse s once a 
part i cula r l ine has been proved profitab le . This s peedy entry 
res ults f rom a numbe r of inf luences, including the ease with wh ich 
a business can be started, a short =term outlook on investment in 
7 
indust r y , the little capi tal requ i red in many of th e Colony' s light 
industr es, th e readines s with wh ich, in this expor t=or i ented 
e onomy , marketing and the provision of raw mate r i als can be le ft 
1 
A brie f biogr a phy 
Chinese familie s in 
See Us ' , SCMP Tr ade 
2 
Ibid . 
4 
of the lead ing conunercial and industr ia l 
Hong Kong is given in Dick Wilson, 'As Others 
and Industry Supplement, 1966 . 
3 
Ib i d . 
Economi.st Intelligence Unit, op. c i t , 
5 
The numerica l dominance o the small r busines s es wou ld be even 
greater when a llo anc is made for the many small enterprises not 
r egis tered wi th the Labour De partment. 
6 
7 
Economist I ntelllgence Unit, op . c it . , p .7. 
See ibid . , p . 8 . 
Table 1 . 6 
INDUSTRIAL ESTAB LSHMENTS CLASSIFIED BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYE S 
31 MARCH 1967 
Number of employ e s i n 
I ndust r i 1 each ndus tr · a1 Total 
e stab l i.:,hment establishm nc. s employees 
5,000 and ov r 1 7,186 4. , 000=4, 99 2 9,254 3,000=3,999 1 3,667 2 ,000 =2 ,999 6 13,583 1,000-1,999 33 44,652 500 - 999 68 45 ,843 200 =499 310 93,528 100=199 438 60 ,8 99 50=99 765 53,9 26 20=49 1,669 51, 214 10=19 2 ,033 27,636 1=9 4 ,128 20,585 
9,454 431,973 
Source: Labour Depar tment, Statistics on Employment, Wages and 
Wage Changes , March 1967 . 
1 
to the expor t houses, and t he 'tradit i onal Chinese preference for 
16 
pos sess i ng an inde pend nt business however smal l this migh t be' 2 
I n seve ral c ses, no tably i n par ts of the clothing , gloves and 
plast i cs ind ustr i es , the rush t o enter ha s meant ex es s i ve compet i= 
tion , pr ic 
. d 1 · d . · 3 d · f cu tt1ng an qua ity eter iora tion , an quite o ten , 
business fa i l ures . The Di r ecto r of the Department of Commerc e and 
Industry has e xpressed this tendency as fol lows : 
1 
In short, Hong Kong' s indus trial developmen t has followed 
an almost classic pattern within a free economy , Its 
four stages might be described as establishment related 
to opportunity; rapid and uncontrolled growth; i nternal 
turbulence; and inally the emergence of a permanent and 
v iable industr . 4 
' R ady a c ess to exc pti onal trading fac ili ties is one of the 
most impor tant advantages that Hong Kong enjoys in competing 
against its r ivals in und rdeveloped Asia.' Ibid., p . 6 . 
2 
3 
Commission r of Police, Annual Rep ort , 1964-65, pp, 2-3 . 
' In general, manag ment i s too li t t le conce rned to p roduce and 
s 11 a specified prod uct at the pri e and in the quantit y which 
will yi l d the high s t r turn on the labour, capital and materials 
mployed ; t o o ten i s unct i on is cone ived as bing to ens ure 
that any prod u t or which th r is a buyer at any price i s produced 
in the larg st poss i ble quantity, provid d on l y that to ta l out lays 
on labour and mater ial s can be cove r ed by total current revenue .' 
Economist Intellig nee Unit, op . cit., p , 8 . 
4. 
In an art i 1 
op , c it . 
ontribu d to SCMP Trade and Ind ustry Supplemen t, 
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(d) B ilding Constr uct ion and Tourism . The construction 
indus r y has mad e a signi icant contribution to postwar pros per ity. 
There has b en av r y high l evel of investment in cons truc t ion in 
a l most very y arsin e 1948 and employment in this sector has 
xc <l ed 100,000 fo r at 1 as 1 a dec ad . 
Since t he mid=l950s Hong Kong has become an important tourist 
centre , 0 fi c ial igur es show an increas e in civ ilian arrivals 
f rom 103,000 in 1958 to 527 ,000 in 1967. Expenditure by civi l i an 
tour i sts is now about $1,000 million a year , 2 
I 
(e) Price Changes. The only pr i ce index available f or more 
than a f ew years , the R tai l Price Index, is shown in Chart 1.1 . 
Although this index must be interpreted wi th some caution, 3 
the tr nd over the whole period i s clearly one of relative price 
b · 1 · 4 sta i ity , From 1947 unt i l 1953 =54 there were appreciable price 
increas s, as wartime controls were relaxed and wo rld pr ic s in= 
creased . Prices wer e virtually stab le during the per iod 1953 to 
1963, d spit the conomic growth. Given the increase in wages, 
at least in the s econd half of the decade (see Chart 1.2), the 
relative ly stable pr ices suggest that there were significant in= 
creases in productivi t y and, perhaps, in employment , i n the ten 
yea rs t o 1963 . Pr i ce increases have been more ev ident s ince 1963 , 
The di sturbances in 1967 and the currency devaluation brought a 
more rapi d incr ase in pr ices in hat year . 
Ther ares v ral r a sons why i nflation has not been a ser i ous 
prob lem . One group of fact ors rela tes to the act ivi ties of the 
1 
Estimates of the value of new building construction are given 
below. Se Table 14 . 1. 
2 
Christin Holgate , ' Tr app ing Tourists',~' 24 November 1966, 
p ,454, 
3 
Food items hav aw ight of 51 p r c nt i.n this index, and the 
i em ' rent' is bas don rent controlled premises , 
4 
The mor e om.pr hensive Genera l Cons er Pr ice Inde , which s 
available only or a short per · od of ime, records a 5 per cent 
increas e in pr ices between 1963/64 and December 1966, and a 12 pr 
cent increase b tw n 1963/64 and the nd of 1967. 
Chart 1.1 Retail Price Index , 1947-1967 (1947 
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100) 
tinan ia l ins ti t ut ions whi ch are t he s ubj t of this s tudy. Th 
credit Ta 1ng a t1 viti so th c ommercial banks have not b n 
dest ab il i sing , Gover nro. nt financia l polic i es hav been extreme ly 
ons er va tive and th Colony' s c urrenc arrang men ts have not per = 
mitt d an in lationary e pa nsion of the monetary base. A related 
L9 
asp tis hat , with h f ully onvert i bl curren y and the ec onomy's 
high mar gina l propensity to import, xpansions in monetary demand 
qu i ckl y s pill overs as. And, many food s tuf sand industrial raw 
materials have been import ed from China at vi r tually constant 
. 1 prices . 
Wages appear to be quickly responsive to the forces of supply 
and demand . Most wags are set by individual and increasingly 
written agre ments betwe n workers and employers . There is a 
uniform wage str uc tur e in a few trades, mostly those where trade 
unions ar par ticularly active or older guilds exis t , 2 but there 
ar w long=ter m wag agreements . In 1967 the first moves towards 
the estab l i shment o minimum wage rates we re made ~ Labour appears 
to be mobile between business es, if not geograph i cally. 
The in lux of unskilled labour kept most wages relat ively 
constant until the mi d =l950s, but from 1959 onwards labour shortages, 
especially of skilled and semi skilled workers became apparent: in 
the 1961 nsus on l 21 , 000 people we re reported to be unemployed 
(including 5 , 000 who were s eeking t heir fi rst job), and in 1964/65 
'the industrial l abour force showed virtually no change because of 
3 the general shortage of labour ' , This t i ghtness in the labour 
1 
No import pr ice index i s avai lable fo r Hong Kong , but it does 
appear that goods have be n imported from China at quite steady , 
and usually v ry low, pr i e 1 vels. See, for example,~' 
14 September 1967, pp . 536-7 . 
2 
In 1966 , 240 worker unions with a membership of 167 , 000 we re re ~ 
gister d with the Labour Of i ce , The trade union movement is 
<l ivid don polit1 a l and r egional gr ounds, and weakened by fami l y 
connections betwe n management and mp loy sand the large number 
of small fi r ms . Th unions are par ticularl s rong in the public 
utiliti es and do kyards, ow ver , and thes s ctors are often 'wag 
lead rs' . 
3 
Labour onnnission r, Annual Rep or t, 1964-65 , H ng Kong Gov rnment 
Pri nt r) p . 10 . Se also Por tia Ho, ' Labour hortage or Wastage ?', 
FEE1, 10 Mar h 1966 . 
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market has been a main factor in the rapid increase in wage rates 
since 1958, With such a large proport ion of industrial output being 
exported , the wage rises have had relatively little effect on local 
prices. The intensely competitive conditions in most sectors of the 
economy would, in any case, have forced most firms to absorb wage 
i ncreases rather than pass them on as higher prices. Concern has 
been expressed on a number of occasions that the general rise in 
wage rates would cause Hong Kong goods to lose their competitive 
1 positio~ in export markets . Thi s question would require a very 
detailed analysis . 
Hong Kong's Political Arithmetic 
Hong Kong is now by far tbe most important of the remaining 
British dependent territories. The Colony is still administered on 
almost 'classic' colonial lines . Political power is concentrated 
i n the hands of the Governor who is advised by an appointed Execu-
tive Council. Government finance and expenditure are controlled by 
the Legislative Council, which consists of thirteen 'official' 
members (who are senior civil servants), including the Governor who 
also has a casting vote, and thirteen 'unofficial' members. Busi-
ness and commercial interests, both British and Chinese, are 
strongly represented on the two Councils. There has been some 
increase over the past two decades in the range of powers assigned 
to the local Government. But no attempt has been made to establish 
an elected or independent Government: 'Hong Kong has no independent 
future~ it remains a British Colony or becomes part of China. 12 
It is conunonly thought that even a tentative step towards an in-
creased local participation in Government decision making would 
br i ng to the surface rivalries between local supporters of the 
Communist and Nationalist Chinese Governments. 
1 
See H.C. Fung, Legislative Council Debates, 1965, Hong Kong 
Government Printer, p ,144 . 
2 
Al xande r Grantham, Via Ports, Hong Kong University Press, 1965 , 
p.111. Sir Alexander was Governor of Hong Kong from 1947 to 1957. 
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Economi growth has taken place under conditions of consider -
ab 1 political unc rtai.nty . The Connnunis t Chinese Government does 
not r cognise t h earli e r treaties which ceded and leased Hong Kong 
1 
to th Bri i sh Government . In any event, the lease of the New 
Territori s land area, i n which all but one =tenth of the Colony's 
land, vi rtuall y all the wate r storag and agricultur a l land, and 
about two-thirds of the factori es are located, expires in 1997 . 
Without this area, Hong Kong is not a viable territory, and at this 
date 'a settlement of the Hong Kong problem has to be negotiated, 
and only a solution which returned the sovereignty of the whole 
Colony to China would be acceptable to the present or any other 
conceivable Chinese Government' . 2 
Until 1967 , the political uncertainty and tension had given 
rise to only one serious disturbance - a period of rioting in 1956. 3 
Between May and December 1967 there were many demonstrations and 
d . b d 1 · b d · ' d 4 istur anc s an sev ra serious or er 1nc1 ents. 
Doubtless, the maintenance of Hong Kong as a British admin -
istered territory is of very great financial value to the Peking 
Government (see the rough estimates presented in Table 1.7). From 
food and consumer goods exports to the Colony, business earnings in 
Hong Kong and remittances from Hong Kong, China is thought to earn 
about half its total for ign exchange receipts. 5 And , on the Hong 
Kong fo reign exchange markets, these earnings can readily be con= 
verted into sterling or other foreign currencies. 
1 
An editorial in th Peking People's Daily in August 1967 referred 
to Hong Kong as 'China's inseparable territory'. Cited in The 
Austral ian, 21 August 1967 . S also Dick Wilson, A Quarter of 
Mankind, London: Weid nfeld and Nicolson, 1966, p,203. 
2 
I 
C.P . Fitzgerald, The Third China, M lbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1965, 
pp . 84- 5 . 
3 
A short per iod o disturbanc s followed an increase in ferry fares 
in 1966, but without any apparent political content . 
4 
Se , or xampl e, FEER in this per iod, especially 6 July 1967 and 
10 August 1967, and Hong Kong 1967, Chapter I. 
5 
Dick Wilson, op. cit., p,201 . 
1 
Table 1 , 7 
CHINA'S ESTIMATED FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS IN HONG KONG, 1966 
($ mi ll i on) 
Trade balance 
Profits from trade and di str i bution 
Profits f rom banki ng 
Water charges 
Other economi c activities 
Source: FEER, 6 July 1967, p . 42. 
2 ,700 
690 
so 
14 
~ 
3,994 
22 
In the postwar period, Hong Kong has come also to act as some-
thing of a capital for overseas Chinese, many of whom are severely 
restricted in their cormnercial dealings in the country in which 
they reside: 
Hong Kong today is a flourishing community of three 
million, overwhelmingly Chinese and living under the 
capitalist economic system and prosperous . It is this 
communi ty with its wealth and sophistication,modernity 
and high educational level which sets the tone for the 
Third China , and which receives in return a great and 
growing volume of funds from the Third China,l 
C.P. Fitzgerald, op. c i t., p .85 , 
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Chapter 2 
MONEY AND FINANCE IN THE ENTREPOT ECONOMY 
1 The Early Financial System 
The foundations both of Hong Kong's early trading system and 
of financial arrangements to service this trade were laid in Canton 
before the Colony was established, European trade with China 
existed for centuries before the Treaty of Nanking but was, for a 
long time, one-sided. The largely self-contained China sought few 
goods from the West, and European purchases of silk and tea resulted 
in a flow of silver, mostly in the form of Spanish coin, to China. 
This movement of silver was reduced, and later reversed, by Chinese 
purchases of two Indian-produced goods - raw cotton and opium. By 
1820 a triangular trading pattern developed. Europe exported 
manufactured goods to India and imported Chinese tea and silk; 
Indian opium and cotton were sold in China. The triangular pattern 
was completed by the shipment of silver from China to India. This 
trading arrangement continued after the establishment of Hong Kong 
as a British Colony, and was replaced by a more complex system of 
trade only in the 1870s, Opium was the main Chinese import by 1830 
and became the 'economic foundation of the rise of the foreign 
2 
merchant community in China' 
At the time of Hong Kong's establishment, the agency house was 
3 
'the characteristic unit of British private trade with the East'. 
These houses were 'the outcome, mainly of geographical distance 
1 
This section draws heavily on the important study based on the 
Jardine Matheson papers, M. Greenburg, British Trade and the Opening 
of China, 1800-1842, Cambridge University Press, 1951, and on a very 
us eful collection o f unpublished material of J.R. Jones, onetime 
Legal Advisor of the Hongkong Bank. 
2 3 
M. Greenburg, op. cit., p.107. 
23 
Ibid., p.144. 
24 
betw n the or i g in o f c ap i tal and it s actual sp r of op rations , 
a nd of chnical di f f r n ee tw 1 n t he two levels of economy' . 
Thy wer primarily trad i ng ent rpr i s s , s lling on own acc oun or 
on a commiss i on b as i s, b u t f or some t ime they had also to ac as 
b a nk r , il l- b r oker , ship- owner, fre i ghter a nd insuranc ag nt . 
Some h ou ses w r to b com 'he r ed itary concern ( s) , commercial 
. 2 dyn st(1e )'. The best known houses to d eve l op fr om this period 
were Jardine Matheson , Dent and Co . , Gibb Liv ingstone, and Russell 
and Co . Several merchants transferred to Hong Kong as soon as the 
Colony was founded; others moved the i r operations fr om China af t er 
the Taiping Rebe ll ion a nd the Arrow War. 
Currency 
(a) 1.§41- 95. Two d eve lopments o f some importance for the 
Hong Kong currency system had taken p lace, i ndependently, well 
befor th establish m n t of Hong Kong a s a British t e rritory . 
First, there h a d a ready been a considerable developme nt in 
the policy o f the Bri t i sh Governmen t on Colon ial currency arrange-
ments . Th oughout t he s v enteenth and eighteenth centuries th 
British Government acce p te d n o responsibility for providing the 
Co l oni s with a circulating medium , f orcing them to use a variety 
of coin , obtained from whatever sources we re available. In 1825 
the British Government attempted to un ify the currency systems of 
the many Colonies and simultaneously to so lve the problem of an 
inadequate s u pp ly o f coin: the shil l ing was to be introduced 
throughout the Co l on ia l mp ire , 't o circulate wherever the British 
3 drum was heard ' . The Proclamation made no al l owance f or any local 
reluctance t o accept British cur rency. 
Second ly - a nd th is was eventually to modify the currency 
principle j u st discus s d - the silver dollar was already well known 
i n the Far Eat, wh r i t had b n i n t roduced mainly b Spanish 
l 
3 
Ibid. 
2 
Ibid. , p . 147. 
R. Chalm rs, A History o Cur ncy i n t h British Coloni s, 
London: H.M . s . o. , 1893, p.23 . 
25 
tr ders bas don th Phi l ippin s. T silv r dol l a r wast comm r, 
currenc oft rading ports of Ea s · and South East As i a , and from 
th star , wast e sta ndard coin of Hong ong. The Colony b cam 
part o f a wi de ' cur rency ar a' i n whi h there wa s cu rr ncy conv rc i = 
b i l ity and stabil i ty no t s i nce peri n eed, 
China its f had no oin of i ts own o h e r than the copp r ' cash ' 
for v ery smal transac t i ons. Its m dium of x cha nge was si1v r - as-
me ·al, mea sured by the tael (Chine s e oun ce) and usually in the form 
of 'syce ' (a silver ' shoe' of about f ifty ta ls). 
The first Hong Kong currency proclamations1 declared the silver 
dol l r ' the standard in all overnment and mercantile transact ion s '. 
But the proclamation s were disallowed by the Secr etary of State, 
who reminded the loca l Government that only 'the legal coin of the 
realm cou ld be declared legal tender without the previous consent 
of the I mperia overnment ' and tha t the currency s y ste m of Hong 
Kong 'shoul d be assimi ated t o those of our other poss e ssions 
2 abroad'. Thu s , i n 184 , ste rling coins w re dec la r e d 1 gal nder . 
Th strong pr f renc of Chinese t r ade rs or silve r and the 
wi ll ingness o British traders, who made a valuable connnission on 
silver tr nsact ions , to mploy silver coin and sycee so long as he 
Chinese retained their preference for the metal, led to almost total 
disr gard o f t he proclamation . The Government's accounts wer kept 
in sterling , b ut ev en t h e Colonial Treasurer refused to accept 
3 
British sove r igns in payment for crown rents. Transact ions con 
tinued in a variet of silv er coins , which, because o f their varying 
4 
silver contents and ' cha ping' , circu lated at different rates. 
1 
These proclamations , of March and Apr il 1842 , are outlined in 
C , F . Joseph Tom , The En t repot Trade and the Monetary Standards of 
Hong Kong, 1842- 1941 , Hong Kong : K. Weiss , 1964 , Chapter II . 
2 
Ci t d ibid . 9 pp . 2 7~ 8. 
3 
G.B. Endacott , ' The Currenc Prob l min Early Hong Kong ' , ~ ' 
26 April 1956 , p . 517. 
4 
' Chopping' involv d th Chines m r chants ' stamping of silver 
coin to certify their fin n ss. I n the pro ss the coins w r 
disfigured nd lost minu e port i on of silver. 
In 1863, a new proclamation made the Mexican dollars and 
quivalent coins legal tender when declared to be such by the 
Government . Sterling was no longer legal tender in the Colony, 
lt was ac epted hat 'the Colony had never had any pretensions 
whatev r to establish an isolated system of currency at var anc e 
with that of the gr at empire on the confines of which i t is 
. 1 
es tab h.shed ' . 
26 
The 1863 Proclamation ended, at least for a while, one cur-
ren y problem - that of acceptability. - but did nothing to secure 
an adequate supply of coin. Soon afterwards, permiss ion was given 
to the local Government to establish a mint , producing a silver 
dollar similar in value to the Mexican dollar. But, desp ite the 
'immense stream of silver constantly flowing into and out of this 
2 Colony' there was little demand for the Mint's services, and in 
1868, after producing only $2.4 million worth of coin, the Mint was 
closed. The failure, and the financial loss involved, doubtless 
discouraged the Government from later accepting responsibility for 
the issue of coins and notes (other than subsidiary currency). 
Banknotes were first issued in Hong Kong by the Oriental Bank, 
in 1845 . 3 Not es were also issued by the Chartered Mercantile Bank, 
in 1858, the Chartered Bank, in 1862, and the Hongkong Bank, in 
1866. The Hong Kong note issue was· approximately $1.4 million in 
January 1867, $3 . 7 million in 188 1 , $5.9 million in 1891 and $7.0 
million in 1895 . 4 P.art was held outsid Hong Kong. 
1 
Dispatch from Sir H rcul s Rob inson to Duke of Newcastle on the 
Subject o Curr ncy, reprinted in G.B. Endacott (ed .), An Eastern 
Entr pot, London : H.M.S. O., 1964, p, 202, 
2 
Dispatch from Sir Ri chard Graves M Donnell to the Earl of Carnarvon 
on th SubjecE of the Failure of the Hong Kong Mint, 1866, reprinted 
in G.B. Endacott (ed.), op, cit.,p.218. This di s patch gives a long 
analysis of the failur , which was mainly due t o the f act that, to 
m r hants who used silver-as-metal as curr ncy, a seignorage charge 
of 2 per cent outweigh d the ben fits of clean, standard coin. 
3 
This bank failed in 1884. 
4 
Sources: J.R. J ons, op. it., and C.F.J. Tom, op. cit ., App ndi 
12. 
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Altho gh n o . legal t ender until 1 935 , banknot s w re readily 
c epted by them rchant c ommu nity. Indeed , by 1890 th re was ' an 
understanding or convention , by wh ich notes became acce pted in al l 
banking , merca n til and revenue transa ctions almost as the sol 
medium of ex change apa r t from subsidiary coins ' . 1 This genera l 
accept bility was due to the convenience of the notes - silver coins 
were far too heavy for most transactions, and coin and sycee had al -
ways to be che cked f or weight and fineness - and to the strict 
condition s governing the banks' right to issue notes. 2 Notes were 
redeemable on demand in specie , a bank's note issue could not 
exceed its paid up capital, a specie re serve of one-third had to be 
held against notes outstanding, 3 and shareholders carried a double 
liability on the note issue . 4 Despite these requirements, the banks 
benefited considerably from their right to issue notes: 
1 
Notes were a source of profit when business was flourishing 
and credit was good, but like current accoun t or any others 
payable on demand they were a danger in the financial panics 
that were all to frequent at this date.5 
Report of the Currency Committee, July 1930, reprinted in 
G.B. Endacott (ed . ) , op . cit., p.225 . 
2 
See R. Chalmers , op . cit., pp . 34- 5. 
3 
The Hong Kong banks usually maintained a higher reserve of coin 
against their note issue, mainly because a large part of their note 
issue was held by other banks and likely to be presented at short 
notice . See Compton Mackenz'ie, Realms of Silver, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul , 1954, p.61. D.M. Kenrick, 'The Economy o f Hong 
Kong, 1841-1945', FEER, 11 August 1949, p.170, relates an interest-
ing episode from the early history of the Hongkong Bank: in 1872 
the Bank's competitors hoarded banknotes issued by the Bank, until 
they held more than $1 million, which they presented for silver late 
on a Saturday, 'To the mortification of its competitors' the Bank 
was able to pay over the required silver. 
4 
The shareholders of the Hongkong Bank carried an unlimited liabi-
lity on the note issue. 
5 
Compton Ma ckenzie, op. cit., p.61. The Colony 's monetary a rrange-
ments made for a simpl rela tion betw n the balance of payments 
and th money supply. To the extent that silver coins and sycee 
were us e d as the circulating medium, local currency could come into 
x iste nce only through a favourab l e balance of payments - which 
might arise from an export surplus, the earnings from mercantile 
services, or favourable capital mov m nts. The use of banknotes 
and ch que d e posits as money, where the se w re not backed by a 100 
p e r cent re s rve o · silver, we al n d this simpler lationship. 
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Aft r being virtually stab le for two centuries, the gold price 
of silve r in 1 8 73 began as ries of erratic and at times very sever 
price variations. 1 The trend in silver prices over the period is 
shown i n Chart 2.1. These price variations encouraged, and in turn 
we r e ac ntuated by , the demoneti s ation of silver in many European 
and Asian countries . 2 The fluctuations affected every aspec t of the 
financial system. The most significant c onsequence was that the 
v alue of Hong Kong currency in terms of gold based currencies came 
to fluctuate over a wide range ( see Chart 2.1 ) . Any fall in the 
gold price o f silver depreciated the Hong Kong currency : imports 
fr om c ountries employing a gold-based currency became more expensive 
and the sterling prices of goods shipped from Hong Kong to Britain, 
for example , fell. Because of the unimportance of locally produced 
goods, variations in the gold-silver price ratio affected the 
Colony's price level more quickly than they did prices in the more 
self-contained China. In the sixty years to 1935, the fall in the 
silver exchanges caus d a significant increase in prices in Hong 
3 Kong. 
When world silver prices increased - as they did, for example, 
in the period 1917 to 1919 - goods imported from gold bloc countries 
became cheaper i n local currencies. In years of rising silver 
prices there was also a significant export of silver coin and bullion. 
As China and Hong Kong both used silver as legal tender currency, 
variations in the gold price of silver should not have affected the 
exchange rate between the two currencies. There was s ome movement 
in this e x change rate, however, because silver did not move freely 
between the two countries . 4 
1 
The causes and course of these price movements are outlined in 
detail in D. R. Leavens, Silver Money , Cowles Conunission Monograph, 
No.4 , 1939. 
2 
Most important Eastern territories demonetised silver about the 
turn of the century : Netherlands East Indies in 1877, Japan in 
1876-78, Straits Settlements in 190 2 and the Philippines in 1903 . 
3 
Se D.M . Kenrick, op. cit., p.165 . 
4 
Se below, pp .30 -2 . 
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Chart 2.1 London Silver Prices, 1870-1935, d. per oz, .925 fine 
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(b ) After 1895. I n 1895 the British silver dol lar, prod uced 
in India, b came leg a tender in Hong Kong . By 19 35 this was the 
main coin i n circu l ation i n th Co l ony. With its successful adop-
tion, there was fo r the first time a re gu lar supply of legal tender 
c urrency . 
I n 1898 the Hongkong Bank's note issue of $10.8 mi ll ion ex-
ceeded its paid up capital, the maximum issue permitted under the 
Bank's Ordinance. The Bank sought permission to maintain this 
excess,arguing that Hong Kong, an important exchange centre drawn 
on by drafts and telegraphic transfer from all parts of the world, 
required an elastic supply of currency. 1 An amendment to the Bank's 
Ordinance int r oduced the distinction between its 'authorised ' issue 
(limited to $30 million, two-thirds of which had to be backed by 
silver , the remaining one-thi rd could be a fiduciary issue), and 
its ' excess ' issue, on which n o limit was impos ed, but which re -
quired a 100 per c e nt silver b acking. 
A 1902 amendment to t h e Chartered Bank ' s right to issue bank-
notes permitted an excess is sue f ully backed b y silver , but this 
was wi t hdrawn in 1922 , and the Bank ' s note issue was limited to $30 
million . All but $5 . 3 mi ll ion , which could be made as a fiduciary 
issu , had to be secure d by silver or approved securities. Its 
1911 Ordina n c e permi tt d the Mercantile Bank to issue notes to the 
va l ue of its paid up capital , provided the issue was fully backed 
b y silver or s ecur ities . By 1934 the three banks had a total note 
issue of $154 million. 
But th se various me asures did nol end the Colony' s currency 
problems . Many merchants continued to refuse silver coin , despite 
its legal tender status. The exchange banks, too , did n ot always 
accept coins in inte ba nks ttlement or from depositors . This 
situation would not have been i n onvenient had the supply of bank-
notes been full y elastic. But , although the note issuing banks 
were in a pos ition to expand their Hong Kong note issue , they were 
1 
J . R . Jones, op. cit. 
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not compelled to do so. Further , each institution had reason to 
restrict rather than ex pand its not issue : the Hongkong Bank made 
a oss on its cess issue (on which it had tom t the printing 
costs and pay stamp duty); the other two banks, with thei sterling 
capital, sought to imit all commitments in silver us ing cou ntr ies . 1 
As a result, banknotes came to circulate at a premium over 
legal tender silver coin. This premium first appeared in the 1890s, 
and was the dominant feature of the currency system until the 1930s. 
The premium increased from around 3 per cent i n 1908 to between 
7 and 10 per cent in 1925 and to between 15 and 20 pe r cent in 
1929. 2 The high premium in the late 1920s is said to have resulted 
mainly from an increase in the flow of remittances from overseas 
Chinese. These transfers were paid into Hong Kong banks in foreign, 
usually gold-based currencies, and withdrawn in Hong Kong banknotes 
to be sent inland. 3 
The banknote premium complicated the Colony's exchange, allow-
ing the exchange value of the common medium of exchange (banknotes) 
to rise above the silve r import points without inducing an equilibrat-
ing import of silver bullion or coin. 4 Although Hong Kong was 
nominally on a si ver standard , specie flows did not develop either 
to limit the exchange rate movements or to act as an equilibrating 
mechanism . 
A related consequence was that the exchange rate between the 
Hong Kong dollar and currencies tied to gold (such as sterling) did 
not always follow variations in the gold price of silver . The bank-
note premium doub tle ss meant some uncertainty for traders , but in a 
1 
It is possible, too, that as a considerable portion of the Hong 
Kong note issue circulated in China, the three banks believed that 
further increases in th note issue would do little to solve the 
olony' s currency probl m. 
2 
Report of the Curr ncy Committee, p.226 . 
3 
Hong Kong Currency : Report of a Commission Appointed by the 
Seer tary of Stat for Colonies , Ma y 1931 , p.6. 
4 
Tom, op. cit ., shows that in nin teen o f the 40 ears to 1935 the 
Colony's market rate of xchange e ceeded the silver import point. 
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number o f year s t premium on b anknot e s appears to have da mp ned 
the exchang ra e variations br ought on b y th fall i n silve r prices, 
There was, mor ov r , a v ariable exchange rate between Hong 
Kong and China , even though bo th employed silver-based currencies, 1 
Th di srupt ions caus e d by the silver price variations and the 
exist nee o f the banknote premium gave rise to a number of demands 
for currency reform, The Government itself ref us e d to take respon-
sibility f or the currency issue , fearing that the move 'might inv olve 
Government, and indirectly the tax payer , in the risks of heavy 
l osses due to fluctuations in t he value of silver and securities, 
risks which bankers, being daily engaged in them , are more competent 
2 
b oth to antic ipate and cover' . The Hong Kong Government established 
a Committee to report on the currency problem in 1930 3 In the 
foll owing year a similar inquiry was undertaken by a Commission 
4 
appointed by the Secretary of State, 
Both i nq u irie s looked into 'the widely debated topic' of 
whethe r th Hong Kong currency should be p l ace d on a gold basis 
('stab ilis d') . Both r ports stressed the disadvantages of silver 
pr ice variation for local traders and residents whose assets , 
pensions, contracts , tc. were d e preciated in gold terms. They 
stressed, nonetheless, that Ho ng Kong, economically a part of 
Ch ina , must adopt a curren cy base similar to that employed by her 
large neighbour: 'if China linked her currency to silver , so should 
5 
Hong Kong' . The Reports argued that Hong Kong would lose much of 
its entre pot trade , inc l uding the intra-China trade it conducted , 
a nd its remittance business , i f a g old currency were adopted, The 
British Commission noted that, as the greater part of foreign i n-
vestment was fr om China and n ot from gold - using countries , 
1 
Repor t of the Currency Committee, pp,227, 229, argued that the 
high premium on Hong Kong banknotes drove r e mittance and exchange 
business to Shanghai. 
2 
4 
Ib i d ., p.229 , 
Hong Kong Curr ncy ... , p.6. 
3 
5 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p . 7. 
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' stabi l i s ation would d i scourag and not i ncrease overs eas invest = 
1 
ment. 
Both Committe s mad a number of sugges tions to improve the 
working of th silv r =bas ed currenc y . Th e loc a l Connni ttee was less 
r adi cal in its r c ommenda tions, s ugges ting on l y tha t the banks be 
permi cted t o h l d bar silver r ather than coin aga ins t the i r not e 
i ssues, and t hat bar silver be accepted in i nterbank settlements , 2 
The Uni ted Kingdom Corrnnission recorrnnended t hat banknotes be de = 
clared unl imited tender and t hat silver and bankno tes be made 
f reely conv r tib le a t t he banks f or a small f ee . 3 The latter 
s uggestion would hav e brought the re t urn of the ' tex tbook ' worki ng 
of the silver standard . 
The reconnnendations of the t wo Corrnni ttees were not, however, 
i ntroduced, and currency reform in Hong Kong was left until Chi na 
i t s e lf abandoned the ilver standard in 1935 . 4 
Banking 
The D ve l opment o f the Banking System. The majority o f 
the Co lony' s ea r l y banki ng off i ces were branches or agencies of 
Angl o=I ndian banks, and carr i ed unl imited liabil i t y. The first 
banking offi ce was opened by the then unchartered Oriental Bank i n 
1845. The inanc ia l cr i ses of 1847, 1866, 1872 and 1892 brought 
down most of the early banks. The priv ilege of Royal Charter, 
which onferred limited l iabil ity s tatus, was ava i lable to the 
colon .a l bank rom 1 35, bu t the oppos it i on of t he East India 
Comp any d l aye d the granting of a Charter to an Eastern bank until 
1851, wh en t he Or i n tal Bank was char tered. Later, t wo Eas tern 
banks were barter d and capital i s ed n England : the Chartered 
1 
Ib i d . , pp . 11, 13' 20 . 
2 
Repor t of the Currency Conuni ttee, p .230 . 
3 
Hong Kon 
0 ,l ' 
p . 30. 
4 
The c; ur r n y re or ms 0 1935 ar out lined in Chapter 3 . 
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1 Mercant i l e Bank, wh1 h r e ce ived i ts Char ter i n 1853, and the 
Char te r ed Bank , whi ch c omm.need op r ations in 1858 , Colon ia l Bank 
Re gu l a tio s , drawn up bv th Br it ish Treasur y in 1840, se t ou t t h e 
conditions r qui red o banks rece iving a Roya l Char t er . S1m1la r 
conditions w r demand d o f banks , s uch as the Hongkong Bank, i n = 
corpora ted under l o 1 Ord inanc s . 
These banks were at t r ac t ed t o the China coas t by the high 
i n t e res t r a tes and t he scope fo r exchange profits . They r eadily 
cover e d t he i r import and e xport bills with the a s sistance of the i r 
I ndian bus ines s and the sale in China of I ndian bills. The banks 
compe ted f or exchange and remittance business with the agency 
2 hous es who regar ded thems e l ves 
as t he cr ue successors of the Company in the China 
t rade and the depos itories of the trad i tion and pr inc i p l es 
of the banking mechanism evolved by t he i r predecessors in 
t he Canton days . The old Agency Hous es di d not wan t banks 
bu t strongl y obj ected to t hem as encouraging s pe cu l ation 
among peop l e who had ins u f fi c i en t capital . 3 
But thee change banks nsured a mere r egul ar supp l y of bills to 
the Eas t rn merch n t s (which benefite d es pec i ally t he smalle r 
t r aders ); 4 the i r entr y na r rowed the margin between buying and 
selling r ate s on bills , and by at t r a c ting depos its i n Eng l and and 
I ndia the institutions made add i t iona l funds availab le t o Easter n 
commerc . 
Compe t i t ion be t ween t he es tab l ished merchant s and the e arl y 
exchange banks c ontr i buted to the formati on , n 18 65, of the Hongkong 
Bank , the inst itution wh i ch bec ame ' t he backbone of Br i t ish financ i a l 
1 
2 
S Compton Ma kenzi , op . ci t . , Chap ters I and II . 
Besid s this ompeti t i on with t he agenc y hous es there was a very 
ac tive c omp tition be tween t he banks thems l v e s . I n par t , thi s 
r es u l t ed from there being t oo many banks , wh i ch fo rced newcomers i n 
Ea s ter n finan e to take 'unjusti f i ed r is ks i n nter t a ining bus iness 
of as p u l a t ive nat ure ' . J . Le ghton Boyce , ' The Br iti sh Eas te r n 
Ex hang Banks: an Ou tl i ne of th Main Fac t ors Affe cting The i r 
Busine s s up t o 1914. u i n C .D. Cowan ed . ) , Th Economic D vel opment 
of South East As i a , London: Ge or ge Al l en and Unwin, 19 64 , p .22. 
3 
J .R. Jons , op . 1 . 
4 
It had b n l aimed that the sma l ler m r hant houses were ,unabl 
a l ways t o pur ha e bi ll s rom th ag n y hous s . I bid . 
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1 Mercantile Bank, wh1 h r e ceived its Char ter in 1853 , and the 
Charter ed Bank, v.rhich comm need op r ations in 1858 . Colonial Bank 
R .gula tions , dr awr_ up by th Br itish Treasury in 1840 , set out the 
condit ions r qui r d o banks rece iving a Roya l Charter . Similar 
conditions w r demanded of banks, s uch as the Hongkong Bank , in~ 
corpor ated under loc 1 Ordinanc s . 
Thes e banks were at tracted to the China coas t by the high 
interest rates and the scope for exchange profits. They readily 
cov rd the i r import and export bills with the assis tance of their 
I ndian bus iness and the sale in China of I ndian bil ls. The banks 
competed for xchange and remittance business with the agency 
2 hous es who r garded themselves 
a s the true successors of the Company in the China 
t rade and the depositories of the trad ition and pr inciples 
of the banking mechanism evolved by their predecessors in 
the Canton days. The old Agency Houses did not want banks 
bu t strongly objected to them as encouraging speculation 
amon people who had insufficien t capital . 3 
But the exchange banks nsured a mere r egular supply of bills to 
the East rn merch n t s (whi ch benefited espec ially the sma ller 
traders); 4 thei r entry narrowed the mar gin between buying and 
selling r ates on bills , and by att r acting depos its i n England and 
I ndi.a t h e institutions made additiona l funds avail ab le to Eastern 
corrnnerc . 
Competition between th e establ ished merchants and the early 
exchange banks c ontr ibuted to the formation, in 1865, of the Hongkong 
Bank, the institution which became ' the backbone of British financial 
1 
2 
Se e Compton Mac kenzi , op, cit , , Chap ters I and II . 
Besid s thi. ompetition with the agency house s there was a very 
active comp tition between the banks thems l ve s . In par t , this 
resul ted from there being t oo many banks, which forced newcomers in 
Easter n finan e to take 'unjustifi ed risks in ntertain ng business 
of asp ulative nat ure '. J. Le ghton Boyce, 'The Brit sh Eastern 
Ex hang Banks: an Outline of th Main Fac t ors Affecting Their 
Bu i.ness up to 191 4 1 in C.D. Cowan ed . ) , Th Economic D velopment 
of South East Asia, London: Geor ge Allen and Unwin, 1964 , p .22. 
3 
J .R. Jone s , op . c it . 
It had be n laimed that the sma l ler m r han t houses were -unabl 
always to pur ha e bi lls from the ag n y hous s . Ib i d . 
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int re:s c in Ch lna' .. 1 As on c ommentator has s ug est d, the o a = 
tion o th Bank was evolut ionar y and not r v o1 ut1.onary: rather 
than yi el d th ei r estab l h ed banking func t ions t o the Anglo=I ndia n 
or L ndon banks , che Hon on merchan t hous s themselves establi shed 
a local .s.nk 'in wh ich th! he l d the shares and which was contr olled 
by a Cour t horo ughly repr sentative of th whole communi t y' . 2 Onl y 
J ardine Mach son o the large merchant houses did not subscribe to 
the ne Bank's cap i t al. hi s house was jealous of its own banking 
business and , mor eover, was at the time i n bi tter conflict with 
Den t and o . who supporced t he Bank. However, in 1877 Jardine 
Ma the on acquired s hares in the Bank and has s ince been closely 
asso iat d with i t , Through its con tacts with local merchancs the 
Bank was r om t h e start well placed t o take a major share of local 
banking business . It gained much bus ines s = and staff= from the 
1866 nanc id l crisis, wh i ch br ough t down si of the leven banks 
oper ting i n the Colony. I n the early 1870s the Hongkong Bank sur = 
pas s ed the Orien tal B nk a s the main bank of the Colony. By 1880 
i t conduc ted ab out one =half of t he Co lony' s banki ng business , 3 
The Bank from an a rly stage wa represented in London by a 
special a enc y and a corresponden t , These links provided a aluable 
line of credi t, and acilities f or the presenta t i on of b ills , 
The Br1.t1 h exchang banks w~re j oined around th e turn of the 
centur y by Europ an nat i ona l banks and American and Japanese insti = 
tutions. In 1938 sixteen W stern=style banks operated in Hong Kong, 
repres enting Bri t ish, Fr nch , German, Dutch , Belgian , Japanese, 
Amer i an and hinese i nter sts . 
Pres umab l y , 'nativ ' or small Chinese , banks first appeared 
in Hong Kong son a t er the olony' s foundation . Certainly , a large 
numb r of native ban ·s and chan shops operat d in the Colony by 
1 
. A, Mil ls, l r itish Rule in East rn Asia , Oxford University Press, 
1942 , p .450 . 
2 3 
J . R. J nes, op . i t . Ibid . 
1 the L880s . The ompl xity of Lhe Chines currency arrangements 
requir d insti t utions bot h t o arrange t rans rs be tween di fferent 
parts o China (the 1 Shansi 1 ban ks ) and to ac t as money changers 
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(' ash shop ' banks). The native banks provided a i nanc ial l i nk 
becween Hong Kon and the i nland a r eas of China, wher e f ore ign 
banks could not op r at , and were, for s ome t ime, the main depos i t 
i ns ti t utions or the Chinese corrnnunity. 2 The banks were clannish, 
s eer tive but high l y f lexible i n t heir operations . Almost all were 
partners hi ps wi t h unlimi ted liability, With the i r small subscribed 
capitals , t he na tive banks depended heavi l y on the short - term loans 
( ' chop' l oans) prov i ded by f oreign banks on the secur i t y of a 
3 
compradore ' s guarantee . Failures were frequent the Chinese Revo = 
l ution of 1911 caused the collapse of a large number of native 
banks, as did t he economic boycott of Hong Kong in 1925 and 1926 
and t he depression in 1933 . In 1925 t h e Hongkong Bank and the 
4 Char ter ed Bank mad e emergency loans t o assist the small Chinese banks , 
1 
See ' Sp ech of Governor to the Legislat ive Council, 3 January 
1881 on the Subj ec t of the Cens us R turns and the Pr ogress of t he 
Co l ony' , r eprint d in G. B. Endaco t t (ed . ), op . cit . , p . 149 , 
2 
Deposits he l d by t he native banks were estimated at $15 mi llion 
in 1889 compa red wi t h $24 mi ll i on i n the exchange banks. ' Extracts 
f rom a Repor on the Conditions and Prospects of Hong Kong ... ' , 
1889, repr int e d in G.B. Endacot t (ed .) , op . c i t . , p . 153 , 
3 
The ompradore p layed an important role in the operations of t he 
exchange banks and other Western merchant houses. The compradore 
took responsibility for, and guaranteed, the contracts entered into 
wi th Ch i nes e traders, he advised the exchange banks on the standing 
of t he nat ive banks, and it was on his guarantee that bills were 
bough t f rom native Chinese banks . These activities were performed 
on a cormnission basis , The compradore was also responsible for 
recruiting and guaranteeing Chinese staff, and for a range of more 
rou t ne du t i es ~ advising on Chines e customs, cormnercial prac tices 
and weight and me as ures . The compradore 'was not just an inter = 
preter and c anva ss r, bu t also the consultative agent as to the 
bus ness ' reputat i on and the s tabi li t y of all the Chinese traders 
who had de a l ings with the firm' . Kuang Yung Pao, ' The Comprador : 
Hi s Position in the Foreign Trade o China', Economic Journal, 
Dec ember 1911, p , 638 . In some of the larger Western merchant firms 
and banks the pos i tion of ompradore became a family one. The 
developmen t o Chines =owned Western- style business and the greater 
f ami l iar ty of Wes cern merchant s with Ch i nes e language and customs 
made the compradore ' s role a less important one from about the 
1920s onwards . The posi tion of 'Ch i nes adv iser' i s the present -
day equival nt, but the dutie ar far less wide - r anging. 
4 
J .R. J ones , op . c i t . 
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he curren y disrup tions o the 1930s brought consid rabl bus iness 
o the native banks, and many new i.nsti tutions were estab lished in 
the Col ony or rans .erred t o Hong Kong rom China. 
The nat ive banks o .f red banki ng unctions comp l mentary to 
those arri.ed c,ut by the oreign banks . Signi ficantly, before th 
se ond world war, ch r was no case of a native bank developing 
into a la r g , Wet rn=sty l e institution, The several Ch inese =owned 
West rn =style banks i.n i.stence by 1941 were established as such 
by Chines merchants . Of these the most important were the Bank of 
Canton, established in 1912, and the Bank of East As ia , set up in 
1919 . 
0 th r than Ord inances gover ning the issue of banknotes, there 
was no banking legislation in Hong Kong before the second world war. 
A proposal was considered in the early 1930s which would have re = 
quir d banks to hold minimum cash reserves 
d ' d3 · d · ) 1 epos 1ts an per c nt on time eposits . 
of 10 per cent on demand 
In 1935 a British 
Treasur y o .ic i al vis it d the Colony to inquire into the advisabil ity 
of drafting a Banking Ordinance to prot ct deposits ent r usted with 
the native banks . But ' the unanimous view of Government , inc luding 
th Attornev = en ral, che rown Solicitor and the Tr eas urer was 
against any att mpt a t legi lation which could not in any cas e be 
ef ·ective and wh ich, in the case of f riendly depos its with shops, 
etc. would not be desirable ' •2 No Banking Ord inance was pass ed in 
Hong Kong until 1948 . 
b) The Banks ' Exchange Business . Until the s econd world war, 
the commer c al banks operating in Hong Kong were· ' pre - eminently 
3 
exchange banks '. Local banking bus iness was o little importance, 
and onduc t d mainl y by the Hongkong Bank and the native banks . Of 
1 
2 
3 
Hon,g Kong Currency •• . , p , 30 . 
J,R . Jones , op . c t. 
Repor t o the Commi s s on Appo nted by His xcellency the Governor 
of Hong Kong t o Engui re into the Caus es and Effects of the Present 
Trade Depress ion n Hong Kong, July 1934 to Februar y 1935, Hong 
Kong Government Pr inter, p ,12. 
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course, th way in wh ich exchange business was carr ied out changed 
significantly over the p r iod , 
The op r ation of an Eastern exchange bank in the 1860s i s out-
1 lined in some d t a il in a paper by Leighton Boyce . Usually , each 
branch was a llotted a c rtain sum as working cap ital which could be 
emp loyed in exchange or local bus iness at the discretion of the 
local manager. Each branch was also allowed a line of credit on 
London , on which it could draw sterling dra f ts so long as cover, in 
the form of equivalent remittances, was provided within three months. 
The branches were expected also to attract local deposits. Longer 
term deposi ts could be employed safely and pro fitably in exchange 
busines s. 
In the 1850s and 1860s, Eas te rn t rade was usually financ ed in 
sterling bills drawn on the large merchant houses or banks i n 
2 London. Bills were commonly renewed until the proceeds of the 
goods were returned from the East by the cons ignee's purchase of a 
bank draft on London . Ad ances under bills of exchange on exports 
I 
from the East were paid out locally in silver and later recouped 
by the Bank in sterling on London, at the current rate of exchange. 
The whole exchange risk was thus carried by the Eastern merchant. 
In this per iod, a usance of six months on bills was common . An 
attempt in 1866 by the London bas ed banks to shorten usance to fou r 
3 
of the opposition of the Hongkong Bank . months f a iled beaus 
The volum of Eastern t rade increased cons i derably after add i -
tional Chines port s were opened by the Tr aty of Tientsin in 1858 
and the 1860 Convention of P king. Ab out the same time there was 
an pansion o trad 4 rom other Eastern ports. The East was 
1 
2 
Op. cit., pp .23- 4. 
Thi s dis ussion draws on ibid . , and Comp ton Ma kenzie, op. cit . , 
Chap t .r V. 
3 
See Comp ton Mackenzie, op . cit . , pp .64=5 . 
4 
Japanes e trad was opened t o the West i n 1853 ; in 1855 two im-
portant por t on t he Phil i pp ines wer opened and trade with Siam 
was stablish d; additional Chinese ports were opene d to Western 
m rchants a ter th Ti ntsin Tr atie s of 1858 to 1860 . 
1 becomi ng 'a dis tinct e c onomic re ion in the world economy ' and 
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' the somewhat simp l pat Yn of the China t r ade had by 1865 become 
much mor e ompl and was gra ually be oming pa r t of a wider net= 
wo rk wh ich requir d a new s ystem of fi nanc to provide for the more 
c ompl i cate 2 t rades tt lements and to ease the flow of payments ' , 
The s tablishment of a te legraphic link with Europe in 1871 en= 
couraged and permitt d East e r n mer hant s t o t rade moYe r egular l y 
on a commi ssion basis and brought about a fu rther, and for a while 
excessive, growth of c ommerce , Many of the small trading firms 
established to b ne it f rom the new trading conditions were heavi ly 
d pendent on the banks f or funds, 
Afte r the conne tion of the telegraph the Eastern banks were 
in a pos ition to sell telegraphic transfer on London and India, and 
merchants in China took to remi tting funds to London by TT rather 
thank bank drats and bills , These trans fe rs were less profitable 
t o the banks, but the inst i tutions benefited from the rap i d expan= 
s ion of t r ade and the scope pre s ented fo r arbitrage operations 
which followed the connection of the t elegraph , The telegraph also 
brought the Eas tern branches of the London=based banks into closer 
contact with the i r head offices . 
More significant was the f all in silver prices. 
The silver r i is placed the Easte rn banks in a situation 
without parallel. The depreciation of a note currency was 
a phenomenon well understood by financial experts, but for 
the legal and undebas ed coinage of a large group of countries 
t o fa ll in value rom first to l ast some th i rty per cent t o 
forty per cen t was ou tside the experience of any expert . 3 
The sev ral Eas t rn banks reacted differently to the deprec ia= 
tion of si l v r , Those banks whos e capital was ra i s ed in sterl ing 
cou ld no longer sa ly mp loy their capital in Eas t ern exchange 
op ra tions . The Chart rd Bank at irst regularly reva lued its 
sil v r as sets , In a little ov er ad cad to 1885 the cap ital of the 
Bank ' s sil · r =using br anch s wa 
l 
3 
J .R. J ones, op , i . 
4 
written down by one - quarter . 
2 
4 
Ibid . 
Comp ton M.a k nzie, op . ci . . , pp .162 =3 . Ibid . , pp . 161- 2. 
The 
Bank c _en w". thdrew v1'.. rtually the whol of i s si l ve r api al. It 
also a t e mpt d t o av oid as far as possible orward cont rac t s in 
silver and toke p al sil e r connnitments - including ts Hong 
Kong bankn te i ss u within ver narrow limits . The Bank ' s Easter n 
branch s became alm t wholl y dep ndent fo r unds on local deposits . 
The Oriental Ban , th Chartered Mercantile Bank and Compt: oir 
d 'Escompte sought t o make prov ision or the deprec i ation of their 
silver assets, but the continued fall in silver prices exhausted 
their res r ves . The Oriental was wound up ; the Chartered Mercantile 
and the Comptoir were reconstructed . 
The Hongkong Bank was better plac ed to meet the problems caused 
by the fall in silv r prices . First , as the Bank 's capital was 
raised in silver, depreciation could not cause any 'loss' of 
capital . (Of cours e, t he sterling value of the Bank's capital was 
affect d by the all in silver prices, but the institution did not 
f ace insolvency as a result.) Secondly , and in the longer per iod 
of more importance , the Bank was b tter prov ided with local (i . e, 
·1 ) d · h · , l si v er eposits tan its competitors . All the imper ial banks 
were readily able to a tract deposits in London and Scotland, and 
through these banks la rg sums were invested overseas f rom Brita in 
in the nineteenth entury . But the fa ll in silver prices dis-
couraged the use o thes fund s in Eastern trade . On the basis of 
local d posits the Hongkong Bank continued to expand its Eastern 
business, at a time when other exchange banks were restricting 
their a tiviti sin the areas. 
The l u tuatin g x hange rats betwe n silver and gold cur -
renci s mad nad quate the earli r me thod of financing Eastern 
trad , whi h had p laced the r sk of e change rate variat ons on the 
East rn mer hant. As a r sult, 
1 
Th Bank was part i cularly w 11 provided with deposits in 
h ld, at various tim s, the Briti sh military hest, 
ount o th Insp ctor neral o the Chinese custom, the 
customs r nu , and o icial d posits of the Chin se Go ern~ 
ment , rom which mu h of China's or ign d bt was serv iced . 
drats on the East were generally mad payable in the 
curr n y con r ned, s uch as dollars or taels, and the 
xchang ra te ixed at the current London quotation . The 
merchant in the East was, in thi s way , fre ed from exchange 
r isk ; and the astern xchange bank concerned i n such a 
transaction ou ld protect i tself f rom exchange loss by an 
immediate pur chase of sterling i n China by either present 
or future de l iv r y, Thus the ol d s t rl ing loan method of 
financ ing shipments was large l y s upers eded by the currency 
draft; an xamp l e o how banking technique was success ully 
adapte d to m I the s e r ious d i i culties imposed by the 
s ilver crisis. 
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Eastern merchants operating without firm orders, however , were 
unab le to gain cove r fr om the banks, and had to continue carrying 
the xchange risk . The exchange banks naturally sought to match 
the r bill holdings 9 but comple t e cover could not always be arranged . 
In s uch cases, silver was shipped . 2 
Throughout the period of the entrepot economy the foreign banks 
vi r t ually constitu t ed the fo reign exchange market of Hong Kong , 
Unt il 1935 there was no official restriction or control over this 
market . Exchange ra tes v aried with the gold price of silver and 
the demand and s upp l y of l ocal c urrency . From an early date, as 
an offic i al Repor t h as r ecorded, Hong Kong had ' a very active ex= 
change marke t , par t cularly with London and Shanghai, and through 
its highly developed banking system [could) readily convert its 
3 dollars into any other wel l=known currency', 
The exchange banks were also the ma in institutions through 
which r emi t tanc s from overseas Chinese were transferred to China , 
Remittances rom Chinese l iving in South East Asia were usually 
pa id into small 'le tter shops ' which would purchase exchange from 
one of the fo reign banks . 4 The foreign bank would then transfer 
the rem t tanc s into the interior through one of the native banks . 
By the 1930s the flow of remittanc es through the Colony was thought 
to hav been between £25 million and £40 million a year. 
1 
2 
J , Leighton Boyce, op , cit . , p ,24 , 
5 
See ev i denc rom the Eastern banks at the United Kingdom Gold 
and Silver Commission, 1887, Quest ions 4998 to 5067 . 
3 4 
Hong Kong Curr n y ... , p .27. Ibid . 
5 
Ibid . , p .31; D.M. Kenrick, op , it , , p . 170 . 
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(c) Non-exchange Business, The exchange banks were from an 
early stage called on to provide short-term credits to finance the 
packaging and storage of goods an d the sale of goods to Chinese 
1 
traders . This business was seen as a useful one fo r funds not 
committed in exchange transactions. One prob lem was that the loans 
often required branch managers to 'shut an eye' to the 'cautious 
i nstructions of Head Offi c e ' . 2 Loans to Chinese businesses were 
made on the recommendation of, and guaranteed by , the banks' 
3 
compradores. 
Given the structure of the Hong Kong economy in this period, 
there was r elatively little demand f or loans for purposes not 
directly connected with foreign trade . Wharf, godown, shipping and 
insurance services were mostly provided by agency houses using 
their own sources o f funds. But, from the time it was established, 
the Hongkong Bank advanced funds to local enterprises, Irt its fi rst 
year the Bank financed the Union Dock Co. and, a littl e later, the 
4 Sugar Refinery and Di stil lery and the Pier and Godown Co . The 
Bank also helped to finance the establishment of coastal sh i pp ing 
services , Taikoo Sugar Re finery and Taikoo Docks, 5 
The acceptance o f local deposits was a sought a fter and compe -
titive business of the exchange banks, especially during the period 
of f alling silver pr ices . But, f or some time, local deposits were 
di ffi cult to attract: the Chinese did not, at f irst, depos it fund s 
with the f oreign banks; agency houses used excess cash within their 
own businesses or held it on account with their compradore; and 
Western merchants usually deposited surplus funds with their 
1 
There is a brief description of this business in G.C. Allen and 
A.G. Donnithor ne , Western Enterprise in ~ar Eastern Economic 
Development - China and Japan, Chapter VI. 
2 
Compton Mackenzie, op. cit . , p.66 . 
3 
Ibid., pp .65-6. 
4 
J ,R, Jones, op. cit, Jones claims that the loan to the refinery 
was the 'first attempt by any foreign bank to finance the develop -
ment of any industr ial ente rprise in Hong Kong or China' . 
5 
Ibid, 
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compradores. Local depos i ts became significant in the latter part 
of the nineteenth entur y; these t otalled $7 . 1 million in 1879, 
$38 . 9 million in 1889, $135 mill i on in 1926 and $285 million in 
early 1931 . 1 The Hongkong Bank held the grater share of these 
deposits . The fo r ign banks in Hong Kong were also depositories 
of the sav ings of merchants and of ficials in China, and periods of 
unrest in China wer usually followed by an inflow of depos its into 
2 
the Colony ' s banks , 
There we re suggestions in the early 1880s that a Post Offi ce 
Saving Bank be s e t up . A Bill authorising t he establishment of 
this bank was introduced into the Legislative Council but, instead, 
an offer from the Hongkong Bank to operate a saving bank was 
accepted. Because of the transitory nature of the population and 
the continuing popularity of the native banks, deposits grew slowly. 
In 1939 the Bank had 23 ,000 accounts, containing $15,5 million . 
The Agency Hous e s and Other Commercial Institutions 
Competition f rom the exchange banks and the increasing com= 
plexi ty of the Colony's t rading s ys tem soon ended the dominant ro l e 
playe d by the agency houses in the Colony' s commerc i al and financial 
s ystem, Several of the older houses fai led during commercial crises, 
including Dent and Co , , which collapsed in 1867, and Russell and Co., 
in 1892 , But others, notably Jardine Matheson, built up a large 
capital and an extensive representation in the Treaty Ports. 
Gradually , these businesses became less dependent on the opium 
trade , The new merchant businesses se t up after the connection of 
the telegraphic link with Europe usually had smaller and less 
divers ified operations than the long established houses, S veral 
agency houses moved to Hong Kong after their establishment in China , 
1 
Sources: 'Extracts from a Report on the Condition and Prospects 
of Hong Kong by His Excellency Sir G. William Des Voeux, Governor', 
reprinted in G.B. Endacott (ed.), op. cit . , p . 153; Hong Kong 
Currency .. ,, Appendix , 
2 
Maurice Collis, Wayf oong : the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation, London: Faber and Faber, 1965, p ,152. 
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including , in 1870 , Bu t ter i e l d and S i r e . rom abou t 1880 a number 
of hines bus iness e s , t rading between Hong Kong and the interio r, 
and with t he ov ers e as Chinese communities, were formed . 
The activ ities of the merchant hous es changed signi ficantly in 
t he 1870s and 1880s, and then r emained substantially unchanged unti l 
1 
a f ter the second world war . The installation of the telegraph 
offered greater scope or t rading on a commiss ion basis - there was 
speedy communication wi t h b uyers, regular market information, and 
less need to carry stock. The more competitiv e condi tions which 
r s ulted induc ed several of the larger house s to make the decision 
' not quickly or lightly r eached 12 to cease trading on their own 
account . These businesses then became almost exclusively concerned 
with acting as loca l agents fo r f oreign shipp ing, fi nanc i al and 
commercial enterprises, and as managing agents f or businesses they 
thems l v e s established . The rate of expansion of the houses became 
less spectacular as a res ult, but the businesses were more s t rongly 
pla ed to survive the periodic commerc ial crises exper i enced . 3 
In the 1870s Jardine Matheson and the~ group established 
lo al shi pp ings r v ices with themselves as managing agents , The s e 
lines, respect iv 1 Indo China Steam Nav igation and China Nav i ga= 
1i2E, , were long the dominant sh i pp ing enterprises in the Ch ines e 
coastal and r iver trade . Jardine Matheson was a lso associated with 
the establishment of Hong Kong Fire Ins urance in 1866, Hong Kong 
and Kowloon Whar f and Godown in 1886, and later, ' Star ' Ferry and 
Hong Kong Tramways, Bu t t er fi eld and Swires t up Taikoo Sugar in 
1881 and Taikoo Docks . In their investment in these enterprises 
the merchant houses acted i r t ually as pr i vate bankers . 
1 
2 
3 
' A Hundred Y ars of Ta ikoo ' , ~' 5 J anuar y 1967. 
Ibid 0 
These br e f comm nts s uppor t the assessm nt of M. Greenburg, op. 
cit . , p . 174 : 'The Ag n y House was .. , a many=s i ded ed ifice . It was 
a struc ur well able to adapt its lf toe ery line of growth, 
every avenue of r mun ration which the China trade offered; and yet 
apable of bar i ng the stress of the xt r me tension which the 
" opening" of China was t o i nvo lv .' 
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A Companies Ordinanc e was introduced in Hong Kong in 1865. 
Public transactions in shares, und rtak n from an early stage, were 
formalised in 1891 with th establishment of 'The Association of 
Stockbrokers in Hong Kong ' . A second exchange was organised in 1921 
as the 'Hong Kong Sharebrokers ' As sociat ion ' . The two exchang s 
were merged in 1947 . 
The prewar public share lis t included a range of firms con-
nected with the entrepot economy~ mainly banking, insurance, 
shipping and wharf companies - a rope factory, electricity com-
panies, cement works, and several land and investment companies. 
In the share boom of the late 1880s, a number of companies engaging 
in mining and plantation activities in South East Asia were floated, 
but many of these were later wound up, The market value of shares 
listed on the two stock exchanges rose from $40 million in 1879 and 
$64 million in 1889 to $150 million in 1935. 1 
Marine insurance was for some time the main insurance business 
transacted, Several of the agency houses formed their own insurance 
companies. In some cases these were later launched as separate con~ 
cerns , On occasion, refusal to insure was used to keep out trading 
competitors . 2 The merchant houses were also the local agents for 
many European insurance companies. Until the Chinese Government 
restr i cted the activities of foreign insurance companies in 1935, 
the Hong Kong insurance compani es wrote considerable business in 
China , 
Most utility companies were formed with British capital, Some, 
f or example gas (1861) and telephones (1887), were subsidiaries of 
companies providing similar services in Britain. The locally-based 
British agency houses set up several utility companies, including 
the 'Star'Ferry and Hong Kong Tramways (1904). In other utilities, 
1 
Sources: 'Extracts from a Repor t, .. by Sir S , William Des Voeux .. . ', 
p,153, and Report of the Corrnnittee ... Appointed to Enquire into the 
Causes and Effects of the Present Trade Depression ... , p , 91. 
2 
N.A. Ri gg, 'Marin Insurance in Hong Kong ' , The Hong Kong Manager, 
March/April 1966, p.24 . 
c apital was subscr1.b d by Br itish res i dents and m r hants li ing 
and trading in the East = for exampl the el c t r i c ity supply om-
pani es 1889 and 1903) and the Pea t ramway 1888) . S veral of 
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these cone r ns became public companies, lit d on the l ocal stock 
exchange . The wac r supp l y , Post Office and railway were provided 
by the Gov rnm nt. Chines =owned business s establish d the motor 
'buss r vices and one of the t wo fe rry s e r vi c s . 
Un f ortunate ly, ver y little information i s available on the 
establishment and growth of Chinese business es in Hong Kong , 
Ch inese t rad ers moved to Hong Kong soon a fte r the Colony's establ i s h= 
ment . The continuing r est r ictions on travel in China by oreigners 
and the difficulties of the Chinese languag and dialects gave the 
Hong Kong Chines e merchant s an impor tant ro l e to play as middlemen. 
They sold produce f rom all par ts of China to the for eign agency 
houses and pur ha ed in Hong Kong Western goods f or sale to dealers 
and sh opkeepers in the interior . 
The rap i d expansion of t he overseas Chinese communities a fter 
the gold r us hes of North America and Austral i a, by creating a de = 
mand fo r Chinese=s tyle goods which the established merchant houses 
could not adequately service, encouraged the growth of Chinese 
trading bus inesses in Hong Kong . By 1876 there were 215 larger 
Chinese t rad ing nterpr ises and 287 traders; in 1881 these had 
increas d to 395 and 2,377 respect ive l y , and the Governor reported 
that 'Chines warehouses, shops and t emporary residences are becom-
ing more numerous 1 v r y year ' About the same time, many small 
manufacturing businesses were set up by immigrant Chinese, produc = 
ing a vari t y of proces s d f oods and Chines e =style goods, The 
economic sue ss o f o erseas Chinese famili es l ed to the es tablish-
ment in Hong Kong of several large trading fi r ms , including Win__g_Qg, 
Sincer , and ~. all of which were inanced by Chinese living in 
1 
'Extra t rom a Di pa tch f rom Sir John Pope Henness y t o the Earl 
of Carnarvon ... Relating o the Economic Progress of t he Chines 1 
1881, reprint d in G.B. Endacott (ed.), op. it. , pp , 143 , 147. 
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1 Australia and N w Z a land . Th us ua l orm of Chin se busin ss 
t . 1 t · th · 1 h ' 2 b f n erpr1se was or a ong 1m e .am1 y par ners 1p, ut rom 
t h turn of the entury larg r Chinese~mAmed business s came 
r egularly to be organi sed on similar l i n s t o West er n nterpr i s es . 
The in l u f apit a l and immigrants rom China a ter the 
Re oluti n of 1911 ur c er increas ed t he number of Chines e businesses 
in the Co lony. At the sam time, the re was a considerable invest= 
ment in Hong Kong real state , The in low of funds continued i n 
the following two decades . A Government Connnittee est imated tha t 
by 1934 $50 mi ll ion were invested in Chines =owned factories and 
3 industry in Hong Kong . 
Government Finance 
The publ ic f inan e sys tem of the entrep ot economy was a s imple 
one, modell ed on, and appropr iat t o, the needs of a Colon f ounded 
' not with a v iew to olonisat i on , but f or dip l omati c , connnercial 
d 1 0 4 an mi .itary purp os s . The Government accep ed respons ibility 
fo r law, order and a sound administration and a minimum of public 
works , and a knowl dged tha t it shoul d finance these serv ices with 
1 
2 
A. Ma millan, Seaports of the Far East, London, 1923, pp . 396~8 . 
In 1880 or 1881 the Chamber of Commerc e proposed that the Govern= 
ment requ i r the registration o all sleeping partners in Chinese 
hous es or bus inesses . The Chinese community ' pointed out that the 
Chinese s ystem of trad ng would be completely ups et by it - that 
there i s an xtraordinar y net =work of investments in this Co lony , 
as n any other comm.unit o Chines e, and chat i t would i nterfere 
seriously w th Chinese trade, and, in act, t end to preven t the 
i nflux of Ch nese into the Colony ' . ' E t racts f rom a s peech by the 
Gov rnor, Sir John Pope Henness y •.. ' , p . 149 . The suggestion was 
not adopted , 
3 
Repor t o the omm t tee ••• App oi nted t o Enguir e i nto t he Causes 
and Ef e c ts of t he Present Trade Depression, ., , p , 87 . 
4 
Lord tanl ey t o Si r Henry Pott i nger , 3 J une 1848, quoted in 
G.B. Endacott , Go er_nment and P ople of Hong Kong , 1841 =1962, Hong 
Kon · Universi.ty Pr ss, 19 64-, p ,v. Report of the Connn ttee, 1 , 
App oin t d to Engui r e i.n to the Caus es and E .fee ts of the Present 
Trade Depress ion •• 8 , p . 87 , noted tha t the Hong Kong Government 
' ha been ont n t t o pro i de se urity and ound administration and, 
for the r s , to ad op t a laissez fai r a ttitude t owards trade and 
indus t r y gen ral ly v. Ex ep tionally, in 1925 the Government lent 
$1 . 6 million to mer hants and trad rs to help them meet the dis = 
r upt ons caus d by the boy ott of Hong Kong . 
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as ligh t a urdeu tax sand charges a s possibl . The Gov rn~ 
m nt 9 s role i n th e onomy was s ric 1/ a laiss ez fa i re one, and 
he Colon vs f i nance in thi s per i od a r an almost classic example 
of t he prewar at t i tudes to public finance 1n the Brit ish colonial 
. 1 
empir . 
The local Gover nment ex r ised l it tle inic.ia i ve i.n f i nancial 
matt r s" The annual stimat sand amendments t o them, and all 
proposals to al ter the r venue laws or rais e a Government loan, had 
irs t to be appro e d by the Se retary of State, and r commendations 
of the Colonial Government were not infrequently var i ed or re used . 2 
Th British Government requ ired Hong Kong = as it did all coloni es 
other than th sma lles t and poorest = to be inancially independent 
f rom an early tage . The Br i tish contribution t o the cost of the 
administration cased · n 1854 . 3 Further, from 1864 Hong Kong was 
charg d with a pare of the cost of c.he militar y garri son s tat ioned 
there , There was r equ.ent disagreemen t on the shar e of t he de ence 
costs which the oca l Government had to mee t . The ac tual division 
appears to have b en <let r mined mor e by the t ate o f the Hong Kong 
inances than on an other basi s . 4 
There wa connnon a ccep tance t ha t the Colony had a ver l imi ted 
tax capac ity: with no local mining, agriculture or i ndustry to 
carr the tax burden , ny but a ve r y low 1 el of taxes and charges 
ould drive entrepot trade to ot her ports on the China coast . Hong 
Kong was describe d or ta able purposes as ' merely one l arge city 
which li ·es b its .ntrepot trade •.. it s e s probable that t he 
taxes are ab out as eavy a is pedi.ent 
1 
See D ,W. Stamm r, ' Br ti sh Col nial Publ 
Economic Studie~, J une 1967. 
2 
5 
n a trade entrepot '. 
nance ' , Social and 
See, fo r 
171. 
ampl , G.B. nda ott , Gov r nmen and P ople •.. , pp .115 , 
3 
Th U.K. Government made small grants to the Hong Kong Government 
in 1910 and 1 1.1 to co pensate it f or the de r ease in pi um rev nue, 
whi. h r sul t d r m t I mper ial Go rnment ' s d c is ion c.o discourage 
us e of the dru 
4 
5 
Compare w th L ,A, Mills, op , it . , p .430 . 
Ibid , , pp , 4,22=3 , 
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Equally strong wa s the attitud that trad t ax s w re inappropr i a te. 
A p titian of mer chants and traders , for example , submitted tha t the 
Colony' s pros per ity ' can bes t be maintai ned by th unr mitting 
xertions ands .lf=sa rifice of your petitioners and the valuable 
oop ration and support of th Chines and only by th continuance 
of Hong Kon g as a .r 1 port'. Much l a te r , a Gov r nment=estab l ished 
Committ es t ated 9 it i s obvious that we c annot r ecommend any alt ra = 
2 ti.on in the free port s t a tus o f the Colony ' . I ncome taxes were 
considered i nappropria te because of the ' difficulties of c ollection 
3 
and of obtaini ng correct r etur ns'. Direc t t axe s on income were 
introduced fi r st i n 1940 , as a temporar y wartime measure .4 The 
st r uc ture of Government revenue over the per iod i s outlined in 
Tab l e 2,1. 
Rats ('assess ed taxes ' ) were fi r st introduc ed in 1843 . The i r 
continued impor t ance as a ma ins tay of Gov ernment revenue was seen 
as appropr iate given the muni c i pal character of much of the publ i c 
e xpenditur e . Stamp dutie s we r e also intr oduced in 1843 . The opium 
monopoly (or 'far m') was fi rs t sold in 1845. In the ear l y 1900s it 
contributed about one ~third of the Gover nment ' s r evenue . Later, 
the official po l i y of dis couraging opium cons umption reduced t hi s 
sour ce of r ev enue t o ins ignificanc e . Al l land was re t a i ned as 
Crown l and , and receip t s f rom the auc tion of leas es and crown rents 
wer e , th roughout t he period, an important , though var able,sour c e 
5 
of r e enue . I mport duties were f i r s t levied on liquor i n 1911 , 
and l a te r on tobacco , By the l a te 1930s thes e duties provided a 
quar ter of the public revenue . 
1 
Pe tition o th Merchants, Banker s ... t o the Hous e of Commons, 
June 1894, cited G. B. Endacot t (ed . ) , op , cit , , pp , 274=5 , 
2 
Re port of the onnnittee •.. Appointed to Enqui r e into the Caus es 
and Eff ects of the Present Trade Depression .. . , p . 73 . 
3 
Ibid . , p , 95. 
4 
See Re por t o the War Revenue Committee , Hong Kong Gover nment 
Pr int r, 1940. 
5 
For example, Gov rnme nt re eipt rom the s a l e of land lease s 
incr eased f rom 1.6 p r c nt of r evenue i n 1919 t o 14 . 2 per cent of 
r venue i n 1923 . 
Table 2.1 
GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 
Selec ted Years 1880 to 1937 
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1880 1890 1900 1911 1920 1930 193 7 
Revenue 
Duties 
Rates 20 
Stamp duty 12 
Opium monopoly 19 
R nt of Gov rnment land 
and property 18 
Land sa les 1) 
Other (fees, licences, etc) 30) 
Total 100 
Expenditure 
21 
9 
24 
15 
35 
100 
Public debt 5 
Pens ions 3 3 
Education 3 4 
Medical 4 4 
Publ i c works department ) 
and recurrent 37 ) 5 Public works, non- ) 
14 
11 
9 
12 
19 
35 
100 
4 
5 
2 
3 
6 
Per cent 
19 
11 
16 
11 
4 
39 
100 
4 
4 
3 
3 
11 
10 
15 
9 
29 
7 
4 
26 
100 
5 
2 
4 
2 
9 
16 
13 
9 
3 
5 
10 
46 
100 
6 
4 
6 
4 
13 
23 
n . a . 
n . a. 
n.a . 
5 
2 
n .a. 
100 
4 
8 
6 
6 
13 
recurrent ) 21 13 11 18 10 5 
Militar y 11 7 18 20 19 14 17 
Other 58 51 49 44 41 43 41 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
-----------------....;;;..;~_...c;...;~ 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
1.1 
0.9 
2.0 
1. 9 
$ million 
4 .2 
3 .6 
7 . 5 
7.1 
Source ~ Hong Kong Blue Book, various numbers . 
14 . 7 
14 .5 
27.8 
28.1 
33 .2 
32,1 
The pa ttern of Government expenditure varied relat ively little 
over the per iod (see Table 2.1). A large par t , usual ly one~quarter 
to one-fifth, of Government spending was allocated to administra-
tion.1 The de fence contribution was regularly one-six th to one - fifth 
of Government expend itur e. Public works spending - on roads, 
1 · 2 d · d 11 1 rec amations, rainage, water storage, an on a sma er sea e, 
schools and hospitals= tended to var y with the Colony' s prosper ity , 
3 
and was espec ially large in the boom periods of the 1880s and 1920s. 
1 
The depar tmental str ucture of the Government administration ic 
outlined in L .A . Mills, op. c i t . , Chapter XII and G. B. Endaco tt , 
Government and P ople ., ., Chapte r X. 
2 
Many r eclamations were carr ied out and financed by pr iva te busi -
ness es , The largest prewar reclamat i on was the Kowl oon Bay project, 
organised by a Chinese syndicate. Chiu Tze Nang, op. cit., pp,96 -7 . 
3 
See L. A. Mills, op. cit. , p .42 6 and G.B. Endacot t , Governmen t and 
Pe op 1 e . . . , p . 113 . 
There are several reasons for t he relatively small spending on 
social services . One, of course, was the Government's laissez 
faire outlook , Hong Kong was established simply as a trading 
colony, and had virtually no indigenous population , Immigrants 
were attracted to the Colony as a place in which to trade and 
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reside in conditions of peace and security . In these circumstances, 
the Government probably accepted even less respons ib ili ty to pro-
vide health and education services than most colonial governments 
of the period , The migratory nature of the population and the 
f reedom with which Chinese could move into and out of Hong Kong 
further discouraged Government spending on social services: it was 
believed that unless the Government took into account 'the condi -
tions which apply in the rest of the economic area of which Hong 
1 Kong is a part' when determining expenditure on health and educa-
tion, further migration would take place and prevent any permanent 
improvement to the social services. It was claimed, too, that the 
'small and inelastic revenue 12 severely restricted Government 
responsibili ty in these fi elds . 
Throughout the period, the public debt was a very light one . 
The Government ' s policy was that of 'refusing to borrow save in a 
few exceptional cases and of incurring only as much expenditure as 
. I 3 1 it could pay out of current revenue . The ear iest Government 
borrowing was a small loan granted by the Hongkong Bank in 1866. 
A sterling loan of £200,000 was raised in 1886 to finance public 
works, A similar loan was raised in 1893, partly to finance further 
public works and partly to redeem the earlier debt . A public works 
loan of $4.9 million at 6 per cent was raised locally in 1927. In 
1934 a furtherlocal issue of securities was arranged, f or $14 
million at 3\ per c nt
1
• In 1938 the publi c debt amoun ted to only 
1 
Repor t of the Committee ... Appointed to Enquire into the Causes 
and Effects of the Present Trade Depression .. . , p.7 4. For example, 
it was claimed that 'a considerable part of the population of 
Kwangtung Province' made use of Hong Kong hospitals. L.A. Mills, 
Op. Cit. , p, 385 , 
2 3 
L.A. Mills, op -.. . cit . , p,383 . Ibid., p .430. 
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$1 6 . 6 million ( the equivalent o f less than six month ' s revenue). 
Th i s sma l l r l i ance on borrowing meant , of course, t hat most publi c 
works w re financ d f rom current r venue . There was occasional 
critic ism of this policy f rom me rchant interests. 1 
The trend i n Government revenue over the per iod 1861 to 1940 
i s shown in Chart 2 . 2 . The level of revenue, of cour se , var i ed 
with the Colony' s pros perity , but fluc tuations were milder than 
would have been the case had income and trade taxes been more im= 
por tant . As it was the Gover nment's intent ion to build up a liquid 
res erve f rom which it cou ld finance continuing cormnitmen t s, such 
as pens ions, in the event of a f al l i n revenue, public expenditure 
was usually kept a little below Government rece i pts . Balance was 
ma int a ined i n per iods of slump by 'making the appropriation f or 
2 Public Works Extraord inar y disproportionately small ' and by re -
trenchments in the civil serv ices . 3 In the 1930s depress ion , 
these adjustments were insufficient and the Gover nment was f orced 
to find addit iona l r evenue by increasing ra t es f rom 13 to 17 per 
cent) and by introd ucing taxes on motor fuel and amusements . 
The variation in silver pr i ces a ffected Government expenditure 
mor e than revenue . As a significant portion of Government salary 
and pension payments had a fixed s terl ing va lue, the burden of 
these payments increased as the exchange rate depreciated . Simi= 
larly, but of less importance, the cost of serv icing the public 
debt increased. 
There were, then, several important development s i n the 
structure o f the financial system over the period of the entrepot 
ec onomy , The agency houses lost their early dominant position and 
aried their operations qui te fundamentally in the 1870s . The ex-
change banks were fi rmly established by the la te 1860s. The 
1 
See Hong Kong General Chamber of Conunerce, History 1861 - 1961, 
p . 32 , 
2 
Report of the Connnittee,.,Appointed to Enquire into the Causes 
and Effects of the Present Trade Depression ... , p . 94 . 
3 
Retrenchment comm ttees were establ i shed in 1893 and 1931 , 
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Chinese - owned inancial enterprises which emerged f rom the 1880s 
had a complementar y r a ther than a compe titive relationshi p with the 
Western institutions . The currency system for a long time f ollowed 
that of China, but there were some developments in the method of 
issuing banknotes . These several changes were assoc i ated with the 
increased vo lume of trade and the growing complexity of the t rade 
s ys tem. 
The financ i al sys tem was directed towards serv icing the entrepot 
t rade . The banks were primarily exchange banks. The considerable 
cap ita l amass ed by the several leading agency houses was used 
further t o expand the entrepot trade and to establish services, 
s uch as ins urance and dockyards, connected with this t rade . The 
Government accep ted the necessity of a low level of taxes and 
charges . The f inancial system gave the Colony a close connection 
with Europe, South Eas t Asia and= especially = China . Because of 
the und veloped financial system of China, many of the financial 
facilities of Hong Kong banknotes, exchange banking, insurance 
services, etc . = had to be provided fo r a much wider area than the 
Colony itself . 
It i s too simple to suggest that the financ i al s ystem was al = 
t ogether a passive agent in the development of the ent repot port . 
The availabil i ty in Hong Kong of a range of fi nancial and connner = 
cial serv ices and the light burden of Government taxes cer tainly 
at tracted addit ional trade to the Colony. Entrepot trade, poss ibly 
mor e than other ec onomic activities, is quickly attracted to an 
ar a which provides the supporting services and facilities. The 
currency di sruptions caused by the silver price variati ons and the 
banknote premium complicated the Colony's role as an entrepot; i n 
the ormer case, though , the fact that the most important bank in 
the Colony was i self capital i s ed in silver, considerably red uced 
the di ffi culti s . 
Chapter 3 
THE CURRENCY SYSTEM AND THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETSl 
The Establishment of the Present Currency System 
The dev elopment of the currency system until 1935 was outlined 
in the previous Chapter. The currency at the start of 1935 was 
,. siJver- based , and the Colony's close commercial relationship with 
China had prevented the adoption of any scheme for currency reform 
while Chinese currency remained linked with silver . As a r e sult , 
currency development in Hong Kong had not followed that of the 
majority of British Colonies, where, under what is usual ly termed 
the currency board system or the colonial sterling exchange standard, 
colonia l c urrencies were issued exclusively, and at a fixed exchange 
rate, against the sale of sterling to the currency authorities, and 
a 100 per cent sterling reserve was held against the note and coin 
issue to ens ure that the colonial currency remained fully conve rt -
"bl . 1 · 2 1 e into ster 1ng . 
The final break with silver-based currencies was forced on 
b oth China and Hon g Kong by the enormous outflow of silver coin and 
bull ion which took place after 1932, especially in 1934 and 1935 
when the United States Silver Purchase Act caused an increase in 
the price of si l ver on world markets . Uncertainty over the future 
price of silver led to heavy speculation, and in 1935 the sterling-
Hong Kong dol la r rate rose from 1/8\ in January to 2/6 in April , 
1 
The two aspects of the financial system are discussed in one 
chapte r because , under the type of currency mechanism employed , the 
issu of currency and its external convertibility are interrelated . 
2 
There is a very large literature on the topic of the colonial 
sterling ex change standard. The more important references are 
given in E . Nevin , Capital Funds in Underdeveloped Countries , 
London : Macmillan, 1963, p . 5 . 
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and fell to a l ittle over 1/3 in November. These luctuations 
adversely affected trade and exc hange with countries whose curren-
cies were not silver - ba sed, but it was a mor immedia te local 
problem - the severe shortage of currency which resulted from the 
export of silver coin and bullion when world silver prices were 
high - which led to the f inal abandonment of the silv r standard 
both in Ch ina and Hong Kong. In November 1935 the Chinese Govern-
ment announced that a managed paper currency supported by an exchange 
fund was to be e stablished . Similar changes were announced in Hong 
Kong a few days later. 
In the f ollowing three years, the managed paper currency in 
Hong Kong was superseded by a de facto colonial sterling exchange 
standard, which gave the Hong Kong dollar a fixed sterling value, 
and automatic convertibility into sterling . As much of the present 
currency sy stem results from Ordinances introduced and agreements 
made between 1935 and 1939, the currency developments of this per iod 
are discussed in some detail . The currency reform took place in 
thr ee stages: the first overcame the shortage of one do l lar currency; 
in the second stage banknotes were declared legal tender and an 
Exchange Fund was established to regulate the backing to this bank-
note issue ; and i n the third period the currency system was made to 
operate on largely automatic- lines . 
The fi rs t measures were intended simply to meet the problem of 
insufficient currency . Exports of silver coin and bullion were 
prohibited , a nd the Government issued a one dollar note which was 
made unlimited legal t ender . The Ordinance established a '$ Note 
Security Fund' i n which the backing to the one dollar note issue 
1 
shall be held on deposit at one or more banks in the 
Colony and shall be available for withdrawal from circula-
tion of such portion of the issue of the said currency 
notes as the Tre a surer ma y from time to tim deem it 
desi r able to withdraw : provided that a portion of the 
fund may lie temporarily invested at the discre t ion of 
the Treasurer . l 
Dollar Currency Notes Ordinance , 1935, s . 4 . 
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A further Ordinanc required the public to surrender its holdings 
of silver coin and bullion. Later, silver coins were demone t ised. 
The second stage of the currency reform began in December 
1935 when the 'lawfully issued ' banknotes of the three note issuing 
b k d 1 d 1 l t d f 1 .. d 1 ans were ec are ega en er or un imite amounts. There was 
no difficulty, of course, in gaining pub lic acceptance of banknotes 
as legal tender - the note issues of the three banks , the Hongkong 
Bank, the Cha r tered Bank and the Mercantile Bank, had been readily 
accepted by the public for some time, even in preference to silver 
2 
coin when the latter was legal tender 
The Government at the same time established an 'Exchange Fund', 
under the control o f the Colonial Treasurer, 3 to regulate the ex-
ternal value o f the banknote issue . The note issuing banks were 
required to surrender their silver coin and bullion holdings to the 
Exchange Fund i n return for 'certificates of indebtedness' (a non-
interest - bearing liab ility of the Exchange Fund, de nominated in 
Hong Kong dol lars) at a value determined by the Exchange Fund . The 
three banks were au t horised to continue issuing banknotes under the 
same provisions as before - i.e . in accordance with their relevant 
Charter or Ordinance - except that certificates of indebtedness 
were to be held instead o f silver. (The regulations governing the 
Banks' note issue are summar·ised later; the effect of the new 
Ordinance was basically that the banks could issue further bank-
notes so long as they f irst obtained the equivalent value of 
certificates of indebtedness from the Exchange Fund.) The Fund was 
l 
Banknotes were not declared legal tender for the bank of issue. 
Thus the shareholders of the Hongkong Bank, who until 1957 carried 
an unlimited liability for that Bank 's note issue, could have been 
called on to meet their liability for the Bank's outstanding bank-
notes in the note issue of the Chartered and Mercantile Banks and 
in Government-issued currency . 
2 
See above, pp.30- 2 , 
3 
An Exchange Fund Advisory Committee was established to assist the 
Treasurer in the administration of the Fund. In practice, the 
Committee has consisted of the Colonial Treasurer (since 1950 the 
Financial Secretary) as Chairman , and a senior member of each of 
the note issuing banks. 
au t h orise d to issu a ddit i onal certi f icates of ind ebted n ss to h 
n ote issuin g banks a ga inst oreign e ·chang , prec ious m ta l s and 
Hong Kong bank deposits . There was n o statuto r y requireme nt hat 
certificat s of indebtedness , and thus the banknote issue, be 
backed even to a minimum proportion by foreign ex change . Th 
Ex change Fund was g i v en the right to fix the exchange rate at 
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which it so l d c ertificates of indebtedness to the banks i n ex change 
f or f oreign currencies or precious metals, and t he Fund was em-
powered t o borrow from the Colony's general r e venue balance and the 
public to provid e it with, respectively, st e rling and local currency. 
The re was no requirement that the Fund buy back its certificates o f 
indebtedness in any particular foreign currency o r at a f i xed value , 
and the Treasurer was authorised to call in certificates of indebted-
ness f or redemption at his discretion . 
The powers g i ven to the Exchange Fund suggest the Government 
saw the need for an ex change equalisation fu nd which would opera t e 
in the Co l ony's f ore i gn exchange market to regulate the exchange 
1 
rate o f the Ho n g Kong dollar . The Fund 'was fully empowered to 
act as . .. an equalisation fund. It did not do so , but the Colonial 
authorities were uncer tain as to the course of events, and we r e 
2 prepared f or any pressure on the e x changes' . 
One o f the f i rst acts of the Exchange Fund was to sell in 
London, through the Hongkong Bank , the silver it acquired from the 
note issuing banks and the public . The procee ds were investe d in 
sterling deposits a nd securities of varying degrees of liquidity , 
and, because a sizeable pr ofit (of about £1 million ) was e arned on 
the transactions , the Exchange Fund had from a very early date a 
surplus o f ster l ing assets over its certificates of indebtedness 
liab i l i ties. With these sterling balances , the Exchange Fund was 
1 
It is f or th is reason that the title 'Ex change Fund ' was adopted 
and not , as was more common in the Co l onies , ' Currency Fund ' . 
2 
F . H . H, King , Mon yin British East Asia , Colonial Res arch Publi-
cation No . 19 , London : H . M. S . O., 1957, p . 108. Although now dated 
in one or two as p cs, this publication rewards care f ul s ud y . 
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wi thout di fficulty ab le to maintain a stable exchange value for the 
Hong Kong dollar from an early stag • The Fund did no need t o 
exerc ise its right t o borrow from the Colony' s reserves or make a 
public issue of securities. The assets and l iabi lit i es of the 
Ex change Fund for the period 1937 to 1940, and the Hong Kong dollar-
sterling ex change rate , 1935 to 1940 , are shown i n Table 3 .1 and 
3 , 2 . At first, there was also a stable exchange rate between the 
Hong Kong dollar and the Chinese yuan , but after 1938 the Sino-
Japanese war resulted in a progressively weaker Chinese currency . 
Table 3 .1 
EXCHANGE FUND: ASSETS AND LIAB I LITIES , 19 37 TO 1940 
($ million) 
30 June 
1937 
31 Dec. 
1937 
31 Dec . 
1938 
31 Dec . 
1939 
31 Dec . 
1940 
Certificates of in-
debtedness 153 182 191 176 182 
Sterling securities 106 125 152 147 151 
Cash and deposi t at 
call in London 61 72 56 53 58 
Silve r 2 0 0 0 0 
169 197 209 200 210 
Source : C.F . Joseph Tom, The Entrepot Trade and the Monetary 
Standards of Hong Kong 1842-1 941 , Hong Kong : K. Weiss , 
1964, p . 77. 
. Table 3.2 
HONG KONG DOLLAR- STERLING EXCHANGE RATE, 1935 TO 1940 
(pence per Hong Kong do llar) 
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 
High 2/6 1;:J 8 1 ;212 32 1121 8 1121 8 1;21 8 
Low 1/~ 8 1;21 4 1/22.. 8 1;212 32 1;212 32 1;i2
5 
32 
Source : as for Tab l e 3 . 1 above, Appendix 14. 
The final divorce of the two currencies , both in value and method of 
issue, occurred in 1939 , and passed virtually unnoticed , suggesting 
that it ma y not have been necessary f or the Colony t o have adhered 
so l ong to the practice of basing i t s currency arrangements on tho se 
fol lowed in China. 
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Although it wa s inte nd ed tha t ' a ny prof i t or l oss arising 
fr om the operat ion of t he Fund wi ll be f or t he Gove r nme n 's ac coun , l 
the r e was no provision i n the Ordinance f or au tomat i ca l t r ans f ex -
i ng to the Gove rnment's general r evenue or t o any other us e the 
e cess of a s se ts over ce r ti f i ca te s of i ndebtedne s s . Fr om the prof i t 
received on the initial sale of s ilve r a nd from the r e t ent ion of 
interest earnings , a surplus in the Ex change Fund wa s qu i ck l y 
built up . A contribution of £200 , 000 was made to Br itish war 
ex penditure in 1940 fr om the accumulat ed surplus . 
A b r ie f account of the regulations governing the note issue of 
the thr ee banks was given in the prev ious Chap te r . I t is usefu l to 
show how these con t r o l s were affe cted by t he r equirement t ha t 
certifica t es of i ndeb t edness and not silver were to be he l d aga i ns t 
the note issue . 
The Hongko ng Ba nk's note is sue was divided into a n 'author is ed ' 
a nd 'excess ' issue. The former was l imi t ed to $30 mi l lion, a ga i nst 
which t he Bank had to hold appr oved sterl ing se cur i t i e s or cert i f i -
ca t es of indebt edne ss to the value of $23 . 33 mi ll ion ( thu s a 
f iduciary is sue of $6. 67 million was pe rmitted) . The ex cess not e 
issue - any issue abov e $30 mil l ion - had to be fully ba cked by 
cer tificates of i ndeb t edness. The Bank ' s not e is sue in 1935 already 
considerab ly ex ceeded its authoris ed issue. Af ter t he 1935 currency 
r e f orm the fi r st $8 million of the banknote issue of the Char t e r ed 
Bank had to be one - third backed with sterling securities or cert ifi-
cates of indebtedness (the remaining two - thirds could be issued as 
f iduciary curr ency ) . The banknote issue f rom $8 mi l lion to $30 
mi l lion had to be f u l l y backed by sterling securities or cer t ificates 
o f indebtedness , and certificates of indebtedness w re requ ired 
against any not issue in excess of $30 million. However , on -
t hird of the total currency backing had to be in t h f or m of 
cer tificates of indebtedness. The Mer can il Bank was pe r mit ted 
1 
Att rney- ener al , 1935, quoted Financia l Secretar , b egislati 
.£2.!:!_gcil De bat s, Hong Kong Government Prin er , 1. 963 , p . 303 . 
to issue notes up to the value of its paid up capital , provided 
these we r e backed either 105 per cent by st rl ing s ecurities or 
100 per cent by certificates of indebtedness or some combination 
of these two . All three banks had to pay printing ex penses and a 
small stamp duty on that part of their note issue not secured by 
certificates of indebtedness. 
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In the third stage of the currency reform, the Exchange Fund 
v irtually surrendered its potential for independent action , and 
the Hong Kong currency system became more nearly a conventional 
colonial sterling exchange standard. In an 'informal but strictly 
honoured arrangement' 1 wit h the note issuing banks the Exchange 
Fund agreed to issue and redeem certificates of indebtedness in 
unlimited amounts with the note issuing banks i n exchange for 
sterling within the range l/2i! and 1/3. In return, the note 
issuing banks undertook to exchange sterling and Hong Kong dollars 
25 1 
on the interbank market within the limits of 1/232 and 1/332. 
7 These rates were later narrowed to, respectively, 1/28 and 1/3 , 
27 1 
and 1/232 and 1/332 . In dealings with the public the rate could 
move an additional f2d in either direction. These agreements were 
maintained until November 1967 , when , following sterling devaluation, 
a similar spread around an exchange rate of 1/4~ to the Hong Kong 
dol lar was adopted. The agreements were informal, bu t in September 
1939, after operating for some time, they were made pub lic by the 
Government, 'with the intimation that no change was intended'. 2 
One can only speculate on why this quick transformation to 
someth ing like a conventional sterling exchange standard was made. 
To a certain extent , the currency developments were similar to 
those which occurred in the United Kingdom about the same time : 
the return to a virtually fixed exchange rate from a floating rate 
control l ed by the Exchang Equalisation Fund. And , the increasing 
1 
Anonymous (later dislocsed to be Sydney Caine), Mon tary Systems 
of the Colonies, published by The Banker, 1948, p .23 . 
2 
Ibid. 
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weakness o f the managed Chinese currency and the growth of the 
Colony's n o n-China trad e made the continued association wi h Chins 
currency arrangements seem less desirable and necessary . Bu t here 
were other inf luences . Certainly , the colonial string e change 
standard had shown i t self to be a reliable and administra tively e asy 
way of guaranteeing the external value and conve r t ibili ty of a 
colonial currency , and it is probable that many of the civil servants 
and bankers responsible for the operation of the Hong Kong Ex change 
Fund would have had ex perience with currency funds in other Colonies. 
Also important was the fact that at a very early stage the Exchange 
Fund acquired ( from the sale of the silver received from the note 
issuing banks and the public) sufficient sterling fully to back its 
cert i f icates of indebtedness liabilities . Once this ste rling reserve 
had been built up, the task of maintaining the exchange value of the 
existing note issue became a simple one and the Exchange Fund was i n 
a position to enter into the agreements which have been described . 
Thus, within four years of the abandonment of the silver 
standard, Hong Kong currency was issued in a similar way to currency 
in other Colonies . With the exception of the one dollar notes and 
subsidiary notes and coins, all currency was fully secured by 
sterling deposits and investments, Hong Kong currency could alway s 
be acquired in ex change for -sterling , and local banknotes were con-
vertible into sterling without limit at a fixed exchange rate . The 
several differences between the Hong Kong currency system and the 
conventional currency board were not fundamental : commercial banks 
and not currency conunissioners continued to issue the greater part 
of the total currency supply, the sterling backing to the banknote 
issue was indirect (the sterling assets of the E change Fund were 
held against th Fund's certificate of indebtedness liabilities, and 
not the note issue itself), and only the note issuing b anks had 
d . h . l 1rect ac c ess to the currency aut or ity. 
1 
As it frequ ntly became the standard practice in other colonial 
currency areas £or one or two of the larger banks to act as a funnel 
be tween the currency author ities and the publ ic and smaller banks , 
th Hong Kong currency system differed little in this regard, 
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Lega Te nder i n Postwar Hong Kong 
(a) The ' Duress ' Not Issue . The re - intr oduct i on i n Hong 
Kong of a sterl i ng-backe d currency was discuss ed on a number of 
occasions during the ar at meetings between the Colonia l Of f ice , 
the Brit i sh Treasury and t he Hongkong Bank . The decisi n was tak n 
to re - establ ish a stab e cur rency, backed by, and convert i b e i nt o , 
sterling at he same r ate of approx imately 1 /3 as ruled before the 
war . To a considerable extent, t h i s decision could be imp lemented 
with little diff icu lty: the ster l i ng assets of the Exchange Fund 
remained i ntact duri ng the war, and it was a simple ma t ter again 
to require that any increase i n the banks' not e issue be made only 
against the prior sale of sterling to the Exchange Fund . The dif-
ficul t y of immedia tely re -establishing a currency which was fully 
backed by sterling arose because the Japanese military authority 
had pla ced in cir cu ation $121. 9 million worth of un issued bank-
notes fr om the vau lts of the three note iss u ing banks (thes e note s 
became known a s t he ' duress ' note issue) . As these currency notes 
were not backed by cert i f icates of i ndebtedne ss , they were not 
legal tender under the Colony' s laws . During and immediately a ft er 
the war the duress notes cir cula t ed at a discount. Mainly t o ensu r e 
tha t l ocal and f oreign confidence in the Hong Kong dol l ar wa s main-
tained , it wa s decided to declare the duress no te s legal tender. 
1 
After discussions between the note iss u ing ba nks and the Governm nt 
a scheme was accepted whereby the necessary certificates of indeb ted -
ness were issued to the banks, $16 million worth of sterl ing was 
pa id by the banks i nto the Exchange Fund , and the rema i n i ng def icit 
of sterling in the account s of the Exchange Fund was t o be gradua lly 
provided from the Fund's prof its . In 1953 the Gove r nment announced 
that the s terl ing assets in t he Exchange Fund again equalled the 
value of cer t ifica · s of i nde b tedness ou s t anding. 
1 
I n these dis cus sions the banks c la imed tha t they should have been 
warn d by the ove nment to destroy un issued notes, wh i l e the 
Governm nt argued that t he banks should themselves hav acted t o 
dispose of th nots , 
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(b) The 967 Cu r rency R va luation . The offic ial exchange 
rate of approxima ely 1/3 to th Hong Kong dollar was maintain d 
until late 1967. Hong Kong currency was devalued in i ne with 
sterling in 1949 ; i n fact , the local Government was not cons u lted 
about the currency adjustment, but was simp ly informed by cable of 
1 
the do lla r ' s new exchange value . In 1966 and ear y 19 67 her was 
considerable discussion at an unofficial level about what course 
the Colony should follow were there to be a furthe devaluation of 
1 . 2 ster ing . This discussion was largely curtailed when the local 
Government announced that it did not have the power to determine 
3 
the exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar . 
On 19 November 1967 , however, the Hong Kong Government was 
informed both that a 14 . 3 per cent devaluation of sterling was to 
be made and that it could on its own initiative determine the 
4 dollar's new exchange value. It was decided at f irst to devalue 
the Hong Kong dollar fully with sterling. Five days later, the 
local do llar was revalued by 10 per cent. 
The initia l devaluation, of course , maintained the Hong Kong 
dollar - sterling exchange rate. The exchange rate with the U. S . 
dol lar moved from HK $5 . 71 to HK $6.67 . The Government declared 
its main concern to be that of maintaining the local value of its 
own sterling assets and those of the Exchange Fund and the conuner-
cial banks . 5 Together, these sterling assets totalled some £350 
million. There was only a negligible debt owed in the United 
1 
2 
3 
SCMP , 30 November 1967 . 
See L . F . Goodstadt , 'Swing s and Roundabouts' , FEER, 18 August 1966. 
Financial Secretary , 1967 Budget Debate : 'Our dol la r's of f icial 
par value is set in terms of g old b y a declaration under I n ter-
national Mcnetary Fund arrangements, made by Her Majesty's Government 
in London as this declaration is constitutional ly a matter of int er-
national relations; while the practical arrangements for maintaining 
the dollar's va lue are in the hands of this Government . .. ' 
4 
The l ocal Government was given four hours notice of thes decisions. 
5 
The holding of sterling assets by the Government and the conunercia l 
banks is discussed blow; see 
ingdom . It was str ss ed that the devalua t ion was no · mad e or 
balance of payments rea sons , and tha t the over nment would a t emp 
to prevent a n excessive increase in l ocal price levels . 1 
The main reason for the Government having to reconsider its 
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decision to devalue the Hong Kong do llar in l ine wi ths erling was 
that the Chines Government made no adjustment in the gol d value of 
the JMP. Prices of food and consumer goods imported from China ros e 
by 15 per cent. There was some apprehension that the generally in-
creased cost of living would result in further political disturbances. 
The decision to maintain the sterling value of the Hong Kong 
dollar was also not popular with Hong Kong commercial and indus-
trial interests: most Hong Kong goods were already sufficiently 
competitive on export markets; because of quota restrictions, 
exporters could benefit only marginally from a devaluation ; in any 
case, the currency devaluation would quickly lead to more expensive 
industrial raw mat erials . 
For these reasons , the dollar was revalued on 23 November to a 
new ex change rate of 1/4\ sterling (HK $14 . 55 = £s t g l ; HK $6.06 = 
US $1) , imply ing a net devaluation in terms of gold of 5 . 7 per cent . 
It was decided to compensate the Hong Kong commercial banks for the 
exchange losses they suffered as a result of the dollar revaluation : 
in the absence of a central bank these commercial banks were force d 
to hold a large part of Hong Kong's foreign ex change reserves and 
thus to carry an exchange loss which elsewhere would have been borne 
by an official institution . This exchange loss, of about $140 
million , was to be met from the accumulated surplus of the Exchange 
Fund . The Fund also met its own exchange loss from its accumulated 
2 
surplus . 
1 
The Government did not state how it would act to prevent these 
price increases . The Financial Secretary did state , SCMP , 
20 November 1967 , tha t 'any attempt to stem them by statute y 
price controls would be futile' . 
2 
It must be pointed out that not all the sterling inve stments 
held by the Exchang Fund - or Government - were U.K . securities . 
A part was Malayan and Aus tralian bonds , whi ch became wor h more 
in terms of Hong Kong dollars . 
Severa l day s l ater , the J MP was deva l ued by 5 . 7 per ce nt a nd 
prices of Chinese-produced f oodstuffs and cons umer goods f 11 to 
l eve l s ruling be f ore 19 November . 
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There was obvious confidence that t he new exchange r at e could 
be maintained . On t he f ree currency market t he Ho ng Kong-United 
States exchange rate was HK $6 . 00 - HK $6 . 04 , agains t t he new off i -
cial rate of HK $6.06 . 
(c) Banknote Issue. The severa l alteration s made since t he 
second world war in the regulations governing the commercial bank 
note issue have not made for any fundamental change in the curre ncy 
sy stem established by the Ordinances and conventions o f t he period 
1935 to 1939 . The few changes made have simply removed discrepan-
cies between the note issuing powers of the three banks . 
In a 1956 amendment to the provisions governing its note issue , 
the Chartered Bank ' s right to make a fiduciary issue was abolished1 
and the Bank was required to hold sterling securities against the 
whole of the f irst $35 million of its note issue . 2 Any note issue 
above this amount must be backed with certif icates of ind ebtedness . 
In the following year, the Hongkong Bank ' s Ordinance was amend ed, 
and this Bank , too, los t its right to make a fiduciary issue . At 
the same time , the shareholders' unlimited liability for the note 
issue was abolished. With a paid up capi t al , in 1966, of $47 
million , the Mercantile Bank was in a position to make a larger 
issue of banknote s against the deposit of securities than were the 
two other banks. An amendment to the Mercantile Bank Note Issue 
Ordinance in January 1967 limited to $30 million the Bank's right 
to issue notes against approved securities. An issue of banknotes 
1 
I incorrectly claimed in 'The Curr ency Issue' , FEER , 19 January 
1967, that the Chartered and Mercantile Banks stilt had a liinited 
right to make fiduciary issues ~ Get:hyn Davies, ' Hong Kong Banking 
After the Crisis' , The Banker, 1965, p , 249, is similarly incorrect 
in suggesting that the Hongkong Bank could then, if it desired , 
make a fiduciary issue. 
2 
I have been unable to find the reason why the limit on the 
Char tered Bank's is sue of banknotes against sterling securities is 
$5 million higher than those imposed on the other two banks . 
above this limit has to be secured wi th cert i ficates of indeb t ed-
ness. 
The note issue of the three banks in selected postwar years 
is shown i n Tabl 3 . 3 . 
Tab le 3 . 3 
BANKNOTES OUTSTANDING BY BANK OF ISSUE, SELECTED DATES , 
1948 TO 1967 
( $ million) 
End of year 1948 1954 1960 1967 
Hongkong Bank 728 67 6 836 1856 
Char tered Bank 51 41 75 290 
Mercantile Bank 4 4 3 30 
783 722 914 2176 
Source : Government Gazette, Supplement Number 4 . 
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The way in which the banknote issue is varied can be outlined 
by taking the case where there is an increase in the demand for 
banknotes, say beca use of an expansion of credit by the commercia l 
banks . If stocks of unissued currency are held by the note issuing 
banks , the f irst result will be that these notes are placed i n 
circulation , either directly by the note issuing banks themselves, 
or through the other banks, which must reduce their deposits with , 
or sell sterling to the note issuing institutions . The i nterbank 
17 1 
sterling rate will move towards 1/432 (the actual rate is fixed 
by the Exchange Sub-committee of the Exchange Banks Association ; 
the Sub-committee consists of representatives of the three note-
issuing banks ) . The rate at which the banks deal with the public 
9 
will tend towards 1/416 . These ex change rate variations will do 
something to encourage those ho l ding dollar balances to exchange 
them for sterling . 2 At this stage, there would not have been any 
1 
Rates in this example are those which have ruled since the re-
valuation of November 1967. In each case the sterling rate is l~d . 
greater than the exchange rate which applied before that date . 
2 
These dollar balances might be offered 
excess dollar holdings or by businesses . 
claim that the supply and demand of Hong 
by movements in the exchange rate. 
by commercial banks with 
The note issuing banks do 
Kong dollars are affected 
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cha nge in the currency supp ly . I f the demand f or do llar balances 
has still no t been sat is f i ed , one of the note issuing banks 1 wi ll 
be r equ ired to incr eas e its note iss ue. The Bank wi ll i nform t he 
Financia l See r ta ry , and cab le its London of f ice to pay th ne ces -
sary sterl i ng (always at 1/4~ to the dollar) to t he Cr own Agen s . 
The additional certificates of indebtedne ss wi ll then b supp l i ed 
to the note issuing bank, and the bank is free to increase it s 
currency issue . 
When t he banknote circulation is shrinking, the cur re ncy hold-
ings of the note issuing banks build up , the inte rbank sterl i ng 
11 
rate is moved towards 1/432 and the rate to the public t owards 
5 1/416 , and , to balance their holdings of sterling and do llars the 
note issuing banks will return some part of their certifica te of 
2 indebtedness holdings to the Financial Secretary, receiving in 
exchange sterling i n London . On each certificate of i ndebtedness 
3 
returned for cance l lation the note issuing bank receives only 1/48, 
1 but not the whole 8d loss on each certificate is borne by the note 
issuing i nstitution; a part (at the max imum ; 6d) wil l have been 
passed on through variations in the int erbank sterling ra t e , while 
1 t he whole 8d loss can be passed on in transactions wi t h the public. 
By vary ing the volume of their advances and by adjusting the 
exchange rate between Hong Kong dollars and sterling , the note 
issuing banks can exert some influence on the public's demand for 
banknotes . But to the extent that the other commercial banks have 
balances with the note issuing banks which can be run down , or 
sterling to sell to the note issuing banks , the currency supply can 
e increased whether or not this is considered desirable by he 
1 
This anal sis is really in terms of the Hongkong Bank and the 
Chartered Bank : the Mercantile Bank has not, since the war , issued 
sufficient b nknotes to require its holding certificates of indebted -
ness . When the latter bank wishes to increase its note issue it 
simply deposits sterling securities of the required amount with the 
Crown Agents, and is then in a position to place the additional 
notes in circulation. 
2 
There are no treasury bills or other liquid outlets in Hong Kong 
in which these sur plus funds can be employed. 
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note i ssu i ng i nst i t utions. The system i s a n automa t ic on ~ and the 
f unct i on of the no e i ssui ng banks i s , as is us u.a l l y 
cen t r a l banks , t o sat is fy the dema nd f or currency, no 
. l 
e cas wi t h 
o r gula te 
1. t . 
(d ) Exchange Fund . The Exchange F~nd is s t i l l operated i n 
the au t oma tic way adopted i n t he l at e 1930s. Ce r t i fl. ca tes o i n-
debted ne s s ar e supp l ied on demand to t he note i s su i ng ank s i n 
exchange fo r s t erl i ng; t he a s sets of t he Fund are held in the f orm 
of s t erl i ng depo s it s a nd investments; the Fund s tands ready t o buy 
ba ck cer ti f i ca tes of indebtedne s s with s te r l i ng ; and the a greement s 
s et t i ng t he l imits to ex cha nge rate varia t ions whi ch we r mad e i n 
the 1930s wer e s t r i ctly maintained unti l Novemb r 1967, when new 
exchange r at e l imits were a greed to . 
Although no balance sheet has bee n publ ished since t he war 2 
and t her e hav been few public refe r e nces t o the Fund ' s opera t i ons , 
it is possib le to h w the r ecent t r end i n t o ta l as set s and in 
cer ti f i ca t es of i ndebtedne ss l i ab i l i t ies (Table 3. 4) and to say 
someth i ng about the inve stment pr inciples fo llowed b the Fund. 
Despite the fa c t that ther e is s t il l ' no statutory requ i r ement 
f or Cer ti f icate s to be backed exclusively by St e r l i ng and they could , 
f or examp e , be backed by Hong Kong dollars , which cou d take the 
f or m of a ba nk ba l ance , or, ·subject to the a ppr ova 1 of t he Secretary 
3 
of St a t e , Hong Kong Gov rnment Stocks ' only ster l i ng assets have 
1 
Get yn Dav ies , op, cit,, p.250, claims tha t the note issuing banks 
conside r the ef f ect of the changed volume of currency on the balance 
of payments and the leve l of prices before deciding to a l t er their 
note iss ue. It wou l d appear that such considerations are incom-
pat ible with t he banks ' commitment to suppl y local currency a ainst 
sterli g o the other. banks and the pub l ic on d ma nd , and to provide 
urre ncy o ·heir own depositors when required. The r e is ev ide nce, 
though , ha t the Hongkong Bank has considered he Co on ' ~ economic 
stability wh .n or mu lating its 1 .nding poli. y. See pp . 12 6 7. 
2 
Perhaps a · ·i r st the balance she et was not publ i h .d becaus e of 
th . duress note i ssue ll wh ich made the s er ling as · ~ s of he Fund 
le ss than i lia ili i e s. It is difficult .. why t h Fund ' s 
balance she t is no t now published . 
3 
Repor t on 
th Rep a cem nt o 
chis study re err ed 
Printe , 1962, p.6. 
of 
Table 3.4 
EXCHANGE FUND : ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, 1955 TO 1967 
($ million) 
1955a 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
Certificates of indebtedness 665 665 689 706 770 846 874 978 
Total assets of Exchange Fund 720 740 780 855 960 1040 1110 1359 
Assets as per cent of certificates 
of indebtedness 108 111 113 121 125 123 127 139 
Surplus of assets over 105 per 
cent of liabilities 
Banknotes backed by securities 62 67 65 66 68 71 79 67 
Total banknote issue 729 732 755 772 838 917 953 1045 
a 31 December each year. 
Source . Financial Secretary , Budget Speech . 
1963 1964 1965 
1074 1230 1559 
1376 1532 1949 
128 125 125 
248 240 312 
66 66 70 
1140 1296 1629 
1966 
1641 
2149 
131 
426 
89 
1730 
1967 
2081 
2332 
112 
150 
95 
2176 
-..J 
0 
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1 been held . The general authority given to the various Colonial 
currency funds in 1954 to invest a small proportion of the currency 
backing i n locals curities 2 has not been exercised in Ho ng Kon g : 
There is no case for our following this practice, at 
least at present , and it is in any cas our view t h a t 
i t is important for the international standing of t he 
Hong Kong dollar and therefore for our own economic 
prosperity , that a high level of external cover should 
b e maintained . 3 
Because of the undertaking to provide sterling on demand 
against certificates of indebtedness, a part of the assets of the 
Ex change Fund must be held in liquid form. The only information 
availab le is for December . 1955, when 37 per cent of assets were in 
the form of cash or money at call and short notice 4 and this pro-
portion of highly liquid Assets is probably a typical one , The 
remaining three-fifths of assets takes the form of dated sterling 
securities, from which a significant interest income is received , 
An increase i n the value of assets in the Exchang e Fund results 
from the sale of additional c2rtificates of indebtedness to the not e 
issuing banks, from capital appreciation of the Fu nd's fix ed interest 
securities, and from re - investment of the excess of income (from 
interest receipts and the exchange profit earned on certificates of 
indebtedness cancelled) over expenses (printing costs) . 5 Until 
1963 there was no provision for transferring any surplus of assets 
in the Fund to the Government's general revenue or to any other 
6 purpose, and with the continued re-investment of interest earnings 
1 
And the usual practice of the Crown Agents i n investing colonial 
currency funds is to place about 70 per cent of reserves in U. K. 
paper . 
2 
3 
4 
See The Colonial Territories, 1954~55, Cormnand 9489 , 1955, p.62. 
Financial Secretary, Legislative Council Debates , 1963, p . 304 . 
Ibid ., 1957 , p , 32 . Because of the surplus of assets held in the 
Exchange Fund, the ratio of liquid assets to certificates of in-
debtedness would have been even higher . 
5 
No administrative expenses are charged to the E cha nge Fund . 
6 
The more standard colonial currency board practice was that any 
surplus abov 110 pr cent of the currency issue was au omatically 
transferred to overnment revenue . 
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and exchange pro f its , the surplus in he accounts of th Ex change 
Fu nd gradually increased . A 1963 amendment to the Ex change Fund 
Or dinance gav e t h e Government authority to trans fer ' t o is ge ne ral 
revenue 'or any such other fund as ma y be authorised by the Secre tary 
o f State' any surplus o f assets over 105 per ce nt o f the v a lue of 
certificates o f indebtedness . 1 I n 1964/65 , $150 million was trans -
ferred from the surplus in the Ex change Fund to the Co l ony's 
Dev elopme n t Loan Fund, 
The Ex chang e Fund suffered a loss , in t e rms of Hong Kong 
dollars, of about 5 per cent of its assets as a result of the 
currency r evaluation of 1967. At the same date , a significant 
part of the accumulated surplus of the Fund was employed to meet 
the ex change losses of the conunercial banks . 
(e) Government Currency Issue. The Hong Kong Government now 
2 
issues a one dollar coin, subsidiary coins and a one cent note . 
There are thr e e separate Government currency secur ity fu nds : t he 
$ Note Security Fund , the Subsidiary Note Security Fund , and.,,-the 
Coinage Se curity Fund . 3 Only in the case of the$ Note Security 
Fund have intere st earnings and issue e x penses been credited and 
debited to the curr ency fund . In the other two funds , coinage 
e x penses have been charged to the Government and interest receipts 
4 paid into the Colony 's general revenue. Be cause of this accounting 
method , it is not possible to show the net profit or loss arising 
from the Government's currency operations, but it is most like ly 
1 
'In theory the 105 per cent requirement is designed to provide a 
cushion against sudden capital depreciation, but at 105 per cent it 
r eflects perhaps excessive caution in that context . ' Fina ncial 
Secretary , Legislative Council Debates, 1963, p . 303. 
2 
The one do l lar coin was first produced in 1960 , and was intro-
duced because of the inconvenience of notes for small transactions 
and the heav y cost of maintaining a reasonably clean note issue . 
3 
Until 1967 there were seven currency funds . 
f ive separate coinage funds were consolidated 
Security Fund . 
4 
In that year t he 
into the Coinage 
See Annual Report of the Accountant General , Hong Kong Government 
Printer, 1966/67, p.8. 
that a small profi t is n ow made . The circulation of the several 
Government c urrency issue s at March 1967 is shown i n Table 3.5 . 
Table 3 . 5 
OVERNMENT CURRENCY ISSUE, 31 MARCH 1967 
$ million 
Coins : one dollar 62 . 8 
fifty cents 27.3 
ten cents 27 .2 
five cents 3 . 3 
obsolete 1. 6 
Notes: one dollar 12.5 
subsidiary ~ 
137 . 5 
Source : Annual Report of the Accountant -
General, 1966-67, Hong Kong 
Government Printer. 
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Table 3 .6 gives a combined balance sheet of the Government 
currency funds f or the period 1954 to 1967 . Although there is no 
requirement that the outstanding issue be backed to a certain pro-
portion by sterling assets, and the Government is not under any 
obligation t o guarantee that the curre ncy it issues is fully con-
vert ible into sterling, there does seem an intention , on the 
Government ' s part , to hold sterling against about one -half o f the 
outstanding issue. 
The Hongkong Bank is the issuing agent o f Government notes and 
coin. Stocks of unissued currency are delivered by the Government 
to the Bank , and additional currency is placed in circulation either 
directly b y the Bank , through the withdrawal of deposi t s by its 
customers, or by other banks, who first acquire th e additional 
Government currency by running down their deposits with the Hongkong 
Bank . When an increase in currency issue is made , the Bank credits 
the current account of the relevant currency fund by the appropriate 
a mount . After the current account has risen to a certain level the 
Goverrunent ma y decide to invest in sterling assets or hold a fixed 
deposit with the Bank . 
Table 3 . 7 compares the trend of Government-issued currency and 
the banknote issue over the pos twar pe r iod. Government currency 
Table J . 6 : Governmen t Currenc~ Xotes and Coina~e Funds 
Combined Balanc e Sheets 1 1956 to 1967 
1954a 1955 1956b 1957b 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
S million 
Circulation 42.4 45.6 51.5 59 . 5 57 . 8 69.9 70.7 82.2 78 . 0 91.8 103 . 3 
Hong Kong C 
0 . 1 0 .1 0 .1 0.5 o . o o.4 o • . ,. 3 . 5 1.7 Government l.O -
42 .5 45.7 51.5 60.0 57 . 8 70,9 71.1 82.2 78 . 1 95 , J 105.1 
Cash at bank 21.5 15.4 ll.5e 18.5 16 . 6 27.0 7 . 5 JO . l 2J . 4 26 .1 26.2 
Fixed deposits 10 . 0 10 . 0 18 . 6 8.5 8 .5 6 . o 15.0 
- 13.8 1.1.6 20 . 0 
Sterling 
invescment s 10 . 9 20 . 3 19 . 5 Jl.8 29.6 J6 .1 45 . 9 49.1 40.J 57 . 7 58 . 9 
Hong Kong d 
0 . 2 0 .1 l. 9 2 . 1 l. 7 2.8 J . O o . 6 Goverrunent l.2 
- -
42.5 45 . 7 51.5 6o.o 57 . 8 70.9 71.l 82.2 78 . 1 95.3 105 . 1 
a . Jl Narch e ach year. 
~otes: b. Adjustments made to remove s mall error at source. 
c . Amount due to Hong Kong Government for appreciation on investment and 
for accumulaced surplus. 
d. Amount due from Hong Kong Government for deprecia"Cion on investment 
and for accumulated deficit . 
e . Includes small sums held by Crown Agents . 
Source: Annual Report of the Accountant-General, Hong Kong Government Printer. 
1965 
111.6 
0 . 4 
112.0 
8,7 8 
44.o 
57.J 
2. 0 
112.0 
1966 
121 .2 
l.l 
122.J 
9 .2e 
52 .2 
60 . 9 
o . o 
122 . J 
1967 
137.5 
l.8 
139.J 
3.2 
60 . l 
76 . 1 
1J9 . J 
-....J 
+' 
Table 3.7; Currencz On Issuez 1_246 to 1967 
194 6a 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
$ million 
Banknotes 459 675 778 840 808 800 80 2 802 728 727 73;, 755 772 838 
Government 
currency 
notes and 
coin n.a. n.a. ~o . 28 51 4J 41 42 43 45 52 57 5 6 58 
798 868 8 59 843 843 844 77 1 772 78 3 813 828 896 
Amounts 
held by 
Commercial 
banks n.a. n . a . n. a. n.ao n.a. n. a . n.a. n.a. n.a, 144 97 118 84 86 
Government n, a . n.a .. n.a . n.a ci n.a. n . a. n.a. n.a. n.. a• 2 1 2 1 1 
Public n.a . n .a . n.a o n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n. a . 62 6 685 693 743 809 
a, J 1 De c embe r each year. 
pource: Governme nt Gazet te , Supplement Number 4. 
1960 1961 
914 953 
70 74 
984 1,027 
136 114 
2 2 
846 911 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
1,045 1 ,140 1,296 1,629 1,730 2,176 
79 90 103 110 121 lJl 
1,124 1,230 1,400 1,740 1,852 2,308 
162 210 202 221 2J2 J J J 
3 2 J 8 4) 
959 1,018 1,195 1,511 1,616) l,975 
'-I 
V, 
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notes and coins have const it uted less than one-tenth of the total 
currency issue , Rather surprisingly, the proportion i ncreased 
from 5 . 6 pe r cent in 195 4 to 9 . 4 per cent in 1966 . There is n o 
chance of an ex cessive issue of Government currency: any surplus 
over that dema nded by the public will quickly be re urned to the 
Hongkong Bank and remove d from circulation , For this reason , the 
fact that the Governme nt is able to vary its currency issue without 
reference to its sterling holdings is insignif icant as e ither a 
wea pon of monetary policy or a possible threat to currency stability 
and confidence . 
( f ) The Volume of Currency on Issue. The volume of currency 
on is sue over the postwar period is shown in Table 3 . 7 . 1 There 
was a very rapid expansi on in the currency supply i n the early 
postwar years, and then a slight decrease until the mid- 1950s. In 
the decade to 1967, the currency supply increased almost three 
times . 
Not all the increased currency supply required to service the 
rising national i ncome has had to come from new currency issues. 
With the more widely-spread banking habit 2 some r elease of personal 
savings from currency hoards must hav e taken p lace. And, a greater 
part o f the currency issue is now h eld in Hong Kong tha n was the 
case early in the postwar per iod . On ly one - sixth or so of Hong 
3 
Kong currency is now thought to circulate outside the Colony, com-
pared with more than one - half in the lat e 1940s . Thus a part of 
the increase in the public's demand for currency has been met from 
balances previously held idle in Hong Kong or held abroad, 
As is the case in most underdeveloped countries, the speculative 
demand for mone y appears to be virtually non-existent . The demand 
1 
The importance of the currency issue in the total mone y supply 
is discussed in Chapte r 7 . 
2 
Se be low , Chapt e r 5. 
3 
This is th estimate of an official of one of the note is su i ng 
banks . Hong Kong currency circula ·e s f reely in Macao , where it 
usually e x chang es at par with t he pataca . 
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f or idle currency balances is almost exclusively o f a precautionary 
nature, inc lud ing currency held because of political uncertainty, 1 
and the lack o f familiar ity with, or distrust of, cormnercial bank 
deposits . 
There is a seasonal peak in the public's demand for currency 
in the Christmas - Chinese New Year period . 2 The main problem in 
manag ing the currency issue is to ensure that sufficient stocks are 
held to meet this 'annual crisis' . 3 In 1951 there was a deliberate 
attempt by hoarders to create a shortage in small denomination 
currencies, and an Ordinance was introduced to make such acts 
illegal. 
In 1965 public misgivings about the sa fety of d e posits with 
several local banks brought on a very rapid increase in the public's 
demand for currency. The cash resources of several commercial banks 
were severely strained as a result, and a number of institutions 
face d illiquidity. To prevent a more severe currency shortage 
developing - the public's demand for currency would have further 
increased had other banks been found illiquid the Government im-
posed a daily l imit of $100 on withdrawals from bank deposits, 
declared sterl ing notes legal tender, and arranged f or £20 million 
of British banknotes ( representing a part of the ass e ts of the 
Exchange Fund) to be flown to Hong Kong . It was not, in the event, 
nece ssary to issue these sterling notes. 
The Foreign Exchange Markets 
Although its currency fund was, from e arly 1936, invested 
almost exclusiv ly in sterl ing, Hong Kong did not f or some time 
1 
The demand for currency increased very strongly during the polit-
ical disturbances of 1967. There was at this time an especially 
strong demand for $500 notes, the largest denomination issued. 
2 
Th re is a slig ht tendency for the banknote issue to reach a 
peak at Christmas and for the Government issue to be at a maximum 
at Chinese New Year. 
3 
Financial Seer tary, Legislative Council Debates, 1958, p.49 . 
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1 join the Sterling Area system of ex change controls. This d ec ision 
to remain outside the Sterling Area was largely that of the Hongkong 
2 Bank and was taken b ecause the Colony was an importan t centre f or 
non- sterling trade and remittances, much of which business would 
have been lost had Sterling Area exchange restrictions been applied . 
Following the Japanese occupation of North China, many Chinese banks 
and, later, the Chinese Exchange Fund were moved to Hong Kong, 
further increasing the importance of the Colony's non-sterling 
currency transactions . But i n July 1941 the United Kingdom and the 
United States announced measures to freeze Japanese and Chinese 
balances, and, under the Defence (Finance ) Regulations, Sterling 
Area currency controls were imposed in Hong Kong. The purchase and 
sale o f foreign currency and gold were restricted, specified foreign 
exchange holdings had to be surrendered to the Government, and the 
Government was empowered to acquire all gold held in Hong Kong . 
These Regulations were still in force when the Colony fell to the 
Japanese in December 1941, and, although introduced und e r the 
Government's temporary wartime powers, have been the basis of 
official exchang e control in the postwar period . 
Immediately after the war the question arose whether Hong Kong 
should remain within the Sterling Area. It was argued, on the one 
hand, that a large part of the Colony's trade ( especially the re -
export o f tung oil and other Chinese products, and goods imported 
from the United States for sale in China) and remittances (part icu-
larly those fr om Chinese living in the Unite d States) would be lost 
to the Colony were the full range of Sterling Area controls imposed; 
1 
The currency bloc which came to be known as the Sterling Area 
emerged in the early 1930s following the suspension of convertibi-
lity of sterling, when a number of countries - i ncluding the 
dominions and British colonies (other than Canada, Hong Kong and 
Newfoundland), Scandinavian countries, Egypt and Portugal - kept 
their currenc ies stable in terms of the pound sterling. The 
Sterling Area gained a more formal st a tus in 1939, when a comprehen-
sive system of x c hange cont r o l s was imposed by member countries . 
At this stag , most non - British cou ntr i e s left the bloc. Hong Kong 
could not, o f cours e , b e com am mber of the currency area while 
its cur r ency was silver based. 
2 
J . R . Jones , op . cit. 
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that it wou d be difficult for the Colony to finance its entrepot 
trade f r om t e limit d supp ly of do l l ars available from the common 
Sterling Area pool; that few of the Colony 's exports were goods 
produced i n t he Sterling Area, including Hong Kong; that the major-
ity of Hong Kong traders had no po litical stake in the Sterling 
Area and wou l d be ard to convince of then ed f ore change control ; 
and that the Colony' s acceptance of Sterling Area restrictions in 
1941 had only been in response to an immediate wartime problem . 
But, because the large part of commercial bank liquid assets and 
Government reserves , and the currency fund, were he ld in London, 
and because of the Colony's large trade with the Sterling Area, all 
of which r equired relatively free t ransfer s within the Sterling Area, 
it was not considered desirable for the Colony to sever its connec-
tions with the Sterling Area. 
The problem was furthe r comp l icated by the fact that a well 
o rganised f r ee market in foreign currencies (consisting of the 
small banks and the numerous exchange shops and trading in U. S . 
dollars , sterling , Far East currencies and precious metals) had 
developed before the exchange banks re-commenced operations and 
before e _cha nge control regulations could be re - instituted . Also , 
there was no official in the Hong Kong Government who was experienced 
1 in administering exchange control. 
The solution adopted was that Hong Kong would remain a member 
of the Sterling Area, applying Sterling Area controls and official 
exchange rates to a specified range of exchange transactions, but 
with the Colony retaining its free currency market, in which all 
other currency transactions could be made without restriction at 
exchange rates which varied with supply and demand. Thus a system 
of exchange control was instituted, first, to e nsure that specified 
e change transactions were, in fact, made in the official exchange 
market and, secondly, to prevent access being gained to the Colony's 
1 
An additional problem mentioned to the author by a veter an banker 
was that , at first , no copy of the exchange control regulations 
could be found in Hong Kong . 
80 
free currency market by residents of other parts of the Ster l ing 
1 Area . An officer of the Hongkong Bank was seconded by the Govern-
ment to establish an exchange control office . 2 The system of 
exchange contr o l was based on the 1941 Defence (Finance) Regula ~ 
tions , and surprising l y, although the ov ernment approved of the 
ex istence of the fr e currency market from early in t he postwar 
period , it was 1967 before the Defence (Finance) Regulations we re 
ame nd d specifically to exempt free currency market transactions 
(i . e . for more tha n two decades, dealings in the free exchange 
market nominally contravened the ex change control regulations) . 3 
To preve nt Hong Kong becoming a 'gap' in the Ster l ing Area 
system of exchange controls, the Bank of England has closely super -
vised the sterling accounts of the large banks . Probably , though, 
considerable illegal transactions took place in hard currencies in 
the late 1940s and late 1950s, in the former case , at least, as a 
result of goods 'shunting' . 
The diff erences be tween the official and the fre e exchange 
markets are highlighted by a comparison of the consequences which 
f o ow a capita l out fl ow . If holders of Hong Kong dollar balances 
suddenl y decid to convert their funds into fore ign currencies 
through the officia l market, the re would be only a smal l var iation 
in the ex change r ate of the -Hong Kong dollar (within the narrow 
l imits agreed by the not e issuing banks and the Exchange Fund) . 
But the note issuing banks would, as a consequence , accumulate ex-
cessive holdings of Hong Kong bankno te s ; they would seek to adj ust 
the ir portfo l ios by returning certificates of indebtedness to the 
Exchange Fund , and the currency supply would be reduced . If , on 
the oth r hand, the capital outflow was arranged through the free 
1 
Since 1967 Singapore residents have been able freely to move 
their f unds betw en the Republic and Hong Kong. 
2 
The position f Assistant Financial Secretary (Exchange) has 
since been held b officers of the Hongk ng Bank on secondment . 
3 
See L . F. Goodstadt , 'London Line',~' 4 May 1967 . 
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market , t here would be no change in the local currency supply, bu t 
an app r eciable change in the external value of the Hong Kong dollar . 
(a) The Official Exchange Market. As a result of Hong Kong's 
sterling exchange currency system, the Hong Kon g dollar and the 
pound sterling are convertible without limit at an ex chang rate 
which can move only within narrow limits around 1/4~ . And , on this 
official market currencies other than the British pound can be pur -
chased, f or uses approved by the exchange control , at rates determine d 
b y the ruling Hong Kong dollar-sterling rat e and the sterling-fore ign 
currency rate in London . 1 
Th e official market in foreign exchange consists of those com-
mercial banks (at present 51, including most of the larger banks) 
which have been 'authorised' by exchange control to carry out 
f o r eign exchange transactions at official rates, and a small number 
of ex change brokers who are members of the Exchange Brokers Associa -
tion . Au thorised banks agree to buy and sell foreign exchange only 
a t official rates, and deal on the interbank market, which is 
1 
u sually 32d sterling better than the rate to merchants. These 
i n stitutions are permitted freely to operate their accounts in 
Lo ndon (that is , to t r ansfer their funds freely within the Sterling 
Ar ea) : thu s, their h oldings of Hong Kong dollars and sterling are 
c o nvertible without restriceion at exchange rates which cannot move 
more than a few points from par . 
Payments for trade between Hong Kong and other countries in 
the Sterling Area may be made in any Sterling Area currency, and 
the authorised banks may freely arrange the transfer of funds 
between Hong Kong traders and residents in other Sterling Area 
2 
countries provided these funds were earned in bona fide trade. 
1 
At a pound sterling-Hong Kong dollar rate of 1/4~ and a U.S . 
dollar-sterling rate of US $2.40 to £1, the exchange rate between 
Hong Kong and the United States is HK $6 . 0625 to US $1. 
2 
A statement of the Hong Kong system of exchange controls is given 
i n th I . M. F . Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions . A number of 
minor changes in the syst m of controls has been made over -the 
postwar period . 
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To prevent acce s s be i ng gained to the Co l ony ' s f r ee curr n cy market 
b y es idents in other par ts of the Sterl i ng Area , x change control 
approval is required for capital transfers from thes e territories 
~ Hong Kong, i n cluding t ransfe rs from the ste r ling accounts of 
Hong Kong r side n ts . But t ra nsfers ca n be freely made from Ho ng 
Kong to othe r pa r ts of the Ste rling Area - holde rs of Ho ng Kong 
balances ar e fr ee to move t heir funds out of Hong Kong and into 
sterl i ng through the official exchange market. The banks deal 
3 
with the public at a margin o f 32d per Hong Kon g dol lar . 
Hong Kong e x porters of locally-produced g ood s and goods from 
China, Taiwan and Macao who rece ive payment in a n on- Sterling Area 
currency are re q uired to surrender the proceeds from insurance and 
1 fr eight to an author is ed bank at the off icial exchange rate; the 
f . o . b. v alue o f the expor t proceeds may be sold on t he free currency 
2 
mark t. Non- sterling foreign exchange is available at offic i al 
ra tes f or certain e ss ential impor ts and fo r sp e cifie d payments for 
inv isibles (education and tourist expenses, e tc . ). The banks 
a u thorised to operate i n the offi cia l fore i gn exchange market deal 
with the public at a margin of .osi U. S. cents per U.S. do l l a r. 
Tra n s f ers of capital to Hong Kong from countries outside the 
Ster l ing Area do not have to be surre ndered to the official exchange 
marke t, but pe r mi ssion la te~ to repat r iat e profits and capital 
through the off icial exchange market is usual ly given only when 
the initia l transfer was made through an authorised bank at official 
3 
rates . 
(b ) The Free Curr e n cy Market. The fr ee e change market con-
sists of the twe nty or so commercial banks which are no t au thor ised 
1 
It i la r gely f rom this exchange re quirement that Hong Kong earns 
f ore i gn currencie s f or t he Sterling Are a pool. 
2 
Until the mid -1 950s , var i ous proportions of t h f . o.b . value of 
specified ex por ts had also to be surre nd r e d to t he official ex-
change market . The ef f ect of this r quirement was to give Hong 
Kong a multip le exchange rate. 
3 
Exchange control offic mentioned to the author that very few 
transfers o f capita l i nt o Hong Kong from countries outside the 
Sterl i ng Area are made through t he official e xchange market, 
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to conduct ex change transactions on the official market (th ' un-
authorised ' ba nks) and the many exchange dealers operating in Hong 
Kong ( including representatives of several large international 
institutions). On this market transactions tak place in most 
currencies , inc uding those of a number of countries which prohi it 
t ansactions in their currencies at other than official rates , and 
in commercial gold, 
By far the most important section of the free exchange market 
is that which deals in United States dollars - in currency notes, 
demand drafts and telegraphic transfer , U.S. dollars have been 
supplied to this market from a variety of sources. Early in the 
postwar period a large volume of U.S. currency notes hoarded in 
China during the war and Chinese-owned U.S. bank deposits frozen 
during the war was sold on this free exchange market. Remittances 
from Chinese living in North America have been a major source of 
U.S. dollars for the open market throughout the postwar period. 
The Colony's e change control permits the larger part of the U. S. 
do l lar proceeds of local exports and of re-exports of Far Eastern 
goods to b e sold on the free currency market. Of considerable value 
recently has been the U.S. dollars spent by tourists and U.S . mili-
tary pe r sonnel. Smaller sums have been provided from American 
investment in Hong Kong businesses , and from the activities of 
international welfare agencies, etc, 
As U. S. dollars and other non-sterling currencies can be ob-
tained from the official exchange market for only a restricted range 
of purposes , the foreign exchange required to pay for the majority 
of Hong Kong imports from these currency areas is purchased in the 
Colony's free currency market. On this market, too , foreign exchange 
is purchased to finance capital transfers from Hong Kong: there is 
no restriction on investment by Hong Kong residents in foreign 
security markets or foreign bank deposits . As well, foreign-owned 
businesses purchase U.S. dollars on the open market to . remit 
profits and capital. The demand for U. S . currency arises also from 
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Hong Kong ourists , or i gn ex change sp culators, currency hedgers , 
etc . 
The supply of U. S . currency notes on the free market is almost 
continuous ly greater than the demand , The ma ny U. S . notes co llected 
by money changers and unauthorised banks are sold (on th Gold Ex-
change or pr ivately) to the larger local commercial banks , who 
per iodical ly mail them to the United States for crediting to their 
New York accounts. 
The Hong Kong-United States exchange rate on the open exchange 
market has , in recent years, been usually within 1 per cent of the 
official rate (see Table 3 . 8). Occasionally , the Hong Kong dollar 
has stood at a small premium. Rumours of a possible devaluation of 
sterling in 1966 encouraged a small flight from the Hong Kong dollar, 
which was briefly traded at a discount of 2.4 per cent against the 
U. S. dollar . For a short period in the 1967 disturbances, this 
discount increased to almost 5 per cent. 
Table 3.8 
FREE EXCHANGE MARKET : SELECTED EXCHANGE RATES , 1960 TO 1967 
Hong Kong dollars per : 
U.S. telegraphic U.S. banknotes , U. K. banknotes 
trans fer, U. S . $1 U.S.$1 £1 
high low high low high low 
1960 5.87 5 . 68 5.74 5.66 16.10 15.95 
1961 5.78 5.66 5 . 85 5 . 66 16.23 15,82 
1962 5.75 5.68 5 . 73 5 .68 16.05 15.90 
1963 5.79 5. 71 5,78 5.68 16.15 15. 92 
1964 5.78 5. 72 5 . 78 5. 71 16.05 15 . 92 
1965 5 . 78 5. 71 5 . 78 5. 71 16 . 07 15.95 
1966 5.84 5.70 5 . 83 5 . 69 16.15 15.95 
1967 6.10 5,73 6.08 5. 72 16.30 14,60 
Source : FEER, various numbers. 
The exchange rate between the Hong Kong dollar and sterling is 
also shown in Table 3,8 . Because of the freedom with which funds 
can be tra nsferr ed between Hong Kong and London on the official 
1 
There are also considerable purchases of fore ign currencies on 
the Hong Kong open exchange market by residents of other South 
East Asian countries. 
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exchange market, there is little trading in sterling on the free 
market other than in United Kingdom banknotes. Many other cur -
rencies are exchanged against the Hong Kong dollar at a considerable 
. 1 discount. 
The Chinese Gold and Silver Exchange Society, formed in 1917, 
was quickly re-established after the Pacific war. At first sales 
were made in monetary ( .99 pure ) gold, most of which was supplied 
from wartime hoards. Trading reached a peak in the period preced-
ing the 1949 sterling devaluation. 2 The Gold Exchange has been 
relatively inactive since the early 1950s. In March 1968 turnover 
was greatly increased, and gold prices briefly returned to levels 
experienced during the Korean war. Presumably because of Inter-
national Monetary Fund requirements, trading in monetary gold was 
prohibited in 1949, and replaced by transactions in commercial gold 
(at first of .9 and later of a maximum of .95 fineness). 
Prices on the Gold Exchange are expressed in Hong Kong dollars 
1 per tael (approx imately 13 oz . ) of .945 purity, and usually repre-
sent a margin of U.S. $3 to U.S . $ 6 an ounce over London prices. 
The local gold price is affected by trends in other gold markets, 
by political and economic events in the Far East, and by rumours of 
currency devaluat~on. There were sharp increases in gold prices 
during the banking crisis of 1965 and the civil disturbances in 
1967. The range of prices on the gold exchange over recent years 
is given in Table 3.9. 
There are believed to be sizeable illegal dealings in monetary 
gold. It is claimed, for example, that most of the gold sold on 
the Macao gold exchange (a legal and active market in monetary gold) 
is smuggled to Hong Kong for re-export to India, South Vietnam, 
1 
Regular quotations on the free exchange market are published in 
SCMP and FEER. 
-2- --
A visit to the Gold Exchange in the period of active trading in 
1949 is described in H. Ingrams, Hong Kong, London: H.M.S.O., 
1952, p.147 . In 1947 a seat on the Gold Exchange was sold for 
$77,000. In 1956 the price was $5,000 . 
Table 3.9 
GOLD PRICES, 1947 TO 1967 
(Dollars per Tael .945 pure) 
High 
1947 405 
1948 372 
1949 654.!. 2 
1950 32~ 2 
1951 348 
1952 329 
1953 286 
1954 2571 8 
1955 26~ 8 
1956 287 
1957 271 
1958 2581 8 
1959 255 
1960 275.!. 2 
1961 2681 8 
1962 2551 4 
1963 2581 8 
1964 25~ 4 
1965 296 
1966 2642 8 
1967 300 
Sources: 1947-62, Ng Kwok Leung, unpublished 
materia 1; 
1962-67, ~' various numbers. 
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Low 
254 
2821 4 
295.!. 4 
250 
297 
276 
2481 4 
244.!. 2 
25cJ 8 
25~ 8 
266 
24~ 8 
250 
25cJ 8 
2431 4 
247.!. 4 
2482 8 
248 
2511 4 
2621 8 
25~ 8 
Indonesia and other Asian countries. 1 And, monetary gold can 
readily be purchased in Hong Kong in a number of local banks, ex-
change shops and jewellers. 
1 
R. H. Kaufman, 'The Asian Gold Trade', Asian Survey, May 1965, 
p.234. 
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There have been several points of contact between t he two 
foreign exchange markets. Until the aboli t ion of 's ecuri ty s terl -
ing'1 in 1967, authorised Hong Kong banks and certain ex change 
dealers were permitted, under licence, to purchase security sterl ing 
in exchange for United States dollars acquired on the fr ee market, 
As a result of these transactions the security sterling reverted t o 
external account sterling, and was freely exchangeable in London 
2 
with any external account currency. These transactions wer e profit -
able when the free rate for U.S. dollars wa s c lose to the official 
par rate and security sterling was traded at a discount against 
external sterling. 
Since the abolition of security sterling, banks and ex change 
dealers in Hong Kong have on occasion been licensed by the Bank of 
England to purchase limited amounts of 'resident sterling' - sterling 
owned by residents of the Sterling Area - with U. S. dol l a r s acquired 
on the free ex change market. No information is available on the 
extent of these transactions . 
A further link between the two markets has arisen from the 
f act that some transactions for which permission could be obta i ned 
to purchase funds on the official market are , for convenience , 
3 
normally made on the open market. When exchange rates on the open 
market move against the Hong · Kong dollar, a part of t hese dema nds 
for foreign exchange is transferred to the official market, reducing 
the pressure on the open currency market. 
1 
Security sterling (or 'block' sterling or 'switch' sterling) is 
the sterling earned from the sale of securities or investment by 
non-residents of the Sterling Area, The security sterling could 
freely be sold to another non-resident of the Sterling Area for 
investment in sterling securities. 
2 
The Bank of England was reported ' to go along with,, , and up to 
a point to approve of' this arrangement . The Timas, 15 February 
1967, p.13, It was estimated that between £50 ~iliion and £100 
million worth of security sterling, much of it from the Middle 
East, was traded on the Hong Kong exchange market annually . 
3 
These transactions include certain imports, tourist and education 
expenses. 
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Also , there has been a c l ose association bet ween several of 
the authorised and unauthorised banks. A number of unauthor is ed 
banks have arranged their trade busine ss through an authorised 
bank rather t han the open market (on these transactions t he un-
authorised bank is paid one-half of the exchange commission earned 
by the a uthorised bank). And, 
some authorised banks have direct representation in the 
lists of unauthorised banks in the form of wholly owned 
subsidiaries, while others are represented by affiliates 
or agents. Indeed, the links are essential, as the 
authorised foreign exchange banks are probably in deficit 
on f oreign exchange whereas the free do llar market yields 
a surplus which is drawn upon for local requirements .l 
The Curr ency System and Foreign Exchange Markets : 
a Comment2 
(i) . A first consequence of the currency system is that there 
is no possibility of an excessive currency issue or of an inconverti -
bility of the Colony's currency into ste rling . The currency supply 
can be increased only to t he extent that the not e issuing banks 
deposit ste r ling (acquired from their own sources, or from purchases 
fr om the othe r commercia l banks or the Government in ex change for 
Hong Kong dollar balances) with the Exchange Fund . And, once issued, 
there can be no currency holding - from e ither present earnings or 
hoards - for which sterling is not availab le at an exchange rate 
close to par. 
But these are characteristics common t o all currencies issued 
under the colonial sterling exchange standard, The Hong Kong 
currency system has one important further advantage. In other 
territories colonial currencies were convertible into non- sterling 
f oreign exchange only through their link with the 'supe r ior' currency : 
holdings of colonial currency could be converted into non- sterling 
f oreign ex change only so long as sterling itself was conve rtible . 
1 
David Williams, ' Hong Kong' in W. Crick (ed.), Commonwealth Bank~ 
ing Systems , Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1965, p.173. 
2 
Several aspects of the currency system cannot be fully discussed 
until after an outline of bank deposit money has been given. See 
below , Chapter 7 . 
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The existence of its free exchange market gave Hong Kong a currency 
system un ique among the British colonial territories . Through this 
open market, the Hong Kong dol lar has had an exchange va ue with, 
and convertibility into, the major world currenc ies , indep ndent of 
that established through its link with sterling. Thus , Hong Kong 
currency balances have been exchangeable with world currencies (al= 
though not necessarily a t a stable exchange rate) whatever the 
current strength or weakness of ste r ling. 
The fact that the Hong Kong dollar has been a strong currency, 
readily convertible into sterling on the official market or into 
other currencies on the open market, has contributed to the Colony's 
economic development in several fields. The freely convertible 
currency has been of considerable benefit to the entrepot trade, a 
part, and perhaps a large part , of which might hav e been lost to 
Hong Kong had not fore i gn currencies been freely available to 
1 traders. The Hong Kong dollar's strength and convertibility has 
similarly contributed to the Colony's importance as a centre for 
international remittance payments and for the investment and deposit 
of foreign funds, There are several ways in which the currency 
system has aided the Colony's industrialisation. The early capital 
inflow into manufacturing - the capital which entered the Colony at 
the time of the Corrnnunist succe sses in the Chinese Civ il War , and 
which provided much of the initial investment in the textile 
industry - was attracted by the stable Hong Kong currency and the 
fact that funds could readily be moved out of the Colony when 
desired. The more recent capital inflow into manufacturing from 
overseas Chinese and sources in developed countries has also been 
attracted by the ease with which profits and capital can be remitted 
from Hong Kong . As well, imports of industrial raw materials and 
1 
Thus, one commentator has claimed that the free currency mark t, 
on wh ich Hong Kong merchants have made he majority of their 
purchases of U. S . currency , was 'in many respects ••. the foundation 
of the post - 1945 renaissance of the Hong Kong economy' . David 
Williams, op . cit. , p.175 . 
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industrial equipme nt h ve been ava i lable fr m t h. most compe ti t i ve 
sour ces , however l imited the Sterl i ng Area a .oca t ions of hard 
cur r encie s; this was an espec i ally important p i v ilege i n e a e 
1940s and ear y 1950s . The s trong currency as contributed also 
to th deve opment of the touris t i ndustry . One of t he Col ony' s 
important attractions i s the ready availab ility of impnrted goods. 
Finally, the stable currency may also have been an advantage in a 
non- economic sense. The fact that China's earni ngs in Hong Kong 
can readily be conver ted into the major wor l d currencie s may have 
helped to preserv e the political status quo. 
(ii) At the same time, the currency sy stem has imposed a 
severe restraint on the public finance sy tern. Because the bank-
note issue is fully backed by sterling , the Hong Kong Government 
has not been able to borrow from the banking system as it could 
have done had there been an independe nt mone tar system. There 
are t wo related consequences , both of whi ch are dis cussed later 
· h" d l int is stu y. i r st , for these institut iona l reasons , the 
Government is unable to finance a budget deficit by borrowing from 
the currency author ity . Any excess of expenditure over Government 
revenue must be financed from reserves, grants or borrowing from 
the commercial banks or public . Secondly, under t he pre sent currency 
system, there is on l y a l imited scope for officia l influence over 
the currency supply. The Government can affect the supply of 
currency only to the extent that it is free and willing o exchange 
its own sterling balances for local currency, or is prepared to 
build up its cash holdings ; it cannot vary the currency supply by 
selling its debt to the mon tary authority. 
(iii) It ha been pointed out in discussions of the colonial 
currency oard s st m that t e assur .d convertibility of colonial 
currency wi th ster l ing does not require th holdin of a 100 per 
cent sterling r serve against the banknot issu • A certain part 
1 
See below , Chap ers 7 and 9 . 
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of the co l onial. curr e ncy i s su is r equir ed f or the a solu t e mi n imum 
of domestic transac t ions ) a nd would no t be presented i n change 
for sterling even i n t he event of an e conomi c cr isis or s ver 
r ecession . Thus , t h mainc enance of a f u l s te r i ng backing to 
h currency is su i nvolve s an unne ce sary inunob i li sat i on of in= 
v s t i ble resources ; without affecting the conver t ibil ity of tha 
part of the note issue which may be presented in exchange f or 
ster l i ng , a portion of the currency re s e r ve can be held i n local 
s ecuri t ies (i . e. a l imited fiduciary issue can be made) . 
There is no way of accurately estimating what proportion of 
the currency supply would not, under any circumstance s , be offe r ed 
in ex change f or ster ling . In discussions of t he curre ncy sy s t~m 
1 
of oth r colonies ) a proportion of up t o one - third has been suggested , 
but , in view of the possibility of a severe political crisis in Hong 
Kong, it would appear necessary t o impos e a lower limit - of perhaps 
15 to 20 per cent - on the fiduciary issue . This propor tion of the 
curr ency acking could be invested loca lly , thus increasing the 
supply of financial r e sources for investment i n the Colony without 
b inging into question the convertibility of the Hong Kong dollar . 
And , it would seem improbable that any l oss of confidence in the 
Hong Kong dollar (either locally or abroad) wou ld result f rom the 
Ex change Fund ' s holding a small portion of its ass e ts in Hong Kong. 
Nor is it like ly that inflation would result from a fiduciary 
currency issue . Becaus e of the high marginal propensity to import , 
the increased Government spending permitted by the fiduciary cur -
rency issue would very quickly res ult in an increased demand for 
imports : in any economy a s foreign t r ade orientated as Hong Kong ' s, 
the possibility of dema nd i nflation is severel limited . The tend-
ency towards inf ation would be l essen d also to t hee tent tha t the 
additional Gov rnment sp nding brought about an i ncrease in the out-
put of goods ands rv ice s, and to the extent that the public desired 
to increase its currency hoards. 
1 
See F . H.H. King , 'Ste ling Balances a nd the Co l on i al Monetary 
Sy stems ' , Economic Journa l , De emb e r 1955 , p .720 , f oo t note . 
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(iv) Almost from the time of the Exchange Fund's establishment, 
the whole of the backing to the banknote issue has been invested in 
sterling. It was for this reason that the Exchange Fund suffered a 
considerable loss, in terms of Hong Kong currency, from the revalua -
tion of the Hong Kong dollar in terms of sterling in 1967. 
There seems little possibility that the assets of the Exchange 
Fund will be diversified into other foreign currencies and gold, 
even though this is permitted by the Ordinance which established 
the Exchange Fund. First, with Hong Kong a British colony, the 
Bank of England would almost certainly view unfavourably any re-
quest of the Hong Kong Government to sell a part of the latter's 
sterling balances for, say, gold or U.S. dollars. But there is an 
additional problem. Because of the very considerable Corrununist 
Chinese dealings in Hong Kong currency, the United States Treasury 
might, under its powers to freeze any U.S . dollar balances in which 
there has been a Corrununist Chinese interest, block the dollar 
1 
securities or deposits held by the Hong Kong Exchange Fund. 
From this it appears that Hong Kong has little alternative but 
to continue holding only sterling as the foreign exchange component 
of its currency reserve. Thus, there seems to be little possibility 
that Hong Kong can become, as has been suggested, a 'Swtizerland of 
the Far East' , offering holders of its currency protection against 
a devaluation of the world's key currencies. 2 Nonetheless, in early 
1968 the Government was reported to be seeking out ways through 
3 
which it could diversify the assets of the Exchange Fund. 
(v) Hong Kong is now perhaps the only important political 
entity where the right to issue banknotes is held by commercial 
1 
For example, it was believed that, in March 1967, the United 
States Treasury objected to proposed Philippine purchases of rice 
from China as these would have been financed indirectly with U.S . 
dollars (the U.S. dollars were to be exchanged for the sterling in 
which payment was to be made). See FEER, 20 April 1967. 
2 
See Dick Wilson, op . cit., p,200. See also below , p,122. 
3 
See SCMP, 9 March 1968. 
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banks . Bu it does not ap e r that tis right und u y benefits t h. 
n ote i ssuing ct n s . As was sen , the hree b anks ea r n only a v r y 
sma 1 i ncome f rom the ir note issuing funct ions . Th y receive in-
te r est on the s ecurities held against th ' a u thor ise d ' part o f 
their issue , but they must pay , on the sam part of th ir t ota l 
issu, the pr i n ti ng e penses and a small stamp duty. The banks do 
not receive interest on their certificates of indebtedness , and 
they ma carry a small exchange loss on ea ch cert i f i c ate returned 
to the Ex change Fund. Perhaps the main advantage gained by the 
note issuing banks is that they are usually more free in their 
management of sterling than the other banks; but there would be 
times when their obligation to purchase or s ell sterling on demand 
1 
with i n the agreed l imi ts would be an onerous one. Th e note issu-
ing institut ions also gain someth ing from prestige and publicity , 
in that the i ssue of banknotes is now only very r a r ely a respon si-
b ility of privately- owne d b anks , and bankno tes carrying their 
issuer' s name are an effective means of advertising. There is also 
the advantage that , so long as the note issuing banks continue to 
accept this responsibility, they know there is no danger of an 
excessive issue o f urrency. However , the note issuing banks do 
not necessar i y have a f ina say on the volume of currency on issue 
even now (they must exchange . sterling and Hong Kong cu rrency with-
out limit) , and it is xtremely unlikely that dire c t control by the 
Gove nment would lead to an irresponsible issue. 
1 
I am g ateful to the Financia Secretar for makin g thi point 
apparent to me. 
Chapter 4 
THE COMMERC IAL BANKS - I : ORGANISATION 
The commerc i al banks are sti ll by far the dominant institutions 
of the Hong Kong financial s ystem. As is seen mor e ful l y later, 
such adaptation as t he financial system has undergone during the 
Colony's rapid industr ialisation has largely taken the form of 
developme nts within the banking s y stem (such as mixed banking and 
gr eater stab ility) and not any significant growt h of non-bank 
financial i nstitu tions . 
This and the following two chapters are concerned with the 
comme rcial banks : organisation , ass e ts and liabilities , and the 
strength and stability of the commerc ia l banking s y s tem. 
Bank Numbers 
I n the early pos twar years there was a very rapid increase i n 
the number of banks. I n the absence of any s ystem of bank licensing , 
any busine ss or private trader could claim the title 'bank ' and 
accept deposi t s fr om the public , and , as well as the institutions 
wh i ch ope ra ted be f or e the war , many new local a nd main land- owned 
banks opened offi ces . Fr equently, the newer banks we r e concerned 
with currency exchange and speculation, and with remittance s , and 
did not undertake trade f inance and cheque deposit business . One 
estimate is that there were around 250 ' banks' in mid - 1947 : four -
teen European or Amer ican institutions (including the three note 
issuing banks) , 32 Chinese commercia l banks , 120 native (i.e. smal l 
local ) banks , 76 exchange shops and 20 other banking firms (includ-
1 ing reta i l stor es and insurance companies) , 
1 
~ ' 19 November 1947, p . 59 6 . 
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The need f or overnm nt contro l ov r the a cciv 1. i s o th 
commercia l banks ve ry soon became appar nt , both to of r min imum 
prote c t ion to d posi ors - t here w r e f ai lur e s among th sma 1 
b k f . th . d1 d ans r om ear y 1.n e postwar per1.o - an t o as s is t the working 
of ex change cont r a. A Banking Bi l l was i nt roduced i n o the eg i s -
l at i v Counci l in 1947. Th is became the Banking Or dinance of 1948 . 
I n keeping with the Governme nt ' s laissez- f a i r e outlook , onl a 
min imum of controls was imposed . There wa s no requirement t hat 
ba nks ho l d a cer tain l evel of paid up capital or observe a min imum 
l iquidity r a tio . Of course , at this time , the deposit l iab ilities 
of the banks were not large and most ba nk advances were fo r short-
term trade purposes ; a bank failure was no t as potentia lly dis rup i ve 
as it was l a te r to become . 
The Ordinance required all institutions carry i ng on 'banking 
business ' (d e fined as 'the busine ss of a ba nk engaged i n the rece ipt 
of money on curren · or de posit account or i n pa men and collec t i on 
o f cheques drawn by or paid in by a customer or i n t he making or 
re ce ipt of r emit t ances or in t he purchase and sa le of gol d and 
silver coin or bullion') to be licens ed as banks by t he Governor , 
and e sta l ished penalties for any ot her business whi ch ca 1 d i t s e lf 
a bank ; the Governor was empowe r ed to demand t he production of a 
bank ' s books ~ accountsand documents ; and the Governor was g i ven t he 
r ight to cancel a bank ' s licence where there was a str ong case that 
this was in the pub lic interest. Banks were required to give pub-
licity to their balance sheets. The fee for a bank licence was 
set at $5 , 000 p . a . A Banking Advisory Committee was stablished 
under he Chairmanship of the Treasurer . This Commit t ee has, by 
convention , consisted of an officer of each of the arge and sma l l 
banks, a representative of commerce (usuall an accountant) a nd 
the Accountant - G neral. 
The 1948 Or dinance did l ittle to restrict t he number of banks 
operating in t he Colony , and , in the words of one commentator , it 
1 
See FEER , 24 September 1947 , p , 413. 
1 
was or a long time easier to open a bank than a restauran. 
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Sev ral measures introduced since 1960 have made the establishment 
of a new bank more difficult. I n 1960 it became th 'admini strative 
practice' 2 in granting licences to new banks incorporated locally 
to requir a paid up capital of at least $5 million and a senior 
staff experienced in banking procedures , and, for a probationar y 
period, that deta i led financial returns be submitted to th Finan-
cial Secretary. In 1964 a new Banking Ordinance required incorporated 
banks to have a paid up capital and uncommitted reserves of at least 
$10 million and to observe certain liquidity requirements. Three 
years later an amendment to the Banking Ordinance required minimum 
shareholders' funds of $20 million. A moratorium on the issue of 
new banking licences introduced in 1965 is still in force . It has 
been suggested that future banking licences might be issued only on 
a reciprocal basis - to institutions from countries which themselves 
permit the entry of Hong Kong-based banks . 
The number of banks and ,banking offices is given in Table 4.1. 
There was a noticeable fall in the number of licensed banks between 
1950 and 1957 (from 133 banks to 83) and a further reduction a fte r 
1962 (from 92 banks to 75 banks in December 1967). Almost all the 
surrendered licences belonged to small local banks. In fact , 
between 1950 and 1966 about 80 small banks handed in their licences. 
But in the same period several new and usually larger institutions 
were set up and a number of overseas banks established branches in 
the Colony. Between 1953 and 1963 about eighteen 'expatriate' 
banks, mainly from East and South Asia, but also American and 
European banks, were granted banking licences. The entry of these 
additional foreign banks added greatly to banking competition, and 
the Hongkong Bank, at least, 'questioned the casual manner in which 
3 
overseas banks have been allowed to set up in Hong Kong' . 
1 
P . H . M, Jones, FEER, 7 April 1966, p . 35 . 
2 3 
Tomkins Report, p.13. SCMP, 1 May 1965. 
Table 4 , 1 
NUMBER OF BANKS LICENSED TO OPERATE IN HONG KONG AND NUMBER 
OF BANKING OFFICES 
Number of 
licensed banks 
Number of banki ng 
offices (including 
head office) 
( 1947) a (252)b,c 
1950 133 135 
1954 94d 97 
1957 83 n . a . 
1960 86 llO 
1961 85 159 
1962 92 187 
1963 87 215 
1964 88 275 
1965 78 301 f 
1966 76e 318g 
1967 75e 331 
a 31 December each year. b Number of banks. 
C Including 23 authorised banks. 
d Including 26 authorised banks . 
e Including 51 authorised banks . 
f After closur e of 25 branches of Canton Trust Bank and two 
branches of Ming Tak Ban1':.. 
g After closure of 4 branches of Yau Yue Connnercial Bank . 
Sources: Hong Kong Annual Report, various; Far Eastern 
Economic Review , various . 
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Another development shown in the Table is the recent establish-
ment of branch networks . Until 1960 the Colony ' s banking system was 
organised vi rtually on a unit basis with only the larger institutions 
having more than one office. By the end of 1966 there were 242 
branch offices 1 and only 22 banks (about half of them foreign and 
2 
the remainder small local banks) had no branches . The larger 
banks have been especially active in openi ng additional offices . 
The Hongkong Bank in December 1966 had 49 branches in the Colony, 
and the Chartered Bank sixteen, compared with two and one respectively 
1 
The increase in bank o fices has been at a slower rate than the 
growth of bank dep osits. The value of deposits per banking office 
increased from $14 . 5 million in 1960 to $21 million in 1966 , 
2 
The geographi cal distribution of the 318 bank offices in December 
1966 was : Hong Kong Island 159, Kowloon 133, New Territories 26. 
The Hongkong Bank also maintained s everal mobile branches in the 
New Territories , 
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in 1954. The main reason fo r this gr owth of branch networ sis 
that the banks have active ly sought to coll ct che small per sonal 
sav ings wh ich were earlier he l d a s currency hoards or jewellery , 
and which , with increasing pro perity , have become mo r e important. 1 
Th larger bank have als o aimed at providing customers w th r ady 
acces to a loca l, and usually Chi nese, manager, to overcome any 
belief that those seeking loans 'have to queue up at the head 
office and see the Genera l Manager'. 
There have been very few mergers or takeovers. In 1959 the 
Mercanti l e Bank became a wholly owned subsidiar y of the Hongkong 
Bank . In 1961 a Japanese bank took a 30 per cent interest in the 
locally-owned Chekaing First Bank of Cormnerce, Chase Manhattan 
Bank N. A. in 1964 purchased t he Hong Kong business of the Nationale 
Handelsbank N.V . , and re -cormnenced banking operations in the Colony 
after the closur e of its Hong Kong branch during the Kor ean war. 
During the 1965 banking cr isis , the Hongkong Bank took a 51 per 
cent inter est in the Hang Seng Bank, a large, l ocally-owned inst i= 
tution. In 1966 two French banks operating in Hong Kong were 
merged into the Banque Nat i onale de Paris . In the same year the 
as s ets and l iabilities of Yau Yue Commercial Bank , a small 
Philipp ine =Chin se bank , were taken over by the Hongkong Bank whe n 
the ormer ins itution faced . insolvency . 
A Clas s ification of Conunercial Banks 
Given the large numb r of commercial banks, some classifica-
tion of banks by si ze or unction is necess ar fo r purposes of 
description , Of cour se, the d i rsity of banks does not make this 
classification an easy one; as was noted in the Tomkins Repor t, ' at 
present (Apr 1 1962) there are 87 differ ent bank; and it is only 
1 
The l ocal manager of the Chartered Bank ommented in 1966: 'I 
suppose saving deposit s haver ally been the stimulus behind branch 
banking ,' P . A. Graham , ' The Banking Industry of Hong Kong' , Uni = 
versity of Hong Kong, Department of Extra -mural S udies, public 
lecture, 6 D cember 1966, mimeographed, p . 6 . 
a sl i ght exagge r ation to say that this means that there are 87 
1 di f erent types of banks '. 
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One criter ion fo r grouping the banks is the s ize of depos i ts, 
but few banks show s epara tely their Hong Kong accounts, and accounts 
on a global bas i s are not availab le or some institut ions, s uch as 
the Ma inland Chi na banks. I t is possible t o classify the banks on 
the basis of the size of pai d up cap ita l (Table 4 . 2) , but this 
groupi ng, although , of course, useful in showing the strength of 
the capital r esour ces of the banking s ystem, does not give any i n = 
dication of the extent of the local business of the various 
institutions. The distincti on between authori sed and unauthoris ed 
banks, outlined in the previous Chapter (autho r ised banks undertake 
f ore i gn exchange deal ings at offi c ia l exchange rates, and can freely 
operate their s terl ing accounts; unauthor i sed banks deal in the f ree 
marke t in f ore ign currencies and a r e restr i cted in the i r sterl ing 
deal i ngs is an impor tan t one, bu t it conceals a number of othe r 
fundamental differ ences, more es pecially on the side of the 
authorised banks. Pe r haps t he mos t us e f u l grouping is one based 
both on 1 nationality' and, r oughly , on bank s i ze , and on t hese 
criteria the 75 banks can be class ified as the Br i t i sh banks , the 
Mainland China banks, the expatriate banks, the large local banks 
and the small l ocal banks , 
1 
Table 4 . 2 
LICENSED BANKS BY SIZE OF PAID UP CAPITAL, 
30 AUGUST 1966 
Paid up cap i tal ab ove $10m, 
Pa i d up cap ita l $7 . 5m, t o $10m. 
Pa i d up capital less than $7 , 5m. 
Unincorporated banks 
Number of 
banks 
40 
10 
22 
~ 
76 
Source: Commiss i oner of Banking, personal communicat i on . 
1.2,mkins Report, p , 2 , 
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(a) The British Banks, The thre note i s suing banks - the 
Hongkong Bank, the Chartered Bank and the Mercantile Bank - ar 
frequently referred to as the 'Britis h banks' , even though t wo ha e 
1 thei r head office s in the Colony. These three i nsti tutions hav e 
occup i ed a dominant po ition in the Colony's banking system sine 
the 1870s; this pre - eminence has been maintained through the recent 
period of industrialisation and rapid economi c growth. The local 
business of the British banks has changed quite fundamentally s ince 
the Pacific war, and they are no longer accurately described as 
'exchange banks'. 
In one e stimate, the three banks in 1963 'almost certainly 
account[ed) for considerably more than 50 per cent of all cormner = 
2 
cial banking business in the Colony'; wi th the r ecent growth in 
branch networks, the employing of additional Chinese branch managers 
and the transfer of deposi ts from the smaller banks dur ing the 1965 
banking crisis, 3 the three banks ' share of Hong Kong banking bus i= 
ness would now be even higher . 
The banks remain supra=territorial institutions, but the 
establishment of local control over banking in many of the territo= 
ries i n whi ch they are represented has requi red them to consider 
their operations more on individual country bases, Their close 
contacts with the London money market and the i r holding the accounts 
of the leading export houses and manufacturers give them a dominant 
position in the market f or sterling , As was seen in the previous 
Chapter, an igreement between these banks and the Exchange Fund 
sets the limits t o movements i.n the Hong Kong dollar - sterling ex-
change rate, and the actual rate is determined within these ext remes 
by the three banks i n consultation , The banks have been, of course 
1 
The head offi c 
Colony since the 
offi ce was moved 
2 
of the Hongkong Bank has been located in the 
Bank ' s establishment , The Mercantile Bank ' s head 
to Hong Kong in 1965 . 
David Will iams, 'Commer ial Banking in the ar East ' , The Banker, 
Apr i l 1963, p , 419. 
3 
S below, p . 151 , 
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s trongly in l uenced by British banking trad:i.tions and pra t:ices, 
but they have been not unwilling t o adopt more fl exib le atti tudes 
on a number o oc as i ons , as , fo r examp l e , in under taki ng long= 
term indus t r ial lending. As expres sed by a former Chairman of the 
Hongkong Bank 
although r udite author ities on the pr inc i ple of s ecuri = 
ties or banke rs might wel l ra ise the i r hands i n ho rror 
at some of our method s they would do wel l to remember 
that it would be a pity f or our indust r ial growth if some 
of the more sophis ticated methods of the progressive 
c ountries f orced banks in Hong Kong t o adop t a tighter 
and less htLman lending policy . l 
The wil lingness of thes banks t o depart f rom t he conservative 
English banking pra c tices more us ua l ly followe d i n colonia l terr i= 
to r ies has both re fl ected and contributed t o Hong Kong' s more 
advanced le el of economic development . 
As well as hold ing the acc ounts of many of the larger merchant 
houses= Chinese as well as British= the t hree Br itish banks con= 
duct the banking business of the Government , the public utility 
companies and most large manufactur ing firms . But , espec ially 
s ince the late 1950s , the British banks have had as customers many 
small Chines e busines ses and depositors . There has probably been 
more cont act betwe n the expatriate British banks and l ocal busi= 
nes ses and res den t s in Hong Kong than els ewhere among the co lonial 
territor i s . 
The mos t dominant bank by far i s the Hongkong Bank, which 
alone conducts one =third to two=fif ths of the Co lony ' s banking 
bu i.ness. The Bank i par t of a wo rld -wide group, having as subsi= 
di ar i e s the M r antile Bank and the Br t ish Bank of the Middle East , 
and b anking and hi re pur hase inter sts in the United States, Br i ta i n, 
Austral i a and Wes t Indies , The Bank 's ro le has been likened to that 
1 
Quoted Geth n Dav ies , op , c it. , p , 244 , I t i.s inter esting t o 
compare thi.s with the obser a tion of E , Nevin , op . cit , , p ,48, 
tha t an 9 mpor t ant fe a tur e of the po lic of the expatriate banks 
has been the r etention i n overseas t err tor i es of conventions and 
standard to which the banks had become accustomed i n their native 
countries and whi ch the exported t o the overseas t rr i tories in 
the same way as the co l onisers exported their currency and their 
capita l ' , 
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enjoyed b the Bank o England in London in the la te nineteenth 
l 
centur y: it has a lar ge share of t he Co lony 0 s banki ng bus ines s and 
s everal a t tr ibut es of a central bank . The Bank has great presc i ge 
in Hong Kong, and has l ong been clos e l y i dentified wi t h the Colony. 
For example , dur ing the Pacific war, the Bank ' s head of ice ~ whi ch 
had be en tempora r i l y moved t o London = promi ed considerab l e assist = 
ance to enable the re - establishment , a ter the war, of the publ i c 
ut il i t y companies; the Hongkong Bank, al ong wi th the Char t ered Bank 
in the lat e 1940s pioneered the granting of medium te rm l oans for 
i ndus trial purposes; and the Bank took special steps t o ass i st cot t on 
sp i nning mi lls a f ter a Uni t ed States embargo on cotton expor t s t o 
Hong Kong i n 1950 . Almost all the i mportan t Hong Kong bus i nesses 
2 have accounts with the Hongkong Bank . Cheq ues drawn on an account 
wi t h the Bank are widely accepted i n Hong Kong . 
Through its London office, the Bank ha a c l ose contac t with 
t he London money market . The London of f ic e is r esponsible f or 
employing l i quid funds , hol ding the s t erl i ng part of t he Bank ' s 
r e s e r ves, negot i at i ng trade bills, e t c . 
Hong Kong bus i ne s s i s of less impor t ance in the global opera= 
tions of the Chartered Bank . None theles s, t he Bank does under t ake 
a s i gnif i cant share - probably around 10 or 12 per cent - of the 
Colony' s banking bu s i ness . 
These t wo British banks h ave performed several functions else~ 
where undertaken by central banks . The banks ' role in issuing 
currency and i n. the. determinat i on of the exchange rate between the 
do l lar and sterl i ng hav been outl i ned alr eady. The two i nsti tutions 
hold t he Gov·e rnment ' s bank depos i ts and conduct trans f ers of Govern= 
ment funds . When, i n 1965, the Government decided to transfer a 
par t of its r serves f rom London to Hong Kong to h elp banks meet 
the liquidity provis i ons of the 1964 Banking Ordinance, the Government 
1 
David Wi lliams, ' Hong Kong' in W. Crick (ed . ), op. cit . , p . 174 . 
2 
All bu t seven of the sixty compan es lis ted on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange have an account with t he Hongkong Bank . 
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funds were lent through , and gua r anteed by , the two Br itish banks. 
They have a l so ac t ed as bankers ' bank . The other c ommercial banks 
hold deposits with the two British banks fo r clea r i ng1 and liquidity 
pur pose s, and have borrowed from the British banks when in d1ff i cu l = 
t i es = i.e . the Hongkong Bank and the Chartered Bank have acked in 
a lender of the l ast resort capa c ity, It i s known that the two 
Br i t ish banks assisted some local banks in 1961, 1965 and 1966, and 
there are poss ibly other cases which have not been made public . 2 
The Hongkong Bank has also, on a t leas t two occasions pursued 
what might be termed a policy of quantitative control of credit 3 
And the Brit i sh banks cla im to have adjusted dep osit rates in ac = 
4 
cordance with the i r as ses sment of the needs of the local economy, 
(b) The Mainland China Banks. Another easily identified group 
are the nine banks wh ose head offices are located in Mainland China. 
Most of these banks were founded before the establishment of the 
Communist Government in Ch i na, and the Hong Kong branches changed 
their a llegiance from the Nationalist Chinese Government when 
Britain formally recognised t he present Peking regime i n November 
1950 . The most important of the nine i s the Bank of China which is 
China 0 s main institution of foreign exchange and t rade finance . As 
befits i nstitutions int imately concerned with t rade and exchange, 
the banks are bel ieved t o b~ highly liquid , Al l are authoris ed 
banks, Because of the United States Treasury restriction on Coromu= 
nist Ch i nes e dealings i n U.S . currency , the Mainland Ch i na banks 
are unable to deal in U.S . dollar s on either of the Hong Kong ex= 
change markets , The Mainland banks conduct a conside rable bus iness 
in remittances from the overseas Chines e , 
1 
2 
Clearing rr angements are descr i bed below. See p . 119 , 
The local manage r O " the Hongkong Bank wrote i n 1965 that the two 
Britis h banks 'habitually act as lender of the last resort ' and 
' prov ded that a bank i s being r un on s ound lines th ere should be 
no dif i cultv n obtain ng he l p if it suffers a t empor ar y shortage 
of l i qu i d ity'. ~ ' 22 April 1965, p . 17 7. 
3 4 
See pp , 26-7, See pp .1 37- 8 . 
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Much of the use fulnes s of the Hong Kong branches f rom the 
Chine s e point of v iew a r ise s f rom the Hong Kong dollar 's ready 
convertibility. The Mainland banks can exchange, fo r sterl ing or 
most other world currencies, the Hong Kong dollars ear ned from 
China' s trade and other connnercial dealings with t h e Colony , and 
with this f oreign exchange payment can be made fo r Chinese imports , 
or the funds can be transferred to London and used to buy gold . 
The Mainland banks, however, do not have a monopoly in the finance 
of Chinese foreign trade - a part is still arranged by other banks, 
including the note i s suing institut ions - or of remittance trans -
f ers, some of which a re still made th r ough local Hong Kong banks . 
Nor are the Mainland banks exclusively concerned with trade and 
e xchange business; advances are made both the offi c ial Chinese 
corporations operating in the Colony and to local businesses. The 
Mainland banks h av e a popular reputation fo r operating on a most 
. b . 1 conservative asis . 
(c ) The Expatriate Banks . There have been branches in .Ho~g 
Kong of European and American banks f rom early in the Colony ' s 
history. There were t en of t hese e xpat riate banks in the early 
1950s . Another eighteen or so have s ince been s e t up, three f rom 
the Uni ted States and the remainder f r om Japan and o t her Asian 
countries , Some are Government =owned inst itutions , The Hong Kong 
capital reserves of these e xpatriat e banks are mostly quite small. 
Local branches rely for capital reserves, and also for second line 
liquid assets, on the global operations of the parent. 
The main interest of many of the expatriate banks, notably 
those f rom South and South East Asia, is in financing trade, espe -
2 
cially, b u t no t exclusively, with their country o f origin, However, 
over recent years the United States and Japanese banks, at least, 
have undertak n s ome l ocal business, often with fi rms establ ished 
n Hong Kong by int rests in the banks' country of origi n. 
1 
See The E onom st, 14 November 1964, p . 733 . 
2 
Tomki ns Report, p,13 , 
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d) The Large Local Banks . The rema ining fo r t y or so banks 
are local ins itutions and r ange in si ze f r om t he large and s t rong 
Hang Seng Bank and Bank of East As i a t o the ve r y small unincorporated 
banks with one banking office , a small cl i entele and depos its of less 
than $2 mi l l ion . It i s us e fu l t o d i stinguish between the large and 
the smal l local banks , but even t hi s divi s ion hide s many impor tant 
differences . A group of about ten can be regarded as the large 
local banks . 
This categor y includes the Bank of East Asi a1 and the Bank of 
Canton, both of wh ich were established in the 1910s as the fi rst 
Ch inese =owned Western - style banks . In 1966 the deposits held by 
these t wo banks were, respect ively , $362 mi llion and $179 million. 
The two institutions have branch networks th roughout South East 
Asia, and a r e particularly important in financing trade and remit-
tances . 
The other eight or so banks i n this class ification do not have 
branches outside Hong Kong , The larges t i s the Hang Seng Bank, 
whi ch now h olds about one =tenth of the Colony ' s bank depos its. The 
Bank was established in 1933 as a partnership deal i ng i n remittances, 
money changing and gold exchange, and made lar ge but v ar i ab le profit s 
from s pec ulat i on in gold, currencies and cormnodities after the 
Pacific war: i n 1947 the Bank ' s profi t was $6 million (or about 
th r ee times its cap tal) , in 1948 a profit of about $2 mi llion was 
earned , When dealings in gold and commodit i es became l e ss profi table 
i n the early 1950s t he Bank move d into the fi eld of real estate ad-
vances and used a part of the sizeable profi ts earned to st rengthen 
its capital , Between 1952, when the Bank was incorpora ted as a 
pr ivate company , and 1966, pa id up capital was i ncreased f rom $5 
million to $100 mi ll i on, and dep osi t liabil i ties rose f rom $14 
mi ll ion to $789 mi l l i on , A bi lls department was establ i shed i n the 
late 1950s , The Bank has recently begun lending f or manufac turing 
purposes . 
1 
The Bank of the Eas t Asia is a publ i c company , wi th i t s shares 
l isted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange . 
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Except that their recent growth is a litt le less spectacular, 
the development of t he other large local banks i s simi lar to that 
of the Hang Seng Bank, These institutions were mostly established 
before the Paci fi c war as partnerships to deal in gold and money 
transfers, and were qu ickly re - established i n the specula t ors' 
markets a f ter 1945, when large profits were earned and retained to 
finance expansion, Pro fit s were greatly reduced in the period 1950 
to 1955. The banks began to place greater emphasis on the granting 
1 
of loans f or r eal estate purposes , Gradually the acceptance of 
deposits became a more important business. With the establishment 
of trade bills sections in the late 1950s, the cont i nued growth of 
deposits and the recent entry into the fiel d of industrial loans, 
these banks have outgrown their earlier reputation of money changers 
and now undertake familiar commercial banking activities. Through 
close contacts with the Chinese business connnunity , a willingness 
2 
to open long hours and an ability to offer a fl exible and personal 
service , these banks have been in a strong position to attract busi-
ness . Recently , there has been a strengthening of capital reserves 
and the establishment of branch networks in Hong Kong . In most 
cases, there is s till a very close i dentification of the bank with 
a particular family: the bank's cap i tal is usually tightly held and 
most senior positions are occupied by members of the family , 
There is another institution which , on the basis of size , might 
be included wi thin this group - Wayfoong Finance, a subsidiary of 
the Hongkong Bank . Although licensed as a bank , this institution 
operates as a hire purchase company, At the end of 1966 it had 
fixed depos it liabilities of $91 million, 
1 
It was estimated that about four-fifths of the advances of the 
larger local banks i n 1959 was f or r eal estate us es , See Ng Kwok 
Leung, 'The Native Banks; their Structure and Interest Rates ' ,~ 
11 February 1960, p . 309. 
2 
The attitude of the larger banks t o the long trading hours of 
their smaller competitors is perhaps shown by the way in which the 
Hongkong Bank and the Chartered Bank required the Liu Chong Hing 
~ drastically to reduce its trading hours when the two British 
banks came to the assistance of the local bank in 1961. 
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e ) The Smal l Loca l Banks . It i s difficult t o general is e 
about t he rema ining thirty or so l i censed banks, ot her t han t o say 
that they are smal l , and local in outlook and opera t ions . As was 
seen i n the d i scus s ion on Table 4. 1, a l arge number of smal l banks 
was set up early i n the postwar per i od, ma i nly t o operate as gold 
dealers and money changers. Under the 1948 Banki ng Ordinance these 
businesses could readily be licensed as banks whether or not they 
were soundly run, and regardless of t heir main business interest. 
In fact, under the definition of banking bus iness adopted in the 
Ordinance, perhaps all gold dealers and exchange shops should have 
held banking licences . There was a big decrease in the number of 
these banks in the early 1950s, more as a result of the slump i n 
exchange speculation than of the 1948 Ordinance. 
There have been several changes in the operations of the small 
local banks over the past t wo decades, mostly in the direction of 
their accepting business of a more conventional commerc i al banking 
nature. Currency exchange is still an important part of the bus i = 
ness of a number of banks, but speculation on the exchanges is 
greatly reduced , Much of the business i n remittances from overseas 
Ch i nese has been lost to the Mainland banks . Commodity speculation 
has been unimportant since the early 1950s. Through the 1950s and 
much of the present decade, lending for real estate transactions 
1 has been ' probably the mainstay ' of these institutions . Until 
recently, the majority of institutions had slender capital resources. 
It was suggested in 1963 that only ten local banks had a paid up 
capital greater than $5 million, and that the ' typ cal' size of 
bank capital was $2 million . 2 Only eleven local banks were though t 
to have liquid asset rat i os in excess of 20 per cent , 
As wi th the large local banks, there is frequently a close 
identification of a bank with a particular f amily . This association 
1 
2 
~' 11 February 1965, p , 270. 
Dav i d Williams, ' Hong Kong Banking', Three Banks Revi ew, March 
1963, p.35 . 
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has tended to prevent bank mergers and takeovers, and has , on a 
number of occasions, r esulted in strong i nterbank jealousies and, 
more rarely , r umour s preading . Many of the banks still have small 
capital r esources; as Table 4,2 showed, in August 1966 , 22 banks 
had a pa i d up capital of less than $7.5 million . Four of the banks 
are unincorporated . The operations of a few of the institutions in 
this group are more accurately described as money lending and money 
changing. The 1964 Banking Ordinance made it illegal for banks to 
trade on their own account and to grant unsecured loans, and has 
required that the banks give more respect to capital and liquidity 
considerations. 
With their small size, personal control and willingness to open 
for long hours, these banks have been able to offer a highly person= 
alised service to their customers, especially to small Chinese 
businesses. An ex411anager of a small bank said that ne 'spoke the 
right language for his customers in a number of ways'; he visited 
many customers daily, and had informal agreements with them in a way 
not possible in a larger institution . 
Not all the small banks offer current deposit f acilities . In= 
terest rates on time and saving deposits have been higher than those 
paid by the larger banks and, until recently, interest was paid on 
current deposits . In one or · two of the smaller banks, depositors 
can withdraw their deposits in gold. Some of these banks have 
attracted deposits from particular groups of overseas Chinese. Few 
negotiate trade bills , In the absence of a local securities market, 
the liquid asset holdings of most small local banks are confined to 
cash, deposits with other banks and foreign currency holdings. 
1 The Banks and the Money Market 
The Hong Kong money market was for a long time largely confined 
to transactions between the note i ssuing banks and the other 
1 
This section draws heavily on David Williams, 'Hong Kong' in 
W. Crick, op . cit., pp , 179-81, and Ng Kwok Leung, 'Reform Round 
the Corner in Hong Kong',~' 11 April 1963, pp .90-5. 
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connnerc al banks . The latter borrowed ove rni gh t f rom t he Hongkong 
~ and the Chartered Bank to meet any serious clearing drain , and 
perhaps deposited wi th these t wo British banks any short ~term s urplus 
of Hong Kong dollars . Among the unauthorised banks there was a we ll = 
organised but thin market in f oreign currenc i es and gol d . A wi der ~ 
bu t still pur e l y interbank - money market emerged i n the late 1950s, 
when a number of expatriate banks required more Hong Kong dol l ars 
t han they were able to attract by way of deposits, while a number of 
local and overseas Chinese banks held surp lus funds . The f orm of 
the money market has changed little in the past ten years . The main 
borrowers are several of the expatriate banks . As the mai n i nt eres t 
of these ins ti tutions is trade finance, t hey can gear the i r day to 
day liquidity requirements to the matur i t y of their bills portfol i o, 
and resort to the interbank market in the event of a sudden i ncrease 
i n the demand for cash . At times, some of the e xpatriate banks have 
been aggressive borrowers. But not all expatriate banks have bor = 
rowed f rom the market, and some have operated both ways . The marke t 
has been supplied mostly f rom the medium~s i zed local and overseas 
Chines e banks, and with f unds which otherwise would have been t rans = 
fe rred to Lo~don or New York . Rarely have local banks gone to the 
market as borrowers : some consider it would be a ' sign of weakness ' 
1 
t o do so ; some that lending -on the interbank market means 'putting 
. 2 
money in competitors' hands' 
On this interbank market money is usually dealt in at cal l, 
seven and fourteen days and one month, but interbank deposits of 
three months are becoming more common. Interest rates on call 
money show a seasonal peak (usually around 5 per cent) at the end 
of the year when most banks balance, and at Chinese New Year. The 
i nterbank rate ros e to 7\ per cent in the 1961 and 1965 banking 
crises. This money carried its lowest rate - of around 2t per 
cent - in February 1963 . 
1 
S .K. Ye e (Managing Director, United Chi nese Bank),~. 28 May 
1962, p.639 . 
2 
P .H .M. Jones, !fillli., 27 April 1967, p . 185 . 
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Five or six brokers operate in the marke t , but not as pr i n -
c i pals . Brokerage i s [ 6 per cent per month, charged on the borrower . 
Contacts are more u sually made directly be tween banks, by telephone 
about 10 a .m. when the banks balance their cash positions f rom the 
prev i ous night. The borrowing bank issues a depos it r eceipt and 
receives a cashier's order, manager's cheque or a cheque drawn on 
a third bank . No security is offered, but a lending bank may set a 
limit for any one borrower. 
The money market is purely an interbank market . There are no 
Treasury Bills on issue, and the Government debt is small in amount 
and tightly held, There are no official rediscount facilities , 
Nor is there a market in commercial paper. In the words of a lead= 
ing banker, 'Bankers here seem to prefer to hold their own paper 
until maturity largely because in the past there has been a surplus 
of credit and at least partly because with the large number of banks 
they fear that the information obtainable by a competitor regard i ng 
their customers' transactions will be used to solicit business ' . 1 
In any case, the supply of bills coming on to the market might not 
be continuous, and there would be ne ed fo r a parallel market i n 
short-term Government paper to even out supply and demand; 'without 
these two factors it is simpler for banks to hold their liquidity 
overseas rather than switch it backwards and forwards, introducing 
a dis tinctly unrewarding exchange cost' . 2 
Of course, a main reason for the undeveloped nature of the 
money market is that, with the Hong Kong dollar f reely transferable 
into sterling at only a small exchange cost, many institut i ons pre -
fer to hold their liquid balances abroad. Even those banks which 
are f requent lenders on the local i nterbank market move excess funds 
to London when the sterling -Hong Kong dollar rate i s f avourable, As 
all authorised banks have deposits in London, transfers of sterling 
can be made between the banks to meet interbank debts or ad just 
1 2 
P .A. Graham, op. cit,, p.14. Ibid , 
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i d . . 1 liqu ity ratios. When the banks as a whole wish to move into 
sterling or Hong Kong do llars , the note is s uing banks approach the 
Exchange Fund in a manner described i n the previous Chapter . 
Desp ite its l imitations, the money market has per formed the 
useful function of providing a liqui d outlet in Hong Kong for the 
temporar i ly s urplus funds of the large local and South East Asian 
banks and of providing the expatriate banks with additional Hong 
Kong dollar balances . As a commentator on the money markets of 
Malaysia and Singapore has reminded us, 
The deve lopment of a money market should be judged ... 
by its adequacy in meeting current demands made upon it , 
ra ther than by its institutional structure . What might 
seem undeveloped, or even inadequate, when compared with 
the stage of institutional development in London mi~ht 
prove to be adequate when taken in a local context. 
Competition Between Banks 
There has been a very strong degree of competition between the 
commercial banks through the whole postwar period. The form of this 
competition has, though, changed significantly . The main reason for 
the intensely competi tive conditions i s simply that there 
are too many banks, even allowing for the international 
importance of Hong Kong . (Because of the impor tance of 
Hong Kong as an i nternational trading and financ i al centre 
a large and possibly i ncreasing number of expatriate banks 
will cont i nue to want to, at least , ' show the fl at ' here . ) 
The volume of busines s available i s spread too thin and 
the struggle for depos its and s ur v ival i s fostering ' cut = 
throat ' competition reflected in part by the payment of 
high rates of interest and by the rapid expansion of branch 
banking . 3 
The mobili ty of a significant part of bank deposits has con= 
tributed to an at times quite fierce competition between a number 
of the banks . Quite a few depositors have maintained more than one 
account, freely transferring the i r f unds wh en induced to do so by 
the o ffe r of a higher interest rate or some other advantage , And 
many depositors - local depositors new to the banking habit and 
1 
For the outline of a similar pract ice among the Si ngapore banks , 
see David Will iams, 'Money Markets of Sou t h =East As ia', The Banker, 
May 1963, p , 488 . 
2 3 
Ibid., p.485. Tomkins R por t , p . 7 . 
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overs e as depos i t ors ~ may not have fl t a l os e r elac i onship wi t h 
any part i cul ar bank . Bu t it is not t he case t ha t al l depos its are 
mobi le betwe n banks , The depos its o Gover nment and t he l arger 
merchan t and manu f a turing concerns a r e tight l y he l d by t he Br i t ish 
banks , wh i le f amily con tacts and a common dialec t have made t he 
d posits of a number of mall banks s imilar l y i nnnobil . Unt il 1964 
when an i nterest rate agreement came into force, competiti on fo r 
bank depos i ts result ed in something of an interest rate war. 1 Com= 
pe t i tion now takes the f orm of the es t abl i shmen t of branch networks 
d f d . . 2 an o a vertising . The smaller banks have t he advantage of l onger 
trading hour s . 
On the ass ts s i de , competition is most active fo r bus i ness 
directly concerned with international trade - opening credits, 
negotiating bills, the granting of trust r eceipt loans, etc . This 
business is favoured both f or i ts return and i ts liquidity , The 
establishment in Hong Kong of add i t i onal expatriate banks, t he entry 
of more local banks i n t he trade finance business, and t he slow ra t e 
of growt h of trade i n comparison with bank funds, have i ntens ifi ed 
bank compe t ition f or t his bus iness , There is less compe t i t ion f or 
o ther f orms of bank adv ances , Only the British banks are yet i m-
portant as lenders of medium term f unds f or indust r y . Further, some 
of the loans f or rea l estate granted by the smaller banks would not 
have been available from the larger institutions, 3 and many of the 
adv ances of the Mainland banks are granted to Connnunist Chinese 
agencies, 
There have been three formal associations of banks : the Ex~ 
change Banks Ass oc i ation, the Bankers ' Clear ing House and the 
1 
2 
See below, pp . 137- 9 . 
The Chartered Bank for a while offe red its depos itors a f ree 
accident i.ns u.ranc scheme , but discon tinued the scheme under 
pressure from the other connnerc ial banks . 
3 
As the repres ntative of th Hongkong Bank told the Radcliffe 
Committee , ' A good de l of the bus i ness done b indigenous banks 
would not ha been handled by us at any ra te of nteres t' . Quoted 
L .A, Presnell , ' A Gli.mps e o~ Banki ng in Hong Kong ' , Three Banks 
ge iew, September 1961, p , 28. 
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1 Inter =Bank Interes t Rate Agreement. Membership of t he E chang 
Banks Ass ociation is op n to any authoris ·d bank , The Association 
is concerned w t h establ i shing the terms and condition of trans ~ 
actions in the official xchang marke t and with de termining minimum 
charges fo r c r tain banking serv ices concerned with trade and ex= 
change . embers also agree on the hours in which exchange bus i.n ss 
is transa ted. The Hong Kong dollar=sterling rate i s set by the 
Exchange Sub=committee of this Associa tion . The Ass ociation was 
influ ntial in bringing about the interbank agreement on depos it 
rates, but members do not agree on the rates of interest charged on 
advances. Until 1965 , the Committee of the Exchange Bank's As socia= 
tion consisted of the three British banks, the Bank of East Asia, 
two Mainland banks, one United States and one Dutch bank , Af ter a 
certain amount of f riction between members, the Committee ' s compo= 
sition was altered and now consists of the Chartered Bank, the 
2 Hongkong Bank, the Bank of China and several elected members. 
There i s no ormal association of unauthorised banks . 
The acti e competition between banks has had several conse= 
quences , In the v iew of a number of bankers, probably the most 
important r esult was that until the 1964 interest rate agreement, 
competit on between banks led to a high level of deposit rates, the 
consequences of which are seen below . The large number of banks 
and the active competition may also have made it easier for rather 
unsound borrowers to obtain funds. And, the competition among the 
smaller banks led, on one or two occasions, to some malicious r umour 
spreading , On the other hand , the rather i ntense competition between 
banks must have contributed to their success ful mobilisation of 
pri ate savings , And the interest rate agreement has pre ented a 
repet tion of the potentially dangeroua int reat t'ate war . It mu t 
l 
The I.earing house and the interest r at . agreement are dis cussed 
below , pp .1 19 , 138 . 
2 
Se Hong Kong Standard , 17 Februar y 1.965 . This news paper r ferred 
to the Exchange Banks Ass oc i ation as ' local big busines s' most 
exclusi r club' , 
b e remembered, too , that there is not the comp e t i t ion b twe e n 
banks and non-bank f inancial institut i ons t h a t i s a fe ature o f 
the monetary s y s tems of many countries . 
114 
Chapter 5 
THE COMMERCIAL BANKS - II : ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
No statistical information is available on the struc ture of 
commercial bank assets and liabilities before 1954. Presumably, 
deposits increased rapidly in the early postwar years as connnerce 
was re-established and the Chinese Civil War drove capital from 
China. A number of Chinese~owned banks moved from the Mainland, 
bringing with them, in aggregate, a considerable amount of funds . 
But there was little competition between banks for deposi t s . In 
1949 it was reported t hat the limited outlet for bank advances dis -
couraged many banks from accepting new deposits: some banks paid no 
interest on their depositors' accounts, other no more than 1 per 
1 h d . 1 cent per annum on twe ve mont epos1ts. The slump in economic 
ac t i v ity i n 1951 presumably led to an appreciable fall i n both 
deposits and the demand for bank credit. Throughout 1952 a number 
) 
of banks took further steps to discourage depositors. 2 Commercial 
bank assets and liabilities began increasing again in early 1953. 
Statistics on bank deposits, loans and advances and liquid 
asset holdings have been collected since December 1954 (Table 5.1). 
A more detailed classification of the assets and liabili ties of the 
corrunercial banks is available from 1960 (Table 5.2). Wha t stands 
out most clearly from the two tables is the very rapid expansion of 
the corrunercial banking system. Between 1954 and 1966 deposits in-
creased eight times to $8,405 million, and loans and advances more 
than ten times to $5,380 million. The year by year changes in 
deposits and advances are shown in Table 5 . 3. 
1 2 
~' 13 April 1949. ~' 2 October 1952. 
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Table 5 . 1 
HONG KONG COMMERCIAL BANKS : a DEPOSITS AND ASSETS, 1954 TO 1967 
($ million) 
1954b 1955 1956 195 7 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
L DEPOSITS 
Demand 828 852 928 955 988 1205 1393 1470 1664 1997 2338 2532 2681 
Time 139 152 173 267 351 482 752 1234 1768 2283 2639 3099 3742 
Savings 101 133 166 190 244 369 537 663 879 1145 1515 1620 1982 
Tot al 1068 1137 1267 1412 15 83 2056 2682 3367 4311 5425 6491 7251 8405 
ASSETS 
2 . Cash n . a . 144 97 118 84 86 136 114 162 210 202 221 232 
3 . Net balances with other 
banks n .a. 459 541 5 78 730 775 930 1041 1482 1831 1577 2133 2862 
4 . Loans and advances 510 632 769 865 919 1373 1720 2334 2849 3642 4612 5038 5380 
5 ' Investments 69 96 98 101 121 133 166 232 191 187 271 527 53 7 
RATIO (to deposit s) 
6 . Cash n . a. 12 . 7 7 . 7 8 .4 5.3 4 . 2 5 . 1 3 . 4 3 . 8 3 . 7 3 . 6 3 . 0 2 . 8 
7. Liquid assets n . a . 53 . 3 50 . 4 49.3 51. 4 41. 9 39 .7 34 , 3 38 . 1 37.5 27 .6 32 . 5 36 . 8 
8 . Loans a nd advances 47. 8 55 . 6 60 .7 61.3 58 . 1 66 . 8 64 . 1 69. 3 66.1 67 . 1 69. 8 69.5 64 . 0 
a Until 1964 some smaller banks were excluded, and a pa r t of t he increas e in de posits and assets for the period 1954 to 1964 
represent s a progressively wider coverage. This element cannot have been impor ta nt . ) 
b 31 December each year. 
Source : Hong Kong Government Gazette, Supplement No.4 . 
1967 
2658 
3324 
2180 
81 62 
333 
2347 
5343 
590 
4 .1 
32 , 8 
65 . 5 
~ 
~ 
Q\ 
31.12 . 60 30.6.61 
LlABILITlES 
l. No t es ia circulation 9l4 945 
2. Deposit s 
Deman~ 1,392 1,503 
Time 752 959 
Saving 537 5 94 
Total (2.682) (3 ,056~ 
3. Ba lances due to o t her banks in 
Hong Kong 300 369 
Abroad 359 3 67 
4. Other liabilities 1,064 1,213 
TOTAL 5 ,31 9 5,950 
------ ----------------- ---------- -- -- ---------- --------
ASSETS 
5. Cash 136 131 
6 . Ba lances due from other banks i n 
Hong Kong 285 323 
Abroad 1,304 1,212 
7 . Loans and advances l, 720 2,214 
8. Investments 
Loca l ~~ I 129 Other 69 
9. Other assets 1 ,709 1,871 
TOTAL 5 , 3 19 I 5,950 
Table 5.2 
HONG KONG COMMERCIAL BANKS : ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, 1960 TO 1967 
($ million) 
31.12.61 30.6.62 Jl.1..2.62 JO. 6. 63 31.12. 63 30. 6 . 64 3l.12.64a 
I 
I 
953 1,003 1,042 1,075 l, 140 l , 184 l, 299 
1 ,470 1,575 1,664 1,854 l, 997 2,079 2 , 338 
1,234 1,434 l, 768 2,055 2,283 2,636 2 ,639 
663 793 878 1 , 020 l, 145 1,335 1,515 
(J,367) (3 , 802) (4,311) (4,929) (5,425) (6,052) (6,491) 
374 4ll 499 526 603 504 736 
370 338 303 32 6 410 442 580 
1,288 1,431 1 ,534 1,683 2,010 2,276 l, 25 7 
6,351 6 , 985 7,689 8,539 9,588 10 ,459 10,364 
-------- --------- --------- ------- --------- -------- ----------
144 156 162 194 210 200 202 
4 14 503 595 698 773 701 824 
1,372 1,446 1,688 1,897 2,070 2,111 l, 745 
2 , 334 2,548 2,849 3,199 3,642 4,167 4,612 
149 152 147 145 156 185 463 
83 85 44 31 3 1 28 12 
1,856 2 ,095 2, 204 2 ,375 2, 715 3,066 2,506 
o,351 6,985 7,689 8,539 9 , 588 10,459 10,364 
a There was a mino r reclas sifica tion of assets a t this date. 
Source: Hong Kong Government Gazette, Supplement No.4. 
30.6.65 Jl.12 .65 J0.6.66 
1,545 1,629 1 ,630 
2,257 2,532 2,625 
2,820 J,098 3,448 
1,456 1,620 1,818 
(6,533) (7,251) (7,891) 
913 950 1,079 
814 83 6 831 
1,460 1,401 l ,450 
11,265 12,066 12,882 
-------- --------- ---------
223 221 236 
938 1,007 l, 126 
2,184 2,912 3 ,318 
4,930 5,038 5,175 
533 5 1·3 537 
14 14 17 
2,443 2,363 2,474 
11,265 12,066 12,882 
31. 12. 66 30 .6.67 
1,730 2,400 
2,681 2,697 
3,742 3,635 
I , 982 1,880 
(8, 405) (8,211) 
i,136 937 
994 l, l22 
1,561 l, 756 
13,826 14,427 
-------- --------
232 366 
l, 178 976 
3,819 3,265 
5 , 380 5,863 
526 554 
11 12 
2 ,685 3,391 
13,826 14,427 
J0.1 2. 67 
2,176 
2,658 
3,324 
2,180 
(8,162) 
l, 115 
l, 198 
1,583 
14,365 
---------
333 
l, 127 
3,534 
5,343 
582 
8 
3,308 
14,235 
,_. 
,_. 
...... 
Table 5.3 
COMMERCIAL BANKS : RATE OF INCREASE IN DEPOSITS AND ADVANCES 
(%) 
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Increase in 
deposits 
Increase in 
advances 
Increase in 
domestic 
ex orts 
Increase in 
total trade 
1955 6.5 23.9 16 . 2 6.9 
1956 11.4 21.7 11. 2 24.4 
1957 11.4 12.5 7.8 5.0 
1958 12.1 6. 2 4.8 -7. 7 
1959 29.9 49.4 81.1 8.5 
1960 30.4 25.3 25.6 19.2 
1961 25 ,5 35.7 2.5 0.9 
1962 28.0 22.1 12 .9 11.6 
1963 25.8 27 . 8 15.5 12.3 
1964 21.1 25 .9 15,6 18.1 
1965 10.4 9.9 13 .5 9.9 
1966 17.3 6.8 14.0 13 ,2 
1967 -2.9 -0.7 16.9 8.9 
Sources: Table 5.1; Hong Kong Monthly Trade Statistics. 
Liabilities 
(a) Cheque Deposits. Cheque deposits have been the most 
slowly growing component of total bank deposits. Between 1954 and 
1966 cheque deposits increased 3.2 times, and now constitute one~ 
third of total deposits, compared with two-thirds in 1954. The 
relatively high interest rates available on time deposits have 
probably encouraged depositors to transfer idle balances from their 
h d . 1 c eque epos1.ts. And, because many large firms are regularly over -
drawn on their Hong Kong accounts (pre ferring to hold their liquid 
2 
assets abroad) and a large number of small businesses do not hold 
a cheque account, the volume of cheque deposits has not increased 
in line with business turnover. 
All banks except about ten local institutions accept cheque 
deposits. Until recently , many banks paid interest on their 
1 
There is some evid nee of an increase in the rate at which cur -
rent deposits are turned over. Between 1954 and 1966 the increase 
in the value of cheques passing through the bank cl.earing house, 
3.7 times, was slightly larger than the increase in the value of 
cheque deposits . It is important to note, though, that because of 
the dominant position of the Hongkong Bank, a large number of 
cheques does not pass through the clearing house. 
2 
~ ' 14 April 1967, p.182. 
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I h d ' 1 b f customers c eque eposits , ut, excep t or Government and inter= 
bank depos i ts, this prac tice is now prohibited by the i nterbank 
interest rate agreement. No fee i s charged on cheque accounts. 
All authorised banks may become members of the Bankers' Clear i ng 
Hous e, and member banks can undertake to clear fo r non-members (who 
are termed 'sub~clearing banks ' ). The value of cheques pass ing 
through the clearing house is shown in Table 5 . 4. Each member must 
hold an account with the Hongkong Bank, which acts as central clear -
ing bank, and maintain this account in funds. In cases where a 
bank de f aults, and cannot make satisfactory arrangements for accom-
modation with the Hongkong Bank, the latter Bank informs other 
members of the clearing house. All cheques paid into a member bank 
in the connnercial area are cleared on the same day. 
1 
Table 5.4 
VALUE OF CHEQUES CLEARED THROUGH HONG KONG 
BANKERS' CLEARING HOUSE 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
Cheques cleared 
$ million 
3,049 
6,595 
8, 268 
11,006 
14,394 
18,070 
14 ,345 
12 ,424 
13,385 
13,916 
15,309 
16,940 
15,709 
17 ,9 23 
23,101 
25 ,8 21 
28 ,15 1 
34 ,5 19 
41,520 
44,590 
49,612 
58,296 
Source: Hong Kong Government Gazett , 
Supplement Number 4. 
Nigel Ruscoe's Annual Hong Kong Register, 1964 , p . 58 reports that 
~bout half the banks pai d interest on current accounts in 1963. 
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The pract i c e among customers of off r i ng pos t dated cheque s as 
security f or trade credit and other loans i s common , and i s re ~ 
quently criticised by the larger banks . 1 
The Government holds cheque depos i ts with t he Hongkong Bank 
and the Chartered Bank . The slight seasonal var i a tion in Govern = 
ment r ev nue and expenditure is shown i n the Gover nment ' s accounts 
with the two banks; the Government does not make use of treas ur y 
bills or other short-term borrowing fr om the banking s yst em, The 
leve l of t h e various Government deposits over recent years i s given 
in Table 5.5. 
(b) Time Deposits. Time deposits have been the most rap i dly 
increasing component of total bank deposits, hav ing i n the period 
1954 to 1966 increased 27 times. The proportion of t ime depos i ts 
t o all bank deposits rose in the same period f rom 13 per cent to 
44.5 per cent. This experi ence is in marked contrast to that of 
. 2 
many countries, and re f lects the unavailabili ty of other f i xed 
i nterest a s s e ts. 
All banks accept time deposits . Terms vary between seven days 
and f i v e years, Competition for these deposits is very activ e . 
It i s t hough t t hat a large part of t ime depos i ts i s owed to 
depositors abroad, part i cularly to overs eas Chinese in South East 
Asia, but also to Chinese living in the United St ates, Latin 
3 Amer i ca and els where, One often heard bankers s uggest that 
between a half and three - fifths of all Hong Kong bank deposits are 
4 
of overseas origin; if this is correct, the proportion of time 
deposits owed to foreigners must be even higher . There are several 
reasons for this capital inflow into bank deposits. For political 
1 
2 
See P.A . Graham, op , cit . , p . 5. 
See, for example, H.W. Arndt and C.P . Harr i s, The Australian 
Trading Banks, 3rd edition, 1965, p.29, 
3 
~' 27 April 1967, p . 182, 
4 
This estimate is supported by the statement of the Corrnuiss i oner 
of Banking that bank deposits ' of which the greater part comes from 
outside the Colony ... ' ~' 12 June 1965 , 
Table 5.5 
HONG KONG GOVERNMENT BANK DEPOSITS HELD IN HONG KONG 
($ million) 
1954a 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Cheque Depos its 
Gover nment 26 30 21 32 33 19 7 64 
Development loan fund 7 5 5 3 2 1 1 0 
Coin and note funds 21 15 11 18 17 27 7 30 
Total cheque de posits 54 51 37 54 52 47 15 94 
Fixed Depos its 
Gover nment 20 45 45 88 121 127 60 26 
Development loan fund 
- - 3 - 0 - 1 0 
Coin and note funds 10 10 19 9 9 6 15 0 
Total fixed deposits 30 55 67 96 129 133 76 26 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT DEPOSITS 84 106 210 150 181 180 91 120 
a 31 Ma·r ch each year. 
Source : Annual Report of the Accountant General, 
1962 1963 1964 
86 94 93 
5 10 1 
23 26 26 
114 130 120 
101 279 389 
0 0 0 
14 12 20 
115 290 409 
229 42 0 529 
1965 1966 
90 59 
16 13 
9 9 
115 82 
402 366 
20 20 
44 52 
466 439 
581 521 
1967 
71 
9 
3 
83 
396 
20 
60 
476 
559 
t-' 
N 
I-' 
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reasons, some o f t he f ore ign dep os i tors do no t f eel f ree to hold 
f unds in their own countries; this is be l i eved to b specially 
i mportant for many Chinese businessmen i n I ndones i a, Vi etnam and 
h · 1 · . 1 the P 1.. 1..pp1..nes . With price stability, low taxation, comparativ e 
political stabil i t y and a relatively respec ted legal system , Hong 
Kong has prov ided a refuge for these funds. Of considerable appea l 
to most foreign depositors is the knowledge that funds can readi ly 
be remitted f r om Hong Kong, through the authorised banks into 
sterling, or into U.S . dollars, Swiss francs and other currenc i es 
on the open market. The relatively high interest rates offered on 
f i xed deposits have also been important in attracting the foreign 
f unds. 
These high deposit rates must also have i nduced many local 
savers to hold their funds within Hong Kong rather than, say, as 
bank deposits abroad. 2 
Most time depos i ts are for relatively short periods, mostly 
h . h 3 tree to s1..x mont s . Depositors, both local and for e ign, like to 
be in a posit i on to move their funds elsewhere on reasonably short 
not i ce, should deposit rates be more favourable abroad, or, more 
seriously, there be any loss of confidence i n the Colony 's future. 
The Go ernment ' s holding of f ixed deposits in Hong Kong was 
shown in Table 5.5. The Government deposi t s were about 12 per cent 
of all local f ixed deposits in March 1967 . 
(c) Saving Deposits . Saving deposits in December 1966 totalled 
$1,982 million, and made up about one-quarter of total bank deposits 
i n the Colony (compared with one=tenth in 1954). These deposits in-
creased almost twenty times in the twelve years. Saving deposits 
1 
It sin this respect, rather than in its currency offering pro-
tection against a dev aluation of the world's key currencies, that 
Hong Kong can be considered the 'Switzerland ' of the Far East , 
2 
The Federal Reserve Bulletin shows that U. S . bank depos ts owed 
to Hong Kong res idents varied very little between 1958 and 1962 at 
around U.S . $28 mill on. More recent information is not available. 
3 
It was sugges ted i n early 1967 that about 50 per cent of time 
deposits were for three months only . .EfilIB., 27 April 1967, p . 182 . 
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1 
are now accepted by most banks, but there are no institutions 
which are exclusively 'saving banks' . 2 Interest on saving accounts 
is paid at one rate by all banks and has, for some time, been equal 
to the maximum rate on which there is exemption f rom Government in-
terest tax . This rate was 2 per cent until 1959, then 2~ per cent 
unt il late 1960, 3 per cent between 1960 and 1968, and is now 3~ 
per cent . 
Competition between banks for saving deposits has been a main 
reason for the rapid expansion of branch networks to the new resi-
dential areas and to parts of the Colony which previously had no 
banking offices. Bank advertising has placed considerable stress 
on the benefits of a saving account. 
It was estimated that there were more than one million saving 
accounts in 1966, 3 or more than one account f or every local family. 
For many residents a saving deposit has replaced currenc y hoarding 
and the purchase of jewellery as the main way in which savings are 
he ld, The more prosperous and settled population has meant a 
greate r emphasis on saving f or old age, children's education and 
consumer durables; given the limited availability of saving outlets 
most of these funds are deposited with the connnercial banks, and 
I 
usually as saving deposits. As well, saving accounts are held by 
many small businesses instead of cheque accounts . 
Clearly, the connnercial banks have been important depositories 
for the economy's growing savings. The deposit function of the 
commercial banks, which was of relatively little significance in 
the prewar conomy , has become of fundamental importance . Table 5.6 
compares the per capita bank deposits for selected countries. In 
1 
In 1948 'only two or three' banks accepted saving deposits. ~' 
21 July 1948. 
2 
The suggest on that the Government establish a Government Savings 
Bank was made in the Legislati e Council in 1961 , The Financia l 
Secretary declined to follow up the suggestion on the ground that 
the functions were being adequately carr ied out by the commercia l 
banks . 
3 
P .A. Graham, op. cit., p . 6. 
Table 5 , 6 
PER CAPITA BANK DEPOSITS, SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1960 AND 1966 
(U.S . dollars) 
1960a 1966a 
Australia 
Demand depos its 293 317 
Time and saving deposits 418 712 
Total deposits 711 1029 
Ceylon 
Demand deposits 13 14 
Time and saving deposits 16 19 
Total deposits 29 33 
Hong Kong 
Demand deposits 78 124 
Time and saving deposits 72 263 
Total deposits 150 387 
Japan 
Demand deposits 82 204 
Time and saving depositsb 329 442 
Total deposits 411 646 
Malaysia 
Demand deposits 20 24 
Time and saving deposits n , a, 36 
Total deposits n , a, 60 
Philippines 
Demand deposits 11 10 
Time and saving deposits 15 24 
Total deposits 26 34 
Taiwan 
Demand deposits 7 21 
Time and saving deposits 8 44 
Total deEosits 15 65 
n.a. =- not avail ab le. 
a 31 December, 
b Includes Postal Saving and Cooperative Banks. 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, 
Hong Kong: Table 5.1. 
1966 per capita deposits were about one-third of the Australian 
level, 60 per cent of the Japanese figure, and approximately six 
times the Malaysian per capita deposits, The Table also points to 
the very rapid expansion of deposits in the Colony ( from US $150 
per head in 1960 to US $387 per head in 1966). 
(d) Other Liabilities. The banks ' liability for 'notes in 
circulation' (row 1 in Table 5 ,2 ) has been discussed in a previous 
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Chapter. ' Balances due to other banks in Hong Kong ' consists of 
the liabilities of the Hongkong Bank and the Chartered Bank on 
interbank deposits held for clearing and reserve purposes, and 
money borrowed f rom the interbank market, The item ' balances due 
to other banks abroad' includes funds owed to head of fi ces by 
expatriate banks, and deposits lodged with Hong Kong banks by 
banks from other countries ( the latter item is believed to be 
quite small). 
Assets 
(a) Loans and Advances. The level of loans and advances has 
increased particularly rapidly, As was shown in Table 5.1, loans 
and advances rose f rom $510 million to $5,380 million between 1954 
and 1966 . The year to year changes in the level of connnercial bank 
credit were shown in Table 5.3. The ratio of bank advances to de-
posits increased from 48 per cent in 1954 to almost 70 per cent in 
the early 1960s (see row 8 of Table 5.1) . There was a significant 
f all in the ratio in 1966 and 1967. 
Hong Kong banks have greater freedom in formulating their ad-
vance policies than banks in most countries. There is no central 
bank charged with regulating the volume or direction of bank credit, 
\ 
and the Banking Ordinance affects bank lending only to the extent 
that it specifi es a minimum liquidity rat io and restricts loans to 
directors, unsecured advances and direct bank involvement in trading 
activities , Before 1964 there was not even this minimum of control . 
The banks have been able to undertake additional lending so long as 
there are borrowers who meet the institutions' own lending standards 
and the banks' liquidity position is sound. 
The supply of bank credit increased especially rap i dly in the 
period 1959 to 1964 , It is pointed out elsewhere i n this study 
that the Hong Kong banks have been willing to grant loans of a 
relatively long term and illiquid nature. Given thi s lending 
criteria, it does not appear that there was, from the late 1950s 
until 1964, any shortage of outlets for bank funds , Rather, the 
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connnerci.al banks wer becoming ' loaned up ' and new lending had t o 
be restrained for l i quid i ty reasons . 
In 1965, 1966 and 1967 bank advances expanded more slowly and 
l i quidity f actors were only one o f several restrain t s on new bank 
lending , Cer tainly , as a consequence of the 1964 Banking Ord i nance 
and the banking di ffi culties of early 1965, a number of local banks 
attempted to s t rengthen their cash positions , Bu t there wa s at the 
same time a reconsideration among many local banks of what consti~ 
tuted a 'good l ending risk'. And, the slight recession i n new 
business investment reduced the demand f or bank credit. As ex~ 
pressed i n one financial report, ' there does not seem to be much 
uns atis fie d demand f or credit from sound borrowers , if any thing, 
fi rst class banks are having trouble in finding good lendable 
projects ' . 1 Further, the relatively high interest rates in world 
financ ial centres induced Hong Kong banks to curtail their loca l 
advances : 
ins tead of l i qui dity problems there has been a tremendous 
switch in the other direction f or local banks have taken 
advantage of the higher rates ruling i n London and New 
York and plac ed their surplus liqui dity outside the 
Colony , The overseas competition f or depos i ts is so keen 
that cred i t, perhaps badly needed i.n t he Colony itse lf , 
is unavailable , 2 
After the outbr ak of disturbances in May 1967, the connnerc i a l 
banks adopt d a still more caueious att itude in undertaking new 
lending, 
Although the banks have not been guided in their cred i t policy 
by a Government or a central bank, there has been in at l east two 
cas es the exerc i se of what might be termed a quantitative cred i t 
policy, In 1955 and again in 1959 and 1960 the Hongkong Bank 
attempted tor duce specul ation on the narrow and volatile Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. The Bank lifted rates on these advances (in 
1955 the increase was from 5 per cent and 6 per cent t o 8 per cent ) . 
1 
2 
~' 27 April 1967, p .185 , 
Annual Address to Shareholders, Char tered Bank, publ i shed in 
FEER , 9 Mar h 1967, p .455 . 
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In 1955 the Bank s ent a letter to a number of cl ients ou t lining i ts 
desire to l imit speculative pressures in the economy, I n taki ng 
these actions, the Bank acted on its own ini t i a tive, t hough i t had 
earl i er inf ormed the Government of its i nten t i ons , The success of 
the Bank ' s move , in bo th cases, was a cons equenc e of i ts size and 
prestige, and of the readiness of the other large banks to co = 
operate, It is unlikely that the Bank could have taken a similar 
stand against speculation in gold, foreign exchange and corrnnod i ties 
in 1948 and 1949, or against real estate speculation in t he 1950s, 
f ields in which its influence has been much weaker. 
Table 5.7 shows the direction of bank loans outstanding. 
About 30 per cent of loans outstanding have been for trade pur -
poses, one-fifth of outstanding advances have been used i n industry 
and between one-sixth and one- f ifth in real estate. The utiliti es 
and primary product i on sectors of the economy have been uni mportant 
borrowers of bank f unds. Over a longer period, informat i on i s 
ava i lable only on bank loans outstanding f or manuf actur i ng pur -
poses, It was est i mated that in 1957 and 1958 i ndustrial loans 
accounted for 18 and 21 per cent, respec t i vely , of total bank 
1 
advances , 
Lending by way of f luctuating overdraf t i s corrnnon practice for 
h b k f b f h 1 1 1 . . . 2 t e Br i tish ans and or a num er o · t e arge oca 1nst1tut1ons. 
This acconnnodation is provided for a variety of purposes, i ncluding 
t he purchase of raw materials and other working capital needs of 
manufacturing businesses, the holding of goods for re=export, the 
l ocal wholesale and retail trade, and for professional borrowers . 
Lending by way of overdraft is especially corrnnon for the well -known 
t rading houses, some of which have been associated with a particular 
1 
Report of the Industrial Bank Connnittee, 1960, published in E!fili, 
4 August 1960, p,228, These figures suggest an absolute increase 
i n the value of bank loans outstanding for industrial purposes of 
$1,000 million between 1957 and 1966 . 
2 
This paragraph draws heavily on David Williams, 'Hong Kong' in 
W, Crick (ed.), op, cit., pp.178 - 9, and P.A. Graham, op. cit., 
pp,11-14. 
Table 5.7 
COMMERCIAL BA.."flr LOANS AND ADVANCES, BY INDUSTRY GROUP, 1965 TO 1967 
MANUFACTURING 
textiles 
cotton 
other 
footwear, wearing apparel 
metal products, engineering 
rubber, plastics and chemicals 
shipbuilding and repair 
electrical and electronic 
food 
·beverages and tobacco 
printing and publishing 
miscellaneous 
AGRICULTURE AND FISHING 
TRANSPORT A.ND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND TELEPHONE 
BUILDING A....-U CONSTRUCTIO~ 
GENERAL COMMERCE 
import, export and wholesale 
retail 
MINING AND QUARRYING 
MISCELLANEOUS 
hotels, boarding houses 
financial concerns 
stockbrokers 
professional and private individuals 
busines s 
private 
all others 
TOTAL LOANS A.ND ADVANCES 
J0 . 6.65. 
;.!m 
988 
492 
(424) 
(68) 
98 
101 
65 
15 
28 
J6 
12 
25 
114 
28 
155 
4 
20J 
1620 
1518 
102 
7 
1445 
89 
274 
41 
725 
(J22) 
(40J) 
316 
s-149 
J1 .12 . 65. 
'/m 
1015 
497 
(421) 
( :-6) 
106 
101 
64 
14 
27 
JJ 
8 
JO 
1J4 
29 
19 1 
4 
9J} 
16!10 
1.520 
121 
6 
1365 
89 
200 
J6 
68 J 
( J1 J) 
(J70) 
J58 
518) 
J0.6 .66 . 
;iSm 
1125 
526 
(4J9) 
(86) 
121 
94 
79 
16 
JS 
J6 
J2 
J4 
15J 
J9 
189 
41 
9J7 
1651 
1542 
109 
5 
1 316 
86 
186 
JJ 
643 
( 209) 
(J74) 
369 
5JOJ 
J1.12 . 66 . 
'Im 
1151 
5 19 
(4J6) 
(BJ) 
128 
90 
80 
17 
5J 
44 
JO 
JO 
160 
26 
197 
39 
957 
17)1 
16J5 
97 
4 
1J70 
86 
187 
Jl 
669 
(288) 
(J80) 
J99 
5475 
Source: Governmen t Gazette Supplement Number 4 . 
30.6.67. 
tm 
1255 
552 
(442) 
( 110) 
135 
128 
85 
18 
61 
37 
JJ 
28 
177 
48 
227 
99 
962 
1910 
1797 
11 J 
4 
1437 
89 
179 
29 
723 
(JOJ ) 
( 420) 
417 
5942 
J1 . 12.67 . 
$m 
1072 
471 
(JBJ) 
(87) 
ll9 
111 
70 
17 
5J 
26 
27 
29 
149 
9 
219 
1J2 
885 
1698 
1590 
108 
J 
1J8J 
82 
170 
27 
706 
(285) 
(421 
J98 
5401 
J1.12 . 67 . 
% 
19.8 
8 . 7 
(7.1) 
( 1. 6) 
2.2 
2.1 
1.J 
O.J 
1.0 
0.5 
0 . 5 
0 .5 
2.8 
0 .2 
4 . 1 
2 .4 
16.4 
Jl.4 
29.4 
2.0 
0.0 
25 .6 
1.5 
J.1 
0.5 
lJ.l 
( 5.J) 
(7.8) 
7.4 
100 
t--' 
N 
(X) 
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bank over a long period. The type and extent of securi ty required 
varies greatly both between banks and between borrowers, and a 
range of interest rates is charged, the l owest , of course, being 
reserved f or cus tomers with a particular ly good name. Overdraft 
limits are usually reviewed ever y six months or annually , Advances 
by a f i xed loan are more connnon among the smaller banks and the f ew 
expatriate banks which have advanced funds to local borrowers . 
The most actively sought after banking business, especially 
since the late 1950s, has been trade finance. The way in which 
the Colony's trade is financed is discussed in Chapter 13 . 
The granting of bank loans on a relatively long ~term basis for 
industrial purposes has been an important postwar development . 
These loans were f irst made by the British banks in the late 1940s 
and the Hongkong Bank and the Chartered Bank are still by far the 
dominant lenders in this field. At least one e xpatriate bank (a 
United States institution) and several of the larger local banks 
have recently undertaken this type of loan . The advances were 
fi rst given to finance the expansion of the cotton spinning indus-
t ry a f ter its establishment with refugee capital, and, about the 
same time, bank loans were important in the establishment of the 
ship breaking and steel rolling industry. 1 Table 5.7 showed the 
range of manufacturing industries at present receivi ng bank credits. 
Advances f or industrial purposes are f requently f or three to five 
years, occasionally longer, and are granted to finance the purchase 
of machinery, f actory re-equipment, and less often, the purchase of 
premises and land . In a number of cases, the loans are nominally 
repayable on demand or at short notice, but with 
1 
an implicit understanding between bank and borrower 
that so long as the enterprise is sound the loan will 
not be called in unreasonably soon, A substantial pro -
portion of bank loans hav been outstanding f or five 
years and some have continued for ten years and more. 2 
As many of the fi rms in this industry had little convent i onal 
securi y to off r the banks (land, premises, etc . ), a bi l l of sale 
was usually taken over t he ships to preclude sale of scrap . 
2 
Industrial Bank Connnitt e Report, p ,228, 
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Security usually takes the form of buildings and machinery, but t he 
banks may accept as security the property and shares of directors, 1 
and, o f course, the bank's assessment of the integrity of manage-
ment is important. For 'known' borrowers the interest r a te charged 
on these advances is little above the bank's prime lending rat, 
despite the illiquidity. Loans have been made to the smaller manu-
fac turing businesses as well as to the internationally known 
industrial concerns. In the case of the smaller manufactur ing 
units the banks have often been unable to obtain balance sheets or 
other financial information from their clients. 2 
The banks also provide manufacturers with working capital. As 
this credit is often provided to finance the import of industrial 
raw materials or is advanced against a cred it opened by an 
overseas importer, a part of this finance is included under the 
item 'commerce' in the Table. 
Bank loans for real estate purposes are usually on a long-term 
basis (up to five years). Advances to the larger developers have 
been available from the large banks, but by far the most important 
institutions in this field are the medium sized and local banks, 
whose l end i ng for real estate purposes has made the property market 
3 
a 'bank dominated one'. Frequently, advances have been made f or 
each stage of property development - land purchase and site forma-
tion, and the construction and sale of the building . Loans have 
often been granted against small margins. Before the 1964 Banking 
Ordinance, advances were sometimes made on an unsecured basis and a 
numb er of small banks took a direct interest in land development, 
purchasing the land in the i r own name and financing the construction 
with depositors ' funds. Some of the local banks were leading real 
1 
Michael Turner, then General Manager of the Hongkong Bank, ' Indus-
tria l Banking in an Eastern Setting', The Statist, 23 March 1963. 
2 
!!§_, 7 October 1967. 
3 
David Wi lliams, 'Hong Kong Banking', p.31, 
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estate dealer s . Loans to finance flat purchase have often been 
arranged on a hire purchase basis. The expatriate banks have not 
entered the fi eld of real estate finance. 
The considerably expanded volume of bank credit has contributed 
significantly to the Colony's economic development. One way of 
demonstrating the importance of bank credit is to set out bank 
loans and advances as a per cent of national income. This ratio 
is shown for a group of countries in Table 5.8 
Table 5 .8 
COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS AND ADVANCESa AS PER CENT OF 
NATIONAL INCOME, SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1960 AND . 1966 
1960 1966 
Australia 50 55 
Ceylon 14 18 
Hong Kong 34 55 
Japan 113 122 
Malaysia 13 24 
Philippinesb 18 32 
Taiwan 14 39 
a Includes claims on governments, 
b Excludes Saving and Development Banks . 
Sources: Hong Kong: Table 5.1 and E.R. Chang , FEER, 
26 May 1966. The 1966 estimate of national 
income assumes that national income in= 
creased between 1960 and 1966 at the same 
rate as domestic exports. 
Other countries: International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics, February 
1968. 
(b) Liguid Assets , It was seen earlier that only a very 
limited range of liquid assets is available in Hong Kong. The 
banks are restricted to holding their local liquid assets in the 
form of cash, foreign currency notes and depos its with other banks 
(the latter may take the f orm either of loans on the interbank 
market or of depos its with the note issuing banks). 
The liquid asset ratio (defined as the ratio of cash and net 
balances due from other banks and other short-term claims to de -
posits) of the Hong Kong banks has varied over a fairly wide 
range, The ratio was a round 50 per cent in the period 1955 to 
1958 , 41.9 per cent in 1959, 34 . 3 per cent in 1961, 38.1 per cent 
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in 1962 , 27 , 6 per cent i n 1964, 36 ,8 per cent i n 1966 and 32 . 8 per 
cent in 1967 (see Table 5 , 1). 
But this ratio is not an entirely satisfactory method of 
measuring the banks' liquidity posit i on. Some part of liquid 
deposits with banks abroad (the major component in the Hong Kong 
banks ' liquid assets holdings) is required to meet commitments in 
these centres. Moreover, 'when the high interbank balances are 
taken into account - net money at call is, in fact, quite small - the 
effe ctive "near cash" assets ratio falls to somewhere around 20 
1 per cent. In fact, holdings both of cash and liquid assets seem 
low in comparison with other banking systems and much lower than 
one would expect, even allowing for the importance of time depos its 
and , perhaps, the fact that many banks could, in an emergency , 
borrow from foreign financial centres: local depositors have 
several times shown themselves liable to panic; there is no offi = 
cial central bank to which the banks might turn fo r large =scale 
fi nancial support; the money market is undeveloped; and a relatively 
large par t of bank advances is of a long term and illiquid nature. 
The cash ratio dis closed by the official statistics (row 6 of 
Table 5.1) fell from 12.7 per cent in 1955 and 8.4 per cent in 
1957 to less than 4 per cent in the years 1961 to 1966, In December 
1966 the banks' cash ratio was 2 .8 per cent , There is no evidence 
of any convention about the level of cash ratios , 
But the official statistics on the banks' cash holdings do not 
include deposits owed by the note issuing banks to other banks 
(which is included as part of the item 'balances due from other 
banks in Hong Kong'). Against these deposits the note issuing 
banks hold local currency notes (which are included in the statistics 
on banks' cash holdings) and liquid sterling deposits, which can 
readily be sold to the Exchange Fund should the note issuing banks 
need to increase the local banknote issue. No information is 
available on the extent of these interbank deposits . 
1 
David Williams, 'Hong Kong' in W. Crick (ed.), op, cit ., p,177 . 
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Net depos i ts with banks abroad increased f rom $945 mill on in 
December 1960 to $2 ,9 25 million in December 1966, and now cons titute 
a quarter of bank assets and equal about one~third of bank deposits . 
In the two years to December 1966, net balances due from banks 
abroad increased by $1 ,660 million (and gross balances by $2,074 
million ) , while deposits ros e by $1,837 mill i on , Most, perhaps 
around two =thirds,of the deposits are in sterling, almost exclusive l y 
in London. The remainder is call and short~term deposits with banks 
in North America, Europe and C~ina. The note issuing banks can sell 
sterling in London to the Exchange Fund for certi f icates of indebted= 
ness, and the other banks are able to exchange sterling in London 
and Hong Kong dollar balances at the note issuing banks. Alternati = 
vely , the sterling balances can be transferred directly between 
banks in settlement for an interbank debt. 
The banks have been criticised for holding such a large part 
of their funds outside Hong Kong. 1 It must be pointed out, though , 
that there would need to be significant changes in the local money 
market be f ore a large part of these liquid funds could be held in 
the Colony, A much wider range of securities would be necessary, 
and some of ficial assistance might be required when several banks 
at the one time sought to move from liquid assets into cash. To 
provide this assistance, a publ ic authority might itself need to 
hold liquid reserves in a similar form to those at present held by 
the banking system. Another important cons i deration is that there 
is no centralised holding of foreign exchange (by the Government or 
a central bank) as there is in most countries, The f oreign assets 
of the banking system serve a similar purpose in regard to bank 
deposit money as do the assets of the Exchange Fund for the currency 
issue: of ensuring the convertibility of local funds into sterling . 
If those holding bank deposits could transfer their funds abroad or 
purchase imports only to the extent that they fi rst withdraw their 
deposits as currency and then draw on the Exchange Fund reserves, 
l 
See, for example, the view cited in~' 14 April 1966, p.69 . 
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a severe contraction of credit might r e s ult . The present f oreign 
asset holding of the banks contributes also to the maintenance of 
I 
f oreign confidenc , and, with more than half of depos its of over = 
seas origin, this is itself of some importance , And, of course, a 
part of the bank funds held on deposit in f oreign financial centres 
is fo r trading purposes. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that the high interest rates r uling 
in foreign money centres were a main reason for the rapid increase 
in the volume of deposits held with banks abroad in 1966, and, at 
least in that year, that the banks were sufficiently liquid to 
undertake additional lending. 
The bank statistics record only a small holding of foreign 
investments (row 8b in Table 5.2). The Colony's banks tend to 
place surplus funds on deposit with a branch or associated bank 
abroad, and not themselves invest the funds in liquid paper in the 
f oreign financial centre. 
There are thought to be considerable differences in the liquid 
assets and cash positions of the dif fe rent banks , The Mainland 
China institutions are known to be very liquid , The lowest cash 
ratios are maintained by the expatriate banks. These institutions 
are usually able to predict closely their future cash requirements 
and can, when necessary, meet a local cash drain with funds pro -
vided by their head offices. Until recently, many local banks 
operated with slender cash reserves. But these institutions have 
become more liquidity conscious since 1964. In 1966 some local 
banks reported~ holdings in excess of deposits; why, one could 
not establish, 
(c) Local Investments, Local investments (row 8a in Table 
5.2) are a relatively unimportant part of he banks' assets , Per -
haps one-hal f of the $50 million Government security issue of 
1947/48 is held by the commercial banks, These securities are 
rarely traded, There were probably considerable deal i ngs i n local 
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1 
shares by a number of smaller banks until early 1962, but the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange list i s too restricted and t rad ing too thin to 
permit the large banks operat ing in the shar e market , Investments 
in subsidi ary companies include hold ings in fi rms which operate in 
insurance, hi r e pur chase , trustee, nominee and several other fi elds . 
(d) Other As s ets. The item ' other assets' (row 9 in Table 5.2) 
covers a v ar i ety of securities and real investments . The cer tificate 
of indebtedness holdings of the note issuing banks are the most im-
portant component. The banks' investments in real proper ties are 
included in this classification. 
Bank Interest Rates 
Little informat i on is available on bank inte r e s t rates prior 
to the interest ra t e agreement of 1964. It appears tha t interes t 
rates were low in the early 1950s, when there we re f ew outlets for 
bank funds . In this period, no interest was usually pai d on current 
accounts and many banks refused ~o acc ept saving depos its . The 
growing demand fo r bank er dit fr om traders, real estate developers 
and manufac turers brought a steady increase in depos it ra tes in the 
1950s and early 1960s. Some i dea of the var i a tions in interest 
rates since 1958 is shown in Chart 5.1. 
There have been appreciable interest rate differentials between 
the banks over the whole postwar per i od. In 1963 the depos it rates 
of the l ocal banks were 1 t o 3 per cent abov e those of the British 
banks , The expatriate banks paid about ~ per cent more on depos its 
than the Br itish banks , The spread of rates wa s even greater on 
the side of advances. While the prime lending rate of the British 
banks has been relatively low f or a rap i dly developing economy, the 
rates charged by the smaller banks have ranged up to 3 per cent per 
month on the r is ky advances which ' would not have been handled by 
[ h f • I 2 t e large banks ] at any rate o interest . 
1 
Until D c emb r 1964 many of these share holdings appear to have 
been grouped as 'other assets' in the official banking s~atistics. 
2 
Repr sentat ive of the Hongkong Bank, c ited above, p. 112 . 
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Interbank competition ford posits in 1960 led to a rapid 
increase in d posit r a tes. The th r ee month deposit races of the 
British banks increased by l! per cent to 4\ per cent during th 
year. This tendency was viewed with concern by the large banks, 
who claimed that the higher deposit r ates woul d harm the economy 
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by making indust r ial loans mor e expensiv e , 1 and force the smaller 
banks into making advanc es wh ich i nvolved a gr eater degr ee of r isk. 2 
But at the same time , the sma l l er banks could not be expected to 
pay the same rates on bank deposits as the very large institutions. 
The problem was expressed in the Tomkins Report in this way: 
On the one hand it woul d be unr ealistic to set one rate 
for deposits (or expect to be able to enforce it) since 
this woul d mean that the major ity of deposits would flow 
to a few major banks of international repute . On the 
ot he r hand ' cut~throat' competition in bidding for 
deposits mus t either reduce unduly the profitability of 
bank ing , or wor se , lead banks into dubious investments 
or loans fo r the sake of the high returns necessary to 
pay fo r depos its obtained on onerous terms with all the 
dangers which this imp lies for the safety of deposits . 3 
In mid=l960 the British banks ra ised their depos it rates by 1 
per cent , deliberate ly 'to demonstrate to all banks the futility of 
uncontrolled competi tion, with the idea o securing a workable 
agreement between banks on interes t rates' . 4 This was f ollowed in 
early 1961 by an attemp t by the Exchange Banks Assoc i a tion to gain 
a general agreement covering bank inter est rates. The s everal moves 
were unsucces s ful because of the strong opposition of a few banks 
'either on the grounds that they did not want to tie their hands or 
alt rnatively that, if they d i d tie the ir hands, they would be ex-
posed to the r i s k tha t the less sc r upulous would ind ways of 
1 
2 
Se R, G,L, Oliphant,~' 22 Apr il 1965 , p , 17 9 . 
Se , fo r e ampl , the vi ws of t he Chairman of the Chartered 
~ ' c ited FEER, 22 March 1962 , p . 673. 
3 --
Tomkins R port , p ,10. But , to a lar ge extent, the smaller banks 
would have been attra t d to real estat and other high yi elding 
but risky outl ts regardless of the level o their deposit r a tes . 
In the lat 1940s when d posit r ates wer v ry low, mos t loc al banks 
engag d n h ghly s pe ulative activiti s , 
4 
R.G.L. Oliphant, op , cit , 
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e ad "n the s p ~r it if not act ually breaking the l etter of th 
1 
agreem nt u. 
I n Mar h 19 62 the thr ee British banks again attemp ted to 
effec t a r edt:ct f.on i n che whol str uctur e of ban interes t rates 
by lowering the i r d pos "t r a e s and the i r prime lending r ate, by 
t d 1 • 1 2 Th 1 per cen an ~ p r cent, res pec t i ve y, ey announced that th 
r educ tions ondi tional on similar adjus t ments being made by 
other banks . Ab out the same time, a mee ting of 22 unauthorised 
3 banks was he ld t o d i scuss interest rate leve l s. But , af ter t wo 
months , int r s t r ates were again increas ed . 
In mi.d =l964 an a greement on deposit interes t r ates was finally 
4 
reached . The agreemen t was drawn up by repres entatives of the 
Exchang Banks Association and the leading unauthorised banks. 
Government deposi ts, i nterbank depos its , and other deposits f or a 
period long r than ighteen months, were exc luded f rom the agree = 
ment . The payment of int res t on cheque depos ts wa prohibited . 
Th variou ban s were cla sified i n five gr oups accord ing to their 
size and countr of or i gin, and a s cale of inter es t r ate differen = 
tial s was agreed ( ee Table 5 . 9) . For example , banks in the ' Loca l 
Al ' gr oup, which included the Bank of China, were permitted t o pay 
\ per c nt more on deposits t han banks in the ' ore i gn ' category , 
and the smallest banks ould offer 1\ per cent abo e the deposit 
rats of the 1Forei n 1 banks , It was s pec f ed that overdraft or 
loan fa i l it ies agains t i n terest bear i ng dep~sits had to carry a 
rat d fe r ential of at least 2 per cent, that no i nterest was 
payable on t ime depos i t s wi thdrawn wi hou t not:i.ce, and that banks 
could not offer t o pay interest t ax on thei r cus ·omers ' behalf. A 
committee was s tablished composed of r epresentatives of the 
1 2 
Tomkins R por t , p .1. L 
3 
Ib d . 
4 
.§..9:!E , 24 March 1962 , 
There were s uggest i ons at the tim tha t t he note i ssu ng banks 
had thr eatened to withdraw cheque clearing facil ties from any 
author !. d banks whi ch did no t enter the agreement ,!!§. , 17 Feb w 
r uary 1965. 
Table 5. 9 
THREE MONTH DEPOSIT RATES, SELECTED DATES 
(%) 
Classification of bank 
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~ Local Local Local Local 
Fore ign Special Al A2 Bl B2 
1. 7.64 4~ 5\ 5\ 6 6\ 
31,12,65 5~ 6\ 6\ 7 
31,12,66 5~ 5\ 6 61; 6\ 
24.10.67 5\ 6 6\ 6% 7 
1.12.67 6\ 6~ 6\ 7\ 7~ 
Number of banks in 
classification 31.12.66 28 6 10 11 21 
Source : Press statements, 
authorised and unauthorised banks, to keep under review both the 
honouring of the agreement and the level of interest rates , Any 
bank which breaks the agreement can be barred from using the faci-
lities of the clearing house. The banks also agreed not to 
undertake exchange dealings or interbank lending with any institu= 
t ion which is notified to have broken the agreement . 
Disagreements developed about the grouping arrangements and 
the differentials between the several classes of bank. In May 1965 
f our expatriate banks claimed that they were placed at a consider -
able disadvantage in attracting deposits, especially against the 
large local banks, and threatened to withdraw from the agreement. 
Their criticism was not ended with the abolition, in July 1965, of 
the category 'Local B2', to reduce the spread of rates between the 
largest and the smallest banks. In a further revision of the 
agreement in March 1966, the five largest banks from the 'Local Al' 
group were reclassified as 'Special Category', with only a\ per 
cent rate advantage over the 'Foreign' banks. At the same time, the 
i nterest differential between the 'Foreign' and the existing 'Local' 
class fications was reduced by\ per cent. 
Concern about possibl unfavourable effects of the interest 
rate agreement was xpressed by at least one observer, who wrote, 
in March 1965 : 
in the flow of funds between households (the main supplier 
of loanable funds) and business enterprises (the main 
inve ·tors) , it i s indi rect inance through the banking 
sy tern that dominate the Hong Kong sc ene . This means 
tha t resource allocat i on in Hong Kong is de t ermi ned 
a lmost entir ely by the banki ng sys tem thr ough bank 
i nterest rates , and it is of t he utmos t significance 
tha t in Hong Kong there has existed , unt i l very rec ently , 
hard ly any restraint on the free f ormulat ion of such 
r ates .... The effect of the interest rate agreement 
wi ll be t o reduc the efficiency of the i nterest rates 
mechani sm and of t he banking sys tem in allocat ing 
resources . 1 
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But , some measure of fl exibility has been maintained by the interest 
rate di fferential s agreed to, by the per iodi c var i ations made in the 
general level of depos it rates, and by the banks ' continui ng freedom 
to determine their own l ending rates. 
The impor tant considerations when the l evel of depos it rates is 
being rev iewed are the local supply and demand fo r bank funds and 
the level o f interest rates in overseas financ ial centres . The 
main influence s i nce 1960 has been the level of interest rates 
ruling in fo r eign financial centres, especially i n London . An in= 
crease in London rates has several ef f ects . Hong Kong banks will 
seek t o hold additional balances with banks i n the United Kingdom, 
businesses represented i n both centres will transfer their borrowing 
t o the Colony , and funds deposi ted in Hong Kong by banks in other 
countr i es will be moved to London. As a res ul t, bank liquidity will 
come under pressure, and bank deposit rates will be ra is ed . Of 
course, the movement in deposi t - rates need not coinc i de with the 
change in the overseas rates in extent or timing; as well as local 
factors, the magnitude of the foreign interest rate adjustment and 
whether or not the overseas variation is expected to be maintained 
are also considered . On some occasions, e . g . i n March 1966, the 
i ncrease in nterest rates preceded that in other financial centres. 
Th s dependence of Hong Kong interest rates on those ruling in 
f oreign f inancial centres ~ a relationship which seems of ten to be 
2 
underp layed in the public statements of bankers = follows naturally 
1 
Gethyn Davies, op . cit . , pp .248-9 . 
2 
See, for xample, the letter f rom P .A. Graham,~' 9 December 
1964. 
l li 1 
r om the ab s n e of any cent r a l bank or othe r o i c a l i.n .lu ne e on 
t he l ocal banki ng sy s tem and fr om t he f r eedom wi th which f unds can 
be t ransfer r ed be twe n Hong Kong and the fo r i gn f i na nc ial centr s . 
To a ver y large extent then , t he dependenc e r e fl c t s t he s t rength 
and conver t ib i lity of the Hong Kong dol lar . 
The int r e s t r ate agr e ement doe s not cover rat . charged on 
bank advances, but the agre emen t may have had s ome e f f ect on t he 
l eve l of these r ates thr ough its influence on depos i t i nteres t 
rates . The r cent trend in the advance r a tes of t he Brit i s h banks 
i s shown in Table 5 . 10 , Other than on bill f inance and on loans 
secur ed by shares, adv ance rates var y wide l y between banks. Very 
h igh ra tes are charged by l ocal banks on real estate lending. An 
a l toge ther independent policy i s f ollowed by the Ma inland banks . 
There has not been a constant s pre ad be t ween the dep os it ra t es and 
t he pr ime l ending ra te of the Bri t i s h banks ; the s pread between 
the th r ee month depos it r a te and the pr ime l endi ng ra t e was \ per 
cent in ear l y 1965 , 1\ per cen t in late 1966 and 1 per cent in 
early 19 67 , In general, advance ra tes ar e l ow f or a deve loping 
countr w th a high r ate of i nvestment. 
Table 5 . 10 
BRITI SH BANKS , RATES OF I NTEREST CHARGED ON ADVANCES, 
SELECTED DATES 
2,11, 61 
23, 3 , 62 
31,12 . 62. 
31.12, 63 
1. 2 , 65 
16 , 7. 65 
15, 7 .66 
1, 9 , 66 
31 . 7. 67 
26,10 , 67 
1 12 .67 
n , a, == no t availabl . 
. (%) 
Pr i m 
merchants 
6\ 
6 
6 
6 
6% 
6\ 
7 
7\ 
7 
7\ 
8 
Impor ts 
6\ 
6 
6 
6 
6% 
6\ 
7 
7\ 
n.a . 
n . a . 
n a 
Proper ty 
developmen t 
7-8 
7\ =8~ 
9=9\ 
9=9\ 
n , a , 
8-8\ 
8\ -9 
8\=9 
n,a , 
n.a . 
n a 
Shares 
7 °8\ 
7\ -8~ 
8-8\ 
7\ - 8 
8~ -9 
H =8 
8=8\ 
8=8\ 
n,a , 
n . a. 
n a 
Sourc e: Ng Kwok Leung, unpublished mater i a l ; news paper reports. 
Chapter 6 
THE COMMERCIAL BANKS - III : 
THE STABILITY OF THE BANKING SYSTEM 
The previous two Chapters have shown that the banking s ystem 
has developed considerably in organisat ion and in the tructur of 
assets and liabilities since 1946. Several times the discussion 
has touched on the question of the stability and s trength of the 
banking system. This topic is now discussed in greater detail. 
As we saw, the 1948 Banking Ordinance imposed virtually no 
restrictions on commercial bank activities . The banks remained 
free to conduct their a ffairs as they liked, and several practices 
were followed, at least by some of the \anks, which made for a 
potentially unstable banking s ystem. A large number of smaller 
banks were involved directly in speculation, first in prec i ous 
metals and foreign exchange, and later in connnodities and real 
estate. Many loans were unsecured. There was considerable bank 
lending fo r real estate purposes. At the same time, a number of 
banks held small liquid reserves - low cash holdings and vi rtually 
no second line of liquid assets - and many banks had slender cap ital 
resources , 
Protection against the consequences of these practices was 
given , fi rst by the banks' success in exchange speculation, and, 
later, by the continued buoyancy in the property market (which meant 
that funds lent for real estate purposes turned over quickly and 
that real estate was virtually a liquid asset) and by the rapid in-
crease in bank deposits (which gave the banks some f reedom from 
liqui dity considerations). But there remained the strong likelihood 
of banking difficulties were there to be either a slump in the real 
estate market or a more gradual expansion of deposits. 
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At the same t i me , there we r e one or two favourable tendencies , 
During the 19.50s there was an appreciable de line in the number of 
very small banks and a ew of the small banks which cont inued to 
operat became mor conscious of their identity as c onunerc ial banks; 
they became less ngaged in speculation and in direct trading and 
demonstrated mor e respect for liquidity and security cons i derations. 
But it r quired the banking cr ises of 1961 and 1965 and the Banking 
Ordinanc of 1964 before the ma jor ity of banks applied more conven = 
tional criteria to their asset portfolios . 
The 1961 Banking Crisis and the Tomkins Report 
In the fi rst six months of 196 1 two large companies made public 
share issues, both of which wer e heavily oversubscribed . The Kowloon 
Motor Bus share i ssue resulted in $230 million being withdrawn fr om 
the banking system and f orced a number of local banks to seek assist-
1 
ance f r om the Hongkong Bank and the Char tered Bank , In June 1961 
bank liquidity was f urther strai ned by the second share issue - that 
of Jardine Matheson= fo r whi ch the public offered $656 million , A 
run develop d on a medium sized local bank, the Liu Chong Hing Bank, 
which , it was r umoured, had invested excess ively in real es tate and 
had be n the subject of a police investigation. 2 The Bank sought 
the assi s tance of the two large British banks, and these ins titutions, 
after an investigation o the Bank ' s accounts, gave a publi c ass ur = 
ance of support. This promise quickly brought to an end the r un on 
the local Bank, and prevented the development of a more genera l loss 
of confidence. 3 
The e xpe r ience po nted to the potential instabili ty of the un -
regula ted banking system and showed that, wha t ever the case for a 
1 
The two banks soon after wards made a statemen t that they would 
not again make loans available to the other banks a t such f avourable 
rates, 
2 
A Gov rnment n estigat on nto the cause of the r umour s was ord ered 
but not made publ The Go e r runent Informat on Serv ices d i d announce 
at th t me of the r un , however, that the r umour s wer e false, 
3 
The Bank as placed und er the . control of a receiver. Six month 
later it re =commenced independent operations , 
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laissez-faire approach to bank i ng control in 1948, the growth of 
the banking habit and t he growing importance of bank credi t i n the 
ec onomy, called or a mor comprehens i e system of control . An 
official of the Bank of England, Mr H.J . Tomkins, was invited to 
the C l ony ' to advise on l egi slation f or the contro l of bank opera= 
tions in Hong Kong ' , His Report, which included reconnnendations 
for a new Ordinance, was pr esented to the Government in April 1962. 
The Report was critical of a number of aspects of the banking 
1 
system: there wer e 'too many banks'; there was t oo great an involve= 
ment by many banks ' in the property market or the stock exchange or 
both 12 (often at the neglect of sound liquidity considerat ions) ; 
and several banks were engaged in trad i ng activities . 3 It stressed 
that 'the card inal principal of sound banking r emains "borrow short, 
lend short" ' , and warned that ' The potentia l dangers of the present 
situa tion would become grave if there were a check to the present 
b d " f h b • I 4 oom an even graver i t ere were to ea reces sion . The Report 
concluded that ' Because it was designed fo r a different purpose, the 
pres ent Banking Ordinance, passed in 1948, i inadequate as a basis 
for exercising supervision over banks in the interests of their 
depos itors 1 • 5 
The 1964 Banki ng Ordnance 
A Banking Bill incorporat i ng most of Mr Tomki ns proposed Ordi ~ 
nance was given a fi rst reading in June 1963 and, after several 
amendment~ , be .ame the Banking Ordinance of 1964. The system of 
control introduced was intended simply to afford some measure of 
protection to depos itors ' funds, and not to permit the establishment 
of a system of monetary controls. 
1 
Tomkins 
2 
Report, p. 7. 
Ibid. , p.8 . 
3 
Ibid. , p.9 . 
4 5 
Ibid . , pp , 8 and 13 . Ibid., p.13 . 
5 
Th min rov~ sions of th i Or din a nc w r e : ( a) Tt. o~ i r a c 
r e · i .t d a ~ l. i n s t i tm: i on c rry i n. o n ' ankir.g us i n ss t o h od a 
b a nkin . · i c n e i s u e d ty t h e F i na n cia e c r eta J . Th annud 
l i cerrse d ~anks we re t o hav . lie r.c .i: e was et t $7, 500 , ( r ) A 
b oth a id up cap i t 1 nd open reserves i n Hon6 o~ o at eas $5 
mill i on. ( c) Ea h bank was to h o l d as iqu i d as e t 9 du ring any 
month: ~o t · e s on t av r a g e than 25 pr c ent o is deposit 
l i b i l i t i e s at t h e end o f the prev ious month. The mi n imum ho din 
of l i quid as s e ts a c any time was s e t at 15 pe r ~ent. iquid assets 
we re def ine d to inc lud e Hong Kong currenc no t es and co i n, ref i n d 
~o l d 9 ne t b ance a t cal or r e pay able on d emand with other banks 
i n Ho ng 
2 
on g or overse as whe n t he funds could rea di ly be t ran s -
ferre d to the Colony, b i lls of e change discountable, and foreign 
treas r y b i l s a n d oth er near money assets provided that the funds 
cou l d b. tra~sferred t o Hong Kong. (d ) Ad va n ce s to a ~y one per son 
or bu i nes s were · imited to 25 p e r cent of paid up capital a n d 
re r v es . Th e s ame l imi t was impos e d on unsecured ad ances t 
direc t or , direc t ors ' r elativ es , and b us i nesses in wh i ch direc t r 
h a v e a n i n t er t j wi t h a imit o f per c ent of s hareho de rs ' fund s 
on l o an wi t ut e cur i t y t o any o n e dir ctor or re a i ve of a 
dire c t or. bhar purcha s sand r eal e s t ate pur hases we r e acb 
imi d t o 2 5 per n t o f hare.ho d e r s ' f und An d t he to a_ for 
thee var i o s transac t ion s was limited to 55 p ent o cap ita 
1 
a n i n ~ b us i ness was de i n ed as ' he busine ss of e i ther -
(a ) i) r ceiv i r.g mon .y on c urrent , deposit , or oth r s imi la r 
ac count from th. g .n r al pub ic , and (ii ) pa · i ng and c o llect i ng 
cheq u or paid i n by custom rs ~ a n d ( i ii) aking dv nces 
() r c . i v ing mon -y on saving account om t _ 
pu yabl o n d .mand o r with i n thr ee months or at 
n t _ s ' n o t i c . r le s , o r both'. 
Bo t 
Bi ·· w·ou 
iquid r e ~ . v 
q uir m nt wa 
tha t it WO 1 i 
t m v e 25 p 
hut in 1967 
c .n t li u id r 
s u ge s t .d by 
d Hong ong 
n t balanc 
from t 196 
r Tomkin s ad 
ank o old 
d u e tooth r 
t . e grou nds 
nking y s -
d 1a n ces . 
or .q u ir a 00 pr 
other b a n k ~. Pre -
s um y, th i m ndmen wa s i ntroduc d o prev ' cros firin ', 
Wh ich wo d hav e pe r mi.t t d the ff .ctiv l i qu id a ssets ra t io of th 
hankin s s em o .a 1 b .low 25 pr nt. 
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and reserv s , e ) In cases when a bank was l ikely to become unable 
to me t its ob ligation , or wher e the bank's activit es were e i t her 
detr imental to i.ts ustom.ers ' in terests or contravened the Ord inan 
the Financ ' al Secretary was empowered to give in t r uc t ions to the 
bank · , appoint a pe rson to advis e t he bank, or assume contro l of the 
bank . The 'nanc ial Secretary was als o empowered to order the Com= 
missioner of Banking to investigate the books, acc ounts and 
transactions of a bank. (f) De tailed monthly retur ns were r equi red 
f rom all banks operating in the Colony , and the banks were requi red 
to publ:i. i se the i r annual financ ial statements . (g) Exemption 
from most o the provisi ons of the Ordinance was given to uni ncorpo ~ 
rated banks l i cens ed under the 1948 Banki ng Ord i nance , prov ided that 
a new licence was obtained, and the word ' bank ' and its der iva~ives 
we re not used i n t he business' title . Unincorporated banks were not 
permitted to accept deposits of more than $2 million . (h) The 
off ice of t he Commi ssioner of Banking was established to supervise 
the working of the Ord i nance, and t o maintain a close wa tch on the 
operations of the banking s ystem. One of the fi r st actions o t he 
newly a pp ointed Connnissioner was to declare a mora t orium on he 
issue of new banking l i cences . 
The new Ord inance became effective on 1 December 1964 and banks 
were i ven a per od of grace to meet certain of the requ rements; 
f or ex mple, the 25 per cent liquid assets ratio had to be obser ed 
1 by the end of May 1965. 
In 1967 the Banking Ordinance was amended urther to strengthen 
the bankin ystem. The amended Ordinance required all i.ncorporated 
banks to have a pad up capital of $10 mill i on and t otal hareholders' 
funds o $ O mil lion. Existing banks were given our years to meet 
the requirement . I . , at the end of this per iod, a bank ' s cap tal 
and r es r es a r e no t. of the stated amount, the .ns titut:ions can 
1 
On 10 J'an ary 1965 the Commissioner of Banking announced tha t all 
of th banks but one w re obs erving the r equired liquid assets ratio . 
During the 19 65 banking crisis, the liquid ity ra t ios o · many banks 
fell below he 25 per cent l evel. 
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accept deposi t s only to the value of ten imes i ts shareho der · 
unds, One e ec t of ·he pro i s ion will be to or ce s ome s cr n t hen= 
ing o bank cap tal reserves, perhaps even by way of mer er between 
banks. The amended Or dinance a lso empower ed t he Commis s i oner t o 
order an inspection of a bank on his own i nitia tive and to app oint 
a second audi tor to look i nto a bank 's a fai r s . Most r esp ons i i l i t y 
fo r administ r i ng t he provisions of the Ordinance was t rans f erred 
f rom the Financial Secretary to the Corrnnissioner of Banking. 
Banks are now requi red t o noti fy the Cormnissione r before open= 
ing a new br anch in Hong Kong, and a f ee of $1 ,000 per annum is 
payable on ach branch operat ing in the Co lony . Of course, this 
f ee cannot be expected to di s courage the establishment of new bank= 
ing of fices, but the prov ision does allow the Connnis s ioner to keep 
a close watch on whether the number of banki ng offices be ing 
established i s excessive and whether any one institut ion is ha ing 
to s pread i ts capital t oo thinly, 
The 19 65 Banking Crisis 
The major banking difficulti es of 1965 occurred be fore the new 
Ordinance could s i ni f cantly af f ec t the structure or stabi l i t y of 
the banking sys tem, The several crises developed from causes aim= 
l. ar to thos e which led to the 1961 bank r un : excessi e lending to 
1 real estale, a lack of second 1 ne liquidity , and the cir ulation 
of r umour s about the f i nancial strength of certa n banks. 
In late Janu.ary , four days before Chinese New Y ar when bank 
liquidi.t y i s always under some strain, one of the smaller local 
banks, t he Ming Tak B!!!!s., was forced to close i t s doors, It had 
been r umored f or some time that the Bank was heavil y committed i n 
dir 2 t i nvestment i n real estate. The Bank contacted the Banki ng 
-------1 
After ·our or · ~e years of very rapid real. esta t development , 
propert prices~ espec ially on luxur y flats ~ decl i ned a li tle in 
late 1961+, 
2 
The Ban ·vs owner 1 at ·r 
no credi d partment and 
.nv s tments than lending 
to trus t the customers ' , 
told the Ban ruptcy ourt t hat the Bank had 
that loans advanced t o h m elf were better 
to bank c ustomers becaus it was dif icul~ 
~' 28 September 1966, 
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Cormnissioner and the Hongkong Bank for assistance, but was re fused 
on the ground that its assets were insuf f icient; later the Bank was 
found to have liabilities of $11 . 8 million (on 4,000 deposit account s ) 
and assets of $3.4 million. 1 
A second and more serious run began on 6 February , t h i s time on 
the Canton Trust and Commercial Bank, a large local institution 
with 26 branches, a capital of $5 million and deposits of $150 
million (owed on 73,000 accounts, many of them to small depositors 
from the fishing and agricultural populations). The Bank closed 
its doors and approached the Hongkong Bank and the Banking Connnisc 
sioner for assistance. Assistance was refused, and this Bank, too, 
was placed in the receiver's hands. 2 
On the morning of 8 February queues also formed outside several 
other local banks, including Hang Seng Bank (which , in its balance 
sheet for Dec ember 1964, published a little later, disclosed de~ 
posits of $700 million and a liquidity ratio of 32 per cent). 
Pledges of unlimited support by the two large British banks - by 
the Hongkong Bank to Hang Seng, Far East and Wing Lung Banks, and 
by the Chartered Bank to Dao Heng and Kwong On Banks= greatly 
3 
reduced the pressure on the local banks, but further action was 
necessary to prevent the difficulties from spreading, At noon on 
9 February a limit of $100 per .day was imposed on withdrawals from 
any one account (transfers by cheque were not affected, and some 
banks may have lost 30 per cent of their deposits through the 
1 
The 1948 Banking Ordinance had not required banks to appoint 
external auditors. 
2 
Soon afterwards the Government lent $30 million to the receiver 
to permit a first payment to depositors. It is thought that eventuc 
ally creditors will rece ive about 50 cents in the dollar . The re 
were, on se eral occasions, demands that the Bank be re =opened, and 
a demonstration took plac e outside Government House . 
3 
These pledges, though, did not eliminate the pressure on the 
banks, One commentator claimed that a typical reaction of the 
local population 'was not simply "Thank Heavens" but "Thank Heavens! 
Since they have enough money let's take ours out" ' , FEER, 22 April 
1965, p,219 , 
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. d . ) 1 clear i ng r ain . To ease the currency shortage , Engli h pound 
notes we re declared legal tende r and the Commissioner of Banki ng 
was empowered to order the r eturn to a note issuing bank of any 
surp lus local currency in the hands of a bank. Later, the Govern= 
ment, aware that the 25 per cent liquid a s sets requirements of the 
new Banking Ord inance could cause a number of banks hurr ied l y t o 
call in advances, e ndeavoured to ease the banks ' liquidity shortage 
by transferring a part of its London res er ves to Hong Kong. These 
funds, totalling at one stage $216 million, were made avai lable t o 
t he banking system in April and May, through the Hongkong Bank and 
the Charter ed Bank, and we re guaranteed by them. No estimate i s 
available of the extent of a s s i stance given by the British banks to 
the var i ous local banks. 
A further r un on the Hang Seng Bank developed in April, an:i the 
pressure on the Bank d id not lessen when the Government publ i cised 
the Hongkong Bank ' s ear l i er pledge to assist the bank . The direc tors 
of the Hang Seng Bank approached the Hongkong Bank fo r further help 
and a f ter ten hour s of dis cuss i on the announcement was na de that, 
wi th the knowledge of the Banki ng Commissioner and the Government, 
the Hongkong Bank was to acquire 51 per cent of the pa i d up capital 
of the Hang Seng Bank . This announcement quickly ended the new run. 
In November, reports i n the vernacular press started a further 
run on the Far East Bank, a small local bank s t rongly represented in 
the New Territories. The run was ended when the Hongkong Bank re a 
i t erated its promise of unconditional support , 
The immed i ate causes of the 1965 crisis cannot be determined , 
Police inves t i gat ions were made into the r wnours whi ch prec eded the 
diff iculties, but no public announcement or pol i ce charges wer 
made, Withtn t he Colony the r umours were attr buted ar ously to 
2 3 
the intens e i nterbank compe tition, to the note issuing banks, 
1 ill!, 14 April 1.965, p . 67 . 
2 
' The Hang Seng Bank had grown very quickly and created many 
enemies in the process , ' 
3 
'The Hongkong Bank had wanted to acquir 
some time t o give it representa tion in the 
the Hang Seng Bank fo r 
ree exchange market , ' 
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and to the Mainland China banks. 1 Whatever the i mmed i a te caus e of 
th r umours, the banking prac tic es f ollowed by a number of banks = 
the heavy c onnni tment in r eal state lending and the low cash ratios = 
and a public l i able to panic, were the mor general causes of the 
crisL 
There wer fe ars that a general contrac tion of bank credi t 
would r esult a s banks attempted to bui l d up their liquid ass et hold = 
ings, that a significant part of depos its would be transferred 
overseas, and that t he appeal of the Hong Kong banks as a re fuge 
2 f or overseas funds would be reduced. In the event, none of these 
proved of more than very limited impor t ance . The rate of increase 
of deposi ts and adv anc es did slow down , but , in absolute t erms , 
deposits and advances continued to grow (by 10 per cent dur ing 1965). 
The t rans fe r of Government funds prevented a more sudden contraction 
of credit on the part of a number of small banks . Some rea l estate 
developers and small businesses did complain of tight credit ,3 and 
sp cial s teps were taken by a group of larger banks through a 
manufac turers ' assoc i at ion to ass i s t the smaller manufacturing 
businesses. 
There was, during midml965 , a t emporary fall in bank deposits,
4 
but thi s was ass oc iated more with the withdrawal of funds by loca l 
5 
depos itors than the transfer of deposits to other monetary centres. 
1 
'The Mainland banks had sought a larger share of the Hong Kong 
banking business, 1 
2 
There was also some apprehension that ro t ing mi ght break out , 
and police and army units were placed on shor t alert . 
3 
See~' 1 August 1965, and Financ i al Secretary , Budge t Speech, 
1966, mimeographed, pp. 2-3 , I t is not known how many of thes e 
borrower s would have f ound i t difficult to ob tain funds even withm 
out the banking crisis, especially as there had been some slack in 
the real e s ta e marke t f rom late 1964, 
4 
A par t of the decl i ne was caused by t he wr iting of f of $160 million 
of depo ts held wi th the Canton Trus t Bank and tl!ng Tak Bank . 
5 
Ev dence of this i s tha t t he no e i ssue he l d outs de the banks 
rose by 28 per cent in 19 65, that f re chan e rates d d not mo e 
strongly gainst the Hong Kong dollar, and t hat the Colony ' s sterl-
i ng assets~ dur ng the year from 235 million to 280 mill on. 
Financial Secre ary, Budget Speech, 1966 , 
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And the rapid growth of d posi ts after mid -1965 suggests that the 
fl ow o unds f rom overseas continued . Of cour s , the fact that 
many banks , inc luding t he largest institutions, were not affected 
by th cr isis is a main reason why there was not a more pronounc d 
withdrawa l o f deposits or a severe contract ion of credit. And, the 
continuing strength of the Hong Kong economy - other than in a part 
of the real es t ate sector = helped maintain f ore ign confid nee. 
On a slightly longer view, the bank crisis contributed to a 
strengthening of the banki ng system. First , it f ocus ed attention 
on the dangers of some of the earlier banking practices, such as the 
excess ive corrnnitment t o real estate l ending, unsecured advances and 
the obs e r vance of low l i quidity ratios. There were repor t s after the 
banking di fficulties that banks were looking fo r more adequate secu-
rity on loans and f or borrowers outside the real estate field , and 
that many institutions were aiming f or higher liquidity rat i os (30 
pe r cent to 35 per cent) than the minimum s pec ified in the Ordinance. 1 
Secondly , the cri sis made the public more careful in choosing an 
institution i n wh ich to entrust savings. During and immediate ly 
after the crisis there was a signifi cant transfer of funds to the 
larger and bette r r un institutions, especia lly to the Britis h and 
the Mainland China banks , Thirdly , the weaknesses of a number of 
banks shown dur ing the 1965 difficulties must have strengthened the 
hand of the Banking Corrnnis sioner in having the Banking Ordinance 
amended - a s i t was in 1967 - fu rther to strengthen the Colony's 
banking syst em , Als o f rom the cr isis came a f ormal i s ation of the 
mach .ne r y fo r ass st ing banks t emporarily shor t o f liquid asset s . 
Instead of the small banks having to approach the British banks 
directly , it became the practice f or requests f or as s stance to be 
directed t o the Commis s ioner of Banki ng. 
In September 1966 the Yau Yue Commerc ial Bank (a small bank 
owned by overseas Ch inese in the Philipp i nes), wh ch had receiv ed 
1 
~' 14 April 1967, p . 169. 
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ass i s t anc rom the Hongkong Bank since m d~l 965, was f ac ed with a 
consider able loss, and the Hongkong Bank announced tha t it had t aken 
over the Bank ' s deposi t l i ab i l i ties and a s s ets , Th i s t rans f er, whi ch 
was approved by the Financial Secretary , was conducted smoothly , and 
there was no questi on of a los s of public confidence in any other 
bank . 
The Commerc ia l Banks and t he 1967 Disturbances 
The strength and stability of t he banking s ystem was demonstrated 
dur i ng the 1967 pol i tical disturbances. Ther e was , for a while , both 
a s i gni f icant withdrawal of deposits as cash and a sizeable t rans f er 
of deposit s to overseas financial centres. Total bank deposi ts de ~ 
creased i n e ach o f t he f irst f our months of t he d i sturbances - by 
$370 million (or more than 4 per cent) in May , $260 mill i on in June , 
$35 3 million i n July, and $48 million in August . (S urpr i s i ngly , 
s av i ng deposits fell only in May. ) From September onwards, depos i ts 
incr eas ed agai n, b ut at the end of 1967 depos i ts were still below 
the Decemb e r 1966 level . The banknote issue ros e f rom $1,883 mi ll ion 
in April to $2,400 mi llion in June . Balances due f rom banks abroad 
f ell. about $400 mi llion between April and J u l y , as f unds were moved 
out of the Colony 's banks, 
But there was no question that either bank ill i quidity or a 
severe credit squeeze would res ult. Al though the banks ' l iqui d 
as set holdings did f al l - f rom 36.8 per cent in December 1966 to 
31 , 0 per cent in June 1967, 28.0 per cent in July and 30 , 1 per cent 
in August - the banks'~ position was not strained duri ng the 
di s turbances. The banks maintained a cash ratio in excess of 4 per 
cent - a h i gher cash reserve than was recorded in late 1966 . There 
were no reports that any small bank required assistance , 
Bank loans and advances continued to increase until the end of 
J ul y, In August, bank credit was reduced by $207 mill i on (3 , 5 per 
cent ), and in September and Oc t ober by $54 and $69 million resp ctiv• 
ely, A part of the reduction was brought about by the marked f all 
in the alue of the Colony's trade n these months (impor ts ell in 
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value from $870 million in J une to $660 million in August and $680 
mi llion in September). And there was, of cours e , a r educed demand 
f or credit f rom real estate developers, i nd ustrial i sts, etc . Ther 
was no evidence that the banks called in advances or that many busi ~ 
nes ses experienced a shortage of credit . 
The Present Stability of the Banking System 
Clearly, the banking system has developed considerably in terms 
of stability over the postwar per iod. In part this is a consequenc e 
of changes made by the banks themselves. During the 1950s the number 
of small banks fell significantly and many of the banks which con-
tinued to operate began undertaking activit ies of a more conventional 
connnercial banking nature. The interest rate agreement took away 
one more dangerous form of interbank competi tion. But it required 
the 1964 Banking Ordinance before many banks gave up the s everal 
potentially dangerous bank pract i ces, such as unsecured lending and 
the maintenance of low cash ra tios . The Ordinance also established 
the of f ice of the Commissioner of Banking to maintain a close wa t ch 
on banking practices in the Colony . 
Many of the pres ent weaknesses of the banking system arise from 
the fact that so many banks operate . A number of banks have small 
capital resources and are unable to spread their lending risks among 
many borrowers, Interbank compe tition still allows a number of 
rather unsound borrowers to ob tain loans. There has been no merger 
or amalgamation of smaller banks . Indeed, wi th the close identificam 
tion of many institutions with a particular family , mergers and 
takeovers seem unlikely , desp i t e the recent requirement that banks 
strengthen their capital, More seriously, the banking system is 
continually faced with the poss ibility that a s ignificant part of 
deposits might be trans erred ov .rs as at short notice, i n response 
t o doubts about t he Colony's conom c or pol i tical future. 
Perhaps the single distingu shing feature of the operations of 
the majority o 
flexibility, 
t he Hong Kong banks over the postwar per od is 
The institutions quickly re - stabl i shed their trade 
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fi nance and xchange business af er the Pac ific war , many profited 
f rom spe ulation in the xchange markets in the late 1940s, bank 
advances - often on a relat i v 1 long~term basi = were available 
to manufacturing bus i ne sses vi r tually f rom the start of the Colony ' s 
i ndustrialisation, t he banks from an early stage met the demand fo r 
credit which arose to finance build i ng cons t r uct i on, and the insti = 
tutions have acted as deposi tories for the growing savings of the 
more s ettled and prosperous c ommunity . 
To a large extent, the comro.ercial banks have been able to adapt 
and develop thei r activi ties so qui ckly because of the f reedom under 
which they have operated . Unt il 1964 there was an absolute minimum 
of control; the banks had only to hold a current banking l i cence 
and to submit occasional financ ial returns to the Financial Secretary. 
Even the 1964 Banking Ord i nanc e allowed the banks a greater measure 
of f reedom than commerc i a l bank usually enjoy. A more embracing 
and stringent system of control might have adversely af f ec ted the 
f lexibility of the banks' operations and restric ted their abili ty 
to adapt so quickly to the changes which have taken place in the 
Hong Kong economy. 
Chapter 7 
THE MONEY SUPPLY 
The f our preceding Chapters , and especially Chap ers 3 and 5 , 
have several times touched on aspects of the money supply . It 
seems us eful , now , to look in more detail at the supply of money in 
Hong Kong. This Chapter ana lyses the components of the money supply, 
var iations in t he money supply and their caus e s , the external con-
ver tibility of Hong Kong money, and the adequacy of the monetary 
system fr om the point of view of economic growth . 
Components of the Money Supply 
A first problem is the very familiar one of deciding what should 
be included in the money supply . In any country the re is a r ange of 
fina n ia l titles with vary ing degrees of liquidity whi ch can perform 
the~ function, if not fully the ex cha nge funct ion , of money. 
The div ision between money and near - money asse ts is ound to b an 
arbitrary on , and depends mainly on the objec t of the particular 
exerc ise . Our main purpose in this Chapter is to outlin the causes 
of variations in the money supply . For this we need a concept of 
the money supply wh ich is capable of statistical m asurement . The 
problem of classification of financial titl s into money and near -
mon y is harder the more complex a country's range of financial 
institutions and titles. In Hong Kong, where non-bank financial 
institutions ar relatively undeveloped, the difficulty is mainly 
that of determining where to include interest-bearing bank deposits . 
The de finition of money supply most frequently adopted is 
1 
simply currency and cheque deposits held by the non-bank public . 
1 
Where the necessary statistics are available , unused bank over -
drafts are usually included in the money supply. There is a case 
too, for including cash held by saving banks. But there is no way 
of es ablishing what part of cash reserves of the Hong Kong banks 
is held against the institutions' saving deposits. 
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Interest-bear ing bank deposits are us ually xc luded on he grounds 
that ( i ) th .se deposits cannot function as am dium of cha n e and 
(ii) int r es -brearing deposits are rarely subject to sudden y ar 
t o year chang s . In th case of Hong Kong t here are strong grounds 
f or including saving deposits in the mon y supply . Al hou h the se 
deposits cann ot be us d as a medium of xchang , hey are withdraw-
able on demand without loss, and are , for many businesses and 
individuals , a substitute for a cheque deposit account . More over, 
th re have been quit e marked year to year change s in the level of 
saving deposits. In the tables which follow, wo measures of the 
'money supply' are given : 'money supply (narrow definition)' in-
cludes only cash held outside the banks and demand deposi ts, and 
'money supply (wider definition)', which includes saving deposits. 
As seen in the discussion on Table 7.4, the two concepts give quite 
different analyses of causes of variations in the money supply. 
There seems to be less reason to include time deposits , which 
in Hong Kong cannot be withdrawn on demand without loss . These 
depos its are better considered as quasi-money . 
Government cash balances and demand deposits are frequently 
excluded from measures of the money supply because (i) it is usually 
intended to present the liquidity picture of t he privates ctor -
the part of the economy which ~he monetary authorities wish to 
control or influence; (ii) in general , government spending decisions 
are little affected by the size of the government's cash holding s ; 
and (iii) in any case, government -held balances are usually qui.te 
small. Here again, the specia l circumstances of Hong Kong would 
s em to justify different treatment. There is no central bank a nd 
the Gove nment cannot readily obtain additional funds by selling its 
debt to the b nking system . The Government differs from other 
cus omers o the banking system only in size and is unable to re-
ceive accommodation fr om the banking system o he same ex ent as 
a government in an independent monetary sys em, The spending deci 
sions of the Hong Kong Government are more influe nced b he size 
of its monetary holdings than is usually t he cas e , 
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Table 7. s t s out component s of the mon y supp ly ver t 
period 95 5 o 1967. 
I n he cours e of economic deve l opment , he re a i v impor ance 
of bank depo s it s usua lly gr ows a t t hee pense of cur r ency) i n i ne 
with the publ i c ' s gr owi ng f mi liarity with ~ and trust i n, commerc ia l 
banks , and the grea t e r impor t ance of l a r ger fi nancial tra nsa ct i ons. 
Eve n i n the r e l atively short period covered i n Table 7 . 1 (s ee r ows 
12 and 13) , the Hong Kong statistics conf irm t h i s exper i e nce . Cur -
r ency f e l l as a proportion of t he money supp l y (narrow def i ni tion) 
f r om 42 per cent i n 1955 t o 34 per ce nt in 1963 . (In th fo llowing 
year s ~ as consequences of the banking crisis a nd the po l i t ical di s -
turbances , t he pr opor t ion incr eased to 43 per cent . ) As a pro por t i on 
of the wider concept of t he money supp ly, curre ncy fell fr om 39 per 
ce nt t o 26 per cent betwe e n 1955 and 1966. The i ncreasin prefer -
enc e of t he publ ic t o hold bank deposits is signif i ca nt , of cour s e , 
i n t ha t it a f f ects not only t he compos i tion of t he mane supp ly, but , 
by per mitt i ng additional credit crea t ion , t he v olum of mon y a s 
well . The omposition of the money supp l y pus quasi=money cha nged 
even more ma r kedly . Ti me deposits increas d f rom 8 per cent of 
money p l us qua si~money in 1955 to 32 per cen t i n 1966 . 
As Tab e 7 . 2 shows , the r atio of currency i n cir culation to 
cheque deposits is lower than in most Asian countries , Hong Kong 
ha s a re l atively high average income, the Colony is very ur bani s d , 
t here is a deve l oped corporate sector , and , i n gene r al, a h ighe r 
l evel of economic sophistication . 
I n many develop d countries , there has ee n a t ende ncy , a t 
leas t ov .r t he postwar period, for the r atio of t he mo ey supply 
1 (nar rowl y defined) to national income to fall - i.e . for t he 
veloci t y of circula t ion of mon y o i ncreas - main l y be cause he 
l iabili t i e s of non- bank fina ncial ins i t utions have incr easingl y 
supp l anted mon .y as a store of value . On t he o her ha nd , in a 
1 
See, for , amp l e , (U. K. ) Commi.ssion on the Working of th Mone t ary 
Sys t em, H,M. S . O. , Command 827 (The Radcliffe Report) , para 478 . 
Table 7.1 
\.OLL'1E OF )o! O~E Y. 1955 ro 190~ 
1955a 1956 19 57 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 196) 19 6-'.> 1965 1 966 1 967 Times Inc r e ase 1 '1,; , to 1 967 
million 
(1) Banknotes Issued by Commerc ial Banks 727 7)2 755 772 8)8 914 95) 1045 114 0 1296 1629 17)0 2176 J.O 
(2) Currency Is s ued b}· HoJ1€ KoJ1€ 
Goverrunent 45 52 57 56 5 8 70 74 7 9 90 102 110 12 l 1)1 2.9 
(J) Total Currenc y Issued 772 78) 81) 828 896 9S.:. 1027 1124 12)0 1 )98 174 0 1852 2 ) 08 J.O 
(4) Currency Held by Commercial Banks 144 97 118 84 86 1J6 114 162 210 202 22 1 2)2 JJJ 2 . J 
( 5) Currency Held by Publi c and Government 628 686 695 744 8 10 84 8 91) 962 1020 1196 1 519 1620 1975 J .l 
( 6) Demand Deposits with Con:mercial 
Banks 852 928 955 988 1205 1J9J 1470 1664 1997 2JJ8 2 5)2 2681 2658 J.l 
(7) =(5)+(6); Money Supply (Narro• 
Derinition) 1480 1614 1650 17)2 2015 224 1 2J8J 2626 )017 J5J4 4051 4J01 4 6JJ J .l 
(8) Saving Deposits ~~ th Co11W11ercial 
Banks lJJ 166 190 244 369 5)7 66) 879 1145 1515 1620 1982 2180 16. 
(9) =(7)+(8) ~loney Supply (Wider 
De f'ini t ion) 161) 1780 lS.:.O 1976 2J84 2 778 )046 )505 4162 5049 5671 628) 681) 5 .1 
(10) Time Deposits with Corm1ercial 
Bank s 152 17 ) 267 )51 4 82 752 12J4 1768 228) 26)9 J099 )742 J J 24 21. 9 
(11)=(9)+{10) Money Supply plu s Quasi 
~toney 1765 195) 2107 2)27 2866 J 5JO 4280 527) 6445 7688 8770 10025 101J7 5 . ..,. 
per cent 
(12) Currency as Per Cent o!' Money 
Supply (~arrow De!'initi on) 42 42 4 2 4J 40 JS JS J 7 J4 J 4 J7 JS 42 
(lJ ) Demand Deposit s a s Per Cent or 
~lone y Supply ( ~arrow Derini tion) 58 58 58 57 6o 62 62 6J 66 66 6J 62 57 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1 00 
(l!t.) Currency as Pe r Cent of ~loney 
Supply (Wider De!'inition) J9 J9 JS JS J 4 J l JO 27 24 24 27 26 29 
(15) Demand Deposits as Per Ce n~ or 
Money Supply {Wider De!'inition) 5) 52 52 50 50 50 48 48 48 45 4-4 4J )9 
(16) Savi"€ Deposits a s Per Cent or 
Mone y Supply ( Wider Definition) 8 9 10 12 1 6 19 22 25 28 J l 29 )2 J2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10 0 100 
1--' 
a. Jl December tbrougbout. u, 
co 
Source: Ho!!& Ko~ Government Gazette 1 Sueelement Number 4. 
Table 7. 2 
CUR RE CY AS PER CENT OF MONEY SUPPLY , SELECTED COUNTRI ES , 
1960 AND 19 6 
Au s tral ia 
Japa n 
Hong Kong 
Ta iwan 
Philippines 
Ceylon 
Malay sia 
Korea 
I ndia 
Burma 
December 
1960 
24 
25 
38 
44 
5 7 
so 
71 
63 
73 
69 
December 
1966 
22 
22 
38 
38 
53 
54 
60 
61 
64 
74 
De f initions. Currency: cur ren cy held by non-bank publ ic . 
Mone y supply: c urrenc y held y n on-bank 
public plus demand deposi t s . 
Note . This Table provides a measure of the component s of 
the stock o f mone y of the var ious countries at the 
two point s o f time. No indica t ion is given of the 
relative importance of the two t ypes of money in 
economic transactions in the differe n t economies, 
wh ich would be af fe c ted by the~ at which the 
two types of money t ur n over . 
Source. Economic Bulletin f or Asia and t he Fa st East , 
v a rious numb e rs . 
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numbe r of underdeveloped countr ies , the growth of per cap i t a incomes 
and mon t isa t ion of the subsistence sec t o r s ha ve tended o raise 
h . . 1 t 1.s r a t io . Tabl e 7. 3 shows t he mone y s u pp ly as a per cent of 
nationa l i n come i n Hong Kong . Although the Table covers on ly a 
relativ e ly s h ort pe r iod of time , t he r esul ts are n t wi thou t inte = 
rest. Th e fa in the ratio o f currency to nationa l i ncome (row 1) 
is in larg e pa rt du e to the spr ead of the banking habit . Over the 
period covered , there has been little v aria t ion i n the ratio o f 
currency and dema d deposits to na tiona l income . But the ra tio of 
money supply (wider definition - includes saving deposi ts ) t o 
na tional income increased from 43 per cent to 49 pe r cent. The most 
n o t ice ble change i th ris - from 4 7 pe r cent t o 77 er c nt - i n 
h 1 1 
. 2 
t e ra io o f mon y pus quasi-money to nat i ona i n come. Part o f 
1 
Se Econ omic Survey of As a and the Far East, 1966 , p . 90 . 
2 
In Austral ia in 1964 , currency and bank d e posi t s were the equival -
ent of 55 pe r ce nt of national income (Hong Kong, 77 pe r cent ) , 
consis t ing of cur ency plus demand deposits 21 per cent (Hong Kong , 
34 per cent) , saving deposits 26 per cent (Hong Kon , 15 pr cent), 
and fixed deposi s 8 per cent (Hong Kong, t ime deposits, 28 pr cent). 
60 
t his i ncr eas e , weve r , i s due simp y t ot e con i nu ing inf ow f 
deposit s f r om abroad , and is , therefore , of r latively l i ttle c -
nomic s i gn i ficance . 
Ta b e 7. 3 
MONEY AND QUASI-MONEY: PER CENT OF ROS D ME TIC PRODU CT , 
SELECTED YEARS 
1955 19 59 1964 
$ mi ll ion 
Est imated gross domestic product 3,780 5 , 290 10 , 000 
Rat i to gross domestic pr oduct 
( 1) Curr ency he l d outs ide of 
banks 
(2 ) Demand deposi ts 
(3) Currency and demand deposits 
(4) Saving deposits 
(5) Money supply (including 
sav i ng deposits) 
( 6) Time deposits 
( 7) Money plus guasi~money 
17 
23 
39 
4 
43 
4 
47 
Per cent 
15 12 
23 22 
38 34 
7 15 
45 49 
9 28 
54 77 
Hong Kong Sources . Gro ss domest ic produc t : K. R, Chou, ~T~h~e;_;;=.:~ _;;,,;.=-=~ Economy, 
Hong Kong: Academic Presr , 1966, Ta le 27. 
Money and quasi - money : Table 7.1 . 
Variations i n the Money S~ 
On can determine mor e about the caus e s of change s i n a country ' s 
money supp ly by l ooking at the componen s of the var ia t i on . 1 I n any 
conomy, th increase in the supply of money in a g iven period is 
qual .o the surplus of international receipts over internationa l 
payme nts plu s the i ncrease in domes t ic non- cash asset s of the bank-
ing syst m (and vice versa for a decrease) . There are several ways 
in wh i ch the compon nts i n the money supp ly var ia t ion can be set out . 
1 
The most useful is : 
One which traces [the changes in the money supp y ] back 
to net le nding and borrowing transactions betw en he 
maj or sectors of the economy ~ f irms , households , gove rn-
ment , and t h r est of t e world . Idea lly, what is needed 
This sect ion has benefited from my read:ipg E.S. Shaw, Mone , Income 
and Monetary Policy, Chicago : R. D. Irwin, 1950 , Chapte r I I; 
F . H. H. King , Money i n Br i t ish Ea st Asia , Cha pter 3 ; P.A.A. Wi l son, 
'Money in Malaya ', Ma l ayan Economic R v ie~ , Oct obe r 95 7; and 
P . J . D ake ~ ' The Deve oping Capi tal Ma r ket i n Malaya ', unpub ished 
Ph . D. thesis , Australian National Un i versi ty, 19 6 9 pp . 115- 29. 
f or s uch an analysis is a regu lar (or a l eas t annua) 
series of flow- of-funds accounts for the economy . l 
1 
But few count r ies have the detailed statistics required f or sue an 
exe rcis e , and in the statistically virtually unchar ted man ta r y 
system of Hong Kong , it is possib le only to make the general break-
down given i n Tables 7 . 4 .A and 7 . 4 . B. The table s, which are as d 
on a classification employe d in an unpublished Wor l d Bank ana ysis 
of the Hong Kong money supply for the period 1954 to 19 60 , show the 
contributions made to variations in the money supply by the Govern-
me nt , domestic and external sectors . The net contributions of each 
of the three sectors over the period December 1954 to December 1966 
is shown in the final column. 
In Hong Kong, the public sector has not infl ue nc ed the money 
supply by selling its debt to the banking system . The Gove rnme nt 
ha s, though , a ff ected the level of the money supply through var ia 
t ions in i ts r eserve holdings (rows 2 and 3 in Tab l e 7.4 . A) . Ove r 
the period 1954 to 1966 the Governm~nt ran down its for e i gn re s r ves 
by $47 mi l lion , and built up its local money balances by alm st $ ' 00 
mill ion . Ove r the same period bank credit t o he priva t e sect or 
was ex panded by $5,405 million . But, unless one inc lude s av i n 
deposits in the money supply (Table 7 . 4 . B), t his expa ns ion of 
credi t was more than of fset $5 , 502 million) by the public ' s a ce mu-
lat ion of nonTmonet ary interest-brearing deposits and by the growth 
of the ba nks' net miscellaneous accounts , If saving deposits are 
included in the money supply, net credit to the private s e c t or 
increased over the period, by $1,784 million, but still cont ri ut ed 
only a thi r d of the total increase in the money supply . I n th 
absence of any statistical information on the balance of payme nts , 
the cont ribution of the external sector can be shown on l y y 
variat ions in the foreign assets of the exchange and cur re nc fund$, 
t he . commercial banks and Government , The foreign asses of t es 
institutions e panded by $3,251 million in the period 195 4 o 1966. 
1 
1 H.W . Arndt and C,P, Harris, op . cit., p.41 . 
Table 7.4A 
ANNUAL VARIATIONS IN MONEY SUPPLY, 1955 TO 1966 
($ million) 
----
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Change 1954 to 1966 
I PUBLIC SECTOR 
(l) Bank credit to government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Offsets 
( 2) Local currency and balances - 59 58 66 -8 -30 -28 95 19 1 105 42 -73 38 397 
( 3) Balances abroad 83 - 42 -32 23 48 -25 -96 -19 -34 141 -85 -9 -47 
( 4) Time deposits and excess cover of no t e and 
coin issues 8 -10 -2 0 7 -16 2 2 7 20 11 9 38 
Total offsets 32 6 32 15 25 -69 l 174 78 203 -147 38 388 
(5) Ne t credit to public sector - 32 -6 -32 - 15 - 25 69 - 1 -174 -78 - 203 147 - 38 - 388 
II PRIVATE SECTOR 
( 6) Bank loans and advances 121 137 96 54 454 347 684 515 793 970 426 342 4939 
( 7) Bank investments 0 l -4 -2 10 21 63 - 2 9 307 so 13 466 
Total credit to private sector 121 138 92 52 464 368 747 513 802 1277 476 355 5405 
Offsets 
(8) Time deposits 20 -4 39 74 145 351 414 356 405 323 496 552 31 il 
(9) Saving deposits 32 33 25 54 124 168 126 216 266 370 105 362 18 ')1 
(10) Net miscel lane ous accounts 45 30 23 18 41 -43 115 -69 -9 - 303 65 0 - 48 £,J O 
Total offsets 97 59 87 146 310 476 655 503 662 390 1251 866 5502 
( 11) Net credit to pr ivat e sector 24 79 5 -94 15 4 -108 92 10 140 887 -775 - 511 - 97 
(12) Net domestic credit 
-8 73 -27 -109 129 -40 91 -164 62 673 -617 - 509 -484 
I II EXTERNAL SECTpR 
(13) Exchange fund 0 0 25 17 63 76 38 104 96 156 329 82 986 
(14) Note and coin funds 1 13 1 4 10 3 5 18 1 -2 4 15 73 
(15) Government balances abroad 83 -42 -32 23 48 -25 -96 -19 -34 141 - 85 - 9 -4 
(16) Net bank balances abroad 1 19 56 151 so 166 59 344 262 - 514 913 646 2153 
(17) Total external sector 85 -10 50 195 171 220 6 447 325 - 219 1161 734 3165 
TOTAL MONEY SUPPLY (narrow definition) 78 63 23 86 300 180 97 283 387 454 544 185 2681 
Annual va riations in the ~oney supp ly (narrow 
definition) from Table 7.5 (n . a.) (134) (36) (82) (283) (226) (142) (243) (391) (519) (515) (250) (n . a . ) I-' 
Q"\ 
Source: see not es to Tables 7.4 and 7.5. N 
Table 7.4.B 
ANNUAL VARIATIONS IN MONEY SUPPLY, 1955 TO 1966 
($ million) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Change 1954 
to 1966 
I Public Sector 
( 5) Net credit to publ ic sector - 32 -6 - 32 -15 -25 69 -1 -174 -78 -203 147 -38 - 388 
II Private Sector 
( 6) Banlc loans and advances 121 137 96 54 454 347 684 515 793 970 42 6 342 4939 
( 7) Bank investments 0 1 -4 -2 10 21 63 -2 9 307 50 13 466 
Total credit to private sector 121 138 92 52 464 368 747 513 802 1277 476 355 5405 
Offsets 
(8) Time deposits 20 -4 39 74 145 351 414 356 405 323 496 552 3171 
( 10) Net miscellaneous account s 45 30 23 18 41 -43 115 -69 -9 -303 650 - 48 450 
Total off sets 65 26 62 92 186 308 529 287 396 20 1146 504 3621 
(11) Ne t credit t o private sect or 56 112 30 - 40 278 60 218 226 40 6 1257 -670 -149 1784 
(12) Net domestic credit 24 106 -2 - 55 253 129 217 52 328 1054 -523 -187 1396 
III External Sector 
( 17) Total external sector 85 -10 50 195 171 220 6 447 325 -219 1161 734 3165 
TOTAL MONEY SUPPLY (Wider definit ion ) 109 96 48 145 424 349 223 499 653 835 636 547 4562 
(Annual variations i n the money 
supply (Wider Defin i t i on) from 
Table 7 . 5) ( n. a . ) ( 168) ( 60 ) ( 136) (408) (394) ( 268) (459) (657) (889) ( 620 ) ( 612 ) ( n. a , ) 
Sour ce : see No tes t o Table s 7 . 4 a nd 7. 5 . w 
Table 7.5 
ANNUAL VARIATIONS IN MONEY SUPPLY, 1956 TO 1966 
($ million) 
1956a 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1_965. --12i6 
(1) Net external asset s of monetary institutions 
Currency Funds 13 1 4 10 3 5 8 1 -2 
4 15 
Exchange Fund 0 25 17 63 76 38 104 96 156 
329 82 
Commercial banks 19 56 151 50 166 59 344 262 -S llf 
913 646 
Total 32 82 172 123 245 102 466 359 -360 
1246 74 3 
( 2) Domestic assets of monetary institutions 
Currency Funds -4 0 6 -9 8 5 -4 10 10 6 
2 
Commerci a l banks 138 92 42 464 369 677 513 802 1277 
476 355 
To tal 134 92 48 455 377 682 509 812 1287 
482 357 
1) + (2) = 
( 3) Total assets of monetary institutions 166 174 220 578 622 784 975 1171 , _ ____JJ2 . _!228 : 100 
-· 
Minus non-monetary assets 
Banks' cash holdings -47 21 -34 2 so - 22 48 48 -8 
19 11 
Otherb 25 -1 34 37 -9 2 56 -66 -49 -360 679 
-144 
4) Total non-monetary assets -22 20 0 _3.L_ ...:!!:2 34 -18 -1 -368 698 -155 
Equals 
(5) Total monetary assets 188 154 220 539 664 750 993 11,72 1295 
1030 1255 
- --.-----·· 
Equals total monetary liabilities 188 154 220 _ 51_9 _ _ ~ - 750 993 11 72 1295 1030 
1255 
----·--· -
Less 
(6) Time de posits 21 94 84 131 270 482 534 515 406 410 643 
Equals 
( 7) Money supply (wider definition) _ -~- ---- 168 _ 60 136 408 __ 394__ 268 __ 459 65 7 889 620 
612 
-·--·--- --
Less 
(8) Saving deposit s 33 24 54 12S 168 126 216 266 370 105 3o2 
Equals 
9) Money supply (narrow def i nition) _134 36 _ _fil__ 1 83_ - 2_2_6 J.42_ - - 2_4-L _ 391 519 515 
2 'i 0 
_ .... _. 
-
Consisting of 
Demand deposits 76 27 33 217 188 77 194 333 341 
194 149 
Currency held outside ba nks 58 9 49 66 38 65 __ ~ __ ?L__ J: 7~ - 12_1 _ _!QJ. 
r-' 
·- -----~-- -·- - -- -· 
(J\ 
a Year ending 31 Decembe r t hroughout b Res idual item; includes errors 
.i:--
Source: see note s to Tables 7 . 4 and 7.5. 
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Notes to Tables 7.4 and 7 . 5 
1 . Table 7 . 4 is given in two parts . In Table 7 . 4 . A saving deposits 
are exclud ed fr om the money supply . In Tab le 7 . 4 . B saving de-
posits are included in the money supply. 
2. 'Net miscellaneous account' i n Table 7 .4 equals commercial bank 
cash holdings plus bank net worth plus net interbank ba l anc s 
in Hong Kong. The cash holdings of the banks are treated as an 
off set becau s e they represent a liability of the currency and 
exchange funds. Net interbank balances should , of course, be 
equal to zero, but , due mainly to di fferent account i ng c lassifi-
cations, a zero value is rarely recorded . 
3 . 'Net miscellaneous account' in Table 7 . 4.B was estima ted as a 
residual . Thus the item in this Table includes the errors which 
r esult fr om the differ ing balance dates . 
4 . St a t istics for the currency funds and Gove rnment relate to the 
year ending 31 March following. 
Sources . 1955 to 1960 : World Bank Repor t on Hong Kong, unpublished , 
1962, Table 5 . 
1960 to 1966 : Annual Report of the Accou nta nt- Gene r a l, 
various numbers ; 
Government Gazett e , Supplement Number 4 , 
various numbers. 
Table 7.5 : Annual Report of the Accountan -Genera , 
various numbe·rs . 
Government Gazette, Supp l ement Number 4 , 
various numbers . 
1 
An o ther wa y i n which the components o f the v a r ia t ion s i n the 
money supp ly ca n b e set out is the ' balance she t ' method u s e d y 
1 d K " 2 Shaw an ing. As the financial titles wh i ch circulate as mon.y 
are the ( moneta ry) liab ilities o f financial insti tut i ons , 3 a ny 
var iation i n the mone y supply must hav e its q u i v a l ent among e i the r 
the assets , o r the n on- mone tary liab ilities of the f inancial i ns i -
tutions whose liabilities are included in the mo ney supp ly . Thus , 
if the mone y supply is taken to consist of currency and dema nd 
deposits , we can highlight changes in the volume of money by analys -
ing move ment s in the monetary assets of the currency funds a nd the 
commercial banks . This approach is s et out in Table 7. 5 . 
Severa l general comments can be made on Tab les 7 . 4 and 7 . 5 . 
F i r st , the Tab l es point to the relative simplicity of the monetary 
syste m: there is no central bank and the money supply has not bee n 
influenced by transactions in government securities by the monetary 
institu t ion s . Second, the continued dominance o f balance of pa y-
ments causes of changes in the money supply stands out . The 
r e l ationship betwe e n the money supply and the balance of payments 
is discussed in the next section . Third, as row 5 of Table 8 . 4 . A 
demonstrates , the financial operations of the Gov ernment h a v e had 
s ome i n fluence on t he local mone y supply. This topic is fur he r 
analy sed i n a later section . 
Money Su pply and the Balance of Payments 
The dependence of the local money supply on the balance of 
payments is a topic which has been given a good deal of attent ion 
1 
2 
3 
E . S . Shaw , op . cit . 
F. H . H . King , op . cit . 
It is convenien o us e the term 'monetary assets ' t o r e fe r to 
th comm rcial banks' total as s ts less ass ts held again st non-
mone ary liabilities. Th main non:;;;;etary liabili t i es ar t he 
b anks ' ne t wor th and cash hold ing s ( the latter is trea t ed as a 
monetary liab i l ity o f the surrency authorities and not o f the 
comm rcial banks ) . 
1 7 
1 in discussions of the colonial sterling exchange standard No 
attempt is made here to review this literature ; in this sect ion w 
are simply concerned to see how rigid a relationship between balance 
of payments and money supply has been experienced in Hong Kong , and 
to make some analysis of what effect a sudden change in the Colony' s 
bala nce of payments situation might have on the money supply. 
Of course , in the simple colonial sterling exchange s tandard , 
where there are no banks and the currency is fully backed by foreign 
exchange, it is correct to say that the money supp ly is de termined 
by the balance of payments, As one author has pointed out , varia -
tions in the money supply in such cases would be the 'one item that 
brings about equality between all the positive and negative items 
2 in the balance of payments' 
Once allowance is made for commercial banks, this simple rela-
t ionship between the balance of payments and the money supply is 
broken , Unlike the currency fund, the banks hold bot h foreign and 
local assets , and the money supply will increase whenever the banks 
expand their credit. The banks can make additional advances so long 
as there are outlets which satisfy their lending standards and they 
are sufficiently liquid to meet the resulting cash drain ; provided 
the se two conditions are met there can be an expansion of bank 
credit whatever the state of the balance of payments. The greater 
the importance of bank credit, the more variations in the local 
money supply are freed from balance of payments forces. 
Creation of money by the banks also means that the money supply 
is less than fully backed by foreign exchange. But it doe s not mean 
that the money supply is inconvertible into the foreign curr ency: 
1 
See, esp cially, J. Mars, 'The Monetary and Banking Sy s tem and tlte 
Loan Market of Nigeria' in M. Perham (ed. ) , Mining, Commerce and 
Finance in Nigeria, London : Faber, 1948 , Chap er IV ; W.T . New lyn , 
' Th Colonial Empire' in R. S . Sayers, Banking in the Bri t ish Common-
wealth , Oxford University Press, 1952; Arthur Raz lwood , 'Colonial 
Monetary Arrangements', Social and Economic Studies, 1954; a nd 
E . Nevin , op . cit ., Chapter 1 . 
2 
J . Mars, op . cit . , p . 186. 
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currency i nconverti i i ty will result only i n ch cas wher . h . 
commerc ia l ba nks have ove -expanded the ir ending and ca nnot mee 
the r e sult i ng demand for cash fr om hol ders of bank deposi As 
Arthur Hazelwood has pointed out in connection wit h t he co ~onies in 
general : 
in he ab sence of a local ' central' or ' res r ve ' bank , t e 
commerc i al banks' cash reserves can cons i st only of ster .i ng 
or s erling-ba cked currency . Bank money ca n be come i n-
convertible i nt o s t erl i ng, therefore , only i f t he banks 
are unable t o meet thei r liabilities •.•• If banks are 
properly managed , their soundness ensure s the full con-
vertibi l i t y of loca l money in to sterling.l 
I t is obv ious that movements in the volume of bank credi in 
an economy such as Hong Kong's cannot be comple tely i ndependent of 
the ba l ance of payments. First , as much bank credi t is for i nt r-
nat ional trade purpos e s - e ither directly to finance the movement 
of good s or to f i nance the production of exports - a f all in e p rt 
demand would qu ickly be associated wi th a red uction i n the vol.um of 
bank er di • A ba ance of payments deficit woul d also af fect the 
ba nks ' li u idity position , perhaps fo rc ing t hem to ca ll i n loans 
and i nvestments . How sensitive the level of bank credit would be 
t o variations i n t he institu t ions ' ca s h base depends on whether he 
banks ea r ier he · d surplus liquid assets and on wh ther t h .y are 
able and prepar d to borrow from their branch sand othe r ource 
overseas . 
Tables 7. 4 . A and 7.4. B showed that the balance of payme n s has, 
in most ye a s j been the main i nfluence on the money supp ly. Howeve r , 
there ares veral years in which , be cause of the activities of the 
commercial banks , the local mone y supp l expand d qu i te r apidly 
desp i t as ow growth i n t he foreign ass t s of the mo t ary i ns t i ~ 
tut ions. Since 1964 bank credi t has expanded a t a mor e rad ua · r a e , 
a nd a anc~ of paym :nt: s factors have a a.in been. t e. mer impor t an . 
ca.us of mo n y supp y vat'ia ·ions . As was s ·n iP Ch. pter 5 ~ th 
banks hav no , ov rall, been 'loaned up' (at ou h th .y w r 
Op . ci t . ~ p . 299 . 
1 9 
t e nding this wa y i n 1963 a nd 1964) , and f o r this reason th re as 
not b een a clos r year by year relationship be tween the balance o 
payment s a nd the mone y supp l y. The data fr om rows 11 and 17 o f 
1 
Ta ble 7.4 a re graphed in Chart 7 .1. 
S veral c onunentators on the workings o f the Brit i sh co on i a 
cur re n c y stan d a rd have claimed for it tha t a colony 'ca nnot have a 
"balance o f payments" proble m as that t e rm i s now commonly u nder-
2 
stood' - t hat 'if a Colony is unable to meet its ex ernal 
obl i ga tions it is because o f lack of money - of income in internal 
3 
curre ncy - not because of lack of foreign exchange' . The way i n 
which he 'automatic balance of payment s me cha n i sm' appe ars o have 
operated i n Hong Kong can be illustrated by the case where th re is 
initially a fall in export receipts , perhaps because an important 
trading partner imposes additional restrictions on imports from 
Hong Kong (t h is was the inunediate cause of the slump in expor sin 
1951) . 4 
A d i stinction must b e made between the income and the mon ta ry 
c on sequences of this fall in expor t rece ipts . Th e l e v e l of inc ome 
wi ll fall a s a direct consequence o f the s lump i n ex por t re c e ipts 
and t he f amiliar mul ip l i e r mecha n ism will come i nt o play. B· t i n 
an e c onomy such as Hong Kong 's , the multiplier effect wi 1 n o t be 
l arge : g iven t he h i gh marg inal p r opensity to import, it is possibl 
tha t a fall i n e x port income s will have almost as great a n effe c t 
on th level of imports as it does on local incomes . And , becau s 
domestic leakages - to savings and taxes - are small , the f all in 
incomes wi ll its e l f be a signi f icant f orce i n the re - establ i shment 
1 
Similar charts are g ive n in W. T . Newl n a nd D.C. Rowan, Mone y and 
Banking i n British Col onial Africa , Oxfdtg : Gl ar ,n d od Pre ss , 1954 , 
p . 171, and ' P,J . Drake, op . cit ., Figur VI -1. 
2 
I . B . R . D., Economi c Development o f Jamaica , 1952 , cited in Arthur 
Raz lwood, op . c i t . , p . 288. 
3 
Ida Greaves , op , cit ., p . 88 . 
4 
Much of th next f ew paragraphs draws on t he author's ' A Go l de n 
Standard' , FEER , 1 September 1966 . 
Char t 7.1 
$m 
6000 
(/J 
.µ 
(I) 
(/J 
(/J 
~ 
00 p 
•M 4000 p 
~ 
cu 
rzl 
....; 
cu 
u 
0 
H 
2000 
/ 
/ 
Commercial Banks : Net Foreign Assets and Cash, and 
Lo ca l Earni?g Assets, 1955 to 1967 
57 
56 
/ 
64 
63 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
.o/ 
'<., "y 
...,tu7 
~~/ 
~/ 
/ 
1000 2000 3000 
Net For ign Assets and Cash 
$m 
4000 
170 
171 
of balan ce of pay m nts equilibriumo Of course the i s l i t e i n 
th is i nc ome mechanism that i s unique to an con omy on t he sterling 
exchange standard . The important consequence of the sterl i ng ex -
change standar d with a 100 per cent f oreign exchange backing o the 
currency is sue is hat the Government canno t attempt to maint a in 
the previous level of income by resort to centra l bank fina n c 
whether i nfla tionary or not . Any Government de f icit must be me t 
from Government reserves or borrowing ( from the public , the commer-
cial banks or from foreign sources) , and can continue only so long 
as th se sources of funds are available. 
The i nitial fall in exports also has ~tary conse quences o 
For a balance of payments deficit to continue, the e x cess demand 
f or imports must be reinforced from either money hoards or new 
money creation o1 In the former case, the imbalance must be s elf-
correcting , for the public cannot indefini tely run down its money 
balances o What , then , of the external defici t being fi nanced by 
new money c r eation? The banks are unl ike ly to go very far i n 
creating credit d ur ing a balance of payments de f icit. Th e external 
imba a n ce would reduce both the demand for bank advan ces , a nd e 
b anks ' holdings of liquid assetso And bank liquidity ca nn o t b 
mainta ined by central bank finance, direct or indire ct. Of c ourse , 
a bud get deficit could be financed -by runn i ng down the Governme nt's 
London reserves ; this would keep up the level of t he money supply 
but there would, at the same time, be an accommodating capital inf low 
in the balance of payments. 
Two othe r c onseque nces might contribute to the restoration of 
balanc of payments equilibrium, If the money supply de clines more 
rapidly than income , tightness in the money market will increase 
i n terest rates, The higher interest rates may, in turn , further 
r duce th level of economic activity and , more ert ainl , encourage 
an i.nflow of short -te rm funds from abroad , Th re is also th 
1 
H . G
0 
Johnson, International Trade and Economic Growth, Lond on : 
George Allen and Unwin, 195 8, p .15 8 , 
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pos s i b i lity that a change i n r lat i ve pr ic s - a owe r i ng of dom .stic 
pr i c s as local exp nd itur s fall - wi l .ncourage som switch i ng o 
expe ndi t ur s from traded to non-traded goods . But it i ha rd t e 
chis eff ct be i ng of much importance in Hong Kon. 
The s mon tary re per cussions of t he i n i t i a l ba ance of paymen 
def i cit serve o re i nfo r ce t he ef fe ct s of th i ncome chan es. The 
va ue of impor t s wi l l fa ll, and , eve ntually, balance of pa ments 
qu i l i br i um will be restored at a new l evel of income and mon y 
supply . Chart 7 . 2 pr esents t he system of re l ationships i n out in 
f orm . The consequences of the 'mechanism ' a r e that local i ncomes 
and the mon y supply adj us t t o t he needs of th alance of paym .nt s , 
and t ha t , short of s erious bank fai lur es, loca l money is fu lly con-
v r tible i nto sterl i ng . There is no need for quantita t i v e cha nge 
re s t rict ions for ba lance of payment s rea sons. 
Th . ma i n disadvantage wh ich follows from this monetar y sy s t m 
i s that i n terna l ba l a nce may be sacrifi ced for the balance of pay= 
1 
m n ts adj u tmen t. But , i n any e conomy where f ore i gn trade i s 
dominant, t he ba ance of payment s is a n impor tant influence on 
domesti c i ncome and moneta r y condi t i ons . And , an e conomy such as 
Hong on 's - i ndustr i al ised wi th e s t abl ished markec s - i s un i kely 
t o ex perience the wide var i at ions in receip t s felt by countr i es 
whos e exports are domina ted by one .or two good s su ch as rubb r or 
coff ee ; thu s , t he pr ob l em of the int erna l effect of the ba ance 
of payment s flu ct uat ions is not as seve r e i n Hong Kong as i n many 
t er r i t or i e s wh i ch have emp l oyed a similar monetary s t anda rd . I t 
1 
Cle ary, the 'aut oma t ic bala nce of payme nt s me chan ism' wh i ch 
ope r ates as a r e sult of the Hong Kong mone tary sys tem is ve r ~ 
s imilar to that wh ch op rated und er t he gold exchange s t andard : 
the valu . of t he l ocal money unit is f ixed i n terms of th res r ve 
cu re ncy ; th mon .y supp ly is dependen t on the ba lance of paym nts ; 
lo mon .y is f r eely convertib le into t he superior currency; and 
i nterna l balance may have to be sa~rificed f or alance of pa ent s 
equi lbr i um. On . point of diffe r ence bet nth . two me chan i sms -
at l~a st betwe en the Hong Kong syst em and the gold · chan ·e candard 
ou t l i ne d by J. E. Me ad e , The Ba l ance of Payments , London: xford 
Un i versi t y Pr e s , 1952 - lies i n t he un impor tance of i nterest r a te 
movem .n ts i n the Hong Kong system of balance of pa me nts adj us tment. 
Chart 7 . 2 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT TO A FALL IN EXPORT RECEIPTS 
I Initial balance of payments deficit I 
~ ~ INCOME EFFECTS LIQUIDITY EFFECTS 
I nit ia 1 fa 11 
i n incomes 
Fall in 
Fall 
Balan c e of pay me nt s 
e qu ilib rium 
Fall in d ema nd 
for bank credit 
balances ; 
from which 
can be fina n ced 
..... 
-..J 
w 
must be remembere d ~ too, that the Government is not ent ir y wi 
out some influence on local monetary c onditions. 
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Although the maintenan ce o f external ba lance is not depend nt 
on the ex istence of th free market in f oreign currencies , this 
ma rke t appears to make the adjustment a more speedy one. During 
the initial b alance o f payments deficit , the f r ee ma r ket r a t es 
would move a gainst the Hong Kong do llar, making i mport s f inanced 
from the open market more expensive, and discouraging ou tward 
capital transfers. Both o f these tendencies wou ld c ontribute t o 
the restoration of balance of payments equilibrium . 
It does not appear entirely correct to say that an e conomy 
with Hong Kong' s institutional arrangements cannot have a balance 
of payments problem, for external imbalance is usual ly define d t o 
include a situation where loss of international reserves is avoided 
only by a depressed income leve l and by mone ta r y stringenc y . The 
'balance of payments proble m' can take the form o f a r e duced incom . 
level and money supply , but not o f a threat to the s tab i l ity or 
c onve r tib i l ity of the Hong Kong dollar . 
Government Influen ce on the Money Supply 
Table 7 . 4 showe d that the financial activ ities of the Govern-
ment have had some influence on the supply o f money within the 
1 Co l ony . I n most years, the Government ' s financia l op ration s have 
l ed to a decrease in privately-held money balances , but in 1960 a nd 
1965 the Government's activities we r e responsible for an increase i n 
the domestic money supply . Of course, this effect o f the Gove r nment ' s 
operations did not come about through any delibe rate attempt to in-
flue nce the size of privately-held money balances . Nor did the 
Governme n t affect the local money supply by borrowing f rom the 
banking s yst m or by arranging a fiduciary cur r ency issue. The 
1 
Th . scope for government influence over the money supp y in a 
territor employing the colonial sterling exchange standa r d appea rs 
to have been f irst outline d by F. H. H. King, op. cit. 
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i nf u nc has en felt throug var i at ions i n he Go ernment' s 
loca ly- h .l d reserves and i n t e Governm nt balance s eld i n Lor,.don . 
If th Government f i nances a budget def icit by running d wn 
its local reserves ~ there wi l be an i ncreas i n privat l y- ~ ] d 
money balances y an equ ivalent amount . ( If overr.ment mon .y 
balanc s are included in th d fin ition of the mon y s upply, no 
var iation i n t h e 'money suppl_ ' will re sul t. ) Unless the banks 
hold a higher cash ratio aga inst Government - owned deposit s than 
privately-held deposits , no multiple credit creation wi ll resu lt 
from such a transfer of deposits. In the opposite case , where the 
Gove r nment r uns a budget surp us and deposi ts the exce ss of revenue 
with the Hong Kong banks , the pr i vately-he l d money s upply i ll fall 
by an equivalent amount , and only i f the ba nks ma intain a dif ferent 
cash ra tio a ga inst Government than non-Government deposit s will 
there be a mu lt iple contrac t i on of t he money supp ly. 
But i f an excess of publ ic spending is financed by a wi thdrawal 
fr om he overnment's London reserve s , the local money supply, whether 
or not it i s def i ned to i nclude Government -held local demand depos i ts, 
wi ll rise. At the very l ea s t the money supply wi ll increa e by the 
equivalent of the Government d .f icit . The transfer wi la so i n-
crease the l iqu id asset ho dings of the banks and , if t ere are 
suffic i ent lending opportunit ie s wh ich meet the ba nks ' loan crite ria , 
cred it wil l be expanded and the money supp ly wil l rise by a mu tipl i ed 
amount , The Gove r nment can influe nce the local money supp ly even 
independently of its budget posi t ion thr ough transfers of its r .-
serve s between London and Hong K ng. In such cases there wi ll be a 
variation i n the private ly held money supply so l ong as the banks 
expand or contract heir l oca l oans and advance s i n response to th . 
cha nge i n the i r cash base. 
Clearly, the Governm nt' ab i l ity to influence th money supp y 
depends on the size of i ts rs rves, on its willin ness om ve 
these funds betwe n London and Hong Kong (wh ich i nvolv amo n 
other th i ngs, considerations o · change cost) , and , most imper ant y , 
1 
on he se nsi t i v ity of the comm r c i a banks o c anges in their 
l iqu id asset pos i tion , 
Transfers of locally e d r eserves between the Gov rnment' s 
demand and time deposit accounts also affect the money supply (if 
this is de f i ned to inc lude the Governme nt's current deposits) . but 
th se transfers are withou t economic significance . 
There are several other way s i n wh i ch the Government cou l d 
exert an i nf l uence on the money supply were there changes i n Govern-
ment attitudes or in i nstitutional arrangements . Firs t , the supply 
of bank mone y could be varied thr ough directives to the banks to 
adj ust their liquid assets ratios. Secondly , a fiduciary currency 
issue would permit additional Government influence ov er the money 
supply , in that the currency issue (and thus the cash base of the 
commerc ial banks) could then be varied without any corresponding 
change i n the external assets of the Ex cha nge Fund . So long as the 
fiduciary issue was limi ed i n size , there would be no qu s ion of 
i nflation or of the Hong Kong do llar becoming inconver t ible. Thirdly , 
if a sale of Government s ecurities to the commercial banks i nduced 
these i nstitut ions to lower t heir holdings of liquid assets a road , 
t he i ncreased Gover nment expe nditure made possible by the loan 
1 
ra isings would lead to an i ncreas ed l ocal money supply. 
It can be seen , then , tha t th monetary framework do~s not 
preclude Gover nment i nfluence over the mon y supply . But, especially 
so l ong as the currency issue remains fully backed by ster l ing, the 
extent of the Government's infl ue nce on the s upply of money is much 
more limited than is the case with a government in an i ndepe nden t 
monetary system . Even if there is unemployment of a Keynesian ype 
(unemployment wh ich could be reduced by an increase in mon y demand) , 
the government i n an economy wi th a pur e sterling e cha nges a ndard 
1 
Of course , there will be no i ncrease in the money supply as a 
result of the Government's sale of bonds if the banks reduced their 
local loans and advanc sin ord r to purchase the Governme nt pap r . 
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would b e unab l to i nanc e a ~d 6 de f i ci t by n .w mon y c rea i on ,
1 
and to thi s tent , the c ur re n cy b oard s y stem can ope ra e as a 
sign i ican t c on str ain t on the 0 1 rnme n t ' s i nf lu nee over th mon y 
supp l y . 
Econ om1 c Gr wth 
The s u i tab i l i t y of th Co orj 9 S mone tary s y s c em from t he point 
o f v i ew o f economic g row h is top i c wh i ch has b en tou ched on 
several t imes already. A monetary system s hould ensur e an appro 
pr i ate rat e of g rowth in t h em ney supp ly. If he mo ney s u pp l y 
incr as e s t oo quickly, e c onomic growth could be disru p ted by s e riou s 
i nflat ion o r bala nce of payment s difficu l t i e s . On the o the r ha n d , 
if the money suppl y is i n s uff i c i ently elastic , economi c growth 
mi ght b e retarded b y a deficiency of money d emand . 
( i ) We saw i n t he pr e v ious s ection tha t the currency b oard 
a rrangements impos e some r estra i nt on t he Gove r nme n 's a b i l ity to 
i nfluence dome st ic mone tary co~di t i n s . It has been a r ued i n t he 
case o f a n umber of co l onies t a t t:h is restraint had adv erse c on-
sequences f o r e con omic deve lopm nt ; the automa ic r ansmission o f 
var ia tio n s in t he b a lance of pay m nt s t o domestic moneta ry condi-
t ion s was sa id t o discoura e i nvestme nt i n fixe d ca pi t a l and fa v o ur 
. 2 investm n t i n specu la t i v e a nds .ort - t erm v ent ur es. Bu t in Hong , 
wh r . eco nomic f luc tuation s ha e een re la i ve mi l d , th is proble m 
has not a ris e n . It has been po i ica u ncertainty, rath e r than 
monetary i n stab i l i ty , which ha s i v n a b ias towards s hort - term 
inve s t m nt . 
(ii) It has b en cl a ime d , too ~ ta t the co l on ia l c urre n c 
b oard mechanism has a 'd .flationar bias ', wh i ch c n ac a s a r eak 
1 
However , t h .re ma y b e oc c si n s i n hich ov ernment b o r rowi ng 
fr om th commer c ia l b a nks i ndu ce t h i n stitu t ion s to ru n down 
their .f orei n r eserve h o din or their cash h oldings . I thes . 
ca s es , the Go ernment borrowi ·. w be a ssociate d with n money 
cr ea ion . 
2 
l . B . R . Dq The Ec2n2mic Dev .!.2£.!Ee n t o f Mal~ , Balt imore : J ohn 
Hopkins , 1955 , pp . 645- 6 . 
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on economic growth . Simply , and rather crude l y , the argumen t c a n 
be expressed in this way: a growing national income requires a n 
increased money supply to satisfy the public's demand for larger 
money balances; under the sterling exchange standard (or any s y s em 
with a 100 per cent foreign exchange backing to the currency issue ) 
the money supply can increase only if there is a balance of payments 
surplus; thus, for the money supply to increase with the national 
income, economic growth must be associated with a continuing and 
increasing balance of payments surplus; otherwise, it will b e choke d 
off by the deficiency of money demand 2 and the increase in interest 
rates, or will continue only so long as there is price deflation .
3 
It is clear from the earlier discussion in this study that 
this problem has not yet arisen in Hong Kong: the growth of national 
income has not been retarded by a shortage of money demand or b y 
high interest rates, And, given the very adequate foreign exch ange 
reserves held at present by the commercial banks and Gov ernment, it 
seems unlikely that the problem can arise for some time , In a ny 
case, one can expect the velocity of circulation of money further 
to i n crease as the public becomes more bank conscious , and there is 
considerable scope for the expansion of bank credit (i . e . for an 
increase in that part of the money supply which is not fully b acked 
by sterling). A limited fiduciary . currency issue within the sterling 
e x change standard currency framework would also permit the mone y 
1 
The question of the deflationary bias is discussed extensively in 
Arthur Hazelwood , op. cit, pp,301 - 7, W,T , Newlyn and D. C. Rowan , 
op , cit . , pp.195 - 7, and P.J. Drake, op, cit., pp.144-8 . 
2 
A further complication is that the drain of currency from the 
b a nks to me et the public's g r owing demand for cash balances ma y 
cause a reduction in bank adv ances, and thus a shrinkag e o f the 
money supply . 
3 
It should be stressed tha t this problem of a deflationa ry bias 
u nder a mon tary system with a 100 per cent foreign e x change c over 
against the currency issue is not an abstract one ; Hugh Pat r ick , 
' Japa n , 1868-1914' in Rondo Cameron , op. cit . , p . 253 , shows t h wa y 
in which t h Japanese Governme n t acted to avert exactly this problem 
in the early 1880s ; W. T. Newl yn and D.C . Rowan, op . cit . , especially 
p,197, saw the deflationary bias of the mon tary system as a rela-
tively immediate problem for several African states, 
s u pp y t o b expanded independently of any bala nce of pa ym n s 
sur p l u s . 
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( i ii) Wha t of the opposite case : can the monetary s y s em 
pe rmi t an ex cessive i n crease i n the supp ly of money, which would 
lead to i n flation or a demand for imports f or which n o fore i gn 
exchange is available? It is very unlikely that r ap id price i n-
creases or currency inconvertibility could result under the Hong 
Kong monetary s y stem . It is, after all, the virtue of the pure 
sterl ing ex cha nge standard that the Government cannot resort to 
deficit fi nance and the banks can hold only f ore ign exchange or 
f o r eign exchange -ba cked currency as liquid asset s . Nonethel e ss , 
g i ve n t he importance of bank credit in the economy, a too rapid 
expansion of b a nk loans and advances could strengthen inf lationa r y 
pressures in the economy. 
(iv ) There has been some cost to economic growth in the 
mainte n a n ce o f a 100 per cent foreign exchange backing again st the 
bank n o te issue . It was seen earlier that full convertib i lity does 
n ot requ i re this e xtent of external cover, a nd some o f the funds 
employe d in this way could, instead, have been used in a on ce - for -
all i n crease in public capital formation. The h i gh level of cove r 
has, though , ensured foreign and local confidence i n the Hong Kong 
cur r ency. 
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Chapter 8 
THE NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The role of non-bank financial intermediaries - housing 
finance institutions , insurance companies, pension funds, hire-
purchase companies, securities markets, co-operative societies, 
etc. - in the saving-investment process and in economic development 
has been given considerable attention by policy makers and 
economists, especially in the more developed economies. 1 In many 
less developed countries, the establishment and nurturing of non-
bank financial intermediaries have been objects of government 
policy: by widening the range of financial titles available and 
by making for a more developed capital market, it is hoped that 
these intermediaries will increase the rate of saving and encourage 
a more efficient distribution of investible funds . 2 
For various reasons non-bank financial intermediaries are 
relatively unimportant in Hong Kong . 
(i) First, the title 'bank' has been given a very wide 
interpretation in the Colony . The 1948 Banking Ordinance required 
any business accepting deposits from the public, or conducting 
money transfers or remittances, to register as a 'bank' . Largely 
for this reason most deposit-accepting institutions have operated 
under the title 'Commercial Bank', even though their operations 
may have been more correctly described as money changing, 
bullion dealing or the provision of hire-purchase facilities. 
(ii) A number of commercial banks - including the older and well-
established institutions - have undertaken a wider range of 
lending activities than their counterparts in many other countries. 
1 
See for example, J.G . Gurley and E.S. Shaw, op . cit. 
2 
See E.C.A . F . E. , 'Measures for Mobilising Domestic Saving ... ' 
Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, December 1962, Part III. 
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As a consequence, borrowers have had less reason to turn to non-
bank financial institutions, such as the new issues market and 
housing finance corporations. 
(iii) Political uncertainty, too, has discouraged the 
development of non-bank financial intermediaries. Many of these 
institutions - notably the new issues market, life insurance 
companies and pension funds - deal in financial titles which are of 
a long term, and frequently illiquid, nature. Uncertainty over the 
Colony's future has favoured saving in the form of short term liquid 
assets with fixed capital values; most especially, in short-dated 
bank deposits. 
(iv) Because of the predominance of Chinese family-owned 
businesses, there i~ little tendency towards public company status 
and public capital issues. Perhaps, too, for the same reason, 
some personal savings are made available only to borrowers within 
the extended family, and not to the capital market. 
(v) Overall, the system of non-bank financial institutions has 
not received the same degree of Government encouragement and 
support as in other developing countries. For example, there is 
1 
no industrial or development bank, post office saving bank, 
Government-established pension fund or Government-supported 
securities market. But this difference is one of degree only, for 
we shall see, even the avowedly laissez-faire Hong Kong 
Government has accepted responsibility for the establishment and 
support of several non-bank financial institutions. 
(vi) The freedom with which money ransfers can be made between 
Hong Kong and other financial centres may have acted against the 
development of the Colony's financial markets. The commercial 
banks, for example, have had ready access to foreign money markets, 
local savers can freely purchase foreign financial titles,and 
1 
In 1959 the Government established a Committee to look into the 
question of whether an industrial bank was required in the Colony. 
See Chapter 12. 
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insurance companies can choose, without restriction , to invest 
their f unds i n the more developed overseas capital markets. 
(vii) In many countries the restrictions placed by monetary 
authorities on the act ivities of the commercial banks have 
encouraged borrowers to turn to the non-bank intermediaries instead, 
and thus have served asa stimulus to the prolif eration and growth 
of the non-bank financial institutions. No such restraint on the 
expansion of the commercial banks has been imposed in Hong Kong . 
(viii) Many non-bank financia l institutions have been 
established specifically to assist the development of rural 
industries - the sector of the economy usually least served by 
commercial banking. This sector is of little importance in Hong 
Kong. 
I n the following pages the several non-bank institutions are 
discussed in turn: the housing finance institutions, the stock 
exchange and new issues market, insurance companies , the merchant 
houses , the co-operat ive societies and, finally, the hire-purchase 
companies. 
The Housing Finance Institutions 
In this group are included the Hong Kong Hous ing Authority, the 
Hong Kong Housing Society, the Hong Kong Building and Loan Agency 
and the building co-operative societies (which are described in a 
later section). These organisations deal almost exclusively with 
the Colony's middle income group and almost a ll of their f unds 
1 
are provided from Government sources. 
(a) The Hong Kong Housing Authority. The Hong Kong Housing 
Authority was set up by the Government in 195 4 as a financially 
independent body to provide housing on a commercial basis, f or the 
middle income group . The role of the Authority can be seen in this 
extract from a recent Report. 
1 
Not all the funds allocated by Government for housing purposes are 
allocated through these institutions . A large part is spent directly 
by the Government on resettlement and low cost housing. 
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The Authority is nether a welfare agency nor i s it a 
charitable institution , but a corporate body set up by 
ordinance to secure the provision of hous i ng accommodat i on 
as it sees fit for such classes of persons as the Governor 
approves [the Authority has been charged with provid i ng 
housing or f amilies with a monthl y i ncome of $400 to $900]. 
It is fur ther charged wi th mai ntaini ng a policy whi ch 
ensures that in any three year period i ts revenues shal l be 
sufficient to meet its outgoings.l 
The Authority - the only semi-Government body i n the Col ony - i s 
responsible for planning housing developments, award i ng contracts 
for the construction of its estates and managing the occupied 
buildings. The Authority has been required to pay i ts own way -
there has been no direct Government 'subs i dy' of the Author i ty's 
operations - but land has been provided f rom the Government at one-
third to one-half its estimated commercial va l ue, and f unds have 
been borrowed from the Government on an indef i ni te bas i s at 
relatively low rates of interest (3.5 and 5 per cent ) . 
The Authority is administered by a board consisting of all 
members of the Urban Council2 and three members appo nted by the 
Governor. It employs its own staff of archi tects, engi neers and 
estate managers . The number of flats provided by the Authority and 
the number of tenants occupying these flats are shown in Table 8.1. 
Given the Colony's land shortage, most developments are land 
intensive: one estate at present under construction will house 
51 , 000 people on 25 acres . 
The standard of estates has been planned on such a basis that 
rents will be between thirteen and twenty per cent of the income of 
the families occupying them. These rents cover the amortisation of 
capital over forty years at five per cent (earlier 3.5 per cent), 
the payment of interest on borrowed funds, rates , repairs and 
maintenance, the costs of management, and a surplus for reserves 
and re-investment. Of the Authority's income from reqts in 1966/67 
1 
2 
Housing Authority, Annual Report, 1965/66 , p . 3. 
At present this Council has 26 members, including ten elected 
members. 
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Table 8.1 
HONG KONG HOUSING AUTHORITY, FINANCIAL AND OTHER DETAILS, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1957 TO 1967 
1957a 1960 1963 1966 1967 
(1) Number of completed flats 2 ,600 11 ,300 22 , 100 22,500 
(2) Persons housed 16,200 68,400 132 ,600 135,500 
$ Million 
(3) Capital assets 24.9 62 . 1 154 . 9 212.6 225.1 
( 4) Hong Kong Government Loan 
(4a) Approved 91.5 139 . 0 180.0 245 . 0 245.0 (4b) Utilised 23 . 8 56 . 6 140.1 181 . 1 186.1 
(5) Accumulated retained earnings 1.1 5 . 5 14.8 31. 5 39.0 
(6) Rental income 4.4 11.3 24.2 25.6 
(7) Interest paid to Government n . a. 1.8 5.5 8 . 0 8 . 7 
a 31 March each year . 
n.a. = not available . 
Source: Hong Kong Housing Authority, Annual Report, various numbers 
of $25,6 million, 34 . 2 per cent was absorbed by interest, 18 . 7 per 
cent by rates, 14.3 per cent by management and administration, 8.3 
per cen t by maintenance charges, 7.9 per cent by capital amortisation, 
leaving a surplus of 18.7 per cent of the rental income. A feature 
of the Authority's operations is a low level of rent arrears. In 
1965 it could be claimed that 'for the past three years there has 
been for all prac tical purposes no arrears of rent, with a rent roll 
1 which now r eaches $2 million a month.' 
The Ordinance establishing the Authority permitted the body to 
'borrow from the Government or from such other sources as the 
Governor may approve such money as may be required for the discharge 
of its functions . •. upon such terms and conditions as may be 
approved by the Government', and it was not intended that the 
Authority would be completely dependent on Government-provided funde. 
At first, the Government loans - which in all cases have been 
provided from the Colony ' s Development Loan Fund - were arranged 
separately estate by estate , but in 1958 the several individual 
1 
Housing Authority, Annual Report, 1964/65, p . 3. 
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loans then outstanding were consolidated into a revolving fund of 
$91.5 million (with the Authority paying interest at 3 .5 per cent 
p.a. on the first $45 million and at five per cent p , a . on the 
remainder). Although it was the Government ' s intention that 'the 
money already granted to the Housing Authority was intended to 
constitute a permanent revolving fund which would very soon make the 
1 Authority independent of further grants' the continuing magnitude 
of the housing problem and the unavailability of non-Government funds 
have required the Government to make additional loans (see Row 4a in 
Table 8.1) . The Government on a number of occasions has informed 
the Authority that further loans could not be provided on such 
2 favourable terms. 
A now significant part of the Authority's investment is 
financed from internal sources (Row 5 in Table 8.1) . A main 
reason for the Authority's decision in 1965 to raise rents was to 
3 increase this re-investible surplus. In its 1964 /65 Report the 
Authority suggested that accumulated retained earnings should be 
around $75 million by 1970 . The recent increase in rents will mean 
that this estimate is considerably exceeded . 
The Authority has been unable to attract funds from non-
Government sources: 'the best we have been able to find were a few 
million do~lars, at seven per cent repayable over three years, a 
reasonable rate of interest no doubt, but an impossible repayment 
4 
period' . In March 1966 the Authority reported that the question 
5 of issuing debentures or annuity loan stock was being examined', 
but it found, apparently, that no underwrit ng support was 
forthcoming and that it would need to offer a high interest rate. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Financial Secretary, Legislative Council Debates, 1965, p . 79. 
See, f or example, Housing Authority, Annual Report, 1961/62, p.10. 
Housing Authority, Annual Report, 1965/66, p . 4 . 
K.A . Watson, Legislative Council Debates, 1965, p .159. 
Housing Authority, Annual Report, 1965/66, p . 6 . 
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The difficulty, of course , is that the Authority requires funds on 
a very long term basis at a relatively low int erest r a te . 1 It 
appears likely tha t the Auth~rity will remain dependent on funds 
pr ovided from the Government and t r om its interna l sources . 
(b ) The Hong Kong Housing Society. This organisation was 
formed in 1948 as a non-profit making institution charged with the 
provision of low cost housing for families with average or small 
incomes . At that stage there was no Government-provided cheap 
housing. The Soc iety was incorporated in 1951. It is a non-
Government organisation, administered by an Ex ecutive Commit t ee 
composed, at present , of members of commerce, welfare agencies and 
Government . Since the Government's resettlement program was 
commenced, the Housing Society has concentrated on the provision of 
housing f or the middle income group (family incomes of $400 to $900 
per month). In this and in several other ways, i t s operations are 
similar to those of the Housing Authority The Society constructs 
and manages multi-s tory es tates on land pro ided cheaply from the 
Government . Flats are rented and not so ld . Rents ar e charged to 
amort is e capita l over 40 years. 
Information on the Society's op erations is set out in Table 8 . 2. 
The l arges t par t of the Society's funds has come from l oans from the 
Government's Devel opment Loan Fund, under the same conditions as 
the funds provided to the Housing Authority . Retained earnings have 
financed about eleven per cent of the Soc ie ty 's fixed capital. The 
Society has made several attempts to obtain funds from non-
Government sources, but found it not possib le to secure loans for 
2 
the nec essary long term at reasonable i nter est rates , The Housing 
1 
As the Financial Secretar y observed 1n his 1966 Budget Speech , 
'the only money t hat one can raise for a period as long as [the 40 
years over which the Housing Au t hority amortises its building costs] 
is money raised by the Government's compulsory power of taxation ' . 
2 
See Housing Society, Annual Report , 1966, p . 4 and Annual Report, 
1967 , p . 22 . 
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Table 8.2 
HONG KONG HOUSING SOCIETY FINANCIAL AND OTHER DETAILS, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1957 TO 1967 
1957a 1966 1967 
Number of completed flats 1,500 14,300 15,400 
Persons Housed 8,800 89,600 96,200 
$ Million 
Capital assets n.a. 131 . 8 143 . 5 
Hong Kong Government Loan 
Utilised 9 . 7 123. 8 134 .3 
Accumulated retained earnings n.a. 9 . 5 15 . 4 
General reserve n.a . 6.0 6 . 0 
Loan Scheme (less repayments) 2.0 2 . 0 
Rental income 1.3 15 . 6 17 . 5 
Interest paid 0.3 5 . 2 5 .7 
a 30 September each year. 
n . a . = not available. 
Source: Hong Kong Housing Society, Annual Report, various numbers. 
Society operates one scheme not offered by the Housing Authority: 
since 1956 it has accepted loans from firms to finance the 
construct i on of flats for nominated employees. The completed flats 
are leased to the contributing firms~ and the loans are then r epaid 
by the Society, without interest, over twenty years . By late 1967, 
29 firms had participated in this scheme, advancing the Society $2.5 
million . In addition, the Government had lent $8 million under 
these arrangements to secure accommodation for 1,000 Government 
employees . 
(c) The Hong Kong Building and Loan Agency . The Hong Kong 
Building and Loan Agency was established in 1964 to finance the 
purchase of nominated flats. The Agency's capital was provided by 
the Government and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (each 
has subscribed $16 million, and the Government has pledged an 
additional $16 million). Overdraft facilities, up to a limit not 
made public , have been promised from four banks - the Hongkong Bank , 
1 
the Chartered Bank, the Bank of East Asia, and the Hang Seng Bank . 
The Agency makes mortgage finance available on a relatively 
long term basis (maximum twelve years) to families with a monthly 
income 1n the range $700 to $2,000. Interest 1s charge ( at a 
non-reducing nine per cent . The Agency approves blocks of flats 
constructed by private developers and lends up to 75 per cent of ts 
valuation of particular flats . 
Despite the advantage of the scheme - interest rates are lower 
than those charged by local banks on s1m1lar loans and borrowers 
gain an immediate title to ownership - there was for some time 
relatively little demand for the Agency's fac1lit1es . In 1966 and 
1967 there was no waiting list of applicants, and a greater volume 
of business could be handled. In December 1967 the Agency had 
mortgage assets of $28.5 million on 1 , 100 accounts, compared with 
$3.2 million to 93 borrowers in December 1965 . Most borrowers are 
s chool teachers or civil servants. 
There are several private housing schemes to which reference 
might be made, even though the organisa t ans cannot properly be 
described as financial i nstitut ions. These schemes are mostly 
concerned with the construction o flats for sale . The largest is 
being undertaken by a local subsidi ary of the Mobil Oil group. 
This housing project is estimated to cost $450 m1ll1on and will 
house approximately 80,000 people in 15 ,000 flats . Construction 
began in 1966, and the first flats are to be ready for sale in mid-
1968. Most will be sold on an instalment basis. Another private 
development scheme offers 1,880 flats for sale on instalment terms 
over fourteen years at prices of $15,800 to $24,500 a flat . More 
than half the flats in this development were sold eighteen months 
before the estimated completion date. 
At the end of 1966, the total investment in housing of the 
Housing Authority, the Housing Society, the building societies, and 
the loans outstanding of the Building Agency, totalled about $500 
million . On che same date the commercial banks had loans outstanding 
for construction purposes of $950 million . 
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The Stock Exchange and the New Issue Market 
Unlike many developing countries, Hong Kong has had an 
organised market in company securities for a long period of time . 
The present Stock Exchange - the Hong Kong Stock ExchangE Ltd, - was 
formed in 1947 from the merger of two earlier associations of 
s harebrokers . 
Membership of the Stock Exchange is restricted to 60 members 
(who were organised in 1967 as 52 member firms , 39 of which were 
Chinese). Transactions are conducted on the board system - members 
mark up the price at which they are willing to buy and sell a 
particular stock, with bids and offers being made in 'board lots' 
(these vary from twenty shares of the Kwong Sang Hong - priced at 
$220 a share in January 1968 - to 5,000 shares in Hong Kong Realty, 
priced at $0 . 87 a share). All board lot transactions are recorded 
on the main board, and reported in the Daily Quotations Sheet . 
Business is conducted on a cash basis, settlement being made on the 
working day following the sale. This rule was introduced to 
discourage speculation; occasionally, exempt ion is given, e.g., 
when the scrip 1s held overseas or is 'on a boat coming out from 
London' , Brokerage fees are charged at one per cent on both buyer 
and seller, though it is said that rebates are sometimes granted . 
Most brokers permit their customers to operate on a margin . In 
1964 the margin was conunonly 50 per cent, and clients were charged 
interest at bank overdraft rates on the balance. 1 A number of 
2 broker firms have substantial bank overdrafts for this purpose . 
The value of transactions on the Stock Exchange since 1948 
are shown in Chart 8 .1. In 1949 and 1950 turnover tell from the 
high levels registered in the early post-war period, when a 
1 
2 
FEER, 11 June 1964, p.556. 
Unfortunately, no estimates are available on the extent of bank 
lending to share brokers during the period when there was active 
trading on the stock exchange . In mid-1965 $40 .5 million was recorded 
as outstanding in this way. By December 1966 these loans had fallen 
to $30.6 million, and by December 1967 to $26.6 million . 
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dominant influence on the market was the inflow of capita from 
China . There was a f a irly rapid increase in turnover in the 
per od 1950 to 1955 . The move of the Hongkong Bank in 1955 to 
191 
1 discourage speculation and a switch n the interest of many small 
banks towards speculat ion in building ac civities , result ed in a 
relatively flat share market from 1956 until 1958 . Under che 
pressure of both f oreign and local demand, a strong boom developed 
over the period 1959 to 1961 , when the temporary investment of 
surplus funds was said, by one broker, to be turning the Stock 
2 Exchange into ' a big gambl ng house' . Share prices on the 
average doubled between 1959 and mid-1961, bringing divided yields 
to l evels similar to those of North America and Australia; in mid-
1961 , banks returned a dividend yield of about three per cent, 
wharves and godowns three per cent , utilities four per cent, and 
property companies around 4.5 per cent . But the boom conditions 
did no t las t f or long. The difficulties experiences by a local 
bank in June 1961 , a two per cent increase in the U.K. bank rate 
and the Berlin crisis soon checked the increase in share prices, 
and by the end of September 1961 share va lues were about twenty per 
cent below peak May levels. 
The market was fur ther depressed by the announcement i n mid-
1962 of G0vernment proposals to control, and perhaps to nationalise, 
t he power supply companies. These pr oposals depressed virtually 
all share prices . Share values recovered only when a new scheme of 
control over power supp l y companies was announced towards the end 
of 1963. The Cuba Blockade in late 1962 also reduced pr ices . 
A share price index is available from August 1962, and is 
shown i n Chart 8 . 2 . Given the buoyancy in t he economy and the 
earlier depressed share values, the thirty per cent increase in 
1 
2 
See above, p , 1z.(, . 
SCMP , 23 J une 1961, p . l . The same broker suggested t hat t he 
Government immediately raise a loan of $200 million to soak up the 
excess l iquidity. During this boom a seat on the stock exchange was 
sold f or $220,000. It would now be difficult to sell this seat . 
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share prices between mid-1963 and early 1965, shown in the Diagr am , 
can hardly be considered excessive . 
The all in share values at the t me of the 1965 banking 
difficulties wa sudden and severe . As a Cesu lL of the banking 
cr i s es, some banks ca l led in loans for share pu! cha se while others 
d sposed of t heir own share holdings , and almost all banks r educed 
new lending in t his field . But the fall in share pri ces was as 
much due to a l oss o confidence as to l i qui dity f a c tors . There 
was some recovery in share prices in late 1965 and ear ly 1966, but 
i n June 1966 the share index stood at only 105 (August 1962 = 100), 
despite, i n most cases, rising company prof its . 
Red Guard a c tivities in China and Macao in 1966 held share 
prices at a steady level . The 1967 poli tical di stur bances in the 
Colony l ed to an almost thirty per cent f all in shar e pr ices ( the 
l i ndex fell to 72 . 77 in mid July and 70 . 47 in S eptember ) . During 
the dis t urbances the Stock Exchange twice suspended operations for 
pe 1ods of about ten days to prevent panic sell ing. Trading was 
also suspended at the t me of the devaluation of the pound s terling , 
but this cur rency adJustment had almost no eftect on l ocal share 
prices . 
The requirements for Stock Exchange list ng are not set out 
in detail . The following appear to be the main conditions: t he 
company is wor th at least $1 million at the offer price; at least 
twenty five per cent of the company ' s share capita l is of f ered in 
t he initial issue ; the Committee of the Stock Exchange 1s 
sat sfied there is suf icient public interest n the shares to 
justify the issue ; there is no restr ction on the ownershi p of 
shares other than in the number held in one particular name; and 
there s a local office in which share transfers can be registered . 
1 
The fal l in share values was not an even one. There was a 
greater slump in the prices of shares in compan es with relat vely 
large investment n f xed capital in Hong Kong - e . g , the whar 
compan es - and less or bus nesses w th moveable assets, such as 
the shipping compan es. 
Listed companies mu c provide the Sto k Exchange wich copies ot 
annual reports and press announcements 
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At the end of 1967 69 companies were listed on che Hong Kong 
1 
Stock Exchange . Table 8 . 3 lassifies these companies by industry 
and compares them with the 51 companies listed in December 1957 . 
There is active trading in only 25 shares , while another ten have 
transactions from time to time . 2 The nineteen companies listed in 
3 
t he cen years to 1967 added to the range ot scrip available to 
Hong Kong investors but the share list is still far from 
representative of the Colony's commercial and industri al scructure . 
In part i cular , few manufacturing firms are listed . 
There were several r easons why these companies sought Stock 
Exchange listing. In the case of the two bus companies the listing 
was associated with their change co public status, which , in turn , 
was mo t i ated by the belief that this would make their Government 
franchises more secure . Several companies - including Taikoo Docks, 
Jardine Matheson, and Local Property and Printing, sought to establish 
a va luation on their shares f or estate purposes . In only one case -
that f TeKtile Alliance Limited - does a desire to obtain additional 
tinance appear to have been important , and even in this cas e it was 
probably not the dominant consideration . There has not been the 
. 4 
equivalent of Malaya's 'new issue boom ' . The new flotations were 
arranged either by the Hongkong Bank or by broker firms . Jardine 
Matheson, exceptionally, arranged its own issue . In each cas e the 
issues were successful , some spectactularly so: Jardine Matheson 
1 
It is interesting to compare this with the Malayan experience, 
where organised public share trading began only in 1960 yet 269 
companies had been given stock exchange listing by De ember 1964 . 
See P . J. Drake, op . cit . 
2 
SCMP, 22 January 1968 . 
t here are more brokers in 
FEER , 3 May 1962 , p.239 . 
~ 
This has given rise to the comment that 
Hong Kong than active stocks. R. Whatmore, 
During this period, one company - an insurance institution - was 
removed from the 1st after it was taken over by a British company . 
4 
See P.J. Drake , op. ct . , pp . 312-22 . 
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Table 8 . 3 
HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE , NUMBER OF COMPANIES LISTED, 1957 AND 1967 
195 7a 1967 
Banks 2 2 
Insurance 3 2 
Investment 3 4 
Shipping 4 5 
Other commer cial l 4 
Docks , Wharves 4 6 
Lands , Hotels 5 8 
Utilities 9 12 
Cotton Mills 2 4 
Other industrial 4 5 
Stores 5 8 
Mis cel aneous 4 4 
Rubber 5 5 
51 69b 
a . 31 December both years 
b . Ten of these 69 Companies did not operate 
in Hong Kong . Five were Malayan or Indonesian 
rubber estates , four were Shanghai Companies 
which had not operated since 1949, and the tenth 
was a Macao utility . 
Source: Hong Kong Steck Exchange, Year Book of Stock 
1957 , and press reports . 
was versubscribed tifty-six times (more than $650 million was 
offered for the company's shares) , China Motor Bus was 
oversubscribed thirty-six times, and Kowloon Motor Bus ive and a 
half times . The success of the various new issues - which, as Table 
8 . 4 shows, raised$ 30.9 million 1n the period 958 to 1966 -
suggests chat lack of investor support can hardly have been a maJor 
restraint on further company flotations. In most cases, the new 
issues eturned considerable short term capital gains to subscribers. 
Shares in Kowloon Motor Bus , China Motor Bus, and Jardine Matheson , 
for example , wer e traded soon after listing at premiums of $18 , $8 
and $7.40 respectively . No new companies were floated 1n 1966 or 
1967 . 
Tab le 8.4 also shows the new capital ra1sings of existing 
companies. $499 .2 million was subscribed to these companies in the 
period 1958 t 1966. Thus , the total amount of capital aised by 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
Tab le 8 o4 
HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE, PUBLIC COMPANY CAPITAL 
RAISINGS 1 958 TO 1966 
New Company 
Flo tations 
9.9 
63 5 
8.0 
34 . 7 
14 , 8 
---
130 . 9 
Share Is ues of 
Existing Companies 
$ m1ll1on 
19 . 2 
39 . 
42 o5 
49 5 
43 . 5 
55 9 
133 01 
72 . 7 
43 . 5 
499 . 2 
195 
Total 
19 2 
49 2 
42 . 5 
113 0 
51. 5 
55 . 9 
167 . 8 
87 . 5 
43 . 5 
630 . 1 
Source: 1959, 1960, 1966, FRr Eastern Economic Review, Pres 
reports o 1961 to 1965, Secretary Hong K ng Scock 
E change, personal communication . 
pub 1c companies in this period was $630 ol million . From 1945 to 
958 1 ess than$ 50 million was raised through share issues . 
It 1s chought that a significant part f the fund ra1 ed 1n 
1961 came rom o erseas invescors o There 1s no way f esc1mating how 
much of the financ e was provided from bankings urc es 
No pub 1c issue of company fixed interest sec r1r1es has been 
made since t he War . Only one public i sue ot Government securities 
has been made in this period, this being the loan f $50 million 
raised in 1948 . 
The distribution of capital ra1s1ngs by induscry groups is 
given 1n Table 8 . 5 . More than 40 per cent was taken b che public 
utilities , fi teen per c ent ~as raised by bo th the propert and 
hotel group and the commercial companies . Relati ely small sums 
2 have been invested in the miscellaneous 1nduscr1al group ( e en 
per c ent of the t tal) and in texcile companie (four per cent), 
1---
2 
Indu trial Bank Committee, Reporc, op . cit . 
Th s group includes a c ement works, brewery and an a1rcra t 
engineering fi rn . 
Table 8 5 
HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE, PUBLIC COMPANY CAPITAL 
RAISINGS , 1958a TO 1966, BY INDUSTRY ROUPS 
Banks 
Insuranc.e 
I n e tmenL 
Shipping 
Ot he commerc ial 
Docks, Wharves 
Lands, Hote l s 
Ut:i l1 c1es 
Cotcon mills 
Ot:her indus tr ial 
Stores 
M1.scellaneous 
Rubber 
a - B t h years inclusive. 
$ million 
27 .2 
45 . 5 
94 . 5 
9 . 9 
94 . 3 
270. 7 
22. 5 
43 . 0 
22 . 5 
630 . 
Per cen t of 
to tal 
4 . 3 
7 . 2 
15 . 0 
1. 6 
15. 0 
43 . 0 
3. 6 
6 8 
3 . 6 
Sources: Secretary, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, per ona l 
commun1.cation; Far Eastern Economic Review; Pr ess 
·reports, 
rwo m tua l funds were established 1n 19 61, boch sell ing units 
worch $1 mi l ion . In March 1968 one dol l ar units i n the f unds were 
selling at $0.76 to $0 . 81 and $0.53 to $0 . 57 r espectively . 
The St~ck E change is a relaci el y narrow and ol at1le one; 
a limiced range of shares ls listed and turnover is ra1r l y small . 
Politi a l factors have commonly been more of an inf luence on share 
prices t han company profitabi lity and share market: va ues have 
r eac t ed 1n a sensitive way to changes in investors' cont1dence in 
t he Colony's future But rather surprisingly, there seems no 
evidenc e that p litical factors have been more an intl ence than on 
share markets in many other territo ies . Doubt l ess, though, by 
discouraging equity and long term investment, the general po l itical 
uncer ainty has been a major influence in restr1 ting the 
development o the share market , The continued dominance of the 
Chinese family firm 1n the Hong Kong econ my has als ontr 1.buted 
t he athe narr w Stock Exchange list. There has been a 
reluctance to yield thi tight tamily control to ab ard ele ted 
19 7 
by 6ha~eholder6 , and , pernap , al o co gi e p b icy CJ the 1rm ' s 
fina.n ~ 1 l op-era·cions " There ar. e. several long eo c b 1i~hed Br·i t i h 
·1rm , too , wh1l .. h show n.:> ncere c in be ng rec:mscr .... c ed as pub l i e 
, :,mpanies • 
The r eady av i labil1cy of r ore gn hates and investmenc t itles 
t.s a.noche ause f t he lim1ced de elopmenc of he oca l Sco .... k 
£xchange o Since t he mid-1950s a l ar ge numbe of r oteign security 
firms have es t ablished branches in t he Co l ny . There i s no 
2 
restr i cc1on on che operatlon:of t hes e ricms , and foreign exchange 
is ea ·· ily a ailable to finance che neces&ar - cransters United 
St a t es, Japanese, Swiss, Canadian and Australian brokering houses 
and investment trusts are represented in Hong Kong and offer local 
invescors a much wider seleccion of titles and s er i ce than is 
available on che local market . The United Scates firms ha ea 
c.onc1n us Tele link w1ch New York . There lo no wa of estimating 
che volume of this cap1cal 3 ucflow , buc che b ·s1ne5s .JI t he foreign 
4 1nve~t menc firms 1s be l ieved c~ be growing rapidly and is 
sufi1c iencly l a r ge to cause concern 1n s.:>me b siness and tinancial 
5 
circ. eo 
Perhaps , to , che increase in bank deposic interest rates 
since 196 1 has made oca l 6har es a l ess at tracc e 1n eatment o 
See Dick Wil on , Hong Kong Trade and Industry Review , p " c it n, 
p n2 
2 
Theoe t xeign se u i t y f1nn don t ha e LO pa 
he i t nsac t1.ons (scamp dut is charge '! on loca 
a t che ra e ot cwent cenc per $ 00 ) n the ground 
ra a~t i ns 'arise o t 1de t he Co ny ' " 
t amp du t on 
hare crans ers 
tha c such 
c w ~uggested in FEER 20 Oc tober 1966 137 , t ha t a much as 
$5 7 m 1 ion pe·.r monch US$ 0 mi lion) was lea ing H ng K ng or 
1nve t ment in t he United States . B c some part t chese funds 
would r ep esenc transact ion~ on beha lf ot re dents of other 
Sou t h East Asian councr1es o ( E en in the lacter a e, t hough, the 
ne es ary US do lla:r wou ld have been pur hased n t he Colony's pen 
eK hange mar ket ) . 
4 
~!, 2 February 1966 . 
5 
See , fore amp le , t he s peech by Mr F. S. 11 , 967 Budget Debat e, 
SCM£._ , 16 March 1967 , p . 9 . 
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Overall , chough, it is perhapo ea y Lo concencrace n c:he 
narcowness and a c k of <level pment f the Sc:ock Ex hange 1nd to 
ver :> k the contributi n the market has made c:o c -:,mpan f1.nance 
in Hong Kong The impor t ance or public c 0mpany s har.e ra io1ng · t 
at lea se t he utility and land c mpanies was ohown n Table 8 . 5 and 
is men ioned again in Chapters 12 and 14 
Insur ance Companies 
Ver.y little tatistical inf nnation is avail ble on the Hong 
Kong insutance market. Much of what is said in chi ~ s ection must, 
therefore , remain r ther impressionistic and ten cacive . What 
information ls avai l able suggests that insurance companies a e of 
relat ively l i ttle importance as supp l i ers of in ascible tunds : the 
life insur ance sector is relatively under deve l ped, and much of the 
money collec ted by insur.ance companies i invested 0verseas . But 
financial in ticut i ons, general y, and possibl the utan ·e 
companies in particula c , must be Judged in terms of t he ervices 
chey perform and not solely by the f nd t hey mobi 1 e t o domestic 
c pita formation . 
There is little Government influence 0ver insurance companies 
(hence the a l mo t complete absence of tatistics n che e 
intermedi~r ies ) . Companies wishing to tr.ansa t lite, ire or 
marine insurance busines are required t submit annual accounts to 
he Regi tar-General (there is no requiremenc, as in che Un ted 
Kingd m, that publicity be given to balance sheecs) and t o hold 
small deposi ts - t up to $200 ,000 for che larger life offices and 
1 
of $100,000 against fire and marine business . Life insurance 
companies must undertake a quinquennia l valuat1 n Ex:empcion from 
these e eral requirements i given to 11 e insurance companies 
which c mp l y wi h the Uniced Kingdom Insurance Companies Ac t of 
1958, and t fire and marine companies which hold deposit 1n 
------1 
In 1966 deposits t life companies t tailed $5 m ll1on and those 
o he fire and marine companie $8 m1ll1on 
anther Commonwealth country. The approval of ~he Governor-1n-
Counc il is required before companies can write motor vehicle 
third party insurance business . There is no l 1m1 t at1on on the 
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l investment activities of the insurance companies As is che case 
in most councries, the Export Credits Insurance Corporation is a 
Government established body. 
he number of insurance companies has 1ncrea ed considerably 
since the war, first , as companies moved from China and, later , as 
new foreign companies opened branches, or more commonl y , agenc ies, 
and additional local institutions were establ ished . In March 1966 
207 insurance companies were represented (see Table 8 . 6) . It is 
fr equent ly claimed by the insurance companies themselves that 
competition is excessive, with a consequent weakening of the whole 
industry . On the other hand, there is a good deal of tied insurance 
busine s, especially on the part of the large t r ading houses , which 
in many cases are the local agents or which manage t he local 
branches of foreign companies. There is agreement on premium rates 
in other than marine and life business . There are no insurance 
brokers such as are found in most financial centres . 
It 1s usually thought that Hong Kong ea ns considerable 
for eign exchange from its insurance f acilities , but no estimates 
a ea ailable. 
(a) Non-Life Insurance Business. Marine insurance business 
is the longest established branch of insurance and s probably still 
the most important sector. Most marine risks can be absorbed 
lo ally, but ready access is available to overseas re-insurance 
2 
centres where particularly large hulls are invol ed . 
l 
There s neither restriction on the class of investment t tle held -
as in much U.S. insurance legislation -nor on the proportion of 
assets which must be held locally - Malayan companies, for example, 
must hold fifty five per cent of their assets locally. 
2 
N. A. Rigg, op. ci t . 
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Table 8 . 6 
INSURANCE COMPANIES OPERATING IN HON ' KONG , COUNTRY 
OF INCORPORATION AND BUSINESS TRANSACTED 
31 March 1966 
C um:ry of Number of Class of ins ranee b s1neas c ansacted I ncor porat ion companies Lif e Fire Mar i ne Thir d party 
Aus t r alia 7 6 6 5 Bahama I s l ands 1 1 
Canada 6 3 2 1 2 China 4 2 3 3 1 France 4 3 3 2 Hong Kong 48 13 34 29 12 India 9 2 7 7 5 Japan 5 3 5 4 Luxembourg 1 1 
Netherlands 2 2 2 New Zealand 4 3 4 3 Panama 1 1 
Philippines 3 3 3 1 Singapore 8 2 6 4 1 Switzerland 6 4 4 1 United Kingdom 64 7 53 51 38 U. S.A. 34 13 20 16 19 
Tocal 207 45 149 138 94 
Source : Hong Kong Registrar General, Annual Rep rt , 1965 / 66, Table 
xv . 
Locally-established offices are said to write the greater 
proportion of fire insurance business, which, with the rapid rate 
of building construc t ion , has been a quickly growing fi e ld . Motor 
vehicle hird par ty insurance is virtual ly compulsory for all motor 
v-ehic le wners (alternatively , vehicle owners have to deposit a 
fairly large sum with the Government) and this , coo , 1s a rapidly 
expanding business. There is no compulsory workers ' compensation 
insurance . 
The size of t he reserves held against non-life insurance 
bu 1ness is not known . Nor is there any way of estab ishing what 
portion of these is held locally . The l atter sum, at least , cannot 
be large . 
rhe Expor Credit Insurance Corporation commenced operations 
early in 1967 . The Corporation does no t nde take risks normally 
c ered with commercial insurers and it can undertake liabilities 
to an aggregate value of $500 million . The Co pora t ion is capita l is 
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provided by the Government and its <l:Pntracts are Government-
guaranteed. There is no intention to follow the practice of many 
other countries and authorise the Corporation to give unconditional 
guarantees to banks financing shipments under it s policies (the 
i ntention of such guarantees is usually to encourage the provision 
of long term credit for exporters at preferential rates). As one 
commentator observed when contrasting the practice in Hong Kong 
with that in the United Kingdom, the Colony 
i s not considered to be under any such desperate necessity 
to increase foreign exchange earnings. Moreover, it has 
little in the way of capital goods exports and no lender of 
last resort like the Bank of England with which the banks can 
rediscount long-term advances - any suggestion that the Hong 
Kong Government might undertake this responsibil i ty is 
anathema to it.l 
In its first year the Corporation issued policies with an 
estimated annual export turnover of $543 million and a maximum 
liability of $266 million. 
(b) Life Insurance. Because there is a saving e l ement in lif e 
insurance contracts that is not found in other forms of insurance , 
life insurance companies are usually of greater importance as 
int ermed i aries in the saving-investment process . In many countries , 
t hese companies are among the most dominant financial institutions 
in the capital market, especially - because their liabilities are 
mostly long-term and reasonably predictable-at the longer end of the 
capital market. 
Life insurance business in Hong Kong seems more concentrated in 
the hands of a few companies than other forms of insurance 
business. A large part of the total business is held by seven 
companies: two U.S., two Canadian, two local companies and an 
I ndian corporation. There were suggestions i n 1962 that a more 
comprehensive system of control over the operation of life 
insurance companies was being considered, to meet the problem caused 
1 
P.H.M. Jones, FEER, 12 January 1967, p.66 . 
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by the entry of Malayan 'funeral insurance' companies . 1 These firms 
were operating mainly in the resettlement areas, and, for premium 
payments of around $3.50 per month, offered a policy paying $500 f 
the i nsured person died in a short period after the policy was taken 
out . To meet this situation the six largest l ife offices formed 
t hemselves into the Life Assurance Association of Hong Kong. Mainly 
because the funeral insurance offices were brought under control in 
Malaya - often after considerable losses by policyholders - the 
problem did not get out of hand, and, in the event , no additional 
Government control was introduced. 
No pr ecise estimates are available on the rate of growth or the 
present volume of life insurance business. Given the rapid i ncrease 
in incomes (especially in the incomes of the middle class), the 
absence of any state-provided welfare payments or pension schemes, 
the experi ence of price stability and the i ncome tax concessions 
availabl e on premium payments, one would expect the life insurance 
i ndustry to be growing rapidly. On the other hand, the Chi nese 
f ami l y system-discourages individual saving for old age, relatively 
f ew private firms offer pension schemes to employees, the low 
income tax rates mean that the tax benefit i s of lit tle advantage, 
and the general political uncertainty makes life insurance a 
2 
r elatively unpopular form of saving. Several companies claimed 
t hat their life insurance business increased at fifteen to twenty 
five per cent per annum from the late 1950s until 1965, but these 
estimates might overstate the actual rate of expansion. 
The Household Expenditure Survey in 1963/64 found that 
expenditure on 1 fe insurance premiums and contributions to pension 
funds was 0 . 2 per cent .of the expenditure of fam lies spending $100 
1 
2 
See P . J. Drake, op. cit., pp.185-6, and SCMP, 11 May 1962. 
Insurance salesmen stressed to the author that the rate at which 
new business was written fell off appreciably during the Red Guard 
a c tivities in China in 1966. 
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t o $3,999 per month (and one per cent of expenditure of fam l i es 
1 
spending $2,000 to $3 ,999 a month) . This would sugges t that 
prem um payments were, at that time, around $20 m1ll1on to $25 
2 
million per annum. On the experience o other countries, assets 
held against life policies in 1964 would have been in the range $150 
million to $200 mill i on . But only two companies have invested 
signi icant portions of their life insurance funds locally . There 
are several reasons why the large part of life insurance moneys is 
remitted overseas. One is the insufficiency of suitable outlets -
especial ly of fixed interest titles - in the Colony. Secondly, 
many life offices are represented only at agency level, and most of 
the offices which have branches in the Colony do not write 
sufficient business to justify their setting up local investment 
departments. Third, some companies have invested outside the Colony 
to cover t heir political risk . Policy liabilities will fall due 
whatever the Colony's political future. 
The two companies which have invested significant amounts in 
Hong Kong hold most of their local assets i n the form of property 
i nvestments and loans secured on real estate for bui lding purposes . 
They also have small holdings of local shares . (It follows that 
there s pr obably a greater degree of risk acceptance than is 
usually the case with life insurance investment) . An i nvestment 
manager in one of these two companies said that no loans or advances 
had been made to manufacturing firms . 
The Merchant Houses 
The merchant (or agency or export-import) firms have been of 
considerable importance in the recent industrial growth . For this 
reason, the role of these firms is now described in some detail, even 
1 
2 
Hong Kong, Household Expenditure Survey, 1963 / 64, Table 16 . 
This estimate is considerably less than the $100 million p.a. 
suggested in FEER, 11 June 1964 p . 559 . The latter est imate would 
mean that about one per cent of the national income s spent on 
life insurance, a ratio experienced by very few countries . 
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though t he institutions' 'financial' activities are of relaciv ely 
limited scope . 
The activities of the merchant f i rms hav e changed appreciably. 
Whereas 'trad i t i onall y, their role was t o import for resale in China 
and other Far Eastern countries the manufactored goods of Europe 
and the United States, and to coll ect , grade and market t he produce 
of China for export in return' 1 the firms have r ecently been a lmost 
exclusively concerned with the export of Hong Kong manuf actures and 
the import of r aw materials, industr al machinery and consumer goods 
f or the Hong Kong market . The old export houses now deal in only a 
few mi scellaneous goods in China's foreign trade, and usually in 
small orders . Most of their 'outstations' have been closed since 
1949; t he i r Far East operat i ons are now largely concentrated i n 
Hong Kong . 
On the basis of t he Hong Kong trade the long-es t ablished 
c ommercia l fi rms (almost all of them Brit sh including Jardine 
Ma t heson, members of the But t erfield and Swire group, Wheel ock 
Marden and Dodwells) 2 have expanded rapidly . The growth of these 
houses has been assisted by l ow taxation rates and the l aissez-faire 
3 
out l ook of the Gover nment . The many new trad ing fi rms set up 
have no t lessened t he dominance of these long-establ i shed houses . 
I t was suggested in 1961 that there were then 1 ,500 or so export-
1 
Commerce and I ndustry Department, A Commercial Guide to Hong Kong , 
1955 , p . 8 . 
2 
There have been several changes i n company organisation since the 
war. J a r d i ne Matheson and Wheelock Marden became pub lic compani es 
in 1961 and 1964, respectively . John D. Hutchison separated rom 
its former parent i n 1964 . The enormous Butterfield and Swi re 
interest - which includes Cathay Pacif ic Airways and China 
Navigation Company - is still a pr i vat e company, but Taikoo Docks 
a partly-owned subs diary has been given publi company s t atus . 
3 
Paul Ferris, The City, Pengu n Books, 1962, p .130 , makes this 
inter esting anal ogy ' J ardines nowadays seems a microcosm of wha t 
commerc al Britain mi ght have been if there had been no world wars, 
communism or United States of Amer ca, and the nineteenth centur y 
had been miraculously prolonged . ' The Company ' s Hong Kong manager 
described it more modest l y : 'We are just gr ocers . Just gr ocers and 
merchants' . Cited Ri chard Hughes , Hong Kong : Bor rowed Place -
Borrowed Time , London; Andre Deutsch, 1968 , p . 23 . 
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1mporc bus i ne ses and tha t the few large houses conducced more than 
half' t h t t 1 b i f t h t · · l e D a us ness o e group o 1ns t1tut i ons o 
There are several ways i n which t he merc hant hous es have 
contr ibuted t o the industrial gr owt h . Throu6hout che er iod ot 
i ndustr ia l isation the export-import firms have been res ponsib l e for 
t he distr ibu tion and market ng of the large part of the Colony's 
2 
output of manufac tured goods . It is not an overstat emen t to say 
t hat ' ready access to exceptional trading t acili t ies 13 was a leading 
f actor in the rapid success of manufacturing i ndus t ry . The Hong Kong 
export-import firms, unlike the Singapore and Malayan houses, were 
experienced in the conduct of trade in manufactur ed goods . In the 
early 1950s many trading firms established Hong Kong produc ts 
sections , specifically to conduct the trade in local manu actures . 
Even now, relatively few manufacturing businesses maintain their own 
marketing and sales sections (the establishment of such di isions 
has become more common i n the past few years). More frequently, these 
func tions are left to the merchant houses . Many manufac tur er s, too , 
a range their raw material and machinery imports through the agency 
houses . 
The existence of th s network of trading houses has especially 
contribu ted to the growth of small manufactur ing bu 1nesses : 
smal l f irms are enabled to· exist in such an export-orienated 
economy because overseas selling, a l ways a problem tor the 
small firm, can be delegated to the exporters; similarly, the 
smaller firms can rely on the trading community t o supply them 
with all the imported materials they require . 4 
For many smaller manufacturers the export firms have occasionally 
5 
a c ted as principals, market ng the goods under t heir own names . But 
1 
2 
Economist Intelligence Unit , op . cit . , p . 9 . 
I bid . , p . 8 : 'At least three quarters and perhaps more of the 
manufac tur ed goods exported are thought to be handled by the export 
houses . ' 
3 
Ibid . , p . 6 . 
4 
I bid 
5 
J . A. King , Hong Kong Trade and Industry Review, p . 27 terms these 
export f rms the 'merchant exporters'. 
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this is usually a transitional phase for both producer and trader: 
manufacturing firms seek to produce under their own name more freely 
to approach other buyers while exporters selling under their own 
name must maintain a detailed supervision of production. Most 
export-import firms act as 'agent exporters.' These traders offer 
to sell a factory's products in nominated markets or they act as 
representatives in Hong Kong rufi_ overseas buyers. 1 Many factories 
have close contact with more than one agent exporter. Both the 
smaller exporters and the smaller manufacturers, though, go 'shopping 
around for bargains. 12 
A number of the long-established merchant firms have established 
their own - and frequently large scale - manufacturing subsidiaries, 
such as Jardine Dyeing (now part of Textile Alliance Limited, the 
Colony's first fully integrated textile establishment), Textile 
C?rporation and Hong Kong Industrial (a major plastics and toy 
manufacturer), which were set up by Wheelock Marden, and the 
highly successful Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Company, which was 
formed as a joint enterprise by the Jardine Matheson and Swire 
interests. At the same time, the merchant houses' long 
established manufacturing subsidiaries, such as Taikoo Docks 
have been expanded. 
Many of the export-import houses, too, have provided overseas 
buyers with a system of quality control on Hong Kong-produced goods. 
Finally, the merchant houses have assisted a number of local 
manufacturers financially. Most frequently, this assistance has 
taken the form of the sale, on credit terms, of the industrial raw 
materials and machinery imported by the agency houses. But, the 
larger export-import firms, at least, have made cash advances to 
known local manufacturers. One large agency house has a 
1 
2 
J.A. King, Hong Kong Trade and Industry Review, p.27. 
Economist Intelligence Unit, op. cit., p.9. 
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'reasonably close association' with 200 to 300 local manufacturers , 
'many' o whom , at one time or another, have been given cash l oans . 
I n some cases t hese advances were necessary to allow the fulfilment 
of an existing export contract, and occasionally they have been gi ven 
despite initial denials from the manuf acturer that financial 
prob l ems were a cause of the production delay . The agency houses 
have also on occasions given guarantees to manufacturers against 
which bank credit can be secured. But, the agency houses stress that 
they 'are not in this business as merchant banks ', and much of the 
f inancial assistance they have given to manufacturers is provided 
only to permit the fulfilment of existing orders . 
The Co-operative Societies and the Marketing Organisations 
A study of the co-operative societies and the two marketing 
organisations is of interest mainly because the institutions show a 
very high degree of Government involvement in a small part of the 
financial system . Unlike the commercial banks which dev e lop ed in an 
environment almost completely free of Government i nfluence and 
control, the co-operative societies and marketing organisations have 
been established and developed by the Government . 
In 1946 the Fish Marketing Organisation and the Vegetable 
Marketing Organisation were es~ablished as financially self-
supporting bodies , administered under the Department of Marketing 
and Co-operative Development. The organisations were given 
monopolies over the wholesale marketing of their respective 
f oodstuff s , but the r activ t es were not confined to marketing : 
fr om an early stage the two bodies were expec t ed to provide credit 
to producers , ass st in extension work, and encourage the 
establishment of co-operative societies . Initially , it was hoped 
t ha t the two organ sations would themselves become co-operative 
enterprises, but, apparent ly for management reasons, t he Government 
control has been maintained. The Organisations' i ncomes are derived 
fr om a charge on marketing transactions , from associated bus ness 
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undertakings and from interest receipts on loans . The 
Or ganisat ions were given Government loans - of $250,000 for the FMO 
and $100 , 000 to the VMO - to begin their operat ons, and from these 
loans cred twas made availab l e to farmers and fishermen for short 
term productive purposes. 
The co-operative movement is entirely a pos t-war development . 
After the Pacific War , the Colony's fishing and agricultural 
industr es were great l y in need of rehab i litation ; production and 
incomes were low , the meagre capital equipment employed was run 
down and transport services were disrupted . The world shortage of 
f oodstuff s made it desirable to increase local production as much 
as poss ible, though Hong Kong could not hope f or self-sufficiency. 
There were demands, too , that the Government break the power of 
the 'laans' (the wholesale middlemen who, in both the agricultural 
and fishing industries , had held a tight contro l over marketing and 
credit arrangements) 1 to give producers a larger share of sal e 
proc eeds . The co-operative societies were intended to assist in 
marketing arrangements, for example , by organising the collection 
and delivery of vegetables to the VMO . Also, the co-operatives 
were favoured as a means o encourag i ng savings among the farmers 
2 
and fishermen and of assist ng with ex tens i on work . Perhaps more 
important , a fr amework was sought for distr buting among pr imary 
producers the loans provided from the Government and var ous other 
sources. There was an urgent need to increase i nv estment i n 
agriculture and fishing , both to increase output and to f nance the 
3 introduction of more profitable lines of pr oduction . The small scale 
1 
See Majorie Topley, 'Capital , Sav ng and Credit among I ndigenous 
R ce Farmers and Immigrant Vegetable Farmers i n Hong Kong's New 
Terr itories', in R. Firth and B.S . Yamey , Capital Sav ng and Credit 
n Peasant Societies, London : George Allen and Unwin , 1964, p . 179. 
2 
At this stage the commercial banks had no r epre sentat i on 
in farming areas or i n the fishing v llages . 
3 
It was recommended that farmers transfer produc t ion fr om rice to 
vegetable growing and pig raising, and that f shermen have their 
craft mechan sed and move into off-shore and mid-distance f shi ng . 
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of operations and the low income levels of the agricultural and 
fishing sectors made it apparent that t he necessary funds could not 
be borrowed rom banks or from other sources in the organised 
market . As well as helping w th the distribucion of loan funds, 
the co-operacive societies have provided a measure of security not 
usually available from individual borrowers , The development and 
present structure of the co-operative movement is shown in Table s 
8 . 7 and 8 . 8 . 
Table 8.7 
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES : NUMBER, MEMBERSHIP AND FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION SELECTED YEARS 1953 TO 1966 
1953a 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 
1 Number of Societies 31 86 213 348 388 416 2 Membership 2,469 5,670 11 ,567 19 ,215 22,094 23,079 3 Paid up share cap tal $m o.o 0 . 1 0 . 4 0 . 6 1.6 1. 7 4 Loans granted in year $m 0 . 1 1.0 17 . 4 22 . 8 16 . 2 8 . 3 5 Loans repaid i n year $m 0 . 0 0 . 6 2 . 6 5 . 7 8 . 3 10 . 8 6 Deposits $m O. J 0 . 2 0 . 3 1.0 1.0 2 . 1 7 Reserve funds $m 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 3 0 . 6 0 . 8 1.1 
a = Rows 1 , 2 ' 3 , 6 and 7 : 31 December each year . 
Rows 4 and 5 : year ending 31 December each year . 
Source: Hong Kong Annual Re:eort, various numbers . 
(a) Agricultural Co-o:eeratives . The agricultural co-operative 
societies l end at relatively c4eap rates (around 0 . 25 per cent per 
monch). Most loans are on a short term basis (twelve months or less) . 
Credit is not available to finance land purchase . Loans are 
occasionally granted for non-productive pur poses, such as festival 
e penses . 
A part of the funds loaned by these societies i s provided from 
the capital subscript ons and deposits of members (both capital and 
deposits totalled around $0 . 27 million in 1967) . As well, some 
soc eties have built up small funds from their trading activities 
(marketing soc eties, f or example, receive a ommission on sales). 
But most of the loan funds has been provided from outside bodies , 
such as the Vegetable Marketing Organisa t on Loan Fund, established 
in 1953 with a capital of $500,000; the J.E. Joseph Trust Fund, set 
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Table 8.8 
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES : NUMBER, MEMBERSHIP AND FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION, 31 DECEMBER 1967 
Loans Loans Number Members Paid up Deposits capital a repaid a Reserves granted 
' 000 $m $m $m $m $m 
Ag icultural 90 12 0 . 27 2 . 03 L74 0 . 27 0 . 29 
Fishermen's 63 2 0.03 4.21 3 . 90 1.65 0 . 22 
Building 221 5 1.33 1. 77 4 . 90 0 . 35 
Other urban 36 5 0.05 0 . 26 0 . 25 0 . 16 0.16 
Federation 6 0 0.01 0 . 01 0 . 01 0.06 
All soc ieties 416 23 1. 70 8 26 10.81 2.09 1.08 
a= In twelve months ending 31 December 1967 . 
Source: ~ ng Kong Annual Report, 196 7 • 
up in 1954 from a private beques t of $460,000 (to which the 
Government later added $750,000); the Kadoorie Agricultural Aid 
Association Loan Fund, established in 1955 from a private gift of 
$250,000 and Government contributions of $1 . 5 million and $2 
1 
million; and the World Refugee Year Loan Fund for Co-operative 
Soc ieties, which was set up with a capital of $458,000 in 1963 (to 
lend also to fishermen's co-operatives) . 
(b) Fishermen's Co-operative Societies . Members' savings are 
a more substantial source of funds for the ishermen's co-operative 
societies ( n which cap tal subscription and members' deposits 
t ogether totalled $1 . 68 mill on in 1967) . But, again, outside 
bo rowings are the man source of the co-operative 'funds . The 
main institut ons lending to fishermen through the co-ope ative 
2 
societies are : the Fish Marketing Organisation Loan Fund, which 
between its establ shment n 1946 and 1967 had lent about $25 
mill on; the Colonial Development and Welfa e Loan Fund, set up in 
1954 with a capital of $800 , 000 to help finance the mechanisation 
1 
2 
Not all of this loan fund s lent t~rough co-operative societies . 
Most, but not all, of these funds a~e lent through co-operative 
societies. 
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of inshore fishing boats ; the C.A.R.E . (Committee for American 
Relief Everywhere) Loan Fund , 1957 , which how has a capital of 
$100,000 and lends specifically to finance the mechan1sat on of 
shrimp fishing boats; and the Fisheries Development Loan Fund, which 
was established by the Government in 1959 with a capital of $2 
million (now $5 million) to provide funds for the mechan sation of 
m cl-distance and off-shore fishing boats . 
(c) Urban Co-operative Societies . The first urban co-operative 
soc i ety, a building society, was formed in 1954 . Almost 200 
building societies were set up in the period 1957 to 1962 . The aim 
of the societies was the provision of housing for locally-appointed 
Government employees. Almost all their construction activities were 
financed rom funds borrowed from the Government . Between 1955 and 
1966 the Government lent $125 million to these building societies . 
Ater 1963 , when the Government decided to reduce considerably its 
lending in this field (mainly to permit an increase in spending on 
other forms of housing), fewer new building Societies were formed. 
The building societies have not accepted deposits from members or 
from the public. Their paid up capital amounts to about $1.3 million 
(an average of $300 per member). 
There are also consumers '_ societies, salaried workers ' thrift 
and loan societies, and several better living societies . Members' 
deposits in the urban thrift societies amount to a mere $160 , 000. 
Co-operative societies are established and operate under the 
Co-operative Societies Ordinance. A Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies was appointed in 1951 . Supervision of the societies 
including the urban Co-operatives s the respons bil ty of the 
Agriculture and Fisheries Department . 
Hire Purchase 
Pa adoxically, there has been a very limited development of 
hire-purchase companies , but a high volume of hire-purchase 
transactions . A large number of new flats and the majority of 
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motor vehicles are transacted under hire-purchase terms . Hire-
purchase arrangements are becoming more common on consumer durables, 
especially air-conditioners and refrigerators, but the sale of these 
goods is arranged more frequently simply on an nstalment credit 
basis. The hire-purchase sales of consumer goods and flats are 
for the most part financed by the local banks. One large local 
bank, for example, has master agreements with more than 100 
authorised dealers of consumer durables. 1 In the sale of flats, 
the smaller banks have usually preferred to offer hire-purchase 
terms than secured loans. 
Wayfoong Finance is the main source of funds for hire-purchase 
sales of motor vehicles, having financed, according to one recent 
estimate, more than half of the Colony's 95,000 registered motor 
2 
vehicles. Before the company's establishment in 1960, the North 
Point branch of the Hongkong Bank handled a considerable volume of 
hire-purchase finance . 
Importers of producer goods and consumer durables have frequently 
offered hire-purchase terms. A large proportion of the marine diesel 
engines used in the fishing fleet was purchased in this way. 
There appear to be only three companies which may be termed 
specifically 'hire-purchase companies'. Wayfoong Finance is by far 
the most important. This company accepts fixed deposits of one to 
five years. Early in 1967 eight per cent was paid on deposits of 
four and five years. Chartered Finance (Hong Kong) Ltd, a subsidiary 
of the Chartered Bank was set up in 1966 and began accepting fixed 
interest deposits in 1967. The third company is a subsidiary of a 
British finance company. 
1 
2 
3 
3 There is no law governing hire-purchase sales in Hong Kong. 
HS, 8 September 1967. 
Ibid. 
See P,C, Woo, Legislative Council Debates, 1965, p.165. 
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Conclusion 
It is evident from this discuss on that the system of non-bank 
financ i al intermediaries is relatively undeveloped . There has not, 
for example, been the proliferation and development of non-bank 
financ i al institutions recently experienced in Ma l aysia where the 
Gover nment has played a more important role in the cap tal market 
and where long term funds have been readily ava ilable . Nonetheless, 
i t i s evident that the system of non-bank financ i al ins titutions is 
more highly developed now than earlier in the post-war period, and 
that a significant part of this development has resulted fr om 
Government intervention and assistance. 
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Chapter 9 
THE SYSTEM OF PUBLI C FINANCEl 
The Legislative Council is described as the 'ult imate financ i a l 
2 
author ty' in Hong Kong. Until 1958 the approval of the Secretary 
of State was required for the annual estimates, for any loans or 
expenditure which involved 'important points of princip le ' and fo r 
supplementary provisions greater than $250,000 . On these matters 
there is now 'demi-official consultation' and the l ocal Financial 
Secretary takes account of 'the views of the financial advisors of 
the Secretary of State in advising [the Hong Kong] Government on 
policy' . 3 Approval from London is still required should the local 
Government desire to raise a loan overseas . 
The Government's annual budget is presented in late February 
or early March. The financial year begins on 1 April . The budget 
i s an admi nistrative one, drawn up on a cash basis . The in tent ion 
i s simply to ensure that sufficient finance is availabl e to cover 
Government spending, and to determine and control the expenditure 
of the i ndividual departments. But, even an administrative budget 
has economic consequences, and the Government has sought to ensure 
that its financial operations do not result in inflation or balance 
difficulties, and that reserves are built up in case there is a fall 
in revenue . 
Unofficial members are a majority of the Legislat i ve Council 's 
Finance Committee . The Committee meets regularly to discuss specific 
items of expenditure, but it is not empowered to discuss 
Government revenue. Several unofficial members have been critical 
of t h i s limitation: 
1 
An earlier draft of this Chapter is to be published as 'The Public 
Financ e of Hong Kong' in a for thcoming issue of Mal ayan Economic 
Review. 
2 
3 
Hong Kong, Annual Report, 1967, p . 35 . 
Leg slati~e Council Debates, 1958, p . 46 . 
••• t he uest i on of taxation 9 o ways of r aib ng mane, 
is mentioned only i n the [Legislati e Council's] Annual 
Budget deba t e , Unof icials canno t get toge t her wich 
t he nancial Secretar y and sort ou t pros and cons of 
diff er ent ways o rais ng money, che justice of impos ng 
spec i a taxation on certain obJects and activ1t es and 
not on others, and on t he appropria ce total amount of 
expenditure and r evenue , 1 
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It is possib l e to detect a change in the general Jut ok of the 
unofficia l members over t he pos t -war per iod . Fore amp e, an 
unoffi ~ial member in 1950 spoke o the 'huge' Government expenditure 
of $200 million, which could not be exceeded without the Government 
f acing 'bankruptcy', and claimed t hat 
t he s tua tion calls f or drastic recrenchment and reduction 
in Government expendi t ur e if we ar e not to fac e another 
record budget next year . 2 
In contrast , t he follow ng views were expressed in t he 1967 and 1968 
budget. debates: 
I have argued for some time that we shoul d place gr eat er 
r eliance on direct taxation ••• [and ] I fee l we sh uld no t 
hand out any gifts in the fo r m of new t ax r emissions until 
i mportant and vital objec tives in the field of education , 
cia l welf are and public health have been achieved . 3 
There can be few times or f ew places here an inerease in 
ca acion would hav e been so accep t ab e and would hav e 
Laised so li t tle pro t est . One might a l most say that t he 
F'inancia l Secretary has been i nvited, on mor e t han one 
occ asion , t o raise taxes ; and this, not by irr esponsible
4 people , but by people who would have to pay these taxes. 
Other than the Hous i ng Authority t here are no financ ially 
independent semi-government agencies or municipal bodies . The Urban 
Council and t he New Territories Admini stration ha e no powers to 
levy taxe or rates , and are, along with the P st Off i ce, railway , 
water-suppl y and government-buil t housing, managed as ,overnment 
Depar tments . Pr ivately owned companies provide the internal 
transport, power and communication utilities . Separate accounts 
are kept f or the Development Loan Fund, discussed late·r in this 
Chapter. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
K.A. Wa t son, 1966 Budget Debate, (mimeographed) . 
Leg slat1ve Council Debates , 1950, p "70 . 
F . S. L1 , quo t ed SCMP, 16 March 1967 , p . 9 . 
Dhun Rutt njee (Senior Unoffi ial member of the Leg1 la ive Council), 
quo ted SCMP, 14 March 1968 . 
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Th Gov rnment 's outlook is avowedly la is e z ·-fa ir . It has 
not yielded to t he occasional demands for pro t tiv arif s 1 
subsidies or some mea sure of economic planning. In h is 1962 Budget 
Sp ch, the Financial Secretary said 
Over a wi de field of our economy it is still t h tter 
cours to rely on the nin teenth century's 'h idden hand' 
than to t hrus t clumsy bureaucratic f ingers into t h 
sensitive mechanism. In pa rticular w cannot a for d to 
damage its mainspring, freedom of c ompetitive en · rprise. 1 
A measure of the Government's involvement in t he conomic 
system is given in Table 9.1 which s hows the ratio of Government 
r evenue and xpenditure to gross domestic product . A comparison of 
the ratios of current revenue and expenditure to gross domestic 
product in Hong Kong with t hose in other countri s (Tab le 9.2) 
places the role of the Government sector in b tt r perspective. 
Government Revenue and Expenditure 
Table s 9-3, 9 , 4 and 9.5 and Chart 9.1 s how t he level and 
components of Government revenue and expenditur over t he post-war 
period . Both revenue and expenditure increased many times: 
revenue from $164 million in 1947 -48 to $1,878 million in 1967-68 
e penditure from $128 million t o $1,803 mi ll i on, As Table 9.1 
demonstrated, public revenue and expenditure have ris en more 
rapid ly than gross domestic product. And , what is of considerable 
importance , there has not been the s hort period instability in 
Government revenue t hat has been a common problem in many developing 
countries. 2 Revenue increased in every post -war year. Expenditure 
fe ll on ly in 1967 -68 (and then by only $2 mi llion; this reduction was a 
1 
Financial Seer tary, uegislative Council Debates 1 1962 . Se also 
the Financial Secretary's Speech in t he 1966 Budg t Deba e, 
(mimeographed): ' I largely agree with t hose who hold t ha t 
Government s ho uld not in general interfere with the course of t he 
economy merely on t he s rength of its own commerc i al judgement .. . 
For I believe that, in the l ong run, the aggr gat of dec i sions of 
individual businessmen, exercising their i ndividual judgement in a 
free conomy, even if often mistaken, is lik 1 t o do less harm 
than the c ntralised d cisions of a Governm nt ; and cer t a nly the 
ha.rm is 1 ike ly to be countera cted fast r. ' 
2 
See A.R. Pr s , Public Financ 
Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1963, 
ed Countries, London : 
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Table 9.1 
GOV ,R MENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE AS PROPORTioL-s or GR ss 
D MESTI C PRODUCT, SELECTED YEARS , 19 50 - ~l TO 1964 -65 
1950 -51 1953-54 1959 -60 1964 -6 5 
per cen t 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
9 . 0 
7.8 
12.4 
10.9 
12 . 5 
13.4 
15 .2 
14 .4 
Source s : Gover nment revenue and expenditure : Table 9 . ;Gross 
Domestic Product : K.R. Chou, The Hong Kong Econo y, 
Hong Kong: Academic Press, 1966. 
Table 9. 2 
GOVERNMENT CURRENT REVENUE AND CURRENT EXPENDITURE AS PROPORTIONS 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 36 COUNTRIES GROUPED BY PER CAPITA 
INCOME , AND HONG KONG, 1950 TO 19 59 
36 Countri s by per 
Capita income US $ 
Hong Kong 
(per capita 
income 
appro . 
>1200 501-1200 200 -500 < 200 US$ 280) 
Cur r en t Reven ue 
Curren t Expend i t ure 
27. 3 
24. 3 
29 . 1 
24 .0 
17.8 
14. 8 
15 .9 
12. 7 
ll . l 
7.6 
Sour ces: 36 oun t ries: R. S. Thorn , ' The Evolution of Public 
Finance s during Economic Deve lopment', Manchester 
School , January 1967 , p.21. 
Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong: 
K. R. Chou, The Hong _'ong Economy , 
Aca demic Pres s, 1966. 
Tab le 9 . 3 
GOVERNMENT REVEND~ AND EXPENDI TURE 1947 -48 TO 1967 -68 
Budget Estima t e s Actua l financ ial r esults Current Account 
Surp lus Surp l us 
Revenue Expenditure 
Revenue Expenditure Current Capital To tal Current Capita l Total % of 
$m $m $m $m $m $m $m $m $m $m Current Revenue 
1947-48 110 110 153 12 164 120 8 128 36 33 21 1948-49 151 150 185 10 195 138 22 160 35 47 25 1949 -50 180 180 255 9 264 143 40 182 82 112 44 1950 -51 204 201 280 12 292 173 79 252 40 10 7 38 1951 -52 248 235 ·293 16 309 188 88 276 33 105 36 1952 -53 291 289 370 15 385 209 103 312 73 160 43 1953-54 349 328 383 14 397 253 103 355 42 130 34 1954-55 389 388 393 42 434 256 118 378 61 13 7 34 1955-56 414 449 420 35 455 282 121 403 52 138 33 1956 -57 450 493 448 62 510 312 157 469 40 136 30 195 7-58 508 561 518 66 584 360 172 533 51 158 30 1958 -59 554 648 567 62 629 394 196 590 39 174 31 1959 -6 0 601 693 616 48 665 504 206 710 -45 112 18 1960-61 712 938 77 1 88 859 568 277 845 14 204 26 1961 -62 914 1075 911 119 1030 625 329 953 77 28 7 32 1962 -63 1062 1226 1006 247 1253 683 430 1113 140 323 32 1963-64 1197 1360 11 56 238 1394 75 1 544 1295 99 405 35 1964 -65 1382 1496 1342 176 1518 894 547 1441 78 4li.8 33 1965 -66 1651 1711 1517 115 1632 1034 735 176 9 -137 482 32 1966 -67 1784 1878 1726 91 1818 1181 625 1806 12 534 31 1967-68 1886 1923 n.a . n . a. 1878 n.a. n . a. 1804 74 n . a . n.a , 
Note: figures do no t add because of rounding. n.a . = no t available 
Source s : Accountant Genera l , Annual Repor t, various numb er s. Es timates of Revenue and Expenditure, va r i ous numbers. 
N 
~ 
():) 
Table 2•4 : Gov e rnm ent Rev enu e 1 Sel ected Years , l 24z-48 to l26z-68 
1947-48 1950-51 1953-54 1956-57 1959-60 l962-6J 1965- 66 1966-67 1967 - 68a 
$ milU.on 
R~c=r-..:.. 
-
-· - - --- ----
-Duties 
I mport dut i e s n a 62 6J 82 1 0.5 175 2JJ 288 na Loca 1. du~ ies n a 10 12 18 1 6 25 27 27 na To t a l d u ties 51 72 7 5 99 121 200 259 )1 5 J l J Rates 10 27 J8 57 85 .129 2·24 248 282 Internal rev enue 
Corporations profits tax na 25 59 42 60 107 187 224 n a Business profit s tax na 6 JO 16 24 Jl SJ 55 na Salari es tax na 7 10 10 15 27 45 57 na Personal assessmen t tax na 0 2 l 4 5 8 11 na Inte rest tax na 2 J 4 5 12 24 J4 na Property tax na 8 11 16 15 JJ 55 65 na Stamp dutyb na 1 2 15 19 25 47 52 63 n a Other C na 19 27 2) 29 60 78 77 na Total I n ternal r ev enu e 21 80 156 lJl 177 J22 56J 586 622d Licences, franchi s e s , f P. CS 16 39 46 79 117 167 206 226 2J5 Wate r rev enue, Post Of-fice , 
r ail-way a nd airport 19 JJ J4 46 68 101 15) 211 210 Rev enue fro m lands and r ent s na 8 11 17 2) 4 5 8 9 87 ) 170 Inte r est na 5 12 21 28 42 72 72 Ot h er r ecurr e nc r evenu e na 17 9 - -
-
1 2 
-
na 
To tal recurrent rev e nue 1 5J 280 J8 J 448 616 1 , 006 1 , 517 l ,74J na 
Capi t al 
Estate duty n a 5 4 24 12 25 .l9 20 na Land sal es na 6 6 15 22 20 8 7J 49 41 Loan s and grant s na 0 l 14 4 0 J 7 4 Oth er capital revenu e na 
- J 8 10 14 20 
Total ca pi ta 1 r evenue 12 12 1 4 62 48 247 115 75 na 
Total revenue l. 64 292 J97 510 665 l , 25J 1,632 .l , 818 1 , 878 
N 
I-' 
\0 
.per cent 
Recurrent 
Duties J1 25 19 19 18 16 16 1.7 17 Rates 6 9 10 11 1J 10 13 14 15 Income taxes } 12 17 29 18 19 17 23 25 ) 33d Other Interna1 revenue 11 10 8 9 8 8 8 
Licences, franchises, fees 10 13 11 16 18 1.3 13 12 , 13 Water revenue, Post 0:f:fice 
rail.,.,ay and airport 12 11 9 9 10 9 9 12 11 
Revenue :from I.ands and rents na 3 J 3 4 4 5 5 I Interest na 2 J 4 4 3 4 4 9 Other recurrent revenue 6 4 
- - - 1 
Total. recurrent revenue 93 96 95 88 94 80 93 96 na 
Capital. 
Estate duty na 2 1 5 . 2 2 1. 1 na 
Land Sal.es na 2 2 3 3 17 5 J 2 Loans and grants na 0 0 J 1 0 0 0 0 
Other capital. revenue na 
- l. 2 1 1 .1. 
Total. capital. revenue 7 4 5 12 6 20 7 4 na 
Total. revenue 100 100 100 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 
a Revised estimates. 
b Excludes excess stamp duty. 
C Includes car registration :fees and betting tax. 
d Includes estate duty. 
na Not avail.able. 
Note: Totals do not add because o:f rounding. 
Sourc e : Accountant-General., Annual. Report, various numbers. 
Commissioner o:f Inland Revenue, Annual. Report, various numbers. 
N South China Morning Post, 29 February 1968. I-' 
'° 0) 
Tab1e 9.5: Gov ernment ~enditure 1 Se1ected Years 1 124z-48 to 126z-68 
1 947-48 1950-51 195J-54 1956-57 1959-60 1962-6J 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68a 
I million 
A<fm:inistration J 5 : 12 14 28 J6 57 65 82 Defence 0 2 ;32 25 J6 J2 65 69 90 Economic Services 1J 29 0 56 74 107 157 222 254 270 Education 6 14 J1 49 88 150 241 267 299 Heal. th and Medical. 7 15 JO JS 65 95 144 158 167 Pensions 6 7 1.1 14 16 24 )1 4J 48 Police and judiciary 10 19 40 49 69 88 1J2 14J 16J Public Debt 2 4 4 ;J J 6 6 5 5 Public Works - Department J 4 17 22 J 4 45 7J 84 95 
- recurrent 6 15 20 21 4 0 45 70 91 91 
- non-recurrent l 19 )1 11J 1 71 J78 587 480 J54 Social Ve1fare 2 7 4 6 9 14 17 20 25 Other 69 111 66 JS 42 4J 121 126 ll.4 
Total expenditure b 128 251 J55 466 7 08 1,ll.J 
.l,765 1,805 1,803 
per cent 
Administration 2 2 J J 4 J J 4 5 Def'ence 0 l 9 5 5 J 4 4 5 Economic Services 10 12 16 16 15 14 lJ 14 15 Education 5 6 9 10 lJ lJ 14 15 17 Heal th a.nd Medical 5 6 8 8 9 9 8 9 9 Pensions 5 J J J 2 2 2 2 J Police and judiciary 8 7 11 11 10 8 7 8 9 Public debt l 2 l l 0 l 0 0 0 Public Yorks - Department 2 2 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 
- recurrent 5 6 6 5 6 4 4 5 5 
- non-recurr e n t l 8 9 24 2 4 J4 Jl 27 20 Social Velf'are l J 1 1 1. l 1 l l 
N 
Other 54 44 19 8 6 4 7 7 6 N 
0 Total expenditure b 100 100 100 100 100 
.lOO 100 100 100 
a Revised estimates . 
b Excludes World Refugee Year Schemes and Colonial Dev e lopment and Well'are Schemes. 
Note: Totals do not add because of rounding. 
Definitions: Gove::::nment expenditure is recorded on a casb basis, in most cases 
by departments. The distribution of expenditure given in this 
Table is based on the follo wing classifications: 
Administration: Governor ' s Establishment; Department s of Audit Census 
and Statistics, Colonial S ecretariat and Legi s lature, Immigration, 
Infonnation Services, Inland Revenue, ~e~ Territories Adm.inistra t i on, 
Rati"€ and Valuation ; the Public Services Commission; Treasury; 
Urban Services; ~ew Territories Administration . 
~: All Defence categories. 
Economic Servic es~ Departments of Agricult~: , i nd Fi sheri es , Ci vil Aviation , 
Commer<;e a nd Industry, Fire Services , Labour )1a rine, Registrar-General , 
Resettlement; Ko wloon-<:anton Ra il~y ; Post Office; Radio Hong Kong; Registry 
of Trade Unions; Royal Observatory; Urban Servic es; Urban Services ; Housing . 
Education: Department of Education; Universities. 
Real th and Medical : Medical and Health Department; Subventions : Medical . 
Pensions : Pensions. 
Police and Judiciary: Judiciary; Legal Department; Police Force . 
Public Debt: Public debt. 
Public Works - Department: Publ.ic Works Department . 
Publ.ic Works - Recurrent: Public Yorks Department . 
Public Yorks - Non-recurrent: Public Works - Non-Recurrent: 
Headquarters, Buil.dings, Civil. Enginee~, Waterworks . 
Social Welfare : Secretariat for Ch:l.nes e Affairs; Department of Socia l Welfare; 
Subventions: Social Welfare . 
~: Miscellaneous Expenditure; Stores; Urban Services : City Hall . 
Source: Accountant-General, Annual Report, various numbers . 
N 
N 
0 
Pl 
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consequence of ower construction costs on the pubic wor ks program 
and of building del ays brought on by the 1967 dis curbances) . 1 
Tab l e 9 . 3 also shows the dif erence be t ween b dgeted and ac tual 
revenue and expenditure . I n mos t years ac tual revenue has 
considerabl y exceeded estimated r evenue. Rea ised expenditur e ha 
usually been appreciably below the budgeted fig re . 
(a) Government Revenue . 
(i) Income Taxes 
There is no comprehens ive income tax in Hong Kong . Instead tax 
is charged separately on a number of specified sources of income : 
profi ts, salaries , property and interest , Indidivuals, however, can 
elect for an assessment on their total income from a 1 the specified 
sources if this would lead to a lower tax liability , Income which 
2 
arises outs i de the Colony is fr ee from tax. There is no tax charge 
on capital gains . These i ncome t axes, first introduced as a war-
time measur e in 1940, became permanent charges in 1947. Until 1950 
the standa d rate of tax was ten per cent . In 1950 it was increased 
to 12\ per cent and maintained a t this l evel until 1966 when it was 
raised to fifteen per cent . These direct taxes now return about 
one quarter of total Government r evenue , 
Profi ts Ta , which i s subdivided into Business Profits Tax and 
Corporation Pr ofitsTax, is charged at the standar d rate on any person 
3 
or company carrying on bus i ness i n Hong Kong . From 1947 until 1955 
1 
The differ ence between budgeted and ac t ua l pending on t hese t wo 
counts was gr eater than the additional Government spendi ng made 
necessary by t he riots and demons trations on police bonuses , s t aff 
overtime , e tc. ) . The disturbances had no apparent i mmedia t e eff ect 
on Gover nment revenue, except for t heir depressing effect on land 
prices, and t hus on Government receipts from the a le of new 
leases . As Government r ecei pts from internal r evenue suall 
r elate to profits and salaries rece ived i n t he previ · us fiscal 
year, the effects of the disturbances on Government r evenue is 
more likely to be seen in t he 1968-69 financia period 
2 
For this r eason t he Government has ot entered inco any double 
tax agreements . 
3 
Thu , unincorporated companies do no t pay tax aL a hi gher rate 
than inco porated companies . 
22 
an initial i nvestment a l owance equal to ten per cent of cap ta 
expenditure on buildings could be claimed . The concession was 
r e-introduced in 1966 at the higher rate of twenLy per cenc " Apart 
from t he norma wear and tear al owances, chere are no 1nvescment 
incentives and no tax holidays . No t a i s evied when che profits 
of an unincorpor ated business ar e less t han $7 ,000 1n any one y ear . 
A s i ng le assessment is made on the aggr egat ed profits of al 
businesses controlled by the one taxpayer . Table 9 . 6 shows the 
number of cases of profit s tax dealt wit h by the Inland Revenue 
Department over recent years, and the ne t profits tax charged , 
Tab l e 9 . 7 gives a distribution of t he profits t ax demand note s by 
trade group ings . 
Salaries Tax is charged on all wages, salaries, pens i ons, 
r ent f ree accommodation and other emoluments , l ess personal 
deductions (which are $7,000 each for the caxpayer and his wife , 
$2,000 for each of the first two children , $1 ,000 for each of che 
t hird to s ixth childr en and $500 each for t he seven th , eighth and 
n nth chi ldren and t he value of life assurance premiums of up to 
one si th of taxab e i ncome over $7 , 000 . Ta is harged at 
graduated percentages of the standard rat e: tax is 2l per c ent of 
che first $5,000 of taxable income, 5~ per c enc on t he nex t $5,000, 
rising to 30 per cent of that par t of taxable i nc ome which is i n 
exces o $45,000 . However, there is a proviso which limi ts the 
maximum t ax payable by an individual to the s candar d rate on his 
gross i ncome . Table 9 , 8 shows that the bur den of salaries tax i s a 
light l one . $18,000 is consider ed to be As an annual income o 
within t he top t en per 2 ent of incomes i n t he Co l ony, t he ta 
base is very narrow . There a r e no pay-as-you- earn dedu tions, but 
t a r e s erve certificates, carrying 4 . 2 per cent ta -fr ee i n terest, 
are avai a ble . 
1 
The ligh t burden of salaries ta is shown also in t he 963-64 
Househo l d Expenditure Survey, op , cit . ncome t a payment s made 
up on y 0 . 2% of expenditure o households w1ch a mont hly e penditure 
of $2 ,000 or mor e . 
2 
inancial Secretary , Budget Debat e, 1966 (mimeographed) . 
Table 9. 6 
PROFI TS TAX: CASES ASSESSED AND NET TAX CHARGEABLE , SELECTED YEARS, 1950 -5 1 TO 1966 -67 
1950 :.51 1953-54 1956-57 1959-60 1962 -63 1965 -66 
Number of ca s e s a s ses s ed n .a . 39, 600 32,000 34,400 41,900 46 ,800 
Number of profits tax 
ass es sments is~s ued 3,300 6,800 4, 300 5 , 300 6, 700 9,300 
Net pr ofi ts tax charged $m 35 87 60 82 138 245 
Source: Commis sioner of In l and Revenue, AnnuaJ Report , vario us numbers . 
1966 -6 7 
48,800 
10,200 
278 
N 
N 
.p.. 
225 
Table 9.7 
PROFITS TAX: DEMAND NOTES BY TRADE GROUPINGS , SELECTED YEARS 
1961-62 TO 1966 -67 
1961-62 1963 -64 1965-66 1966 -67 
$ mi llion 
Corporations 
Distribution, Wholesale, Retail, 
Export & Import 19 34 37 
Banking 10 12 21 
Other Finance and Investment 12 19 42 
Manufacturing : 
-Clothing and textiles 8 6 9 
-Other 13 20 25 
Shipping 5 9 7 
Hotels, Restaurants 4 6 7 
Utilitie s 15 22 37 
Other 10 14 25 
To tal Corporations 96 142 192 
Un incorporated Bus inesses 
Professions, Amusements 7 10 13 
Export-Import, Wholesale, Retail 7 10 14 
Manufacturing 3 4 4 
Other 11 22 28 
Total unincorporated businesses 28 46 59 
All Businesses 124 188 241 
No te : Totals do not add because of rounding. 
Source : Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Annual Report, various 
numbers . 
51 
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Tabl 9.8 
SALARIES TAX PAYAB LE BY A MARRIED MAN WITH TWO CHI .DRE 
Gross I ncome Salaries tax payable Av r age r a te of t ax 
$ $ % 
18,000 
24,000 192.50 0 . 8 
36,000 1,155.00 3,2 
80,000 11,475.00 14 . 5 
100,000 15,000.00 15.0 
The number of cases assessed for Salaries Tax and the net 
Salaries Tax payable are shown in Table 9 . 9 
Property Tax is charged on the net rateable value of all land 
and buildings at the standard rate, other than on property occupied 
by the owner as a residence, which is free of tax, and land in the 
New Territories and pre-war buildings subject to rent control, which 
are charged at concessional rates . There is a repairs and 
mai ntenance allowance of twenty per cent of the net rateable value . 
Interest Tax is charged at the standard rate on interest 
receipts which arise in Hong Kong. Interest recei ved by companies, 
r ece i pts of bank interest at rates of 3~ per cent or l ess, and 
i nterest on tax reserve certificates, are all exempt from tax. There 
i s no tax charged on dividend receipts. 
The introduction of a comprehensive income tax - one charged 
on the taxpayer's aggregate income rather than separately on 
different sources - has been suggested by several members of the 
1 Legislative Council, as a means of increasing tax revenue (since 
some taxpayers would be moved into higher tax brackets and avoidance 
2 
would be more difficult) and of relating tax payments more closely 
1 
2 
Alternat vely, of allowing a reduction in the rate of tax . 
It s claimed that avoidance would be redu ed because tax 
payments could be more nearly related to apparent wealth . However, 
if some forms of income - such as income arising abroad, and capital 
gains - remained tax free , this advantage would not follow . 
Table 9.9 
SALARIES TAX: CASES ASSESSED AND NET TAX CHARGEABLE$ SELECTED YEARS 1950-51 TO 1966-67 
1950-51 19 53 -54 1956-57 1959-60 1962 -63 1965 -66 
Number of cases assessed 8,700 21,500 16,200 19,700 32,900 44,100 
Number of Salaries tax 
assessments issued 6,800 9,100 9,700 13,300 23,500 31,200 
Net Salaries tax charged $m 7 10 11 14 27 46 
Average per assessment $ 971 1,075 1,166 1,083 1,148 1,489 
Source: Corrnnissioncr of I n land Revenue, AnnuaLReport, various numbers. 
1966-6 7 
47,100 
32, 700 
57 
1,741 
N 
N 
'-I 
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to ability to pay. In h s 1962 Budget Speech, the Financial 
Secretary referred to 'the compelling need to make an early change to 
a system of full income tax', 1 and added, later in t he debate, that 
'it s the intention to set up a special committee to cons der the 
matter' . There was strong oppos tion to th s suggestion from the 
unoffic ial members, one of whom argued: 
Such inquisition is part cularly objectionable to the 
Chinese people; by nature and custom the Chinese people 
resent t . Apart from the objection that it will cause 
untold irritation , annoyance and inconvenience to the 
taxpayers, the administration of such a tax is a difficult 
one and requires a large staff to function .•• Such a 
system will create more opportunit i es for corruption ••• 
Foreign nvestors have come to this Colony principally 
because there is no full income tax here and because our 
rate of tax is low . • . To change the present system of 
taxation by one of fuli income tax is therefore attended 
by the danger and risk of a flight of capital from the 
Colony ••• 2 
In the event, real sation that 'an orthodox full income tax 
would not command the support of a substantial part of [the Legislative] 
Council' for ced the Financial Secretary to drop the proposal, even 
t hough he expressed 'difficulty in wholly acc ept ing' the case against 
full income taxation . 3 
There is general agreement on the necessity for low taxes . 
Early i n the pos t-war period the view was put that because of 'Hong 
Kong's pecul ar position as an entrepot, and not in the main , as a 
producer', there was little scope to increase taxes without 'doing 
4 permanent injury to Hong Kong as an entrepot' . More recently, it 
seems to have become the accepted view that, for political reasons, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Legislative Council Debates, 1962 , 
' 
C. Y. Kwan, Legislative Council Debates, 1962. 
Financial Secretary, 1966 Budget Speech, (mimeographed). 
Legislative Council Debates, 1949, p . 61 . 
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t he ceiling for direct taxes is about t wenty per cent - 1 around half 
1 t he r ate l evied in many count ries . 
i) Ot her Recurr ent Revenue 
The few mport charges levied - thes e ar e i mposed on li uor , 
obacco , hydrocarbon oi l s, table water and me thyl alcohol - are 
pur ely or revenue purposes and, desp i te several incr eases since the 
2 
war , are generall y light . Excise duties ar e charged on t he same 
goods if t hese are manufactured locally " Revenue from duties has 
gradua l ly become a less important part of total Gover nment r ecei pts 
(conttibuc.ing 31 per cent of Gover nment r evenue in 1947- 1948 and 17 
per cent i n 1967-68) . 
The income from the Government's commercial operations - Pos t 
Office , railway , water, lands and housing - is recorded on a gross 
basis . Charges for the various services ar e fixed on t he bas i s of 
covering 'commercial 3 osts' ; for example, rents on low cos t housing 
es tates a·r e char ged at levels which cover r eimbursement of t he capital 
cost over forty years at five per cenc. per annum compound interest . 
Fourteen to twenty per cent of Government r evenue has consisted of 
t eceipt s f r om its several under t akings , 
1 
See H.M. D" Barton, 1962 Budget Debate, and Financial Secre t ar y, 
Budgec. Speech, 966 (mimeographed) p . 29 . As wel l as c.he politica 
factor, of course, t here is the Gover nment's laissez-faire outlook : 
'I am confident, however old fashi oned t his may sound, that f unds 
left in t he hands of the public will come into t he E hequer with 
i nterest at t he time in the future when we need them ' Financial 
Secretar y, Legislative Council Debates, 1962 . 
2 
In 1966 t he char eon liquor ranged from $1 . 60 per gallon on 
local l y-produced beer to $73 a gallon on imported spirits (a 
concession is allowed on imports of liquor and tobac co from 
Commonwealth countries) . On tobacco the range was $2 . 50 a pound 
on Chinese-pr epared tobacco to $11 , 25 d pound on Commonwealt h 
ci gars . On moto~ spirits the duty was $1 . 80 a gallon , 
3 
On t he ground that commerc ial costs 'measure the true cos t to the 
community i n terms of the choice be tween compet i ng use of scarce 
resourc.es . ' F nancial Secretary, Legislative Council Debates, 1964, 
p . 50 . However, land or low cost housing purposes is priced below 
mar ket value , and no charge is made for land provided for hous ng 
pur poses 
23 0 
Other sourc e o recurrent r ev en e a e a irs t reg s n:at:ion cax 
and a Commonwealth Pr eference Ta · on mo tor vehic·· es ( nc uded in t:he 
·overnment ' accouncs as a part of i nterna revenuej and rates, which 
ar·e ·ha:c ged a t event.een per cent of r ateable va ues .::,n land and 
buildings in che c ity and at eleven per cenc 1n par Ls of t he New 
Te:c'f·ir.:ories . The ur:·ban development and increase i n pt · perty values 
have led to a r ise i n receipts from rates f rom $10 mi l on in 19 7- 48 
(six per ent o total revenue) to $282 million in 1967-68 (f ifteen 
per cent o total revenue) . 
(iii) Capit al Revenue 
The overnment's intention of reducing the maximum rate of 
estat e duty t he maximum rate applies to estat es worth $15 million) 
t t he ame le el as the standar d r a te of Salaries Ta was announced 
in t he 1967 Budget . As a first s t ep, the maximum r a t e was red c ed 
from 40 per c ent to 25 per cent . The concession was given or economic 
not o·ial reasons - it was said to be encouraging a cap1tal outflow. 
Al land in Hong Kong is crown land . Leases, wh1ch in che urban 
area are u ually or 75 year s, a r e sold at publi" auc tion . Rev enue 
from t he sale f leases is , for obvious reasons , ariable and difficult 
to predict . I ncreasingl y, t hough, land for in ustria p r po es and 
r e-gr an ts of existing leases are sold on 1ns talmenc cerms a cash 
payment of t en per cent and the balance over t wenty years at t en per 
cent intereBc) . This has made for a more regular f ow of r evenue 
from Government 's l and transac tions . 
Tab l e 9 . 4 shows the unimportance of loans and ant s in 
comparison i t h ta and ot her re enues ., And, what itt e borrowing 
t here h s been is counterbalanced many times by t he accum lation 
of reoerves ,1 The only public i sue of securities since t e War was 
t he $50 million Rehabilitation Loan raised 1 ca yin 19 8 t his is 
not shown i n Table 9"4 because the proceeds wer e used to r epay 
previDus advan es from surplus balances) . An i n tereat free loan of 
1 
See Tab e 9n 2 , 
2 1 
$ 8 mi l ion was received from the United Kingdom Government n the 
late 1950s, specifica ly to inance development of che airporL 
This 1 an is bei ng repa d in fifteen annua l instalments of $3 . 2 
million . Several small loans and grants have been r eceived from che 
Colonial Development and Welfare Fund , and ot her small grants hav e 
come ft'om World Refug ee Year Sources . The pub l ic deb t is shown in 
Table 9 , 10 . 
(b) Government Expenditur e . The dis tribution of Gov ernment 
spending over the post-war period wa shown in Table 9 . 5 . 
Defence expendi ture is regulated by an agreement with the Un1ted 
Kingdom o A 1958 Agreement committed the Colony to pay $24 million a 
year towards its def ence costs . To this was added in 1964 a promise 
to make available an additiona l $96 million over s i years to finance 
a defence capital works program . A r evision to the Agr eement in 1966 
required t he Colony to contribute $80 million per annum . 
Public service wages and salaries t ake about two fifths of total 
Government spendi ng (in 1967-68, $678 million o t of $1, 804 million) . 
The larger and more settled population has meant a greacer 
demand for education and health services, and thus for increased 
1 Government spending i n these fields . It is now the Government ' s 
i ntention to provide, by 1971 , a subs i dised primary school pla e for 
every child of primar y school age and subs idised secondary school 
plac es for fift een to twenty per cent of pr i mary sch 1 leavers . In 
a program for t he development of medical and health services adopted 
in 1960 the Government a ccep t ed responsibility fot· p:coviding hospita s 
and c lini s for t hat part of t he popul ation whic.h could not afford to 
pay economic rates (a Government statement suggested t hat t his would 
invol e O per cent o the popu l a tion for ou t pat1en t cat e and 80 per 
l 
See Hon$ Kong 1966, Chapter 1, 'The S0c1al Services ' , It hould be 
pointed out that about half the school places and about one-tenth of 
t he hospital beds ar e provided by private b dies 1th no Goe nment 
assistance, and t hat the majority of the r emainder is Governmen t 
as isted and no t Government-provided 
Tab l e 9.10 
PUBLI C DEBT, SELECTED YEARS 1 1948 ·o 1957 
1948a 1951 1954 19 57 l9 0 1963 
$ mil lion 
Pub lie de 70 65 56 73 94 90 
l ess ·nking f und 3 8 13 14 17 21 
67 56 43 59 77 69 
Expenditur e on 
public d bt b,c 2 4 4 14 17 21 
Not To tals do not add be ause of rounding. 
a= 31 March each year 
b Yea r ending 31 March 
c In lud e s r epayments 
1966 
79 
25 
54 
6 
Sourc : Accountan t -Genera l , Annua l Rep ort, v rious _umbers. 
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196 7 
75 
28 
47 
5 
cent or inpatient treatment) . 1 At fir st, emphasis was placed on the 
provision o clinics . A more comprehens ive program was adopted in 
1963, t o i ncrease the number of hospital beds (including those in 
private hospitals) per thousand o population from 2 . 9 i n 1963 to 
2 4 . 25 by 1972 . In the field of social welfar e, the Government 
consider s its r ole to be that of co-or dina ting t he work of the 
various private bodies and of providing certain basic and emer gency 
r e.lief services . There is no likelihood t hat a system of general 
welfare payments will be introduced . 3 
A most important part (in recent years, a third) of 
Government spending has been on non-recurrent pub lic works . A 
breakdown of this item of Government spending is shown i n Table 9 .11. 
The largest single item of public wor ks spending has been , in 
most years, expenditure on the Colony's water supply . The large 
1 
2 
3 
Hong Kong 1966 , p . 10 . 
l b d . , p . lL 
The Whi e Paper Aims and Policy for Social Welfare in Hong Kong , 
1964, p . 7 , stated that ' ••. in planning for future de elopments, t 
would not be realist c to env sage comprehens ve e ice or to 
introduce any further elements in a soc ial security programme beyond 
t he provis i on of relief services based on stric t need, without very 
care ul cons derat on o the potential ef f ect on t he eco nomy . ' 
Tab l e 9 .11 
CBLIC W:JRKS ~ NON -RE ITD'RE~ a SELECTED YEARS~ 1950-51 TO 1966-67 
1950 -51 19 53-54 19 56 -57 
Civ i l e ngineering b 45 40 30 
Mucation 9 8 3 
~ dical and hea lth 6 10 2 
Re s e ttlement and l ow cost housing 
- - 11 
Police and Prisons 19 12 6 
Social Welfare 
- 1 0 
Water Works 6 2 32 
Otherc 16 27 15 
Total E';XDenditure 100 100 100 
No t e: Tota ls do no t add beca us e of rounding. 
diture financed from t he De velopr:.e:i t Loan f und . 
b = I nc l ude s a i_rpor t. 
c = Includes works , e t c. , r t ~e s e rvices. 
Source : Accounta nt-General, Annua l Report, various numbers. 
1959 -6 0 
per cent 
26 
4 
9 
16 
6 
24 
14 
100 
1962 -63 
18 
3 
8 
17 
3 
0 
31 
21 
100 
1965 =66 
24 
0 
3 
21 
4 
0 
32 
16 
100 
1966 -6 
25 
1 
3 
25 
2 
1 
30 
14 
100 
N 
w 
w 
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population and t he demands o industry , on t he one hand , and t he 
Co lony ' mall land area , lack of rivers and a seas0nal and unreliable 
rainfall ~n t he other , make t he provision of an adequaLe water supply 
an e pensive one . The accountsof the Water Authox1 cy ate disc ssed 
belowo 1 
I t is for i ts i nves tment in utili tar ian, low cost housing tha t 
t he Hong Kong Government is probably most wi dely known . The 
Government entered the hous ing field on a large s ca l e i n 1954 , when 
it was becom ng evi dent that immigrants wer e not r e t urning to Ch na 
a s had been earlie expected, and i s now landlord to almost one- third 
of t he population . About one-quarter of t he Colony' s population is 
now housed in ' r esettlement' estat es (accommodation prov ided to 
families from 'squatter' areas) . By 1971 , mor e than 1 . 5 million will 
2 be housed in such estates , To accommodate the small factories which 
have been s et up in squat t e areas , the Go ernment's Resettlement 
Department has cons t ructed blocks of fla tted fa .tory space near to t he 
resettlement estates . 
The separate category of ' Gov er nment Low-Cose Hou i ng' was 
establi hed i n 1964 to provide hous i ng of a minimum standar d f or 
fami lie whose income was t oo low to quali y for Housing A t hority 
accommoda t on but who, not being squatters , could not seek 
accommodation i n resettlement estates , I t is planned to house 220 ,000 
people in Low-C 3 t Rous ng estates by 1970 . ove nmenL pend ing on 
resett ement and Low-Cost hous ng is expected to be abo t $1 ,000 
million i n t he s ix years to 1970 . 
The very large spending on public housing by this mos t laissez-
fa i r e ot governments has r esulted from the magni ude of the housing 
1 
2 
See Chap t er 12 . 
The magn tude of the s quatter prob l em har dly needs to be s t ressed , 
Despite the r esettlement program, t he number of squa t ters i ncreased 
fr om around 260,000 in 1954 to 580,000 i n September 196 " Review of 
Policies or Squat ter Control , Resettlement and Gover nment Low Cost 
Hous i ng, 1964 , p . 2 . 
3 
Hong Kong Annual Report , 1966 , p , 135 , 
2 5 
s hortage and, to a lesser extent, from t he unw1l ingness of private 
capital t o make the necessar y l arge and very long term inves tment . 
Buds,et Balances 
Over the twent y-one years covered by Table 9 "3 budget surpluses 
have been retur ned in all bu t two years (in both f which new salary 
award , for which no allowance was made in t he Budget , were g anted 
to Government employees) . The Table also showed that t here have been 
very w de di fer ences between budget pr ed ictions and recorded 
f inancial results. An extreme case was 1962/ 63, when an anticipated 
de ic t of $164 million became an actual surplus of $140 million . 
Estimates o likely revenue have been made on wha appear to be 
excessively conserva tive assumptions, 1 while actual expenditure, 
espe ially on capital projects, has fr equently been less than 
autho i sed " Five year forecasts of revenue and expendi ture have been 
made periodically since 1951 , but with wide margins of error , 
2 
especially on t he revenue side . (The fact that the expenditure 
projections have been reasonably correct makes the fiv e year 
forecasts of ome use, as, f or exampl e, in planning the taff needs 
in t he Public Works Depar tment). 
In t he period shown in Table 9 . 3 the sur plus on curren t account 
has been about one-thi rd o 3 current revenue and by far t he main 
source o f unds for Government capita l formation . 
The surplus on current account has a lso been considerably i n 
excess of the deficit on capital account , From the re ulting 
surpluses large reserves have been built up . These have been held 
1 
Frequently, t he level of revenue forecast has been l ess t han actual 
revenue in t he previous year . 
2 
For example, the five year prediction given in the 1954 Budget 
Speech estimat ed t hat r evenue in 1958 /5 9 would equal $358 million ; 
ac.t ual r evenue in that year was $629 million, 
3 
Current revenue is defined in the Government's accoun t s as total 
r evenue less estate duty, land sales, excess stamp duty, and loans 
and grants . 
2 6 
as a Reve nue Equa l i sation Fund (se up in 1953 sp c ifica lly 'for t he 
purp ose of me ti.ng any s rious shortage of r ve ue fo r a par icular 
y a r, or f orm ti g any non -recurren t increas in e _p nditur in 
1 
a ny pa rt ic ular year ' ) and a General Revenue alanc . . Va r iations 
in t h 1 v ls of t he two res e rves and the ass ts he ld agains t t h m 
ar s hown in Table 9.12. 2 Si.nee 1960 an i.ncreas d prop ortion o f 
t h Gove r nmen t ' res rves has been he ld with i n t h Co l ony ; b March 
1967 mor t han ha l f of the Government res e rves was he ld as deposits 
with Hong Kong banks . 
As a r sult of the devaluat i on of sterl ing n Novemb r 1967 , 
$38 million was written off the sterl ing assets he ld against th 
Government reserves. 
Th bui ld i ng up o f sizeabl e reserves and t h ho lding of t hese 
large l y in t he fo rm of liquid assets abroad hav een de lib r a t e 
f G 1 . 3 acts o ov rnm nt po icy . The Government has s ug~t to ac cumulate 
a re s erve f rom which it can maintain public spe_ding in t h -vent 
of a fa ll in r evenue . A large part of t he r e s erve s are held a s 
liquid deposits and investments in foreign financial centr s 
becaus 
1 
2 
R serves are of little use un less they r in r a s onably 
li.q uid form so t hat they can r eadily be drawn n when 
required . . . fo r t hi s r ea son a substantial propor tio 
of t hem must be he ld abroad ; for t h r is nor .a s onably 
liquid form in which sums of t h is magn i.t ude can be. held 
in Hong Kong . .. A poten tially diffic u l t position could 
arise wer e we to deposit very larg sums in t he banks 
Financia l S cretary , Legislative Council De ate~, 1953 , p .36 . 
The transferable surplus in the Colon 's E change Fu d (se . 
Chapter is not i nc lud din t he Government ' s r e s erves . 
3 
I h i 19 6 Budg t spe ch, mim ograph d, h Fi ancial Ser tary 
stated 1 1 am now mor t han ever conv i nc ed t hat it i s s nt i a l in 
our c no i c in eres t ha t h Government ' s r e .r v .s s hou ld b 
s ubsta tial and b ld to a grea t xtent abroa d '. The Governme nt ' s 
int t o bu i ld up its fo r . ign r serv . ugg . t t ha t, at 1 ast 
in mo8t y ars, i wa s con fid nt t h budg t d d , fic it wou ld no t 
r:- v n. tua t . 
Tab l e 9.12 
VERl{MENI LIABILITIES AND ASSETS ~ SELECTED YEARS ~ 1948 TO 196 7 
1948a 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 196 7 
$ million 
Liabilities 
Revenue Equalisat ion Fund 
- - 137 138 138 138 138 138 
General Revenue Balance 37 193 242 358 407 659 688 710 
Other, inc 1 , deposits 36 12 7 63 69 43 66 78 87 
Total liabilities 73 320 443 565 588 863 904 935 
Assets 
Cash and current deposit 73 61 87 57 27 102 71 76 
Fixed deposit 
- 70 20 88 60 27 9 420 409 
Investments 
- 102 246 415 497 429 400 430 
Other 
- 87 89 5 5 53 12 11 
Tota l asse ts 73 320 443 565 588 863 904 935 
Ca s h , deposits and inve stment : 
held in ~ong Kong 49 82 so 123 71 380 426 469 
held in sterling 24 151 303 43 7 512 430 466 457 
Note: Totals do not add because of rounding 
a= 31 M..arch each year 
Source: N Accountant-Gener a l, Annua~~port, various numbers. (..,..) 
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in Hong Kong f or t hem to l end i n t he orma l cours a d 
w were t h n o find i.t n c ssary fo s om. r as on o ru 
t h m down quickly. l 
2 
b is ed to build up reserves in anticipat io of f~ t ur . budget 
d f icits r fl cts t he Government ' s very rs rict d ab il ity o 
financ a budge d f ic it by borrowing fro t h ank ' ng svst 
Th re is no central bank, t he cur r ency is s u i s ully back d by 
sterl i ng , and any borrowing f r om t he comm rcia l anks wou ld probably 
b on ly for a sma ll amount and on a s hort term asi . Und r t hese 
institut i ona l arrangements, the Gove rnment can r un a budge deficit 
on l y t o t he exten t that it ha s r eserves or can obta in new f unds 
f rom borrowing or grants. It cannot direc ly ' er a 
fina n e a d fi cit . 
n w a:on y ' o 
A smaller part o the r e s rves is commi tted to t h paym nt of 
pensions, and to th repayment o f th few l oans r eceived from 
outside so ur ce s. 
here ha s been no attempt t o us e budget ba l a nc s as aw apon 
of stabilisation pol i cy . Thus, t he budget surpluse s r ' corded over 
almost a ll t he post -war period wer e not i n end d as def l a tionary 
meas ur _s a nd t he budge t d f icits in 1959/60 and 1965/66 wer o t 
aimed at s timu l ating t he l eve l of demand in he e conomy . I n any 
case , as was s hown in Chapter 7, one wo u ld have o look a t what is 
do . e wi ht _ surplus f unds or at t he source fro . whi ch the 
exce s of spending i s £ina ne d . I f , f or amp l e, t he budget s urplus 
i.s le.f n d posit wi h t h . Hong Kong banks (as was t h c~s in 
1 
Fi nan ia l Ser ary , Budge t Spe ch , 1967 (mi ograp .. d), Th r 
ha s .n a good d a l of criticism of t h dec i sion ·o intain l arg 
s, especially about ha part wh i ch is h ld ou sid 
amp l , it ha s r .c ntly be n a sk d 'What ar t 
s rv d fo r ? Fort e n ds of Ho g and its ? 
v r b en drawn and f or wha? I 
ca ll .d rs rv . are mor • lik a l if . insura 
nam of Hong Kong and its premiu 
of th ong Kong p .opl , bu in 
G v r nm .nt ot b . i ng immortal - t h 
t h. British Gov rnment or t h Hong 
1 .s ·.han 1% o ." pop ulation, 1 
August, 1967 . 
2 9 
1963 / 64) , t h exce ss of Gove rnm nt rev nue ov r s pending 1 d no t 
d f l a i onary . Similarly , a budge t de f ic i t f inance d f r om t 
Gov rnmen ' s l ocally h ld r e serves would no t ne e s sarily e 
expansionary. 
Gov .r nmen t Borrowing 
The un impor tanc of borrow d funds wa appar ent fr o . Table s 
9,4 and 9 . 10. The nominal public debt in March 1967 stood a t on l y 
$7 5 million, or $20 a head, and against t his a sinki ng fund a t $28 
million was held. In his 1961 Budget Speech , t he Financi al 
Seer tary announced t hat an issue of tr asur y bills wi t h a ma tur ity 
of hree mon t hs was to be made. It was stre sse d t hat , as we ll as 
providing t he Government with funds , the propos e d issu would 
constitute a first step in t he establishment of a Governme nt 
s ecurities market and would give some indicat ion of t he y ield wh ich 
the market expected of Government securities . 1 The Government, 
apparently , was willing to provide r e -discount facilities for at 
1 ast a part of the security issue . However, t he continu d 
uoyancy of r evenue made it unnecessary to proceed with t h. i ssue. 
As t he new Financial Secretary pointed out i n la t e 1961, with t he 
s trong revenue there was little. hat co uld be done wi t h t he f unds 
r aised t he bill i ss ue other than to dep os it h m wi .. t h Hong 
Kong banks ; tis might be useful to the banks ut it wou ld no t 
2 bene f it t h Government. 
I n the f ollowing year, the Financial Seer ary disclos .d t hat 
an Ordinance au horising a short term loan raising of $50 million 
to $100 million was under preparation, Again, howev r , t 
con inued i.ncr as i.n r venue made i t unn c .ssar to j ss u t he 
Gov~r m n scrip , 
1 
2 
l'h i d . , p . 2 71 , 
To some xtent, the neglect of borrowing r e fl ects a 
Gladstonian approach to public finance - a view t ~a t Government 
spending should be limited to that level which can be f ina nced 
f rom revenue. The Financial Secretary in 1966 discuss ed t he 
Government ' s attitude to borrowing in som detail ~ 
In the first place, except in the event of borr owing 
a broad, borrowing does not throw the cost of dev lopment 
on future generations, as some believe; it tends merely 
to redistribute the burden; not that, I f eel, w today 
in Hong Kong have any very clear moral right t o try to 
pass capital costs on to the future if t ha t were 
possible, the assets handed on to us being a lmost 
wholly free of debt. Much of the strength of our 
economy today derives from the prudently orthodox 
policies we have pursued in the post-war years. 
Secondly, there are strong grounds for at t empt i ng 
if one can, not to mortgage the future. It is certainly 
cheaper in aggregate terms not to do so and it secures 
one from the temptation of assuming too heavy a burden 
of debt ... 
Again, one of the dangers about governmental borrowing 
is that there is a temptation to borrow for investment 
in capital projects which can never generate adequate 
income to redeem the debt or which do so at t oo slow 
a rate; and the burden of debt and the pr oblem of its 
r financing grows rapidly.l 
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But t here have been other considerations. Until 1965, t he 
r ate of increase in Government spending - especially on water 
storag and housing - was held back by real fact ors (such as t he 
long t i me taken to prepare plans and difficulties of site 
f ormation) . Further, there has been a limited market for fixed 
i nterest securities, especially those of the longer term. Most 
long term investment is discouraged by political uncertainty. There 
is no central bank to support a public issue of securities. And, 
as conunercial banks have free access to foreign money markets, a 
local issue may need to match foreign securities in liquidity (which 
could involve the Government in the provision of re -discount 
facilities) b fore receiving strong bank support. The problem is 
t o some extent a circular one: ther is littl app tite f or fixed 
interes securities in part because of the negligible supply of 
f i xed interest securities. Bu t here would almost certainly hav been 
1 
Financial Secretary, 1966 Budget Spe ch, (mimeographed) , pp . 25-6. 
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in most pos -war year s, suf ici nt demand t o absorb st shor t r . ( .ive 
) . 1 t o t n y a rs iss ue . 
The Governm nt ha s been especially unwilling o ace p t he 
proposal hat it make an iss ue of bonds whict t hf:! commercial banks 
migh t c oun t a s liquid a ss ets for purposes of h Banking Ordi ance: 
I am afraid t ha t I totally disagree with h i id _a, 
I is potentia lly inf l ationa y, in th bad sens , as 
it wi ll tend t o build up t he supply of credit to 
und sirable l eve ls and put a strain on our external 
resourc s . . . Furthermore, and this is a Eacet of t he 
fi rst objection, Government's consent to i .s l oans 
being treated as liquid a ssets would involve it in an 
obligation to discount or repurchase these l oan s on 
demand, should banks run short of liquid ity for any 
reason - as they might under the very imp tus of 
Gove rnment borrowing, and its effect on our balance 
of payments.2 
Despi e t he Colony's financial respectability, it has been 
very difficult to obtain fund s from overseas. Borrowing fro the 
London market has been prevented by t he United Kingdom balance of 
payments di fficulties and t he priority given to other Corrnnonwealth 
borrowers. The World Bank, to which t he Co l ony applied for credit 
in 1961, a.nd 1966, considered t hat the Colony was not s ufficient l y 
in need o outsid funds. 
It is di ff icult to say which of th se various inf luences has 
contr ibuted mo st to the limited use of borrowing. It s e ems probable 
though , t ha t if revenue we re ever to be less than adequate in t he 
future, he whole quest i on of borrowing wou ld e r econsidered , 
The Development Loan Fund 
In 1951 t he Government announced t he e stablis hment of a 
Deve l opment Fund to finance 'revenue -producing projects, a nd such 
othe r development and welfare projects as do no t co~.mit Gov rnment 
to i er a s recurrent expenditure o be financed f r om general 
3 
revenue.' The Fund was initially allocated the proc ds of former 
1 
For .xample, t he Financial S cretary said in 196, Budget spe ch , 
'W • .. may be abl . to borrow , a not unr a.sons. 1 ra e s of int r st, 
for p .r iods of say, ten years . ' 
2 
Ibid . , pp, 2 7 - 8. 
3 
Legisla iv Council Debates, 1951, p.51, 
242 
enemy property and t he prof it s from t h Gove n . nt'c; trading account. 
A sma ll Local Loan Fund was set up in 1956 t o make interest free 
loans to s chools. In 1958 t he Developmen Loan Fund wa es tablis hed 
to take ov r t h.e s wo funds. 
Tab 1 9. 13 shows t he growth of t he D v l opm n t Fund <e1 nd t h 
D velopment Loan Fund in the period 195 t o 1967 . On veral 
occasions t he Fund has r eceived appropriations from t he Co lony's 
general revenue. A significant tra ns fer from the accumul ated 
surplus o t he Exchange Fund wa s made in 1965. It was announced in 
the Financial Secretary's 1967 Budget Sp e ch that another , 
sizeable transfer was und r consideration, but this t r ans fer had to 
be de l ayed because of the los ses suffered by t he Exchange Fund in t he 
1967 sterling devaluation . Interest on t he Fund ' s own loans is now 
a significant source of r ev nue. 
The grater part of the Development Loan Fund's assets in 
1967 wa s in the form of loans outstanding - $528 mi llion - mos t of 
wh ich ($434 mi llion) was to the credit of t he Housing Au thority, the 
Housing Socie ty and the building co -operative societies. Loans to 
schoo ls s tood at $50 mi llion. Earlier , the Fund directly finance d 
a rec l ama ion scheme which provided l and fo r industrial purp os es . 
For many y ars, a significant part of t h a ss t s of t he. Fund was h ld 
in liquid form, l a rgely in s terling i nve s mens. 
Origina lly , the Fund was not empower d o mak grants or to 
tak an qui y int res t i n bus iness 1 corporations, In 1966 .h scope 
of t h Fund ' s operati ns was wid ned t o include inv .stme t in the 
quity capital of 'viable s h .ms of dev lopm n ' such as the 
' 
Expor Cr dit Insuranc Corporat ion, and h cross harbour tunnel. 
Loan and inv stment must be approved by t he 
Financ Commit tee, 
gi lative Council ' s 
l 
Th und di d , how v r , und rwri wo shar is u .s o t h local 
t 1 pho company in t h early 1950s, 
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Table 9 . 13 
DEVELOPMENT FUND AND DEVELOPMENT LOAN F D~ ASSETS AND REVENUE 
ACCOUNT , SELECTED YEARS , 1957 TO 1967 
1957a 1960 1963 1967 
$ million 
~ss eta 
Reclamation at cost 3 7 8 17b 
Loans : 
Rous ng 44 138 289 434 
Education 18 25 so 
Medical 6 5 4 
Fish r i e s 2 4 
Other 1 2 26 
To tal loans 45 163 322 528 
Inve stments: 
Hong ong 1 1 0 0 
Ste rling 10 0 0 1 
Advan e s 0 3 
To al assets 137 227 358 579 
R venue Acc ountc 
Int rest on loans 1 4 10 20 
Bank int re.st 3 2 1 2 
Tr ans ers from Trading 
Rs r vE. Fund, etc . 13 
Appropr ia i on from 
g n r 1 r ev nue 0 5 
r om Ex hang 
To a l ue 4 24 1 22 
o t e : not add b ca use of r ounding. 
a = 31 March ea h y a r. 
b Premia ou tstanding from sale of land . 
C ar nding 31 March each year. 
d = A tran f r or $150 million was made in 1965. 
Source: Acc oun tant-Gen ral, Annual Repor t, various numbers. 
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Pos -War Deve l opments in th Public Finance Syst m 
It is perhaps s urprising to see how little t h sys m of 
public financ has chang dover the post-war period, oth r t han 
simply in terms of the volume of r evenue and expenditure, wh ich has 
incr as d greatly. 
The £act tha t revenue has increased more rapidly t han h 
national income while tax rates have remain d fairly st a dy suggests 
that the tax-system is income-elastic . It is this characteristic 
of t he tax system which perhaps explains why t here has be n little 
ne d o al er the revenue syst m despite t he growth of public 
spending. Had there been the dependence on income - inelastic trade 
taxes that is a f ature of many developing countries, it would have 
been more necessary to change the level or system of taxes (or the 
relianc on borrowing) as Government expenditure increased. 
Possibly, too, the tax system is now better administe r d. 
Businesses and salary earners are more familiar with t he r egulations 
gov ruing direct tax; the population is a more settled one; and the 
D partm nt of Inland Revenu seems better placed to limit tax 
avoidanc and evasion: a tax payments investigation section has been 
stablish d, and the Department has built up its holdings of marginal 
tax f iles. On the other hand, the absence of a system of f ull 
income tax, the preva lence of unincorporated businesses and 
par n rships and the fact that many businesses do not maintain 
audited accounts, probably mean that there is still considerable 
tax avoidanc . 1 It is believed too, that a number of transfers of 
property ar signed in Macao to avoid stamp duty. 
Th distribution of Government expe.nditure over the post -war 
period was set out in Tabl 9,5, Much of the change in t h pattern 
of expenditure evident in the Tabl is due oar duction in 
e p ndi .ur on Government tors (includ din 'other e p nditure' in 
th Table) after th restocking of the arl post -war 
1 
S , or xampl , Financial Sec 
1961, p. 6, 
ars . 0th r 
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t han incr e ses in t he propor tion of xp nditure allocat d to public 
works (i .e . , Government investment in i nfra structur and housing) 
and of spending on e ducation , t h re has be n lit 1 a lteratio to the 
pattern of Gove rnment expenditure , despi t th .conomic and demographic 
changes which have tak n place over t he pas t two d cad s . 
Th Publ i c Finance System: An Evalua tion 
(i) If it does not appear that industrialisation and population 
growth hav result din any fundamental change in he Co lony ' s 
system of public finance, what, then , of th opposite qu stion : 
had the public f inance system contributed t o he Colony ' s successfu l 
indus ria l i a ion and , there for e, to its ability t o mploy th 
incr a sed population? Certainly, there hav been a numb r of 
f avourabl cons equences of the public finance system . 
In t he firs t place , the fact that t he Governmen t ' s financial 
operations have not caused inflation or balanc of payments 
problems has been favourable to industrial growth . Of course , a 
government does not necessarily preclude t he possibil i t y of 
inflation simply because it fol lows conservative f inancial principles: 
1 price rises might occur t hrough bank credit creation, bottl necks, 
or, what is especially relevant, more expensive i mports . As we saw 
in Chapter 3, the freedom from balance of paymen ts probl ·ms has been 
of be n ~fit to industry ( for ign capital has been attracted and 
there ha s been no restriction on raw materia l import s ), to entrepot 
trade and to the Colony ' s flourishing tourist industry. 
Th, l ow tax burden must have b en favour able t o industrial 
development in several ways. Economic initiat i ve coul d have be n 
litt l e discoura ged by taxes ; businesses have be n able to reinvest 
a larg . part of th ir earnings (and retained prof i ts appear t o have 
been the major sourc of f unds for investment in industry), and the 
1 
Though, with the 100 per cent foreign e change reserve against 
the curr ncy iss ue , thi.s is r elatively unlikely, 
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l ow axe s have pr oba l y h l ped compensa e f or t b poli tical risk. 
Cert in l y, t he low taxe s have con trib ut d to t h. quick t u ov r of 
capi a l which is a feature of inve s m nt i . ·h Co l o y. -~.e v ry 
light ta burd n and t he lack of Gover nm n t int .r f renc in 
business activiti s almos t cer tainly hav p rmit t:d ·~ong Kong t o 
make b s u e of t he factor most important to i ts cono i c 
d ve l opm nt - ent ~pren urship . 
It i s unl i kely t hat an increase in inve s men t incentives ov r 
the pre s nt leve l or t he introduction of ta holidays or subsidi s, 
would s ignificantly a ffe ct the ra e of investment in industry . Tax 
paym nt s ar o e of many factors which a feet inves m nt decisions; 
businesses must also consider the availab ility of markets, the supply 
and productivity of labour, the availabil ity of capital and 
political factors. So long as tax ra tes are l ow, fur t her 
concessions wou ld be of little value. The nee ds o t he entrepot 
trad and tourism, and t he f act tha t in most produc ts present output 
grea t l y exceeds t he r equirements of t he home market , r u le out t he 
possibi li ty of tariff protection for l ocal manufactured goods . 
The economy has als o bene f it d f rom t he large Governmen t 
invest .. ent in infrastructure and low cost housing . he fina c i ng of 
this i. ve s tm n t mo s tly f rom current r evenue s urpl use s seems not 
inappropr ia g i ven t he underdeveloped capital ma rke t a nd t he 
shortage of long term funds , 
But the Government ' s approach to public finance has not been 
free from. criticism. With in Hong Kong , opposition has een voiced 
partic ularly to t he limite d government spending on educa tion, 1 heal t h 
and social wel fare. That Government spending in h e f i e lds has 
.,; 
:, 
been increased was seen in Table 9,4. The critic i sm is t hat 
penditur ha s been insuffici nt to mee · t .. demands o he Colony's 
l 
li'o example, i is claimed that h s all s ending on ducation, 
.spec i a lly echnical e ducation, has contri u .d o t es .ortage of 
skilled l abour wh i is now re tricting s om line of i dus rial 
p n i on . 
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l arg r, mor. se tled and more prospe rous popula i on. ~h vi w has 
been stro gly put by L. F. Goodstadt : 
has t he time no · come o use our ina _c ia l s r eng h 
o meet h legi i ma e a sp ira tions of he comm.uni y 
at larg . Surly t h r e is some t h i ng un e~ l y i n t c 
Gov r nor ' s promis e t hat not befor e 19 71 , will t h 
b a subsidise d primary schoo l place .or ~very ch i ld 
b twe n 6 and 12 years of ag . Can her be any do· bt, 
too , t ha t our medical s ervice s are t oo t h inly s pr a d 
and far too expensiv o s rve adequately t he ne .ds of 
t h population? . . . With official r e cogni t i on of t h 
f a t ha he probl mo slums cannot b ignored much 
l ong rand t hat a solution must be found to overcrowding 
in public housing - to say nothing of t he squa tter 
colon i e s that cont i.ne to mar t he fac of Hong Kong -
surly curr nt sp nding on housing canno be c ons id r ed 
suff ici nt. And how much human misery is condoned by 
our f ailur to increas e t he f unds sp n on s ocia l 
1 
welfare f rom t h pre sent, beggarly , 1 . 1% of he budge t. 
And, it is sa i d t hat the Government is esp cially unwilling t o 
undertake new spending of a recurrent nature: 
Generous in capital expenditure our Governmen t i s 
parsimonious in the extreme when any programme i s 
propos e d wh ich involves recurrent sp nd ing.2 
(ii) The earlier discussion mentioned t hat t he Government has 
no t sough t to use budget balances as a means of stabilising t he 
e conomy. The question must now be asked whether t here is a need 
for a counter -cyclical policy, and, if so , what con r ibution migh t 
be expec t ed of fiscal measures. 
A f i.r st point is t hat short term fluctua t i ons have been much 
less sevet·e than in most developing countrie s, esp cially t hose 
whose prosperity is dep ndent on one or two agric ul ural 
commodities. But there have been periods of slump - such as in 
1950/51 and in the r eal estate sector in 1965/66 - and of rela tive 
boom , as , f or xample, in th period 1959 1964, 
In an .conomy such as Hong Kong's t her ha .en little n ed 
f or a s abilisation polic during th r n p . i ods of pansionary 
l 
1967, Se, , too, sp ech s b Uno f icial rn mb rs of 
ive Council, quo · din ....Qli!:, 14 and 15 March 1968, 
Nov mb r 1964, 
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onomi c condit ion . Wi.t r. h h igh margina l pr ,">pe sit... u i por t and 
t h conv~r ib l currency , i e r as .s i n d snd have quickl spil 
ovbr s ea , But h i t e r na l e f cts of bo m condi i o Il!.8.y w 11 
becom , a problem. as t he domestic sector gr ;;, in i mpor tanc 
Anot h r per iod of very rapid building co_s r uc t ion c ou ld , for 
exampl , bring ab out an pansi.on of demand and a genera l inc r eas 
i n wage r a e s wh i h are out of line wi h t he Co l o y 1s tra d arn ings 
and t he co p titive posi tion of its export industries. A reaction 
o his type of boom c ould then r sul t in reso urc s bing 1 f 
idle o a greater s cale than has previously been experi need . It 
fo llows that t here may in the f ut ur e be more need fo r a 
stab i lisation po licy t han has yet arisen. The Gov rnme cou ld move 
to dampen such a period of excessively rapid growth by r unning a 
1 budge t surpl us and transfe rring this surplus out o f t he Co l ony , or 
more , s imp ly , by moving r e s erves f r om t he :~ong Kong a nks to 
L 2 don . 
h re is a mor e apparent need for a s tabilisation policy at 
t he t i me of a sl ump in income and employment. eca u e of t he 
limi at ions on the operat i on of monetary po licy ( s ee Chapter 11) 
probab l y t he greater emphasis wou ld n . d t o be plac don fis cal 
m ,a ur s : a n .xc ss of Gove rnment sp nding over r eve nue . ut, as 
we have se n , the 100 per cen t c urrency eans t hat the 
Government has only a limited ab i l ity t o run a budget d .fic i t . It 
mus t finance any excess of spe nding from r e ser ve s , new p blic l oan 
is s ue s or f oreign l oans and grants: t h onetar y sy s e impos es a 
constr a i nt on Hong Kong publi.c £ inane not f lt by governments in 
independ~nt mon tary systems . 
1 
I mus t be. r emember .d that th multipli. r e ects o · a Gov rnment 
s urplus on t ht:. l eve l of domes t ic income s wo ld. be qui · sma. 11 ; a 
l a.rger Gove rnm n t s urpl us would b . necessary to r in ab out a given 
decrease i i ncomes in Hong Kong t han i.n an conomy wh re f reign 
trade is of less importance . 
2 
The l atter move mi gh t more appr opriat 1 b 
of mon tary po licy. Th lik ly ff i acy of 
di c ussed in Cha.p t .r 11 , 
consid. r d a eas ure 
o tary co o ls is 
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Even wer t here to b a 1 ss than 100 p .. r c n ore ign change 
baking t o t h c urrency issu however, there wou l d stil l b a 
stri c lim. i to he e tent to which the Gov rm!l.en cou ld r sort to 
infla t i onar y so r e s o f inance - at 1 ast s o l ong as a f ully 
conver ibl c ur ncy is d sired. With t h J::.ig" . mar gina l propen ity 
o i mport, a large part of any increas i.n dema .d wi.L l pi ll 
overseas . The Government could not run ad f icit financ d by 
borrowing against new money creation for long wi hout causing 
balance of payments difficulties . External imbalanc would not 
aris w r e there unemployment of a Keynesian t ype in t h economy. 
As was men ioned in Chapt r 7, it is to th extent hat t he s t erling 
exchange urrency standard prevents the Governm _t r e sorting to 
inflationary finance even in this case, that t he f inanc i al 
arrang ments are an independent constraint on t he i mplem ntation 
of a stabilisat i on policy. 
(iii) B cause some sources of income are no t subj ect t o tax, 
t he tax sys em can be criticised on the grounds t hat t h tax burden 
is no t dis ributed according to ability t o pay . A f ull income tax, 
including he taxing of dividends, and the r eten i on of estate duty 
( t o give some , if belated , taxation of capital ·gains ) migh t seem 
desirable on equity grounds. But the low rates o tax have made 
equity considerations relatively unimportan t , and he present tax 
sys t m has not imposed a heavy tax burden on t hose wi h low incomes . 
The discussion in this Chapter has s hown t hat the Colony's 
system of public finance is still conducted on ver conservative 
lines, owing mor to Gladstonian than to ·eynesian prin iples . 
This public financ system has been favourabl tote Colony's 
economic development in several ways (giv n he supply of 
ntrepren urship in he priva e sector, t h r la iv ab nee of 
short t rm onornic f luctuations and the foreign r ad dominated 
economy). 
One cannot bu t str ss in conclusion t h enormous streng h of 
·. e Hong ong public finances. At v ry low rates of tax and with 
25 0 
virtually no borrowing, the Government has financed a rapid incr as e 
in r c urrent exp nditure, a h igh leve l of pu l i e capi a l f orma ion, 
a nd th . acc umu la t i on of sizeable reserve s . 
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Chapte r 10 
OTHER SOURCES OF FINANCE 
Ther e are thr ee other sources of funds for capital f orw~ tion 
to which attention must be d i r e c ted - capital inflow, retained 
earnings and t he unorg~nised market. Unfortunately, or lack of 
precis e information, the discussion of thes e sources must be of a 
very genera l nature. The most serious deficiency i s that no 
ba lance of payments statistics are coll ec ted. Of course, d tailed 
information on the unorganised market and retained earnings as 
sources of inve s tment funds is available in very f ew countries. An 
add it ional difficulty in Hong Kong i s that only a small number of 
businesses are organised as public companie s (thus little 
information can be got from company balance sheets). 
Cap ital Inflow 
Capital inflow has been of fundamental importance in the 
r ecent e conomic development. The establishment of th modern 
cotton spinning industry in the period 1948 to 1950, the real estate 
boom of the 1950s and the rapid expans ion of he banking system 
throughout the post -war period haye all been heavily dep endent on 
for ign f unds. 
Some idea of the extent of t he net capita l inf low can be 
ga t he red from the Colony's trade statistics, even though these 
show only visible trade. Statistics on external trade and movements 
in the i dentifiable fore ign reserves are set out in Table 10 . 1 
Despite the very large adverse balance of trade deficit (Row 5) 
ther has been in every year but one since 1955 an increase in the 
Colony' s identifiable foreign exchange reserves (Row 6). From t hi s 
we can ca lcula te the apparent net surplus on the invis i ble and 
capita l accounts, wh ich has grown from $1,270 mi llion in 1955 to 
$3,26 0 mi ll ion i n 1966 , But there is no way of divid ing t h is 
statistical series be twe en net capital inflow and net earnings from 
1) Exports f . o. b , 
2) Re -exports f.o.b. 
3) Total expor ts 
) Imports c . i •. f . 
5) Balance of trade 
6) Net change in 
identifiable foreign 
reserves 
) Apparent balance on 
invisible and capital 
accoun t 
Sources: Rows 1) to 5) : 
Row 6): 
Tab l e 10.1 
BALANCE OF TRADE AND NET CHANGES I~ IDENTIFIABLE FOREIGN RESERVES, 1955 TO 1966 
1955 1956 195 7 19 58 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
$ million 
1,003 1,115 1,202 1, 26 0 2,282 2,867 2 , 939 3,317 3,831 4,428 
1,531 2,095 1,864 1, 728 995 1,070 991 1,070 1,160 1,513 
2,534 3 ,210 3 , 016 2, 989 3, 277 3 , 938 3,930 4,387 4,991 5,941 
3 , 719 4,566 5,149 4, 594 4,949 5,864 5,9 70 6,657 7,413 8,707 
-1,185 - 1,356 -2 , 133 -1,605 -1,672 -1 , 926 -2, 040 -2 , 2 70 -2,422 -2,766 
\. 
85 - 10 50 195 171 - 220 6 447 325 942 
1,2 70 1 ,346 2,183 1 ,800 1,843 2, 146 2 ,046 2 ,7 17 2 , 747 0; 153 
Eong Kong Trade Statistics, various nurrbers. 
Table 3.4 . 
1965 
5,027 
1 ,802 
6,829 
9,2 74 
-2 , 445 
J 
1966 
5,730 
2,126 
7 ,856 
10,382 
-2, 526 
734 
3, 260 
N 
V, 
N 
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inv isibles. The latter item includes earnings from banking, 
f ina ncial and commercial services and tourism, and remit tance s from 
overs eas Chinese. It seems unreasonable to assume, as does one 
1 
a u thor, that virtually the wh ole of the balance of paymen ts 
deficit is cove red by foreign investment ( in wh ich is included, 
presumably, r emittances from overseas Chinese), for an entrepo t 
such as Hong Kong would receive a considerable income from a range 
of invisible services.
2 
One must also consider - as does Table 
10.1 - c hanges in the level of foreign reserves. Still, it seems 
tha t a large part o f t he favourable balance of invisible and 
capital accounts is due to net capital inflow, as the following 
discussion shows. In the absence of statistics, one can only 
discuss in a general way the several changes in the post -war capital 
inflow and repeat the few rather adventurous estimates which have 
been made of the possible magnitude of these flows. 
(a) Early post -war 'hot money'. The e conomic and political 
chang e s on the Chinese mainland in the early post-war year s gave 
ris e to a very large inflow of 'hot money' into Hong Kong, 
e sp e cially f rom Shanghai. 3 Once transferred to t he Colony, t he 
fund s were mos tly he ld in liquid form - in c ur r ency or deposits -
or used for spe culative purposes - the purchase of gold, foreign 
exchange a nd commodities. Investors remained in a position to move 
the ir fund s to other financial centre s at shor t notice. There was 
s ome criticism in the Colony's financial circles of t h is 
a ccumulation of highly liquid funds : 
1 
Henry Smith 'John Stuart Mil l's Other Island', Hoba rt Papers, 
I nstitute o f Economic Affairs, 1966, pp.19-21. 
2 
Thi s was poin ed out in a revie w o f Smith's paper. See L . F . 
Goods a dt, FEER, 27 October 1966, p.238. 
3 
Th funds were transferr e d in a variety of ways, incl uding in t he 
fo r m of p r e cious metals and currency nots, and t hroug h the Hong 
Kong - Bri t i sh and native - ba nks . In many cases funds were 
transfer r e d from deposits in the Uni t e d State s. 
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The Shanghai psychology which by now has be com an inveterate 
characteristic to make money by manipulation and specula tion 
rather than producing is preventing serious and long r ange 
investment and planning.l 
Th inflow of hot money from China reached its peak i n 1949. It has 
been estimated that from 1947 to 1949 this capita l inflow totalled 
about $2,000 million, 2 while the inflow in the one y ar 1949 - 50 has 
been valued at around $1,000 million. 3 The capital transfers were 
often associated with, or followed by, immigration, and soon , of 
course, the funds lost their identity as 'foreign capital'. 
It appears that the larger part of this refugee capital was 
held in liquid form until the early 1950s, when investment in real 
4 
estate became more common. 
(b) Early post-war foreign investment in textiles. Of more 
significance in the longer run was the inflow of capital into 
cotton spinning. Between 1947 and the end of 1950, Shanghai 
industrialists invested about $140 million in establishing the 
C 1 I f' • • '11 5 o ony s · irst cotton spinning mi s . Equipment was of the most 
modern de sign. There was, in many cases, an associat d migration of 
experienced managers and technicians. As was seen in Chapter 1, 
the cotton spinning industry expanded rapidly and formed the basis 
of the Colony's post-war industrial growth. 
(c) Capital inflow from the overseas Chinese. Throughout the 
post-war period there has been a significant inflow of capital from 
overseas Chinese, incLuding those living in the United States. There 
1 
2 
FEER, 12 November 1947, p.576. 
Wong Po Shang, The Influx of Chinese Capital into Hong Kong since 
1937, paper read at the Contemporary China Seminar, University of 
Hong Kong, 1958, p.5. 
3 
T.C. Lee, 'The Economy of Hong Kong Since World War II', in E. 
Szcepanik (ed.), Symposium on Economic and Social Problems in the 
Far East, Hong Kong University Press, 1962, p.176. 
4 
Wong Po Shang, op. cit., p.6. 
5 
This estimate is based on FEER, 7 April 1948, p.336. 
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is no way of estimating the extent of these r emi ttances. In any case, 
it is d iff icult to distinguish between remittances s nt to assist 
relatives and transfers made for investment purposes. Moreov r a 
par t of the remittances - thought now to be fairly sma11 1 - is sent 
on to China. In the late 1950s a consider able part of t he capital 
inflow from t he overseas Chinese was invested d irectly in real 
estate - and in 1960 and 196 1 on the share market - but the greater 
proportion seems now to be left on depos it with banks. Small 
amounts have been invested directly in manufactur ing. Of course, a 
part of the remittances is sent for switch transactions, being 
t rans ferred through the Colony's free currency markets to 
Switzerland and North America. 
It has been estimated that in the mid-1950s remittance s from 
the overseas Chinese were worth some $700 million per annum, of 
which approxima tely $500 million per annum was r etained in the 
2 Colony . Possibly the fl ow increased to $1,000 million a year by 
the early 1960s, 3 but the slight recession in the real estate marke t 
after 196 5 and the outbreak of Red Guard activities in China are 
believed to have reduced the flow of remittances to around $500 
mil lion in 1966. 4 rolitical disturbances in South East Asia and 
restrictions on the commercial activities of the overseas Chinese 
have usually meant temporary increases in the level of these 
trans fers . 
The f unds are transferred in a variety of ways. Remittances 
and loans by Chinese Americans can be made free ly through t he 
commercia l banks, and it is also through these institutions that 
1 
It is commonly estimated that only about one-fifth of remittances 
is now sent on to China. 
2 
Wong Po Shang, op. cit . , pp. 9 -10. The source o f t he $700 million 
was e stima t d to be : Americas $500 million; South East Asia $150 
million, and other countries $50 million . 
3 
4 
SCMP, 30 July 1964. 
I bid., 8 April 1967. 
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much of the inflow of capital from Malaysia and Singapore is arranged . 
A large part of transfers from the United Kingdom is made through 
Post Office money orders. Considerable ingenuity is believed to be 
used in remittances from a number of South East Asian countries. 1 
Significant transfers are probably arranged through false invoicing 
of exports and imports. Often the transactions are arranged by 
Chinese currency dealers through elaborate family networks. A 
cousin in Rangoon, say, will take delivery of a large sum of 
Burmese kyats from a local client whose account in Hong Kong will 
be credited with the equivalent in Hong Kong dollars. In some 
cases, currency is physically transported, for sale on the Hong 
Kong exchange markets. Transfers are also effected through the sale 
in Hong Kong of airline tickets purchased elsewhere. And there is 
a range of other methods. 
(d) Capital inflow from the developed countries. There has 
been some inflow of capital from the developed countries over 
almost all the post-war period. Initially, this investment often 
took the form of transfers from China of the Far East operations of 
European and American commercial enterprises. There was also from 
an early stage a small amount of investment in oil storage, soft 
drink manufacture, textiles, 2 the production of torches, etc. But 
it was towards the end of the 1950s that the capital inflow from 
the developed countries - for the most part the United States and 
Japan - first became significant. Much of this foreign investment 
was initially centred on the production of textiles. Japanese 
textile firms invested in Hong Kong to avoid the quota limits which 
had been imposed on exports to the United States from their home 
plants. The several American companies sought a regular supply of 
1 
The remainder of this paragraph follows closely information given 
in SCMP, 23 March 1966 . 
2 
For example, Mandarin Textiles was set up by United State s 
interests in 1950. 
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t extil s of specified quality fo r t he ir U.S. market ·ng n tworks . It 
was capital fr om deve loped countrie s which l argely p ione~r d (from 
about 1962) the production of transis tor rad ios, and his industry 
is still dominated by foreign companies. 1 The l argest individual 
inve stment f rom a source in a developed country appears t o b the 
$220 mi llion (US$40 million) in electricity gener ation by t he Es so 
gr oup, announce d in 1964 . There has als·o been America n and 
Japanese investment in export-import firms, steel r olling, toy 
production, hotels and department s t ores. Often the foreign 
investment ha s been made in joint enterprises, with local sources 
providing abo ut half the risk capital. The Government has 
pub licis ed the advantages of such jo int ventures both for t he Colony 
and for the foreign investors, 2 and several trade missions have 
attempted to f oster foreign interest in j oint undertakings. 3 
The capital inflow from t he developed countries has benefited 
the Colony in several ways. The most important are t h new 
techniques and goods introduced, 4 the relatively high standard of 
manag ment and quali ty control, and, in several cases, acce ss to 
e stabl i s hed marketing networks in the United State s. The a ctual 
capita l gaine d has been much less important. The total inve stment 
of the United States companies was estima ted at US$15 mi llion in 
1 
Among the largest manufacturers of radios in Hong Kong are Semi 
Conductor Ltd, a subsidiary of the U.S. Fairchild Camera and 
Industry Corporation, and Oak Electrics, also a subsidiary of a 
large Uni ted States concern. 
2 
3 
See Join t Venture Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government Printer, 1966. 
See FEER, 8 October 1964, p.113. At one stage the Hongkong Bank 
was r eported to have 'taken the initiative in bringing selected 
British manufacturing firms into contact with Hong Kong int rests 
with the object of setting up joint manufacturing enterprises in t he 
Colony' . FEER, 3 October 1963, p.4. 
4 
Th us the Chairman of the Hongkong Bank observe d in 1962 'A 
relative l y recent factor in the evolution of our economy has been 
the collaberation between Chinese industr ia lists and t hos of 
other countries in setting up new factories her . There is a 
need for new techniques and "know how" rather than inv s t ment of 
apita l, of whi h there is no shortage.' 
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1959, 
1 
and US$100 million in 1967. 2 The total investment in Japanes e 
companies i n Hong Kong did not exceed $50 mill ion a. t t he end of 1966 . 3 
No special concessions or incentives have be n giv n to f oreign 
investors . As an American commentator has po inted out: 
Hong Kong does not have a foreign investment law and doe s 
not need one. It gives ~oreign capital no privilege s and 
no special status, but throws no roadblocks in i ts way 
either. The money come s i n because the cond itions are 
attractive . 4 
Among these favourable conditions are the relatively cheap labour 
f orce (which is experienced in manufacturing activities), low taxes 
and a minimum of Government controls, excellent shipping and other 
commercial services, and, most important, a fully conver tible 
currency. Of course, as is the case with local investment , most 
foreign funds look fo r a relatively quick return - t he main 
exception appears to have been the Esso group's investm nt in 
electricity generation but there is no evidence t hat , in general 
foreign investors seek a more rapid turnover of f unds than local 
investors. 
The aggregate 'foreign' investment in Hong Kong would be 
considerably larger were we to treat as 'foreign ' concerns the 
5 several sizeable British merchant houses which operate in the Colony. 
But these institutions, which have invested cons iderable amounts in 
Hong Kong, mostly from retained earnings, have long b en associated 
with the Colony, and commonly consider themselves as local firms. 
(e) Off icial loans and grants . Hong Kong has received 
relativ ly small sums by way of loans from governm nt and 
international agencies . An interest-free loan of $48 mil lion was 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
FEER, 
SCMP, 
~' 
FEER, 
20 August 1959, p,2 67 . 
28 March 1967 1 citing U. S. News and World Report. 
11 May 196 7 . 
14 June 1962, p ,573 . 
The activities of these houses were described in Chapter 8 . 
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received from the United Kingdom Government in t he late 1950s to 
f i nance airport construction. Small sums have been r e ce ived from 
t he Commonwealth Development Corporation to finance a variety of 
scheme s, including fishing boat mechanisation and university 
housing. The Corporation subscribed $16 mill ion to the capita l o f 
t he Hong Kong Building and Loan Agency. An approach to the World 
Bank for a loan to finance a reclamation or water storage scheme in 
1962 was unsuccessful. The World Bank decided that Hong Kong was 
not, at that stage, suffic iently in need of cred it. A mission from 
the World Bank visited the Colony again in late 1966, and a 
representative visited Hong Kong in March 1968 . The Colony has not 
received loans from other international agencies. Be ing a dependent 
territory, Hong Kong is not a member of the International Monetary 
Fund. 
Foreign government and private agency spending and grants have 
been more important. The United Kingdom Governmen t ha s spent around 
£5. mi llion to £6 million per annum on the Colony's defence, of which 
perhaps one third is paid out locally. A range of national and 
international charity and missionary organisations have provided 
funds for education, health and relief services. One estimate in 
1962 put the annual Hong Kong expenditure of private United States 
bodies alone at around US$6 million. 1 Since 1959 t he Government has 
received about $10 . 5 million from World Refugee Year sources. 
Clearly, the form of the capital inflow has changed appreciably 
over the post-war period, from the frantic influx of hot money in 
the late 1940s to the more regular inflow of funds from the overseas 
Chinese, and a smaller capital import from developed countries. Of 
course, through the whole period foreign investors have favoured 
outlets of a relatively liquid and short term nature . 
On several occasions concern has been expressed that the capital 
inf low was excessive. On the one hand, the capital movement was 
seen as adding to inflationary pressures: 
1 
FEER, 25 January 1962, p.125. 
There has b en a ph nom nal ris e in l ocal share a nd 
land values and i is doubtful whether h peak has 
been yet reached. Much of t he demand s eems to have 
come from overseas funds see k ing investment ... s o 
much o the p os -war developm nt in Hong Kong has 
been due to an influx of capi tal f r om abroad that 
one would no t l ik t o discourage the f low, but I think 
that here is 1 · tle doubt t ha t th present volume is 
unhealthy.l 
There have been ears , too , that a sudden inflow of capital 
might t ake place: 
Indeed my concern r cent l y ha s been rather that t he 
net infl ow has been excessive ; already a very high 
proport ion of our bank deposits belong to non-
residen ts and t hi s could be a potentially unstable 
factor in our economy if we were to do anything t o 
upset confidence. 2 
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Despite these apprehensions, it is apparent t hat capital inf l ow 
ha s played an overwhe lmingly important role in the Colony's economic 
transformation and rapid e conomic development. 
Even less is known ab out capita l outflow . Throughou t t he p s t-
war per iod considerable sums have lef t Hong Kong for deposit in 
banks in North America, Switzerland and t he United ingdom, main ly 
a s a hedge against the political risk. Of course , part of these 
funds was earlier transferred to Hong Kong from coun t ries in Sou th 
East As ia for switch operations Foreign brokering house s and 
i nvestment s ervice s operating in Hong Kong have also undertaken a 
large amount of bus iness. 3 These companie s advertise ex t ensive ly i n 
the local press . Hong ong r e sidents have invested in real estate 
in North America, Australia and the West Indies, to d i versify their 
asse t s and , in s ome cases, to aid later migration. Local merchant 
firms have inv sted considerable fund s in a rang of subsidiarie s in 
South East Asia, Australia and elsewhere. A number of l oca l 
manufacturing firms have invested overseas - main ly in t e tiles and 
metal goods - for sev ra l reas ons, main l y, it i s laime d , becaus 
1 
2 
3 
Chairman, ongkong Bank , FEER, 9 March 1961 , p.412 . 
Financial S er e ary , ~ ' 31 Mar h 196 7 , p . 10 . 
See above , p.197. 
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of the availabili y of pioneer ax c o c ssion 1 and cheap land . But 
the imposition o quota re s r i c tion.s on t he xp ort of Hong Kong -
produced goods, and t he po li i cal r isk have possibly been more 
important considerations . During t he 1967 disturbance s Hong Kong 
was a net exporter of capi al. 
Retained Earnings 
One cannot observe t he Hong Kong economy without being left 
with the strong impression t hat t o all business units , from the 
smallest manufacturer or r e tailer to t he giant industrial, 
commercial and utility company - as , indee d, is t he case with the 
Hong Kong Government - r etaine d earnings are t he main source of 
funds for capital formation. The observation of t he Economist 
Intelligence Uni on industrial enterprise s applies also to other 
sectors of the economy: 
In almost every case of which we have personal knowledge, 
the funds for investment in an industrial enterprise came 
initially from the pockets of private individuals (including, 
of course, immigrants from t he mainland and overseas Chinese) 
or , what usua lly amounts in practice to t he same t h ing, from 
locally owned private companies . Ther e are some notable 
exceptions in large-scale industries, bu t they are few and 
far between. Once launched, most firms rely principally on 
their own pro f its f or long - t e rm capital and on the banks, 
on private lending or again on the ir own profits for short-
term finance. The degree o f self f inancing in Hong Kong 
industry is indeed abnormally h igh ; a number of substantial 
firms rely exclusively on their own r e sources. 
There ares veral r eas ons f or t h is heavy reliance on internal 
finance. The political unc rtainty has discouraged the development 
of the longer end of the capital market, f orcing even the larger 
f i r ms to rely more heavily on r e tained earnings t han is the case 
elsewhere ; for companies, as for the Government, the supply of long 
term funds is very limited. Many f i rms too , are unwilling to make 
available the financial in f ormation on their operations and capital 
required for outside borrowing and publ ic share issues. And, the 
1 
2 
See, The Banker, January 1965, p . 57 , and CMP , 7 S ptember 1966 . 
Op . cit . , p . 16 . 
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very f act that much of Hog ong commerce and industry consist s of 
f amily -owned businesses and no t public companie s means that a high 
proportion o f pr f its can be r tained for re-inve stment. Some 
sizeable, progressiv businesse s have, f or s ome years , us ed all 
t heir profits to finance . 1 xpans ion . It is most un l ike ly that the 
shareholders of a pub l ic ompany would favour t he same policy . 
Tabl 9, 7 gave some i dea of t he trend in business profi ts over 
recen years, and s howed a rapid rate of increase in t he aggregate 
level of profits. Thus, the scope for investment financed from 
retained earnings has grown quickly . The l ow rate of taxes on 
profits has permitted t he r e -investment of a significant portion of 
gross profits. 
A perhaps unusual bu most important aspec t of business saving 
in Hong Kong has been t he tendency for business profit s earned in 
one field to be retained and re-inve sted in another fiel d. Funds 
ear ne d i n trade during the Korean War boom were spent on property 
development, and in turn, he prof its of real estate operations were 
inve sted in the establishment of manufacturing businesses . Probably 
the main reason for t h is mobil ity lies i n t he dominant position of 
the hinese family -firm . Often these busines s es operate in a number 
o f fields at the one time and are quick to direct arn ings to 
investment in t he currently most . profitab l e l ines. The sma ll size 
of t he olony, the limited amount of capita l needed to commence 
oper ations in most sectors of t he economy and , in the case of 
manufacturing activities, t he availability of estab lishe d marketing 
f acilities t hrough he ag ncy hous e s , have a lso contributed to the 
mobility of f unds . 
1 
For exampl , it has been r eported t hat t h owner /manager of China 
Cold Storage and Engine ring (wh ich 'cat rs for a t h ird of the l oca l 
r oom coo l er marke, njoys a t hriving e por t business and ha s a 
much -va l u d contract to mak Westinghous e air-conditioners under 
licence ' ) 'ploughs back all of h i na Co ld Storage's profi ts into 
the business, living p r s onal l y from hi s other f amily income.' 
Dick Wilson, op . ci t . , p . 22 . 
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The Unorganised Market 
In the unorganised market secured and unsecured loans are made 
by money lenders, private loan businesses, merchants, landlords, and 
a variety of other sources, including relatives. Such markets 
exist, of course, in both developed and underdeveloped countries . 
But they are usually thought to be of greater importance in the 
underdeveloped countries, and especially those with large rural 
sectors . 
The Industrial Bank Committee observed that privately-supplied 
finance 
may take the form either of direct risk investment or of 
loans against security, or even against no security . The 
former is most often on a friendly basis. For the latter 
there is no formally organised market, but a market of 
sorts operates, equipped with brokers, etc. The most 
normal security is a mortgage on land; plant and 
machinery may also be used as security, the loan often 
being in the form of a debenture. The sources of such 
funds are profits of business, including the very rapid 
redemption of capital invested, personal savings and 
proceeds of sale of land (particularly against imported 
capital). The appreciation of real estate and stock 
exchange values has played a large part in the mobilisation 
of capital in post-war Hong Kong. It is not possible even 
to attempt an estimate of the amount of money so invested.l 
The main borrowers on the unorganised market over most of the 
post-war period have been the real estate developers. The high 
profits available in this sector and the security of real estate 
developments gave these borrowers the advantage in the unorganised 
market. The numerous small manufacturing businesses have also been 
important borrowers. Many of these businesses are thought to have 
used their limited capital resources to acquire some meagre capital 
equipment, and, lacking adequate security, 'name', or a confirmed 
order against which to borrow even from the liberal Hong Kong banks, 
are forced to turn to the private money lenders for their working 
capital. 
Recourse to the unorganised market is also made for loans for 
personal, non-productive purposes, including expenses connected 
with weddings and funerals. Mrs Topley has suggested that in such 
cases smaller sums are arranged person to person , while larger 
1 
Industrial Bank Committee, Report, op. cit., p,227. 
1 
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amounts are borrowed fr om l andlords, money lenders, etc . She , refers 
to a 1957 survey o ami lies i n a r e s ttlement estate, wh ich found 
t hat 22 pr cent o adults wer in deb t o r e lat i ves , f riends or 
1 
clan. 
Borrowing from the unorgan ised market is mostly on a short 
term basis and even l oan for productive purposes are rarely for 
more than one year. Despite t he prevailing price stability, 
interes rates range to very h igh l eve ls (30 - 40 per cent). In 
late 1966 press reports suggest d that se cured l oans for productive 
purposes were being granted for t hree years at a non -reducing 20 
per cent per annum and an initial s ervice char ge of twelve per cent. 
Majorie Topley, 'Hong Kong', in R. D. Lambert and B. F . Hoselitz, 
Th Role of Saving and Wealth in Southern Asia, and the West, 
Paris : UNESCO, 1966, pp.136, 162. 
Chapter 11 
THE NEED FOR A CENTRAL BANK 
Hong Kong's continuing colonial status is no doubt one reason 
why it is probably the only important economy in the world which 
does not have a central bank. No central banks were set up in the 
British Colonial Empire in the 1920s, when such institutions we re 
established in a number of underdeveloped countries mainly to assist 
1 the working of the international gold standard; the existence in 
the British Colonies of the sterling exchange standard or - as in 
Hong Kong - of currency systems based on precious metals made the 
establishment of such regulatory institutions seem unnecessary. 
Another large group of central banks has been formed in underdeveloped 
countr ies since the second world war, in large part, it is said, as 
2 
'an expression of monetary independence by new states'. Most of 
these recently established central banks were set up about the time 
of their country's independence to implement the monetary controls, 
and assist the economic development programs, of the newly indepen-
dent g overnments. 
But this is not a full explanation. There is no reason why a 
central bank cannot be established in a colonial framework, espec 
ially where there is a developed commercial banking system, It is 
not so much that the Government is a colonial one, but rather that 
it is a Government with a laissez-faire approach to its role in the 
economic system, that explains the absence of an official central 
bank . 
1 
See R,S . Sayers, Central Banking After Bagehot, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1957, pp.108-15. 
2 
Gethyn Davies (ed. ) , Central Banking in South and East Asia, Hong 
Kong Univers i ty Press, 1960, p.vii . 
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Of course, the fact that there is no official central bank does 
not mean that Hong Kong has been without all the functions us ually 
d e scribed as 'central banking' ones. It was seen earlier that the 
c urrency issue is the responsibility of the note issuing banks and 
t he Government, while the sterling backing to the banknote issue is 
held in the Exchange Fund and the Hong Kong dollar sterling ex change 
rate can move only within the limits set by agreement between the 
Fund a nd the note issuing banks. The liberal system of exchange 
control is administered by the Government. The Hongkong Bank and 
the Chartered Bank have acted as bankers to the Government. The 
Hongkong Bank performs the functions of the central clearing house. 
On a number of occasions these two British banks have provided 
lender of last resort facilities to other commercial banks. In the 
1965 banking crisis they were assisted in this by transfers from 
the Government's London reserves. Deposits are held by many commer -
cial banks with the Hongkong Bank and the Chartered Bank to provide 
first line cash reserves in Hong Kong. Banking licences are issued 
b y the Governor - in-Council, and banking supervision is administered 
by the Commissioner of Banking. There is no official credit policy, 
but on one or two occasions the largest banks have acted to dis-
courage speculation. The Government is advised on economic matters 
b y its Economic Secretariat. 
Discussion on the Need for Establishing a Central Bank 
Discussion on whether or not a central bank should be estab-
lished seems to have started around the time of the 1961 banking 
1 
risis and the Tomkins Report. The discussion - one can hardly 
call it a debate - is outlined in this section and commented on in 
the following section. 
1 
Th dis nssion was stimulated by the curr ncy r adjus t ment of 
Nov mb e r 1967, during which the commercial banks we re compensated 
f r om the surplus in the Exchang Fund because they had earlier been 
requir d to perform 'central banking' functions. S above, 
Cha pter 3, and more particularly, SCMP, 9 D c mb r 1967 and Sunday 
Post - H rald, 10 Dec mber 1967. 
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The Tomkins Report itsel f s aw n o need for t h estab l ishme n t o f 
c .n t al bank : 
I t has b e n said qui e rig tly that comm rcial ba nking 
a nd c e ntral banking are uneas y bed-fel l ows , bu t t he r e 
s e ems to be no pressing r e ason to s ugg s t t h inau6 u ra -
t ion of a statutory cent r al bank at t h pr sent jun c t u r e , 
a nd t o do s o mi ght i nvolve Hong Ko ng i n unr. c e ssary 
t Xp ns a nd would certainly entail s ub s t a nt i al changes 
i n t pr e s nt banking, c urre n cy a nd fore i gn x change 
f ie l d. 1 
The R port, h owever , qualified i t s elf 
Th is is a que stion .. . which is outside the t e rms of 
r e f e r ence of the present report , and the f o regoing 
comme n ts should not be held to prejudice a ny possib le 
f uture i nqui r y i n to the desirability of setting up a 
cent r al b ank in Hong Ko ng in the light of chang i ng 
c ircums tances.2 
Th e s uggestion t hat a central b ank be s e t up has be en oppos e d 
by the note issuing banks (which have been see n as the 'sharpe st 
c r itics of the central bank idea'); the Gove r nment and by h e Com-
mi s sion r o f Ba nking . The attitude of the Hongkong Bank has been 
4 
outl i ne d s trong ly by a Deputy Chie f Manage r , and is s urmnar i s e d 
below. Th e r e has b een n o cle ar state m nt of t h e Government ' s posi-
tio . Th over nme nt appears to be lieve that t he pre s ent s y s tem of 
commercial b ank control and of providing assistan ce i n t he eve nt of 
a r un on commercial b anks is ad e quate to maint ain a sound banking 
sys tem) tha t there is no ne din Hong Kon g fo r t he monetary controls 
wh ich a r a main responsibility of most ce ntra l banks and that no 
change is ne ce ssary in the method of issuing cu rre ncy. The Commis-
sione r of Banking has argued that the need for ' a c ntralis d form 
of gu idance a nd protection f or the Colony 's banking s y stem [which is] 
e ssent i a l to safeguar d its economic f uture a nd the saving of depo-
sito s ' can be provided, inexpensively , by thee isting facilities 
f or b a nking control and supervision , and does not justif the 
5 
establ ishme n t of an official central bank . 
1 
3 
4 
5 
Ibid ., p .7 . Tomkins Report, p.6 . 
2 
FEER , 18 F bruary 1965, p . 307. 
R . G •• Oliphant , FEER , 22 April 1965, pp.175 - 9. 
SCMP 12 Jun 1965. A littl e arlier, SCMP , 31 March 1965 , the 
Commission r of Banking was quot d as considering a c e ntral bank 
t o 'xp nsive' and 'unn c ssary'. 
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A number of the smal l er commercial banks a nd s eve ra l acad mic 
economi ts hav supported the s ett ing up of a c ntral b a nk . main ly 
o n t he grounds that s u ch an i n stitution woulds rengt en t e whole 
b nking system th rough its prov ision of lender of las t resor t fac i -
iti .s. When the Tomkins Report was pub l ished , a leading ocal 
anker , Dr S.K , Ye argued 
A banking s y st m requires control but it req u ire s j u s t 
as much, or even more , an i nst itution which can act as 
'lender of the last resort' such as a central bank . 
Mr Tomkins recommends control but has made no r ecommenda-
t ion for helping banks when they are in di fficult i es .... 
What we need is an institution represe n ting a reservoir 
of l iqu idity, ready to quench thirst as wel l as to put 
ou ire. 1 
Later , another commentator suggested that only a ce ntral bank could 
provide rediscount facilities on a large enough scale 
although the Hongkong Bank does act, at present , as a 
rather reluctant 'lender of last resort' it could not, 
as a pr ivate commercial bank, assume this function to 
t he de gree which Japanese experience suggest s ma y be 
necessary. 2 
Two other adva ntages also cla imed for a s t a tut or y lender of 
last resor were~ first, that it woul d lead to a better l i a ison with 
the b orrowing b anks (in part because it would e nd a ny prese nt f ars 
that the commercial banks which have acted as end e r s of last r e s ort 
might t ake a dvant a g e of their position), and, s e cond ly, that, with 
a centra bank to back them, the commercial banks would increas e 
oth their t otal lending (through a willingness to ope ra te wi h 
1 h . ) 3 owe r c a s ratios and their lending for long-term purpos e s. 
Th os e opposing the establishment of a central b ank have put 
f orward two mai n arguments against these views. First, that exist 
i ng fac ilities re adequate 
1 
2 
At pre sent the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Chartered 
Ba nk hab itua lly act as lenders of last resort, .• , Prov ided 
S, . Ye, FEE , 28 June 1962 , pp ,638- 9, 
Get yn Davies , 'Hong Kong Banking Aft r the Cri is ', op . cit, , 
p,250 . 
3 
4 
S, • Ye , op , cit., p ,639 , 
S . C . Ch n, FEER , 6 July 1961, p.27. 
t ~ ta b ank is being run on sound l i n s the r e shou d 
b n o diff icul t y in obtaining he lp if it suff rs a 
tempor a ry s hort a ge of l iquidity ; a cont inge ncy agains · 
whi ch n o b ank can protect itself complet ely y t e us e 
o f i t s own r esource s . Government ha v e mos t h e p f u 1 y 
s h own that they are willing to make availab e such 
f u nds as are necessary to give banks t he requ i red 
iqu idity, during and after periods of unusual stres 
T e r e is no lack of funds or faciliti es availab now 
o n r a sona b e terms t o all banks which merit s uppor t . 
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The r h a s also be n ' the extremely harsh view t ha t the cent ral 
ank wou d b e p cted to act, and would be r egard e d by h e b anks , 
as protect ion aga inst their own irresponsibility . I n other words, 
e stab is hme n t o f a central bank could c aus e a d e ter i oration i n 
local banking pract ice' 2 
The re has b ee n l e ss discussion on then .e d for a central bank 
t o act as regulator of the monetary system . Dr Yee appears to have 
suppor ted the e stablishment of some form of credit control 
I n the absence of a central bank credit policy, one 
o f the key levers which control a modern economy , must 
be 1 f t to the discretion of the management of the 
commer c i a l banks; and it is difficult to s e how these 
b anks, wh ich have to earn profits for the ir shareholders 
can wo r k it out in the best interest of the economi c 
life o f t he Colony. Control of finance is a mos 
ssent i a l step t o t he control o f t he whole economy. 3 
A leading academic writer on the Hong Kong eco n omy has also supported 
t h e s e t ting u p of a central bank to contro l the Co l ony' s money suppl~ 
This i t cou l d i n fl u e n ce , he suggested , through sta tutory re s erve 
requ i r ments a nd thr ough its operations in the Colony 's gold and 
4 
fore i gn exchange markets. More generally, it has been argue d that , 
a l thoug there may be little need for monet a r y po l icy a t present , 
th is my n ot be the case in the future 
1 
2 
there is no formal credit poli cy in Hong Kong, nor is 
ne likely to be instituted in fore s eeable circumstances. 
The level of income and the volume of money are det e rmine d 
R. G. L. Ol iphant , op. cit., p . 177. 
D v id Williams, 'Hong Kong Banking', op. cit. , p.41 . See also 
R •• L . Oliphant, op. cit ., p .1 79 : 'The d mand o a central ba nk 
probab ly ar is e s from much the sam misconcept ion as does the de mand 
fr a n Industrial Bank, i.e. that it would be a f airy g odmother 
l e ndin g who l l or largely on t rust . It mos t certainly wou l d not . ' 
3 
S,K . e ~ op. cit., p.639 , 
E.F. Szcz .panik , FEER, 3 August 1961 , pp,22 7- 9 . 
by the balance of payments ; any central bank i nflu nee 
i n t his almost mechanical relationship could lead t o 
i n fl a tionary financing which might endanger the pa r i ty 
o f the Hong Kong dollar with st e rling . ... [However] 
i n the l onger run, the time might come when speci f ic 
credi t policie s will need to be implemented to stabi-
l i se the economy . It might be a useful hedge against 
future d iff iculties to establish an i nstitution wh i ch, 
t t h least can do no harm to the financials ructure , 
a nd might i n fa ct do some useful work in s trengthening 
that st ructur e over time.l 
Aga i n st these arguments, Mr Oliphant asks 
is such control [as would be required to implement 
mon tary policy] either necessary or desirable ? Hong 
Kong is one of the last bastions of free trade and 
dos no t take kindly to controls, even when they 
appear to be necessary. When, as in this case, they 
do not, it is hardly to be expected that Gove rnment 
would try to enforce them, or, in that unlikely event , 
that they would be readily accepted. 2 
The expense involved in the establishment of a central bank 
ha s been mentioned by several commentators, most strongly by 
Mr Oliphant 
A Central Bank would be an expensive luxury becaus e 
it would need a highly qualified Governor and a 
staff adequate to perform all its functio ns, all of 
whom would have to be paid, housed and prov ided with 
o ff ice s ~a ce, and there would be no commensurate 
benef it. 
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Against this cost, though, could be set the 'administrative 
tidine ss ' r esulting from the transfer of 'all the va riou s eleme nts 
of central banking control into one institution' . 4 
Is Th re a Case for Establishing a Central Bank? 
We can analyse what justification there ma y be for establish-
ing a central bank in Hong Kong by taking, i n turn, the s everal 
't pical ' central banking functions. This section highlights the 
f ields in which one might expect a central bank to make a signifi-
cant c ontr i bu tion ; it does not seek to give an ove rall ass e ssment 
of whe the r or not such an ins titution should be s et up. 
1 
Davi d 
2 
R.G .L . 
3 
Ibid ,, 
Wi lliams 
Oliphant , 
p . 17 9 . 
op . cit., pp . 40, 43. 
op , cit., p.177 . 
4 
David Williams , op , cit ., p.41 . 
271 
(a) Currency Issue . Most central banks maintain a monopol y 
of the issue of legal tend er currency. In part this is because 
currency i s one component of a country's money supply, the deter-
mination of which is a main responsibility of central banks. By 
arranging th is sue of currency , a central bank also gains conunand 
over the resource s held as currency backing. There is the fur the r 
advantage, especially significant for a newly established central 
bank , that responsibility for the currency issue can add to the 
institution ' s prestige and standing . 
The main advantages and disadvantages of the Hong Kong currency 
system were outlined in Chapter 3 . Briefly, these are, on the one 
hand, t he currency issue is fully convertible into sterling at a 
fixed exchange rate and there is no danger of an overissue of cur-
rency, and, on the other hand, the 100 per cent sterling backing to 
the currency issue means some sacrifice of investible funds and the 
g old value of the Hong Kong dollar is dependent o n the international 
value of the pound sterling. Modification of the present currency 
system to permit a small f iduciary issue would not, in itself, 
require that a central bank take over the issue of notes and coins. 
Perhaps a stronger ca se could be made for setting up a central bank 
were it feasible for such an institution, by diversi fying the assets 
of the Exchange Fund, to give the Hong Kong dollar a value in terms 
of gold independent o f that estab lished through its link with 
sterling - i.e. to make Hong Kong more of a 'Switze r land of the Far 
East' . But, as we have seen, this diversification might not be a 
. 1 1· l practica po icy. 
It was argued, too, that the commercial banks do not benefit 
excessively from their right - now an unusual one for privetely-
owned institutions - to issue legal tender banknotes. 
(b ) Banker to the Government . I n most countries, the central 
bank hold s the go ernment's accounts and arra nges go ernment 
1 
See above, p .92. 
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t r an e r s; i t issue s government securities and i s agent f or the 
gov ernmen t deb t ; i t pr ovides fina ncial acc ommodat ion t o tr. overn-
men t ; i t is respons i ble f or developing the market i n gove~nm n 
secur i t ies ; and it acts as the government ' s fi nancia l advi se r . But, 
ther is poss i b l y less scope f or a central b nk o opera t as 
Gove r nment's bank i n Hong Kong than i n most coun r i e s. 
irst, to nsure that the de posits of the Hong Kong overnm nt 
could be withdrawn at short notice - which ma be nee ssary i n t he 
eve nt of a reces sion - the central bank would have to hold l iqu id 
sterling assets aga inst a high proportion of its l iabili t i es to the 
Gove rnme nt. Gi ven th is requirement, it is unlike l y tha t a sign ifi-
cant part of the Government 's reserves at pr esent he ld i n London 
cou l d be transferred to Hong Kong. A central bank would , though , 
permit the establ ishment of of fic ia l control ove r the use mad e of 
Gove rnme nt r eserves held locally . These reserve s have in the past 
bee n unde r the control of the private banks. But t he r e ar e f ew 
ou t l e t s f o such funds in Hong Kong wh ich can prov ide t he necessary 
de gree of l iquidity. 
Secondly, there is relat i vely limited scope fo r the cent r al 
bank ' s ro l e as agent for the public debt, The pr esent evel of 
debt is fa r too small to require i t s administration by a ce ntral 
bank . The earl i e r discussion on public fina nce sugges ted it is 
un lik l y the Government will rely signif icantly on borrowed f unds 
int e future : there is pr obably still scope for an i ncreas e i n 
tax e , and , most important , the political uncertainty dis courages 
pubic and i nst ituti onal inve stment i n all but short- term paper, 
On th other hand, as Malaysian ex pe rience shows , a central bank , 
by providi ng r ediscount facilities and direc t suppor t , and by ad is-
i ng the gov rnment on the type and volume of s e cur i ties offered to 
the mark .t, can signi ficantl y assist the deve lopm nt o . a local 
1 
securities market, That is , a central bank could us e fu l y assist 
1 
P,J , Drake, op , cit., pp,137 - 40. 
t he Government in tapping what support there i s for a n iss u o f 
securities. 
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The establishment of a local liquid asse t s ratio for the com-
mer c ial banks would aid the development of the l ocal ma r k e t i n 
Government paper, But this type of provision, wh i ch was o f s ome 
importance in the growth of the Malaysian security market , 1 ma y be 
less practicable in Hong Kong, where a very large part o f ba nk 
deposits is owed to overseas depositors, and , as a conse que nce, the 
banks seek to cover themselves against the risk of large - scale 
withdrawals by holding a sizeable portion of their liquid ass e ts 
in foreign financial centres. 
The establishment of a central bank might also permit the 
Government to economise a little on its holding of reserves : the 
b a nk could provide limited financial accommodation to the Gove rnment 
fr om its own resources and there would be a slightly wider market 
for Government securities. 
The role of the central bank as adviser to the Governme nt 
would b e especially useful were it able to collect some of the 
in f ormation (for example, on the balance of payments , the rate of 
c a pital f ormation, sources of company finance and the e f fec t s of 
the Gov ernment's financial operations) which would give a fuller 
understanding of the economy. But this information could , instead , 
b e c ollected by a department in the Government's Secretariat, 
(c) Bankers' Bank. There are two aspects to the possible role 
o f a Hong Kong central bank as bankers' bank. First, the central 
bank could provide 'service facilities' to the commercial banks , 
such as clearing house arrangements and holding the first line 
l iqu id r e serves of the commercial banks. But there appears t o have 
bee n little complaint with the way these servic es hav e be en provided 
b y the note issuing banks. It is on the second aspect o f a central 
bank's role as bankers' bank - the provision o f official lender of 
1 
Ibid ., p.138. 
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las r esort facilities - that most support for t he e s tar ishment of 
such an i nst itut ion has been based. 
Unt i l the office of the Commissioner of Banking was se up in 
1964 , any l ocal commercial bank short of cash had to approach 
directly either of the two large British banks. Wh i le there is no 
s uggestion that any well-run bank was refused assistance i he sma l l 
ba nks appea r to have been apprehensive that this arrang ment placed 
them unfairly at the mercy of their larger compet i t ors. This 
attitude - whether or not it was soundly based - pe rhap s mad e the 
smaller banks reluctant promptly to request assistance. More im-
portant , the absence of official responsibility to support commercial 
banks experiencing liquidity shortages may have had an unfavourable 
effect on depositors' confidence. 
But these arguments for establishing a central bank have lost 
much of thei r force since the office of the Banking Commissione r 
was set up . Commer cial banks short of liquid asset s can now request 
assistanc through the Commissioner. This arrangement make s for 
better l iaison , and overcomes any apprehension that advantage would 
be t aken by the lending institution. It was also through the off ice 
of the Bank i ng Commissioner that the Government was approached to 
bolster the liquid asset holdings of the local banks by transfer ing 
r e serves from London . Presumably, a similar request f or assistance 
wou l d be made by the Commissioner during any futur e crisis . Thus, 
although no i ns t itution has been designated a statut ory lender of 
la s t resort , any well-run commercial bank - i. e. a commercial bank 
which meets the provisions of the Banking Ordinance - can x pe ct 
ass istance through the Banking Commissioner should it experience a 
temporary shortage o 1 cash, This assistance would be provided by 
the not e i ssuing banks or from Government reserve s . 
There is , then, an appar ntly adequate if unusual - mechanism 
f or pr oviding lender of last resort facilities, I t is unl ik l y that 
1 
See Commissioner of Banking, quoted SCMP, 11 January 1966. 
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the estab lishment o f a centra bank would br ing other than an 
administrative change i n the provision of thes e faciliti es . 1 
Certainly, th central bank could not permit th c omme r c i al banks 
to borrow from i t on the substant ial and continuing sca le permitted 
in Japan (where, becaus of c entral bank credit, the level of he 
c ommercial banks ' l oa ns and advanc s has for some tim exceeded 
2 
that of depo s its from the publ ic) . The need to hold a h i gh fore i gn 
exchange reserve against t h e currency issue would limit the extent 
to which a Hong Kong central bank could provide rediscount fac ili-
ties. Its credit would bed s igned to meet the commerc i al banks' 
temporary demand for cash - and as such would carry penal rates . 
The provision of central bank credit on the scale given in Ja pan 
could result in currency i nc onvertibility . 
There is still the qu es tion whether sufficient support could 
be provided to meet depo i t ors' d e mands in the event of as ver 
political crisis. But i n such a case, there might be little that 
even an official cent ra l bank could do. 
(d) Administration o f Ex change Cont r ol and Determination of 
Exchange Rates . In mos t countries the central bank is re spon sible 
for determining exchange r ates, administering the system of xchange 
control and maintaining the country's reserve of pre cious meta l s and 
foreign currencies. 
The very liberal system of exchange control has been outlined. 
It was seen, too, that a fu l ly convertible currency is d esirable 
f or several reasons , includ ing : the needs of the ntrepot trade; 
the non-economic advantage of ensur·ng that China c an convert its 
fore ign exchange earn i ngs in Hong Kong into othe r currenc i es; the 
Colony's appeal to t he ov rs as Chinese and other for e i gn investors, 
1 
There seems to be nor ason f or suggesting that the sma ller ba nks 
would more readily approach a central bank when in di ff i culties 
than thy would appr oach the Commissioner of Banking . Probably, 
the small banks would b ss a pprehensive i n turning to i ther 
th Banking Commissioner r a c ntral bank than to the note i ssuing 
banks . 
2 
See abov , p. 268. 
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who are attracted by the freedom with which thy may later t ran sfer 
funds f rom Hong Kong; and the like lihood, perhaps great .r i n Hong 
Kong than i n most countries, that a black market i n for eign curren-
c i e s wou d q u ick ly make most controls inef fec tive . 
Th e s e considerations would severely limit the activi tie s of a 
centra b ank i n t he foreign exchange field . St il l, a central bank 
wou d almost certainly be better placed than the Governme nt o dis -
courag e - f or e x ample, by varying interest rates par t of th 
c api tal outflow of a period of economic or poli tical crisis. And, 
with an established central bank the problem of compensating com-
mercial banks f or any exchange losses they might suffer as the 
r esult o f a future sterling devaluation would not arise. 
() The Development of the Capital Market. An impor t ant 
objective of many central banks in underdeveloped countries is to 
encourage t h e development of local money and capita l markets, This 
they ca n do in several ways, such as providing of f icial rediscount 
fac iliti sand support for the government securities market, en-
c ourag ing and assisting the flotation of pr ivate share issue s , 
i nducing commerc i al banks to hold more local assets and establ ish-
i ng a nd financing various development corporations. 
We h ave s ee n that the Hong Kong capital marke t has developed 
ov r the postwar period without guidance and assistance from a 
centra l bank. Important constraints on the development of the local 
capital market have been the political uncertainty , which discourages 
mu ch equity and long-term investment, and the opposition f many 
busines s enterprises to any change to public compa ny status. These 
same facto r s would doubtless also limit th extent to which a 
central ba nk could develop the local capital marke t . But , within 
these constraints, there is probably some scop f or ce ntral bank 
ac ion , through the measures mentioned alread y , to broaden a nd 
strengthe n t he capital market. 
I n a numb r of countries - for example Malaysia 1 c ent r a 1 
banks have ncourag d commercial banks to build up the portion of 
1 
Se , J . Drake , op. cit., pp.160- 3 . 
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their assets held locally . A thoug h it is , of course, a ways d if-
ficult t o say exact ly whac is t he correct combinat ion of local and 
fore ign assets , a Hong Kong central ban k might per iodically r v iew 
the geographical di stribut ion o f th commercial banks ' as ts, to 
see whet her any s eriou s imbalance has occur r d . 
( f ) Contro l and Regulation of Commercial Banks . Commonly, 
central banks are respons ible for the general supervision a nd 
control of commercial banks . This function seems to be adequately 
performed in Hong Kong under the present arrangement in which the 
Governor h as fina l r e sponsibility for the provisions of the Banking 
Ordinance and day to day supervis ion is the c oncern o f the Commis-
sio ner of Banking . 
( g ) Monetary Po l icy. The implementation of monetary policy 
is often seen as the main respons ibi lity of a central bank . In the 
v i ew of one authority 
The essence of central bank i ng is discret ionary control 
of the monetary system ... . Central bank i ng is an institu-
tional arrangeme nt which may be made to serve any one o f 
a number of purpose s . The choice of purpose - t h objec t 
of monetary policy - is not irrelevant t o the choice of 
method: a community might hope more reasonably in some 
cases than in other s to attain its end s by making i ts 
monetary sys tem work to rule. And working to rul e is 
the antithesis of central banking . A central bank is 
necessary onl y when th e communi ty d e cides that a discre -
tionary elemen t is d e sirable. The c.entral banker i s the 
man who exercises his d iscre tion, not the machine that 
works according t o rule . l · 
In many te rrit ories wh ich earl ie r employed the sterl i ng ex-
cha nge standard, central banks have been establ i shed specifically 
to break the rigid and di sadvantageous l ink which ha d supposedl y 
2 ex isted between the ba lanc e of payments and the supp l y of money. 
In Hong Kong, we have seen , this link is neither as rigid - because 
of the greater relativ i mportance o f bank credi t - nor as di s -
advantageous - becaus the balance of payments i s les s volatile -
as was claimed t o b the case i n many territor ies. 
1 
2 
R. S . Sayers, op . cit., p.l. 
See Cha pter 7. 
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We mus t n ow ask whether there is a need for mone tary po l icy in 
Ho ng Kong . If this need is argued, it must then be asked whether 
th necessary monetary controls could be introduce d u nd er the present 
currency b oa rd system and, finally, what scope there is for he 
b r oader range of monetary measures which might b introduce d by a 
ce ntral bank. The first two questions have largely been a nswered 
already. 
There appears to be no evidence that the supply of money has 
varied at an inappropriate rate in either the short or the long 
period : the economy has suffered neither from short - term i nstability 
nor from l ong- term monetary disequilibrium. But, it was seen, there 
may be more need for a stabilisation policy in the future . Some thing 
has already been said of the scope for fiscal policy; our present 
concern lies with the contribution which might be made by monetary 
measures and , specifically, with the role of a central ba nk i n the 
impl e me n tation of these controls . 
Tha t there is some scope for the operation of a limited monetary 
policy u nd e r the currency board system has alr ady been established. 
By trans ferring reserves between Hong Kong and Lond on (regardless 
o whether or not there is, at the same time, a budget imbalance) , 
th . Government can exert some influence on the mone y supply. The 
e tent of th is influence depends on how sensitiv the commercial 
banks are to changes in their holding of liquid assets. With a 
f id uc iary issue , the Government would have an increased influence 
on the mon y supply. Its ability to stimulate the level of monetary 
demand during a depression would then be less dependent on the size 
of its London reserves. 
Wou l d a central bank ensure a greater degree of monetary 
c ontrol? Th re is a considerable literature on the operation of 
monetary policy in underdeveloped countries, 1 much of which is 
1 
Se e especially H.C . Wallich, Monetary Problems of an Export Eco-
n omy , Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1950, Ch.XV; S.N . Sen 
Central Banking in Undeveloped Money Markets, Calcutta : Bookland 
Pr i va te Limited, Third Edition, 1961, passim, and E , Nevin , op. cit. , 
Chap ters 2 and 3. 
279 
r 1 vant to Hong Kong . This literature is especia ly arge on th 
top i c o f the fficac y in underdeveloped countr ies oft e trad it ional 
w a pons of c e nt ra l bank control - variations in the bank rat and 
op n mar ke t operat ions. 
Bank r te v a r iations would probably have l i t tle ef f e c t in a 
f i nanc i al s y stem such as Hong Kong's. Some considerable t ime would 
b required before the central bank could encourage t he comme rcial 
bank s t o rediscount with it, in part because many banks, i ncluding 
the largest institutions, can borrow from head offices and other 
sources ov e rseas . Secondly, so long as funds can be freely moved 
between Hong Kong and other financial centres , intere s t rates wil l 
in general move in line with those overseas , and no t follow the 
local rediscount rate. 
Even we r e the market in government securities to be devel ope d 
by t h prov ision of rediscount facilities and a considerably in-
creas e d v olum of transactions - the latter so that centr al bank 
dea l ings would not give r ise to excessive varia ion s in bo nd prices 
and y i elds - a Hong Kong central bank would probably h av e r elat i vely 
l i ttle scop to influence mone tary conditions through open market 
op rations. Variat ions in the commercial banks ' cash bas e would no t 
affe c t t he lending policy of institutions holding ex c e ss r e se rve s or 
o f banks which can obtain additional cash reserves fr om overseas 
s ourc e s.
1 
Diff erences in the extent to which the banks hold e cess 
cash r eserves and have access to overseas credits me an that ope n 
market operations would not affect the numerous banks un i f ormly. 
This discrimination, which in most cases would be a gainst the small 
l ocal banks , might actually assist the implementa tion of monetary 
contro l y b ut it would pose delicate problems for th 
1 
2 
centra l b ank . 
This is the same pr oblem as was seen earlier to app ly to th use 
of trans er s of the Government's reserves b e twe en Londo n and Hong 
· o ng as a weapon of monetary policy. It would be les s s r iou s a 
probl m d ur ing a domestically-generated boom , in which cas t he 
ex c s s cash reserves would be run down and ov e rs e as line s of credi t 
drawn upon . 
2 
As David Williams has pointed out, op. cit ., p.36 , ' any measur e 
wh i ch discriminated against the local banks would inevitab ly, have 
political overtones'. 
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imi ar difficu lt i es would surround the u se of var i able cash 
r s r ve r equirements , the control wh ich, it has been ugge ed , 
is likely to be of more use in underdeveloped coun r i es ta_ t he 
two trad i t iona l weapons of monetary policy. 1 A ce ntral bank ' s 
at empt t o cut short a domestically-genera ted boom by incr as i pg 
r equired cash reserve r atios cou ld be thwart db cause a numb r of 
banks ob ta i ned funds from outside source s or ran down he i r excess 
cash reserves. Again, the central bank might be unwilling to intro-
duce a measure with such discriminatory eff cts. 
Th . considerable differences between the banks might further 
discourage the central bank from attempting t o control the direction 
of bank lending. It is unlikely that any need to restrain bank lend-
i ng for trade purposes will arise. Most of this credit is provided 
by the larger banks and the expatriate banks . Any attempt to l imit 
new loans for real estate purpos e s would fall eav i l y on the small 
l oca banks . 
It migh t be possible by agreement and s uas ion t o estab ish some 
official influence over the level of interes t rates . Such a policy 
appears t o have had limited success in Malays i a, 2 a coun r y with a 
simi larly clos e relationship to the London money market. Perhaps, 
hough, the polit i cal uncertainty and the cont inu i ng colonial status 
of Hong o~g make it more difficult to convinc the commercial banks 
tat su ch agre ements are to their long-term advantage. 
There r mains another weapon of monetary policy : transfers of 
Gove r nment reserves between the commercial banks and t he central 
bank .
3 
Th se trans fers would have a similar effect to the mov .m nt 
of Government reserves between London and Hong Kong , but without 
n c ssitating that funds le ave the Colony. But th r might be 
l it t that a central bank coul d do with d posits trans£ rred to 
1 
2 
3 
R. S . Sayers, op . cit ., pp .123- 33 . 
P . J. Drake ~ op . ci t., pp .156-7. 
E, Nev in , op . cit., pp.5 7-8 . As Ne v i n points out , thes transfer s 
have a s i milar effect t o ope n ma rke t ope r at i ons. 
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1 i , other than hold them in liquid form in London . If this were 
to be so , the transfers would be little different from those pos-
sible under the present currency board system, 
This discussion suggests that the scope for the introduction 
of monetary pol icy i s rather limited , whateve r the weapons employed . 
The preference for a system of free and unrestricted transfers 
between Hong Kong and overseas financial centres, and the discourage-
ment to the development of a money market g iven by the uncertainty 
which surrounds Hong Kong's future, are the main reasons for this 
l imi ted potential of monetary policy. And, there is aga in the 
important consideration that i n any economy as export-oriented as 
Hong Kong's, it might be difficult for domestic policy measures 
s ignifi cantly to affect income and empl oyment . 
But this does not mean that central bank monetary control s 
would not work at all . A Hong Kong central bank would have the 
advantage over many newly-established institutions that there is a 
developed system of corrunercial banking and a monetised economy . 
And, if it is accepted that the need for monetary controls will 
increase i n the future , there is a strong case f or the early estab-
lishment of a central bank: as well as permitting the central bank 
to make the institutional changes necessary for future monetary 
contro l s, this would enable the . bank itself to determine when the 
implementation of such controls is first called for. It is possible, 
too, that the central bank might facilitate any future i ntroduction 
of fiscal policy . 2 
1 
2 
* * * 
This point seeems to have been overlooked by Nevin. 
The In t ernational Bank survey of Malaya, op. cit., p.647, observed : 
'Compensatory government f inancial policy is of course not a matter 
necessarily requ ir ing the existence of a central bank , but a central 
bank can exerc ise an importa nt advisory and persuasive influence, 
and may, in certa in circumstances and within prude nt limits make a 
compensatory policy feasible by some financing of temporary gove r n-
ment def ici ts at the right time.' 
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In this discussion there has be en no suggestion that a c ntral 
bank c uld or should dismantle the sterling exchange currency stand-
ard which presently occupies a central position in the f inancial 
system, and which ensures the ex ternal convertibili ty of the Hong 
Kong dollar. It is simply suggested t hat, in view of the increasing 
volume o f bank credit and the growing importance of the domes tic 
sector of the economy, the monetary cont r ols of a centra l bank 
might in the fu ture be necessary to ensure the continued smooth 
working o f the sterling exchange standard - to supple ment, rather 
than t o supplant, the present currency syst em. Without these con-
trols, an excessive increase in bank credit during a period of 
economic ex pans ion might make the subsequent adjustment of the money 
supply to the balance of payments a disruptive one, and there might 
be an unnecessary contraction of bank credit as a result of a shor t-
term balance of payments deficit. Thus, for the most part, the 
likely r o le of a Hong Kong central bank would be dissimilar to tha t 
of most post -World War II central banks, and more l ike the role of 
the central banks established early in this century when ' the desir -
ab ility of the gold standard was taken f or gran t ed ... i t was for the 
sake of their usefulness in running a gold-standard world that 
lbk d . h. . ,1 centra ans were wante int e ninet een-twent ies . At the same 
time , a central bank could contribute in s everal ways to the further 
devel opment of the Hong Kong capital market. 
1 
R.S. Saye rs, op. cit . , p . 110. See also E. Nevin , op. ci . , 
pp.23-4, and H.W. Arndt, ' Central Banking i n Developing Countries: 
Some Lessons of Australian Experience ' , Ind ian Economic Journal, 
Janua ry- March 1965, passim. 
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Chap ter 12 
THE ADEQUACY OF THE FINANCIAL SYS TEM - I : INFRASTRUCTURE 
So far, t h is study has dealt mainly with t he inst itutions -
actual or proj ec e d - of he Hong Kong capital market , the suppliers 
of funds . In the following t hree Chapters we s ha ll l ook mostly at 
the demand side, the use of funds. The questions discussed are: 
who have been the main us ers of f unds? Fr om whom have funds been 
obtained and for what purpos e s ? Ha s t he f l ow of investible funds 
been adequate, in v olume and omposit i on ( for example , has there 
be en suff icient l ong term c~edit)? Th is Chapter is concerned with 
capital formation in t he infrastructure: water supply, the power, 
transpor t and c onununication services, publ i c works (o t her than 
housing which is discussed in Chapte r 14) and port fac ilities. 
Most private ly-owned utili~y companies operate under f ranchises 
granted by the Government , wh ich st out t heir monopoly righ ts, royalty 
charges and, in many cas es now, what t he Government considers a 
'reasonable ' rate o return on capital. The two e l ectr icity 
distribution compan ie s do not operate under franchise s; thei r 
monopoly positions are maintained by the ve ry large capital 
investment r equired and by their established s upply networks, while 
t he companies' tariffs and profits are regulated by the Government. 
The Government has set a reasonable rate of return in the transport 
utilities at fourteen to eighteen pe r cent before taxes and royalty 
charges, for t he telephone company a nine per cent rate of after 
tax arnings is consider d reasonable, and a 13\ per c nt before 
tax r e urn on capital is approved f or t he e l ectricity companies. 
Table 12.1 se s out t he royalty charge s l evied on t hose 
utility companies which opera under fr anchis . . 
The utility service s have xpand d rapidly ove r t he post-war 
period, in line wi th pop ulation growth, industrialisation and 
higher incom l evels . The expansion of selected uti lity s e rvices 
is s hown in Table 12 .2 . 
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Table 12.1 
ROY . Y HARGES 9 MAJOR UTI LITY COMPANIES 
Ch ina Mo tor Bus: 
Kowl oon Motor Bus: 
' Star' Ferry: (Approx imate l y) 
Hong Kong and Yauma i F rry : 
Hong Kong Tramways: 
Peak Tramways : 
Hong Kong Te l ephone o: 
46 per cent of net profit 
20 per cent of gross receipts 
25 per cen of ne t profit 
25 per cent of net prof it 
l 
23s per cent of net profit 
5 per cent on first $7 00,000 of 
tolls and 10 per cen t on tolls 
in excess of $7 00,000 
$8 . 00 for each exchange line 
in service . 
Source : Legis lative Council Debat s, 1965, p.124. 
Water Supply 
Water supply is a r e sp ons i bility of t he Department of Public 
Works. The demand for water has increased rapidly (water consumption 
rose f rom 11,000 million gallons in 1948 to 44 ,000 million gallons 
in 1966) and in all but a few periods supply has been restricted . 1 
Storage apacity was 3, 000 million gallons in t he late 1940s and 
17 ,000 million gallons in 1966 , and will rise to 47,000 million 
gallons in 1969 when t he Plover Cove scheme (costing $560 million) 
is completed. Table 12 .3 s hows the value of capital investment in 
water s upply. The water authori y has not issued its own bonds or 
borrowed f rom non-Government sources. The very large investment in 
water storage and supply has been finance d entirely from Government 
revenue. 
Revenue f r om he sale of water and an al l ocation fr om urban 
rates (two of t he seventeen per cent l evied on urban properties) 
are credited to the water au t hority. harges allow t he undertaking 
to cover its ommercial costs, which are ca l cu l ated to include the 
amortisation of capital a five per c nt over forty years f or dams 
and over 25 years for plant. rom 1946 until 1960 t he charge for 
1 
For 13 months in 1963-64, supp l y was r e s tricted t o four hours 
every four days . 
Table 12 . 2 
PUBLIC UTI LITY SERVICES ~ SELEC TED YEARS » 1948 TO 196 7 
Public Transport Journey s El ectricity sold 
Kowloon China Tr amways 'Sta r ' Hong Kong Ra ilway To tal Hongkong China Mo tor Motor Ferry and Yaumati Electric Ligh t Bus Bus Ferry 
m. m. m. m. m. m. m. m. unit s m. units 
1948 56 20 88 28 35 4 231 83 60 
1954 203 56 142 35 76 J 515 2 13 269 
1960 381 106 175 39 102 6 809 403 679 
1966 643 189 182 56 161 9 1,238 816 1,829 
196 7 516 169 154 49 158 9 1 ,055 890 2, 091 
a = 1949. 
Source : Hong Kong Governmen t Ga zet t e Supplement Number 4, various numbers . 
Gas 
Sold 
m. cubic ft . 
--
28 7 
585 
772 
1, 384 
1,488 
Tele -
phone 
1 000 
working 
stations 
28a 
49 
110 
300 
35 0 
N 
co 
V, 
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Table 12.3 
WATER AUTHORITY: FINANCIAL DETAILS» SELECTED DATES » 1952 TO 1966 
$ million 
1958 -59 1965-66 
Revenue 
Rates 9 26 Water charges 13 60 Fees 1 1 
Total 23 87 
Expenditure 
Staff 7 19 Maintenance and running 7 26 Interest 5 28 Sinking fund charges 4 7 Other 
1 
Total 22 81 
1952a 1959 1966 
Assets 
Dams 120 238 910 P lant 40 67 222 Sinking Fund 16 87 
Total 160 321 1,219 
a = 31 March each year. 
Source: Estimates of Revenue and Ex:eenditure , various numbers. 
water was 80 cents per thousand gallons. This charge was raised t o 
$1.00 in 1960 and to $2.00 in 1965. The increases were necessary 
to cover the very high costs of recent storage schemes. 
But not all the water consumed in Hong Kong is supplied from 
local sources . An agreement with China signed in 1965 permits the 
Colony to draw a minimum of 15,000 million gallons of untreated 
water a year from the East River Scheme in China, 1 at a cost of 
$1 . 06 per thousand gallons at the border. Distribution and 
filt ring systemswithin Hong Kong had to be established , but the 
agreement f r eed the Government from the imm nse exp enditure 
neces sary with local storage reservoirs. 
1 
The Chinese East River Scheme has b en described as 'a major 
pro j e c t bu ilt a l most entirely for the bene f it of the Colony '. 
~. 3 December 1964, p.510 . 
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Power 
Electricity is supplied t o Hong Kong Island by Hongkong Electric 
and to Kowloon and t he New Territories by China Ligh t. A small, 
independent company operates on Cheung Chau Island. China Light, 
which supplies the majority of t he Colony's manufacturing 
businesses, has experienced by f ar the more rapid increase in 
1 
electricity supply . Despite t he recent expansion in demand for 
electricity and - especially in t he late 1940s - the companies' 
difficulties in predicting future demand, there has been no 
shortage of electricity other t han for temporary mechanical 
difficulties. 2 
Table 12.4 s e ts out electricity charges at selected dates. 
China Light ha s off red concessional rates to industrial users 'in 
order to help and encourage industry and thereby to increase 
employment . ' 3 
Pub lic complaints about the level of tariffs, and especially of 
the surcharge made to cover increases in t he cost of fuel oil, led 
in 1959 to the establishment of an Electricity Supply Companies 
Commission to advise on 
the form and extent of th control which Government 
should impose, and on the method of assessment of 
any compensation which may become payable in the 
event of any such control being imposed . 4 
Th Commission found 'li le, if anything, to criticise in the 
record of the Companies on the t chnical side'. But it was 
critical of the extent to which retained earnings had financed 
expansion - i •. , the contribution consumers had made to capital 
1 
The same company is responsible, for providing electricity to 
most of the Co lony's agricultural areas, and claims to have extended 
electricity supply to a number of village at uneconomic returns . 
~' 7 December 1961. 
2 
3 
See Legislative Council Debates, 1965, p.491. 
Government Print 
4 
lb id. , p. 1. 
Table 12.4 
ELECTRICI TY CHARGES~ 1959 AND 1967 
(1) China Light: 
1959: Lighting - 29 cents per unit plus nine per cent 
surcharge . 
Power - basic rate 14 cents per uni plus nine per 
cent surcharge. 
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1967: Lighting - 29 cents per unit less rebate 0.7 cents. 
Power - 13.6 cents per unit. 
(2) Hongkong Electric: 
1959: 
1967: 
Lighting - 15.4 to 28 cents per unit plus nine per 
cent surcharge. 
Power - basic rate 12 cents per unit plus nine per 
cent surcharge. 
Lighting - 15.4 to 28 c nts per unit. 
Power - 11.4 to 12 cents per unit. 
Source: Hong Kong Annual Report, various numbers . 
formation - while the companies were making 'rights and bonus issues 
and substantial dividend distrihutions to shareholders.' The 
Commission interpreted its terms of reference t o be 'not on 
whether control should or should not be imposed on the Companies, 
but on what that control should be' and concluded that, as detailed 
controls to protect consumers' rights would lead to 'a situation in 
which responsibility is taken away from management', the two electricity 
supply corr.panies s hou ld be taken over by the Government. 
The electric ity companies strongly opposed the Commission's 
recommendation, and offered alternative proposals. In May 1962 the 
Government announced that instead of nationalisation , the two 
companies would be amalgamated and a system of Government controls 
introduced to govern tariffs and profits. The proposed merger, 
however, was not acceptable to shareholders in the two companies. 
In 1964 the Government announced the formation of a new 
electricity company (PEPCO), set up jointly by China Light and 
Esso Standard Eastern, to supply electricity to China Light . Esso ' s 
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investment was $220 million . 1 An agreem nt with the Government set 
the maximum earnings of the new company at 13~ per cent of fixed 
assets. One hal of hese ea nings can be paid out a s dividends. 
Earnings over 13~ per cent must b al l oca ted to a development fund, 
to whi h in erest accrues at eight per cent, and which can be used 
only to reduce tariffs. About t he same time, Hongkong Electric 
a ccep te d a scheme of Government control over charges and 
distribution of profits . 
Table 12.5 sets out the level of investment in electricity 
supply in a number of years since 1947 , and, more roughly, the way 
in which this inves tment was financed between 1957 and 1966 (see 
Note to Table 12.5) . Even allowing for Es so's investment in~' 
which is not shown in the Table, retained earnings have been by far 
the dominant source of f unds. In the period 1957 to 1966 China 
Light raised only $25 million from shareholders and Hongkong Electric 
$58 million. New share raisings were discouraged during the period 
of uncertainty about the companies' future. Consumer deposits have 
provided a small amount of investible funds . Hongkong Electric has, 
on several occasions, financed expansion with bank credit until new 
2 fund s could be raised from shareholders. China Light, on the other 
hand, ha s for some time he ld very large cash reserves. 
Hongkong and China Gas supplies the urban areas and new 
industrial towns on both sides of t he Hong Kong harbour. The 
Company was for a long time owned in the United Kingdom. A block 
of shares was purchased by a Hong Kong investment company in 1954 ; 
the Company has been listed on the local Stock Exchange since 1958. 
The Company ' s rights and obliga ions are set out in a 1961 agreement 
with the Hong Kong Government. Charges for gas have been virtually 
unchanged over the post-war period. 
1 
It was rep orted hat Esso at irst offered a fixed interest loan , 
but because of a 'fundamental dislike for loans ' on the part of 
Ch ina Light, this was rejected. 
2 
See the Company ' s Annual Report, 1958 and 1967 . 
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Table 12.s 
BALANCE SHEET INFORMATION: PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANIES, 
S LET D POST -WAR YEARS 
(1) China Light and Power 
Capital employed 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Total 
Represented by 
Fixed assets 
Net current assets 
Intangibles 
Total 
Less consumers ' deposits 
Total 
(2) Hongkong Electric 
Capital employed 
Share capital 
Reserves 
To tal 
Represented by 
Fixed assets 
Net current assets 
In tangibles 
Total 
Less consumers' deposits 
Total 
1947a 1952 1957 
$ million 
13 42 55 
2 8 54 
15 so 109 
11 52 98 
1 7 25 
6 0 0 
18 57 123 
3 7 14 
15 so 109 
a= 30 September each year. 
Change 1957 to 1966 
Share capital 125 
Reserves 195 
Total 320 
Capital raisings, 
1957 to 1966 25 
1962 1966 
110 180 
125 249 
235 429 
237 448 
27 30 
0 0 
264 478 
29 49 
235 429 
Difference 295 
======================-================== 
1952 1957 1962 1966 
$ million 
21 35 so 80 125 
1 8 18 79 155 
'22 43 68 159 280 
7 45 82 171 318 
13 4 Cr .5 2 Cr.14 
5 
25 49 77 173 304 
3 6 8 14 24 
22 43 68 159 280 
a = 31 December each year 
Change 1957 to 1966 
Share capital 75 
Reserves 137 
Total 212 
Capital raisings, 
1957 to 1966 58 
Di ference 154 
====================--------------------
Table 12.5 continued 
(3 ) Hongkong and China Gas 
Capital employed 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Total 
Fixed assets 
Bank overdraft 
10 
9 
19 
n.a . 
1 
$ 
1962 
million 
11 
19 
30 
36 
0 
a= 31 December each year 
Change 1958 to 1966 
Share capital 6 
Reserves 12 
Total 18 
Capital ra1s1ngs, 
1958 to 1966 nil 
Difference 18 
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1966 
16 
21 
37 
37 
0 
--=---=-=--=-========================== 
(4) Hong Kong Teleehone Comeauy 
Capital employed 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Total 
Fixed assets 
Depreciation for year 
1957a 1962 
$ million 
30 65 
10 62 
40 12 7 
48 108 
7 12 
a= 31 December each year 
Change 1957 to 1966 
Share capital 70 
Reserves 98 
Total 168 
Capital ra1s1ngs, 
1957 to 1966 124 
Difference 44 
1966 
100 
108 
208 
310 
25 
=----=================--------- --------
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Table 12.5 continued 
(5) Hong Kong and Yaumati Ferry_ 
1957a 1962 1966 
Capital employed 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Total 
Fixed assets 
(6) 'Star' Ferry 
Capital employed 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Total 
Fixed assets 
Depreciation for year 
(7) Hongkong Tramways 
Capital employed 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Total 
Fixed assets 
5 
22 
27 
25 
$ million 
10 
28 
38 
43 
a= 31 December each year 
Change 1957 to 1966 
Share capital 15 
Reserves 9 
Total 25 
Capital raisings, 
1957 to 1966 3 
Difference 22 
20 
31 
52 
57 
-------------=-=-===-=-=======---=----= 
1957a 1962 
$ million 
1 2 
5 8 
6 10 
9 9 
1 1 
a= 31 December each year 
Change 1957 to 1966 
Share capital 2 
Reserves 2 
Total 4 
Capital raisings, 
1957 to 1966 nil 
Difference 4 
1966 
2 
8 
10 
12 
1 
======================-=------=--------
1957a 1962 
$ million 
15 15 
8 11 
22 26 
16 13 
a= 31 December each year 
hange 1957 to 1966 
Share capital 22 
Reserves 4 
Total 26 
Capi tal raisings, 
1957 to 1966 nil 
Difference 26 
1966 
37 
12 
48 
24 
===================---------------- ----
Table 12 .5 continued 
( 8) Peak Tramways 
Capital employed 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Tota l 
Fixed assets 
(9) Kowloon Motor Bus 
Capital employed 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Total 
Fixed assets 
Depreciation for year 
(10) China Motor Bus 
Capital employed 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Total 
Fixed assets 
Depreciation for year 
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1958a 1963 1967 
$ million 
1 
1 
1 
1 
a= 31 March each year 
Change 1957 to 1966 
Share capital 3 
Reserves 1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
Total ---Z:-
Capital raisings, 
1958 to 1967 2 
Difference 1 
3 
2 
5 
6 
-----------------------=-==-=========== 
$ million 
31 
24 
56 
41 
3 
a= 14 February each year 
Change 1961 to 1966 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Total 
Capital raisings, 
1961 to 1966 
Difference 
nil 
-7 
-7 
-7 
1966 
31 
17 
49 
72 
8 
=============================-======--= 
1962a 1966 
$ million 
5 5 
11 19 
16 24 
14 30 
3 2 
a= 30 June each year 
Change 1961 to 1966 
Share capital nil 
Reserves 8 
Total 8 
Capital raisings, 
1962 to 1966 nil 
Difference 8 
-===================-==-=------------
Source: Hong Kong Stock Exchang, Year Book. 
Tab le 12 . 5 continued 
Note 
This table provides information on the amount of capital 
emplo ed in t he several public utility companies, and on the 
relative imp ortance of capital raisings and internal sources 
of f unds. Ideally, the information r quired is a year by year 
analysis of: 
a= new capital raisings 
b new borrowings 
c = funds provided from retained earnings 
d depreciation allowances 
But insufficient information is available on the Hong Kong 
public companies to make such a detailed analysis. 
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The Table concentrates on variations in shareholders' funds. 
An increase in shareholders' funds can come about through new 
capital raisings (includ ing share premiums ), transfers from 
earnings and revaluation of assets . The Table sets out the change 
in shareholders' funds for each company over the period 1957 to 
1966, and compares this with the company's new capital raisings. 
The difference between these two values gives some ideas of the 
importance of internal sources of funds. 
The fixed assets of the Company were valued at $37 million in 
1966 (see Table 12.5). Expansion has been financed almost entirely 
from retained earnings. 
Trans port 
Two companies hold exclusive franchises to provide public bus 
services; these are China Motor Bus, which operates on Hong Kong 
Island, and Kowloon Motor Bus. Both are now public companies. The 
rapid inorease in public bus travel over the past twenty years, 
shown in Table 12.2, has required a large investment in new 
vehicles: t he China Motor Bus f leet increased from 48 buses in 
1947 to 502 in 1967 ; the fl et of Kowloon Motor Bus increased from 
482 to 1,051 be tween 1959 and 1967. A Public Transport Survey Unit 
ha s been established in the Public Works Department to assist the 
bus companies in forward planning . Fares are low - a maximum of 
20 cents for journeys within the urban areas - and unchanged from 
the late 1940s . 
The two companies r aised $53.5 million by share i ssues whe n 
they first became public companies. Both issues were heavily 
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oversubscribed. Except for the use of bank credit by the Kowloon 
company, all recent expansion has been financed from internal 
sources. The fall in profits of Kowloon Motor Bus from $14 million 
in 1963 to $6 million in 1966 brought about, it was claimed, by 
rising costs, and the resulting suspension of dividend payments 
have posed considerable problems for financing future investment: 
less funds are available from internal sources and it is more 
difficult to offer shareholders a favourable rights issue. As a 
local newspaper commented at the time 
a public utility, privately owned and with an area monopoly, 
which pays no dividends cannot hope to exist for very long, 
let alone achieve the expansion required in the interest of 
the travelling public.l 
The 'Star' Ferry Company operates services between Victoria and 
Kowloon and between Victoria and Hung Hom. Other ferry services, 
including vehicular ferries, are undertaken by Hongkong and Yaumati 
Ferry. A number of new ferry routes, many of them uneconomic, have 
been opened since 1946. 2 The Government undertake the construction 
of ferry piers. 
In 1965 the 'Star' Ferry sought Government approval to increase 
fares. Permission was obtained only to raise first class charges 
3 (from twenty cents to 25 cents). The widespread public 
disturbances which followed presumably have discouraged the other 
public utility companies from increasing fares and charges. 
Table 12.5 showed the increase in fixed assets of the two 
companies between 1957 and 1966, and demonstrated the companies' 
heavy reliance on internal sources of funds. The recent fall in the 
1 
2 
SCMP , editorial, 11 November 1966. 
It has been claimed that, in 1964 Hongkong and Yaumati Ferry 
carried 28 million passengers on uneconomic routes. Legislative 
Council Debates, 1965, p.493 . 
3 
This fare incr ase was the first change in public transport 
charges in twenty years. Hong Kong Annual Report, 1966, p.198. 
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profits of the 'Star' Ferry1 creates similar difficulties in 
financing further expansion to those experienced by Kowloon Motor 
Bus . 
Hongkong Tramways operates 162 tramcars (126 in 1954) on a 6~ 
mile route (unchanged since the War). Fares have been constant at 
ten cents and twenty cents for any distance, A funicular tram service 
to the Peak is provided by Peak Tramways Company. 
Balance sheet information for the two concerns is given in Table 
12 . 5. All the funds for expansion in Hongkong Tramways has been 
provided from internal sources . Capital raisings have been a 
significant source of funds for Peak Tramways . 
The Government-owned Kowloon-Canton Railway operates a 22 mile 
route between Kowloon and the Chinese border . The volume of both 
passenger and freight traffic fell suddenly with the establishment 
of Communist control in south China and the U. N. embargo, but has 
since increased steadily. Table 12.6 shows the recent trends in 
revenue and expenditure. The purchase of rolling stock is included 
in expenditure in the Table, but capital expenditure on track and 
terminals is omitted. 
Table 12 . 6 
KOWLOON-CANTON RAILWAY, REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1947-48 TO 1967-68 
1947-48 
1957-58 
1967-68 
Revenue 
4 
8 
12 
Expenditure 
$ million 
3 
6 
9 
Source : Annual Report of Accountant-General, various numbers. 
~' 29 February 1968. 
1 
Profit fell from $2.2 million in 1964 to $0 . 6 million in 1966. The 
Company's Chairman attributed the fall in profits to ' continuing 
losses on the Hung Hom service , heavy expenditure on necessary repairs 
to Government piers, rising maintenance costs and the swing from first 
to second class travel [after the increase in first class fares]' . 
SCMP , 23 March 1967 . 
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The Government commissioned a mass transport feasibility study 
in August 1965 to advise on the Colony's urban transport 
requirements until 1986. In its report, made public in February 
1968 , the unit found that an underground railway system covering a 
40 mile , four lane circuit, would be feasible, The study estimated 
that the t rans,or t system would cost $3,400 million - $200 million 
in each of seventeen years of development, Estimates of passenger 
demand suggested that the authority would pay its own way if the 
necessary funds could be found at 4.2 per cent . The Report suggested 
that public funds will be required for the development, not only to 
cover the deficiency of private finance, but also 'to offer a more 
1 attractive proposition to investors' by way of return. The 
Government has still to announce its decision on the proposal. 
Communications 
Telephone services within the Colony are a monopoly of Hong Kong 
Telephone Company . Despite the opening of additional exchanges, there 
has been much public criticism of delays in telephone installation, 
and the Government established an Advisory Committee on Telephone 
Services in 1964 to review periodically the Company's rate of 
expansion . Telephone rentals, which have increased by only a small 
amount in the last twenty years, are at present $225 per annum for a 
residential line and $300 per annum for a business line. There are 
no call charges. 
The telephone company has relied more on new capital raisings 
than the other utility companies (Table 12 ,5). To assist the 
expansion of the telephone service, the Government in 1952 took the 
unusual step of underwriting one of the Company's share issues. It 
was required to take up only a few shares. In 1966 and 1967 the 
1 
SCMP, 15 February 1968, p.10. In his 1967 Budget Speech the 
Financial Secretary referred to ' a possible new public transport 
system , the estimates of the cost for which are so terrifying that 
I will not spoil today ' s, I hope, not unhappy occasion by 
mentioning them.' 
298 
telephone company received $120 million i n financial accommodation 
from the United Kingdom Exporters Refinance Corporation. 
The Post Of fice is operated as a Government Department and 
separate f inancial accounts are not maintained. The Government's 
expenditure and receipts from postal services are shown in Table 
12 , 7. Expenditure on new buildings is excluded from the Table; this 
is treated in the Government ' s accounts as public works non-recurrent 
and is financed from Government revenue . 
Table 12.7 
POST OFFICE, REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE, 
SELECTED YEARS 1947-48 TO 1967-68 
1947-48 
1957-58 
1967-68 
Revenue 
7 
30 
99 
$ million 
Expenditure 
2 
19 
56 
Sources: Annual Report of the Accountant-General, various numbers. 
SCMP, 29 February 1968. 
Public Works 
The level and distribution of Government expenditure on public 
works were shown in Tables 9.5 and 9.11. Total spending on public 
works (Public Works Department, public works recurrent and public 
works non-recurrent, including housing, waterworks and education) 
increased from $10 million in 1947-48 (eight per cent of total 
Government expenditure) to $692 million in 1965-66 (39 per cent). 
Expenditure on civil engineering projects rose from $9 million in 
1950-51 to $140 million in 1965-66, the main items in which were 
roads, reclamations and site development. These are 609 miles of 
road in Hong Kong. It has been claimed that 'except a t a few 
intersections, traffic congestion has not yet reached the level 
experienced in most Western cities. ,l But by 1986 the number of 
1 
Hong Kong 1966 , p.190. 
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registered vehicles in Hong Kong will have quadrupled from the 93,000 
registered in late 1966. 1 Three main industrial areas have been 
developed by the Government: Kwung Tong (640 acres), Tsuen Wan 
(500 acres) and Kowloon Bay (550 acres). Industrial leases in these 
areas have been sold at open auction. Site formation has 
commenced for the establishment of satellite towns of 750 ,000 to one 
million people at Castle Peak and Shatin. The present airport was 
constructed in the late 1950s at a cost of $130 million. 
Apart from a loan of $48 million from the British Government 
towards the cost of the airport and the Rehabilitation Loan of $50 
million raised locally in 1948, all civil engineering projects have 
been financed from Government revenue. 
The construction of a road link under the Hong Kong harbour is, 
however, to be undertaken by private enterprise. A town planning 
report in 1948 stressed the need for a cross-harbour road link. The 
Government commissioned a feasibility study on a cross-harbour tunnel 
in 1954, and subsequently set up as an inter-departmental committee 
to advise on whether the Government should accept responsibility for 
the project . The Committee found that a cross-harbour tunnel would 
be of insufficient economic or social importance either to take 
precedence over other public works or to justify a Government 
subsidy .
2 
This conclusion was accepted by the Government but at the 
same time it announced that privately sponsored schemes, either for 
a tunnel or a bridge would be considered. 3 In 1961 the Victoria City 
Development Company submitted an analysis of the feasibility of a 
cross-harbour road link , and it was given a franchi se from the 
Government to build and operate the tunnel. These rights were later 
transferred to The Cross-Harbour Tunnel Company, the General Managers 
1 
2 
Hong Kong Passenger Transport Survey, 1964 - 1966. 
See Inter Departmental Working Party on the Proposed Cross-Harbour 
Tunnel , Hong Kong Government Printer, 1956. 
3 
See Director of Public Works, Legislative Council Debates, 1965, 
p . 457. 
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of which are the long-establi shed merchant firm , Wheelock Marden , 1 
The estimated cost of the tunnel scheme is $280 million, which is to 
be financed fr om equi ty cap i tal, contrac tors' finance and loans . 
The conditions laid down by the Government include that the 
Company offer stated proportions of its shares to the ferry companies , 
the public and the Government; that after 30 years all assets will be 
transferred to the Government ; that construction be completed by 
August 1970; and that the Company pay $12 million to the 
Government to cover the cost of engineering works which would not 
otherwise have been required. 
Start on the construction of the tunnel was delayed in 1967 
because of difficulties in arranging contractor f inance and renewed 
2 uncertainty about the Colony's future. 
Port Facilities 
Port facilities - an important part of the infrastructure of an 
entrepot - are probably more the responsibility of private 
3 enterprise in Hong Kong than in any other international port. The 
Government provides only navigation aids, moorings, typhoon shelters, 
sea walls , and routine dredging . 
There are four main wharf and godown companies - Hong Kong and 
Kowloon Wharf and Godown, China Provident and its subsidiary North 
Point Wharves , and Holt's Wharf - and about 100 smaller companies. 
The large companies between them have storage space of well over a 
million tons . The recent expansion of wharf and godown facilities 
has been financed mainly from internal sources and the sale of 
1 
Wheelock Marden and the John D Hutchison group are committed each 
to provide $28 million of the equity capital. 
2 
See HS , 28 September 1967. 
3 
As a senior official of one of the major trading firms has conunented : 
the Hong Kong Government ' s ' general policy of supporting free 
enterprise ... has been carried through almost to the ultimate insofar 
as shipping is concerned : D.K. Newbigging , 'The Shipping Indus try of 
Hong Kong ' , University of Hong Kong, Extra - 1ural Lecture , November 
1966 . 
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1 
properties; the public companies did not raise new capital from 
shareholders i n the period 1957 to 1966. 
A new overseas term nal was completed by Hong Kong and Kowloon 
Wharf and Godown in 1966 at a cost of $70 million. Unusually , about 
one-half of the cost was provided from the Government , by way of a 
grant of $10 million (including $4 million to cover the cost of the 
terminal's public car park) and a loan of $30 million at six per 
cent interest repayable over twenty years. This financial 
assistance, provided because the terminal was considered too large 
a scheme for a privately-owned company, represented a first departure 
in the Government 's traditional policy of leaving port development 
to private enterprise. 
In 1966 the Government established a Committee to inquire into 
'the implications for Hong Kong trade and industry' of the 'development 
of containers and transport services' and to advise on the need for 
2 
container handling facilities in Hong Kong, The Committee concluded 
that 'unless a container terminal is available in Hong Kong to serve 
[the containerships which will be operating in the Pacific area by 
1970] the trading position of the Colony will be affected 
detrimentally' and that local industry would 'derive considerable 
advantages as a result of containerisation'. The Committee was not 
in 
a position to consider the commercial viability of a 
a container terminal and depot. But in view of the 
high capital cost, a period o~ several years before 
optimum utilization can be reached, and the difficulty 
of forecasting tonnage moving and the number of 
containerships calling , it is of the opinion that it 
may take some time before private enterprise will come 
forward with firm proposals. 
The Government appears willing to accept responsibility for a large 
part of the cost of the container terminal: in his 1967 Budget 
Speech, the Financial Secretary estimated that almost $200 million, 
1 
See Chairman's Statement, Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown, 
1965. 
2 
Report of the Container Committee , Hong Kong Government Printer, 
196i, 
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over an unstated period would be allocated from public funds for 
this purpose. However, Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown in 
mid-1967 expressed i ts nterest in a privately-developed container 
terminal , costing around $70 million, a part of which would need to 
1 be provided from Government sources. 
The discussion in this Chapter has pointed to the high level of 
investment made in the infrastructure over the post-war period. 
Much of the investment has been of a long term nature. Of course, a 
much larger investment has been required in some utilities - such as 
water and electricity supply - than in others. The utility companies 
have raised an appreciable sum from new capital raisings ($271 
million in the period 1958 to 1966, out of total public capital 
raisings of $630 million). They have been well placed to obtain 
this equity capital from the narrow Hong Kong share market: the 
companies are well known and their monopoly positions give them, over 
the longer period at least, virtually assured profits. 2 But not all 
privately owned utility companies have made recourse to the new issue 
market. The telephone company, largely because its rate of 
expansion has been a particularly rapid one, has relied most on new 
capital raisings. Other than a small purchase of shares in the 
telephone company, the Government has not provided direct financial 
assistance to privately-ownea utility companies. Capital obtained 
from abroad has been of importance only in the case of electricity 
supply and telephones. Commercial bank loans have not been a 
significant source of funds. Retained earnings have been the main 
source of funds; criticism of the extent to which retained earnings 
have been used in at least two of the utility companies was noted 
earlier. 
1 
2 
See SCMP , 22 June 1967. 
The Chairman of China Light stated to the Electricity Commission 
that shares in his Company were the nearest investment in Hong Kong 
to trustee stock. 
1 
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Thus, the shortage of long term investible funds in the Hong 
Kong capital market has not prevented a considerable, and in most 
cases apparent ly adequate, expansion of utility services. The 
limited capital market, though , has apparently required a 
relatively greater reliance on internal sources of funds (and, in 
the case of water supply, on general Government revenue) than is the 
case with utility services in other countries. Given this need to 
rely heavily on internal funds, the recent decline in the profits of 
two companies greatly complicates future capital formation. 
The post-war stability in the charges of most utility services 
has both resulted from, and contributed to, the relative absence of 
inflation in other sectors of the economy, Utility charges appear 
to be low by international standards, 
There has been, too, a high level of expenditure on public works 
projects. A suggestion that the Government has been more willing to 
undertake spending on public works than current expenditure on social 
· d 1· l services was cite ear 1er. 
Seep,247 . 
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Chap r 13 
THE ADEQUA Y OF HE FINANCIAL SYSTEM - II: INDUSTRY AND TRADE 
Industry 
The lack of d tailed and precise information on the level of 
inves ment in manufactur i ng indus ry and on the sources and adequacy 
of this flow of funds has be en commente d on by both a Government 
Commit ee which investigat d the ne d for an industrial bank, and 
the E onomist Inte lligence Unit: 
We have f ound it very difficult to secure any precise 
information on t h is subject ... t he [ Ch inese Manufacturers' ] 
Association did no t fe e l able to provide information and 
assured us that an app eal to members f or information to 
be communicated confidentially direct to the Committee 
would m with no response.l 
Of all t he subjects wh ich we examinedin Hong Kong , the 
supply and use of capital in industry was the most 
difficult on which to find concrete information . 2 
Among the reas ns for t h i lack of reliable information on company 
finance are t he small number of public companies, the highly 
competitive conditions in most lines of industry so that few 
businesses will disclose information they believe may be of use 
to their competitors, and a r luctance by businessmen, which is 
certainly not unique to Hong Kong, to admit to many financial 
difficulties t ey may be exp eriencing. 
It is nece ssary, then, t o rely on fairly rough estimates . 
Table 13 . 1 s hows sev ral indicators of the level of~ capital 
formation in i ndus ry ove r r c nt years . This Table, which is 
based on one presented in t he Economist Int lligence Unit Survey , 
must be interpr t d carefully: i understates both the actual 
1 
Indus rial Bank ommitt , Report mimeograph d, 1960 . This 
Report was publis hed in full in FEER, 4 August 1960, pp.226-3 1, 
and r ferenc e s to t he Report in thi study are to the latter 
printing. 
2 
Economist Inte lligence Unit, op . cit., p . 15. 
Land 
Buildings 
~achinery imports 
less r e-exports 
Textile 
Other 
To tal imports 
Total fixe d investment 
a == 11 months . 
Def initions : Land : 
Buildings: 
Machinery: 
Sources : 
Table 13 .1 
INDICATORS OF FIXED CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY ~ 1956-6 7 
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
$ million 
8 10 6 5 34 31 11 12 32 22 40 41 
11 33 20 42 86 62 24 49 41 86 97 102 35 82 61 12 8 183 164 
54 104 99 155 25 7 236 
Sales of new industrial land by Government. 
Value of new industrial bui ldings completed, urban a r ea . 
Industrial machinery imports less re -exports . 
76 
4 7 
41 
136 
177 
300 
1963 
75 
62 
52 
173 
225 
362 
1964 
94 
96 
116 
191 
307 
49 7 
Economist Intelligence Uni t , Industry in Hong Kong, 1962, p . 16. 
Commissioner of Rating and Valuation, Annual Rep ort, various numbers . 
Department of Commerce and Industry, End-Us e Analysis of Imports, 1959-65 , mimeographed. 
Superintendent of Crown Lands and Survey, personal communication. 
1965 1966 1967 
15 4 2a 
186 134 n . a. 
94 n . a. n . a . 
22 7 n .a. n.a . 
321 n . a . n . a . 
522 n . a . n . a . 
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l ev 1 of f i x d capita l forma t ion in industry and (though to a much 
small r ext n t t h r a t . of incr ·a s of b is f i x d investment. 
Ex luded f o he l a 1 . a~ e lad purchases othe r t han new 
industr ia l l a __ d~ t he val ue added locally t o i mported machinery and the 
cos of i dustrial mach iner produc d in Hong Kong (th is latter 
i em, which include s a ir ond i io ing quipment and plastic 
mould ing ma h inery 1 i s unlik l y ye t to b v ry large). The value 
of the s v r a l i t ems omitted from the Tab l e almos t certainly 
increas e d over t he pe riod cov r e d by t he Table . 
There i s no way of estimating t he precise value of investment 
in industrial work i !!.8_ capital . I has ee n sugg sted, though, that 
'the increase in working cap ita l was o f t he same ord r as, or 
gr at r than , he increas in f i x d capi tal inve stment 1 • 1 
Wha ever the limitat ions of Ta l e 13.1 , it cannot be denied that 
there has been a r emarkable inc r ea s e in industrial investment even 
ove r the r e latively short p riod cove r d. The question which must 
now b ask dis how t h is capi t al formation has been financed. 
(a) Source s of f unds for indus tria l i nves tment. 
( i ) ·oreign capital 
As we have see n, it wa s with imported capital - mostly from 
Shanghai industrialists - t ha co t on spinning, t he olony's first 
large seal indus ry, wa s estab lished. This industry was set up with 
mode r n machinery and a suppl of raw materials, mostly purchased 
from the United States , at a time whe n t here were world shortages 
both of capita l equipm n and raw mat ria ls, and of t he goods which 
the cotton mills could pr oduc Some l ocal funds, mostly credits 
from the British banks, we r e made available to t hese cotton spinning 
mills, but in most cases xpans i on was £inane d f rom new capital 
inflow, and, mor f r e quently, from retained pro f its . 
Th r e wa s l i tl f urthe r direct ov .rs eas investment in indus t ry 
until the late 1950s whe n a number of manufa turing nte r pris es 
1 
Economist Int llig ne e Un it, p . i ·, p . 16 . 
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with mainly Un i t ed State s and Japane s 
api a l wre st up. This 
foreign investmen was given nu s pec1·a1 ncourage et · 
m n or concessions , 
nor was it mo iva ed y -",:; pr os p c t of producing for a tariff-
pro ected hom rr~ rke t . 
Indire c l y 1 t h inf l ow of f ore i gn cap i tal i nto other sectors 
has assis ed capital orma tion i n i ndustry . The expansion of bank 
deposits o wh i h or e ign capi al con t r ibuted, made possible a rapid 
in rea s in bank 1 nd ing f or indus tr i a l purpos es . Overseas 
investme n in t he proper t y and s hare mar ke ts fr eed f unds for 
investment in manuf acturing . 
(ii) hare iss ue s 
Publ ic share i s s ues have no t been a significant source of 
funds for industr i al investmen. $66 million was raised by 
manufacturing firms by public cap ital r a isings in the period 1958 
to 1966 (total pu lie share subscriptions dur ing t he period were 
$630 million) . The narrow s hare ma r ke t and t he investing public 's 
pre ference for t he mor e ass ur ed r etur ns of u til i ty companies and 
building companie s have discourage d publ ic s hare issues by 
manufac ur i ng concerns. The r o le of t he stoc k marke t as a mobiliser 
of funds for manu actur i ng i ndustry has t hus changed little since 
he Economist I n t e ll i g nee Unit observed. 
The Sok Exchange , wh ich migh t be expected t o make some 
contribution t o i ndustria l financing, however small, makes 
none ; eve n t he f ew ex is i ng public companies in Hong Kong 
1 industr have no s ough t t o raise additional capital there . 
The re is no way of est ima t ing how much s hare capital has been 
rais ed by private companies . Certainly , he advantages of 
incorporation have been wi de l y apprecia ted. Many previously 
unincorpora e d businPss .s have b n i ncorporated, and 'most new 
busin sses of any magnitud a r probably incorporated as limited 
• I 2 compan1 s . 
1 
2 
Economis Intellige n e Un it, op . c i ., pp . 17 -8 . 
Registrar -G n ral , Annual Report, 1962-3 p . 17. 
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Table 13.2 shows the authoris ed capital of newly registered 
companies (public and private) by industry gr oups in 1962/63 and 
1965/66. The sta tistics do not relate to paid up capital, and do 
no t i nclude increases in the authorised capital of existing firms . 
Table 13.2 
NOMINAL CAPITAL OF NEWLY REGISTERED COMPANIES 
BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS, 1962-3 AND 1965-6 
1962 -3 
$ million 
Manufacturing 
Garment s 6 Text iles 7 Engineering, etc . 10 Other 21 
Total Manufacturing 44 
Non-manufac t uring 
Financiers so 
Import and export 153 
Land and Build ing 471 Other 164 
Total non-manufa cturing 838 
All compan ies 882 
Source: Registrar-Gener al , Annual Report, va r ious numbers. 
(iii) Commerc ial Banks 
196 5-6 
25 
32 
22 
72 
151 
60 
170 
94 
243 
567 
718 
The commerc ia l banks have lent to industrial firms over almost 
the whole post-war per i od. Bank cred it was provided during the 
immediate post-war recons truction to assist the re-establishment of 
the ship building and ship repair industry. Fr om an early stage, 
the banks financed the co t ton spinning industry; one estimate 
s uggests tha t twenty per cent of the fixed cap ital of the early 
1 
mills was financed from bank loans , a signifi cant contribution to 
an industry which had ye t to establish itself. Bank loans for 
industrial purposes slowly increased to around $200 million in 1958, 
and then doubled in the two years to 1960 (see Table 13.3). There 
is no way of estima ing the vo l ume of bank credit employed in 
manufacturing indus try between 1960 and 1964, b u i t appears fr m 
1 
~' 6 July 1950, p.3. 
Tab l 1 . 3 
COMMER IAL BANK LOAN f'OR MANUFA TURING INDUS TRY ~ 
SE ECT ·n DATES 9 19 57 TO 1967 
1957a 1958 1960 1965 1966 
$ million 
Loans for manufacturing 
170 205 420 1,015 1,151 indus ry 
Total bank advances 940 980 1,860 5,183 5,475 
Per cent 18 21 23 20 21 
a = 31 December each year 
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1967 
1,072 
5,401 
20 
Sources: Indus rial Bank Commit e , Report, mimeographed, 1960. 
conomist Intelligence l nit, Industry in Hong Kong, 1962 
Governme nt Gazette, Suppl ment Number 4 . 
the Table t ha t industrial l oans increased at a similar rate to total 
bank advance s (i .e.~ be tween twenty and thirty -five per cent per 
annum). In Decemb r 1966 commercial bank loans to industry stood at 
$1,151 million. Table 5. 7 gave the distribution of these loans by 
industry group . 
The Industrial Bank Commi tte ' s Report stressed the contribution 
bank credi had made to industrial financing and gave several reasons 
why these loans have be n granted. 
The same phenomenon is observable in Hongkong as in the 
United Kingdom, that is , he extension of bank lending policy 
from short - term commercial loans to med ium- t e rm or even 
long- e rm industrial loans. 
There ar a varie y of r asons for t h is new development. 
First , in Hongkong ind ustry has now b come of first 
importance in the e conomy .. .. Secondly, a new type of 
bank has been developing in Hongkong ; its interests have 
from the beginning been in financ of local activity 
rather han for ign commerce, although its main interest 
has so far been in real esta e rather than in industry. 
Thirdly, h funds available to banks from deposits have 
1 grown v r much aster than the volume of foreign trade .. . 
The wo large British banks were the first institutions to 
lend for manufacturing pur p ses and the se two banks are still 
responsible for av ry large proportion of all bank lending to 
industry. Re ently, sev ral l ocal banks have actively sought 
borrow rs from manufactur ing industry. To some extent, this 
1 
Industrial Bank ommitt e, R port, p.228 . 
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development r fleets the c ntinued growth o the manufacturing 
sector, but the mor ma ur e outlook of a number of local banks and 
he reduced returns available on r al es te development have also 
contribut d. 
The commercial banks u ually prefer a charge over land, 
buildings or mach inery ass curi yon industrial advances, but have 
frequent l y relaxed this r equirement. 1 A range of interest rates 
has applied on industrial loans. Minimum rates are low on 
international standards: 
Only in North America and Switzerland has industrial 
borrowing from the commercial banks been regularly and 
substantially cheaper than borrowing from the main 
British banks in Hong Kong. Rates charged by hinese 
and foreign banks are h igher but t he risk accepted is 
greater . 2 
It has been claimed, too, that the minimum lending rate is available 
to a 'larger proportion of industry than is perhaps realised. 13 
There is no way of estimating the proportion of industrial 
investment financed from bank credit. A leading banker claimed in 
1965 that 'many ' medium and large scale manufacturing firms have 
borrowed 'more' fr om the banks t han they have provided from their 
own sources.
4 
A little information is available from the balance 
s he ts of the few manufacturing concerns which are public companies, 
but not all of these firms state separately heir indebtedness t o 
commercial banks (seve al companies include bank loans with 
provisions for taxation, dividends and other creditors), and there 
is the common difficulty that stated values of shareholder s ' funds 
may be little related to he siz of actual capital . What information 
can be ob tained from the balance sheets of manufacturing fi r ms 
listed on the Sock Exe ange is presented in Table 13 . 4 . The Tab l e 
1 
2 
3 
4 
See a bove, p . 130 . 
Economis Inte lligen e Unit, op. cit., p,17 . 
P . A. Graham, MP Banking Supplem nt, 1965, p , 11 . 
I b id. 
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Table 13 .4 
MANUFACTURING . IRMS LI TED ON T HONG KONG STOCK EX RANGE, 
SELECTED FINANCIAL INtORMATION~ 1957, 1960 AND 1966 
(1) Amey Canning Corporation 
Issued capital 
Reserve s 
Bank overdra f t 
(2) Green Island Cemen 
Issued capital 
Reserv s 
Bank over dra f t 
(3) H.K. Aircraft Engineering Co . 
Issued apital 
Reserves 
Bank overdra f t 
(4) H. K. Breweries 
Issued capital 
Reserves 
Bank overdra f t 
(5) M tal Industries 
Issued capital 
Reserves 
Bank inter est paid 
(6) Nanyang Cotton Mills 
Issued capital 
Reserves 
Bank overdraft 
(7) South Sea Te tiles 
Issued capital 
R serv s 
Bank overdra f 
(8) Textile s Alliance 
Issued capital 
Res rves 
Curr nt liabilities 
(including overdraft ) 
(9) Textiles Co poration 
Issu d capital 
Res rves 
Bank int r est paid 
n.l. = not l ist d 
n.s. = not stated 
1957 
4 
9 
9 
5 
n.s . 
n. 1. 
n. l. 
2 
0 
n.s. 
15 
3 
6 
n. l. 
n. l. 
8 
1 
o.3 
Source: Hong Kong Stock Excha nge , Year Book. 
1960 
$ million 
5 
10 
9 
8 
n. s. 
n . 1. 
n. l. 
2 
0 
n .s. 
20 
7 
7 
n. 1. 
n. l. 
8 
3 
0.2 
{ 
f 
f 
( 
1966 
5 
17 
n.s. 
15 
17 
25 
14 
7 
n.s. 
20 
2 
n.s. 
11 
3 
0 . 3 
20 
6 
12 
24 
18 
10 
45 
3 
76 
3 
10 
3 
0.5 
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shows that for the t e i l ~ firms , a 1 a , bank credi has been a 
significant s ourc o unds. 
As is common l y t h ase 9 t he larger man uf acturing firms have 
been better plac d o ob ain bank credit . The Chairman of t he 
Small r Busines s Mana gem nt Committe of the Federa tion of Hong 
Kong Industry has expressed h i s ' strong susp i c ion' that ninety per 
cent of bank loans for indus ry are taken by t he larger industrial 
enterprises ( t hos e with a paid up capital in excess of $5 00,000). 1 
The small firms' di f f iculties in obtaining bank credit have been 
lessen d somewhat by two deve l opments mentioned already: the 
establishment of bran h networks by t he Brit i s h banks, which has 
given them closer contact wi t h sma ller manufact uring e nter prises , 2 
and the r ecent s o licit ing o f indus trial loans by a number of local 
banks. 
Because of t he rapid increase in bank deposits over the period 
(except in 1967) the banks have not, at any stage, had to reduce 
their l ending for industr ial purp oses. 3 Nor, with one important 
excep ion, ha s bank l ending t o manufa cturing businesses been 
restricted b ca use the banks were too heavi l y committed in other 
directions . The except i on was th tend ncy , until late 1964, of 
th smaller banks virtually to avoid lending for industrial purposes 
to profit as f ully as possible from r ea l estate advances . 
(iv) Retained earnings 
Retained earnings have financed a signi f ica nt portion of 
industrial capital expenditur: outside long term funds are in 
1 
K. S. Lo, 'Local Small Sale Industries', University of Hong Kong, 
Extra-Mural Lectur, November 1966. 
2 
In 1960 t h Hongkong Bank d irectly approached t he Chinese 
Manufactur rs ' As sociation to facilitat borrowing by small 
manufacturers . Su u Hsin and Der k Davies, 'Finance for Industry' , 
FEER 23 May 1963 comm nt t ha t 'many such loans were arranged but 
_, ' 
gradually the demand e ll of ' . 
3 
In 1965 a group o larg r banks as sured representatives of two 
industrial associations t ha thy would assis smaller industrialists 
affected by t he sl ight r dit squeeze of that year . 
313 
limited supply , many indus rialists seek t o maintain a tight control 
over their enterprises, and a nu er of small firms cannot offer 
sufficient security o ob tain bank credit . The r e ention for 
f ur her inv s ment of a high proportion of business earnings is 
assisted by the low rate o profits tax and encouraged by the 
relatively quick turnover of f unds in labour-int nsive Hong Kong 
indus ry. There mus b many cases where industrialists, particularly 
those in the smaller firms, have stinted pers onally to permit the 
re-investment of past earnings . These sacrifices have increased 
the overall rate of capital formation . 
Because of t he impor tance of smaller firms in the industrial 
s ctor and, until 1965 , t he inability of most manufacturing 
businesses to offer a comparable return to that available on real 
estate investment, manufacturing industry may have had to rely on 
self -f inancing to a greater degre e than other sectors of the 
economy. 
(v) Government 
The Government has not provided funds for investment in the 
manufacturing sector as it has financed capital formation in water 
supply and in the housing and primary producing sectors . But there 
have been several examples of indirect Government financial 
assistance. Purchasers of new industrial land can make a ten per 
cent initial payment and pay the balance over twenty years with 
ten per cent interest. Th is form of Government 'credit' to industry 
was worth $28.5 million in 1960 . 1 A more recent estimate is not 
available, but 'the vast majority of purchasers elect to pay by 
instalments over the maximum period possible. 12 There is no price 
subsidy involve d in these land sales: all industrial blocks are 
sold at auction, with reserve p~ices sufficiently high to cover the 
'cost of production' involved in reclamation or levelling. 
1 
2 
Economist Intelligence Unit, op . cit., p.l7. 
Personal communication from Superintendent of Crown Lands and 
Survey. 
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The Government ha s cons ructed facto y blocks to house 
manufacturing busines ses prev iously operating in squatt r areas. 
Almost two million square ee o factory space had been provided 
in this way by t he end o 196 7, at a cost of $31 million. 1 
(vi) Other s ources o funds 
Non -bank finan ial institutions have mad negligible sums 
available to manufacturing industry: there is no industrial 
finance coporation ; insurance companies have invested most of their 
funds outside Hong Kong ; and hire purchase credit had usually 
financed consumer durable goods. The merchant houses have been 
the main non-bank institutional source of funds for industry. 
Their assistance had benefited mainly the smaller manufacturers. 
Because of the labour-intensive character of much Hong Kong 
industry, the network of export houses to undertake marketing 
arrangements and the availability of rented premises, a 
manufacturing enterprise can be formed with a small amount of 
capital. The personal savings of managers, prof its from real 
estate, share transactions and trade, and loans from relatives 
and the unorganised market have all been used to finance 
industrial capital formation. Frequently, new manufacturing 
businesses have been formed by skilled workers and technicians 
from existing enterprises, using their own savings and funds 
borrowed from the unorganis ed market. 2 A senior Government official 
has described this mobility of funds in this way. 
l 
In the early years of industralisation ... a large number 
of HoThg Kong's industrialists ... were not really 
industrialists at all; some were merchants who had been 
deprived of their business by the close of the China trade 
and saw lu rative opportunities offered by a world sellers' 
market for consumer produc s ; others were investors who 
assessed risk against possibilities for profit and came 
Personal communication rom Sup rintendent of Crown Lands and 
Survey . 
2 
K.S. Lo, op. cit. 
ou in favour o indus r i a l enterprise. Once industry 
prov d o be profi able all s or s o f people with a 
little mon y and a head f or busin ss j o ined i.n .l 
This tend ncy has ontinued hrough mos t of he post -war period. 
For example , in l a te 1967 r eal estate deve lopers complained of the 
way that idle funds from within the real estate sector were being 
invested in ind ustry to bene it from the higher returns available 
2 there. 
The ma in features of ind us trial financing appear, then, to be 
these: the early manufacturing investment was financed mainly from 
capital inflow; retained earnings appear to have been the main 
source of long term funds ; especially since around 1958 the 
commercial banks have provided a considerable amount of finance 
for industrial investment and, often, these funds have been lent 
on a medium erm basis; and, most important, profits earned in 
speculation and other transactions have been invested - often 
through the unorganised market - in lines of industry which promise 
a relatively quick r e turn. There has not developed a broad market 
in company securities, nor has there been long term lending for 
industrial purposes from non bank financial institutions or 
official s ources (other than , in the latter case, credit on 
Government land sales). There has been a continuing reliance on 
retained earnings and, for the smaller firms, on the unorganised 
market. The main dev lopment in the system of industrial finance 
in the post-warp riod has been the increasing rol of the commercial 
banks as providers of credit for manufacturing investment . Despite 
the very r stricted supply of long term funds, a high, and in most 
years rapidly increasing, level of industrial capital formation 
has been financed. Finance has been found, too, for the rapid 
establishment of new lines of manufa cturing activity . 
1 
2 
TD S b 
·t Se also Richard Hughes, op . cit., p.25 . . • or y, op. ci ., 
HS, 8 October 196 7. 
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Mor evident t hat any d v lopmen i n he sources of industrial 
finance over time have b en dif er n e s i n the financing of the 
large and small i ndus r ia l n erpr i ses . The l arger businesses 
hav usually b n be tt r placed t o obtain funds from both external 
and internal s ources : 
The dichotomy betwe n t he f inancing of large, well -
es ablish d firms and the rest of industry is apparent 
the whole way t hrough. It is almost as i f two entirely 
separate systems of industrial financing ex isted side 
by side. By and large it is he big or medium-sized well-
run f irms which go to t he banking sys tem ; smaller 
enterprises and ill -manag d concerns of wha tever size 
must resort t o private lenders. It is , most probably, 
the bigger, solidly -based irms which have be n 
able to f ina nce s ubstantial additions to fixed assets 
from retained prof its ; profit margins in t he rest of 
industry may well have be n t oo small and too uncertain 
to cover signif icant add i tions t o capital.1 
This statement, made i n 1961, has now to be qua lifi ed t o t he extent 
that more of t he better run smaller firms are able to obtain funds 
from commercial banks. 
(b) The Industrial Bank Report. The formation of an industrial 
bank or dev lopment corporation ha s been f avour ed by t he Ch inese 
Manufacturers' Assoc ia tion (wh ich was respons ible for the 
establishment of t he Government Connnittee to inquire into this 
probl m), and a number of individual industrialists and 
2 
commentators. In most ca ses 1 the establis hment of an of ficial 
industrial bank has been suggested - of course, with no restriction 
on its right to borrow f r om non -off icial organisations. Nothing 
has come of one or two r ports that an industria l bank was to be 
1 
2 
stablished by privat 3 inters s . The rio ts of 1967, which 
Economis Intelligence Un it, op. cit., p.18. 
Se Su u Hsin and Derek Davis, ' Finance for Industry', FEER; 
23 May 1963 ; S . C. hen 'Industria l Bank?', FEER, 12 March 1965 ; 
Sutu Hsin, 'Problems o Smaller Industry with Special Reference to 
Hong Kong', Hong Kong Manager, March/April 1965 ; K.S. Lo, op cit .; 
K. S. Lo, 'Is here a plac for an Industrial Bank in Hong Kong? ' 
mim ographed 1966 ; and Sunday Post -Herald, 17 Decemb r 1967, p. 23. 
3 
See FEER, 19 March 1959, p.416 and 16 April 1959, p.549. 
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discouraged private inves m n - especially long and medium-term 
investment - stimulated further interest in the establishment of an 
industrial bank. 
The Industrial Bank Commit e was established in 1959 'to 
advise whether there was a need for an industrial bank for the 
financing of industry in Hong Kong and, if so, whether Government 
should take steps to set up such an institution• . 1 The Committee, 
was composed of representatives of banks and connnerce. The 
Assistant Financial Secretary was Chairman. The Connnittee found 
2 that 'the need for an industrial bank is not proven'. 
The Report briefly mentioned the working of industrial banks 
in other countries, where governments 'felt that official action 
was necessary to stimulate the growth of industry'. No attempt was 
made to review in detail the working of these institutions, but the 
Committee made two observations: 
One comment we might be p~rmitted is that such bodies are 
more often found where progress has been slow and scanty 
than where it has been rapid and extensive; they are a 
remedy for failure rather than a cause of success.3 
It seems doubtful if any of the special roles assigned to 
industrial banks in under-developed territories can be 
held to be appropriate or necessary here. Certainly, 
enterprise is not lacking and requires no stimulation. 
There is no need in this Report to stress Hongkong 's 
debt to the enterprise of its industrialists in the 
post-war period.4 
The Report outlined the main sources of industrial finance in 
Hong Kong and noted the difficulty faced by industry in obtaining 
long term funds. It was on the difficulty 'of securing finance 
for investm nt in industry requiring a relatively long term to 
reach maturity or to redeem their original capital', the Committee 
argued , that the case or an industrial bank 'must largely stand or 
£a11•. 5 
1 
FEER, 4 August 1960, p.226. 
2 
Ibid. , p. 231. 
3 
Ibid. , p.226. 
4 
Ibid. 
5 
Ibid. , p.229 . 
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Four reasons supported the Committee's view that an industrial 
bank was not neces ary. The most important was that 
In gen ral i would se m tha t such a bank could not 
increase th supply and would at most div rt it to 
i ndustry from other competing uses - although v n 
that is not necessa rily so; it migh t mer ly. provide 
a different channel leading to th same uses.l 
Given this limit d supply of inv stibl funds, 
there would appear to be no adva ntag in Hong Kong's 
present circumstances in diverting capita l to 
industries which require a relatively heavier capital 
investment and a correspondingly longer redemption 
period. 2 
The Committee claimed that no concrete example was given to hem 
of an industrial development 'frustrated by lack of financial 
facilities', and that bec1use the 'majority of risks which go to 
make up the interest r ate [at present charged by connnercial banks] 
are normal commercial ones which any lender must look at when 
deciding against or i n favour of a loan ... the interest rates 
charged would not d iffer mate~ia lly from those charged by 
commercial banks'. 3 
The Committee's general conclusion was qualified, however, by 
the statement that 'We do not exclude the possibility t hat an 
industrial bank may become necessary or at least desirable, at some 
future stage of developmen t '. It was specifica lly noted t hat an 
industrial bank would be an appropriate body to distribute any 
funds which international agencies might make available for 
investment in Hong Kong indu try. 
The Repor can be cr iticised for overlooking the advantage 
ev n to the ex i sting labour-intensive industry of genuine long 
term loans. Most commercial bank advances to manufac t uring firms 
are nominally repayabl 4 . on d mand and, even where loans remain 
1 
2 
3 
4 
FEER, 4 August 1960, p .. 229 . 
Ibid. 
Ibid., pp.228-9 . 
Thi was str ssed by P .A. Graham, 'The Banking Industry of Hong 
Kong ' , op . c i t . 
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outstanding or four or ive years , they are less appropriate to 
expenditure on fixed cap tal assets than would be the advances of a 
specialised industr al bank. This is simply to say that commercial 
banks , with their necessary insistence on liquidity , cannot as 
willingly undertake long term lending as an industrial bank whose 
liabilities are not repayable on demand . 
The Committee , moreover , did not discuss the non-financial 
problems of industry : problems of management, productivity, quality 
control, etc . Thus , no mention was made of t he contribution an 
industrial bank might make in these fields . 
Thirdly , t he Committee overlooked the financial problems of the 
Colony ' s main heavy industry , shipbuilding. The provision of long 
term credit to buyers has been a main aspect of international 
competition in this industry, and the local shipbuilders are said to 
have lost orders because they could not match the deferred payment 
1 terms offered by foreign competitors . 
Perhaps, too, not enough emphasis was placed on the bank's 
possible role in attracting funds from overseas sources. It may be 
preferable to have such an institution established before approaches 
are made for overseas credits. 
These arguments strengthen the case for the establishment of an 
industrial bank, On the other hand, the Report failed to mention 
that the intensely competitive conditions in industry would considerably 
complicate the operations of the industrial bank . The industrial bank 
might reduce one barrier - the financial one - to further increases 
in industrial output, and so contribute to the overproduction which 
has disrupted several lines of industry. This would suggest that the 
industrial bank should seek to finance the introduction of better 
techniques and sca le - i.e ., that it emphasise its non-economic role . 
Surprisingly , the Committee made no men t ion of the financial 
problems of smaller businesses . The establishment of an institution 
1 
See~' 2 March 1967 , Trade and Transport Supplement , p . 8 . 
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to assist the smaller manufacturing firms has been strongly recommended 
by the Smaller Business Management Comm ttee of the Federation of Rong 
Kong Industry. It has been suggested that the official support be 
given by way of a credit guarantee or, more directly, by chanelling 
public funds through a body such as a 'Small Ma nufacturers' Aid 
0 • • I 1 rgan1sat1on. 
Such an authority would probably face several of the difficulties 
discussed already in connection with an i ndustrial bank . The high 
risk surrounding many of the authority's loans would make losses 
virtually inevitable, and a fringe of unsatisfied borrowers would 
remain . Again , however, the non-financial services of the authority -
its contribution to improved management and production techniques -
could prove to be of considerable significance, 
Trade 
Finance for trade purposes is required for the Colony's entrepot 
trade, domestic exports and imports, and local wholesale and retail 
transactions. The growth of the foreign trade was shown in Table 1.3. 
There is no way of determining the rate of expansion or the present 
level of the Colony's wholesale and retail trade, but, in line with 
the rising population and income levels, a rapid increase must have 
taken place. 
(a) External Trade. There has been no evidence of a shortage of 
funds to finance the Colony's external trade. The main sources of 
this finance have been the commercial banks and the export houses. 
(i) Commercial Bank finance 
The finance of foreign trade is the most sought after business 
of the commercial banks . The Hong Kong commercial banks are well 
placed to finance international trade : this bus ness has been central 
to the operations of many banks since their establishment ; they are 
1 
K. S . Lo , 
op . cit. 
' Is there a place for an Industrial Bank in Rong Kong ', 
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wel l represented i the ~ountries with which Hang Kong trades; and, 
mos t imporcant , many have access to world f i anc ial centres should 
additional funds be requi r ed t o meet a sudden increase in the trade 
1 
v olume , The banks have not had to l1m1t their lending for trade 
purpos es because they were ' loaned up' , and chere was no concraction 
i n the s upply of fi ance or fc:e ign trad e purposes after the 1965 
banking crisis. 
The letter of credi t is used more widely in Hong Kong than in 
most countries.
2 
Several years ago some 80 per cent of imports and 
60 per cent of exports were financed in this way . 3 In 1966 the 
proportions were around two-thirds and one-half . In 1963 , 60 per 
c ent of import bills by value were expressed in sterling, ten per 
cent in U.S. dollars and 30 per cent i n other currencies , including 
Hong Kong dollars . Export bills were written 50 per cent in 
sterling, 25 per cent in U.S. dollar s and 25 per ent in ocher 
currencies. 
Most banks provide pre-shipment finance or packing credics. 
Packing credits - usually for one month - are simil ar to a clean 
overdraft. The bank has no guarantee that the advances i s used f or 
5 the purpos e s intended, or even that the goods are exported. The 
banksnegotiate bills drawn under an overseas ban~ s l etter of credit 
or provide facilit ies or t he purchase of export bills on DA or DP 
1 
One l eading banker has commented 'Naturally , of course, the 
banks are limited i n the amount of import and export finance which 
t hey can give according to the size of their res ources , but smaller 
organisat ons are fr equent ly able to obta n discount faciliti es 
f rom their international correspondents in the principal centres 
abroad such as London and New York - so on ce aga i n we find that the 
good credit standing of the banking industry enables Hong Kong to 
obtain a measure of outs i de fi nanc e . ' P.A. Graham , op . cit., p .14. 
2 
The f ollowi ng paragraphs draw heavily on ibid., and David Williams, 
' Hong Kong ' in W. Cri k (ed.), op . cit . 
3 
4 
Nigel Ruscoe 's Annual Hong Kong Register, 1964, p.59 . 
Much o the Co lony ' s imports f rom China is den m1nated i n long ong 
dollars. 
5 
Dav d Williams , op. cit. , p.423. 
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terms. DA terms are the more usual for known customers. The 
proportion of exports financed on DP terms appears to be higher than 
in most trading countries. Bi ll usance is tied to the shipment period 
and to the buyers' requirements. Usance is commonly for 60 days (for 
textiles) to 90 days , but 120 or 180 days is stil l arranged when the 
parties are well known, More frequently now , b lls are being drawn 
at sight. 
On the import trade, letters of credit are opened, usually for 
120 days , but for a longer period on some commodities, including raw 
cotton. The banks are also frequently involved in providing short 
term credit to the importer, to permit the settlement of bills at 
maturity. These advances usually take the form of a trust receipt: 
the customer promises to hold the goods in trust for the bank and to 
surrender the proceeds when the goods are sold. For less known 
borrowers , collateral security is required. Loans arranged under trust 
receipts have become ' a very close adjunct to bill financing', and 
well over half the customers engaging the banks in bill financing are 
d d . h ' 1 accommo ate int is way. The currency of these loans is usually 30 
or 60 days. Interest is charged at the same rate as on bill finance, 
(ii) The export houses 
A large part of the Colony's trade is conducted on open account 
between the commercial houses and their branches and counterparts 
2 
abroad. The large merchant houses work on similar principles to the 
exchange banks. They operate a system of set off accounts , crediting 
the account of the Hong Kong branch with the proceeds of goods 
exported from the Colony, and debiting these accounts by the value of 
goods imported into Hong Kong. To the extent that transactions 
balance , the merchant houses avoid exchange commission and transfer 
costs. Of course , a part of this trade is financed indirectly with 
1 
2 
David Williams, op. cit. , p.423 . 
The first half of this paragraph draws on P . J. Drake , op. cit ., 
pp . 363-4 . 
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b k d . 1 h an ere it, Butte numerous export-import businesses have 
themselves considerable funds from mainly internal sources. The 
largest trading firms have a capital built up over a long period of 
time, while the many smaller businesses have funds provided by their 
owners and from past profits, and access to additional finance from 
relatives and other sources in the unorganised market to meet any 
short period increase in trade turnover. Several larger houses, most 
notably Jardine Matheson, can borrow in foreign monetary centres. 
(iii) Other sources of funds 
No information is available on other sources of funds for 
external trade. Local manufacturers and suppliers in other countries 
have occasionally offered extended credit terms, but, more usually, 
this finance is provided by merchant houses. 
The Government has not provided funds to finance trade. It did, 
though, set up the Export Credit Insurance Corporation, and it has 
underwritten the Corporation's policies to the value of $500 million. 
The Government has not sought to make the Corporation's policies a 
means of securing long term advances for manufacturing industry. 
(b) Domestic Wholesale and Retail Trade . The commercial banks 
and the export-import firms also finance most of the wholesale and 
retail trade. A considerable part of the wholesale trade, especially 
in consumer durables and luxury items, is arranged and presumably 
financed by the trading houses themselves. Bank funds are provided 
by the British banks and several well-established local banks. Credit 
from the export-import firms is less important in the retail trade, 
2 and the bank credit employed comes mainly from the smaller banks. 
A number of small retail businesses borrow from the unorganised market . 
1 
Jardine Matheson in December 1966 had current liabilities to bank 
advances and creditors in excess of $200 million. 
2 
Bank loans outstanding for retail sales stood at $97 million (or 
less than two per cent of total bank lending) in 1966 . 
1 
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As bank loans for domestic trade pu poses are usually less 
liquid and less profitable than foreign trade credits, bank lending 
for internal t rade has fallen when the banks have experienced 
liquidity difficulties or there has been reduced confidence in the 
Colony's economic or political future, For example, there was a 
reduction in bank lending for local retail and wholesale trade in 
1965. 1 
See Chairmans Statement to _ _ , Shareholders , Dairy Farm , Ice and 
Cold Storage Limited , FEER, 2 June 1966 , p . 458 . 
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Chapter 14 
THE ADEQUACY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM - III: CONSTRUCTION AND 
OTHER SECTORS 
Table 14.1 sets out the little information available on the 
value of building activity over recent years, The Table suggests 
that a boom in private construction started soon after the Korean 
War , and reached its peak in 1960-61. After a fall in new 
construction in 1961 (caused by a temporary oversupply of many types 
of residential flats and reduced bank lending), the value of new 
building wor k more than doubled in two years, The rate of increase 
was slower after 1963 and from 1965 there was frequent reference to 
I • I • h 1 " d 1 c · 1 a recession int e rea estate in ustry. ertain y, an excess 
supply of luxury accommodation developed. Building construction was 
depressed further by the 1967 disturbances, Public spending on 
building construction has risen steadily since the Government 
accepted responsibility in this field in 1954. 
Table 14 . 2 sets out the volumeand types of new housing provided 
between 1960 and 1967. Over this period there was a considerably 
i ncreased interest in the construction of middle standard and low 
cost housing. 
There is no way of estimating the return earned on capital 
employed in private building construction, but there are many 
indications that profits have been high , often spectacularly so. 
It has frequently been claimed that until 1963 capital invested in 
private construction schemes was returned in three years : one 
analysis shows that in 1962-63 capital was liquidated in 1.75 years 
on property for sale and in three to five years on property 
1 
One real estate developer in 1966 described 1965 as the ' gloomiest 
period of real estate market after the war . ' K. C. Pang , 'An Analys i s 
of Hong Kong ' s Real Estate Development ', University of Hong Kong , 
Department of Extra-Mural Studies , Public Lecture , October , 1966 . 
Table 14 .1 
COST OF NEW BUILDING WORK COMPLETED, URBAN AREA, 1950-51 TO 1966-67 
Factories Offices Ho uses Others Total Government Development Loan Fund and and and private capital increase in housing s hops 
expenditure a loans 
godowns flats 
$ million 
1950-51 15 23 59 25 121 1951 - 52 10 4 41 14 69 1952-53 8 35 75 28 146 1953 -54 7 7 46 11 71 1954-55 9 6 49 27 90 22 3 
1955 - 56 13 4 129 28 174 16 13 
1956-57 11 20 103 22 156 15 28 
1957-58 12 13 134 23 182 20 22 
1958-59 32 30 140 56 258 20 39 
1959 -60 22 27 214 25 288 28 34 
1960-61 40 59 250 47 296 42 40 
1961-62 41 7 177 49 2 75 44 58 
1962-63 49 56 210 50 363 65 53 
1963 -64 62 27 338 159 586 116 61 
1964-65 96 51 58 7 59 793 120 51 
1965 -66 186 105 622 104 1,017 125 18 
1966-6 7 134 143 598 116 990 122 16 
a= Resettlement and Low-Cost Housing On ly . 
Sources: Commissioner of Rating and Valuation, Annual Report, various numbers . 
Accountant-General, tmnual Report, various numbers. 
w 
N 
O"I 
Table 14.2 
NEW HOUSING PROVIDED. BY TYPE, 1960 TO 1967 
Private developers 
tenement floors 
flats, houses 
Government quarters 
Resettlement and Low Cost Housing, flats 
Co -operative Societies, flats 
Housing Society, flats 
Housing Authority, flats 
a= 31 December each year. 
Source: Hong Kong Annual Report, various numbers . 
1960a 
2 , 200 
1,700 
2 , 200 
8,000 
400 
1,000 
2,200 
1961 
8 , 400 
8 ,700 
200 
14,300 
600 
1,000 
1,800 
1962 1963 
4,400 7,700 
5,200 12 , 400 
300 900 
14,100 20,400 
400 500 
1,800 700 
3,800 5,600 
1964 1965 1966 1967 
8,600 14,100 20,800 11,500 
1,400 5,800 10,300 4,500 
1,100 1,000 1,000 1,000 
28 , 900 19,400 19, 700 28 ,700 
300 300 100 100 
1,100 4,9 00 1,300 1, 700 
5, 700 900 200 400 
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1 
constructed for renting purpose s. Since 1964 , h owever , rents 
on lux ury accommodation hav e fa llen, lengthening th period ove r 
which capita l is ret urn d. The quick turnover o f funds has attracted 
capital to building construction from several sources ( he unorganised 
market, c api tal i nflow and the commercial banks) and has comp nsated 
f o r the political unce rtainty. At the other extreme, rents in 
Government-provided housing have prov ided f or th amort i sa tion of 
capita l over fo r ty years. 
The shortage o f land, which has neces sitated multi -storey 
development o f most sites, req uires de v e lopment companies to have 
a r elatively large capita l . It has been s aid , for example, that a 
larger volume of f unds is required to estab lish a land development 
company than to en ter most branches of industry . 2 
Sources of finance for construction 
( i ) Commerc ial banks 
Commercia l bank f i nan c e of real estate ac tiv ity ha s alr e a dy 
been outlined. Loans and investment in real es tate were for long 
a 'mainstay' o f the smaller banks, making the real e s t ate market a 
3 
' bank made' one . Before the 19 64 Banking Ordinance many banks 
took a direct interest in real estate development. New bank lending 
for construction purposes was reduced in 1960-6 1 and aga in after 
1964, in the latter case beca use of the Banking Ordinance, bank 
liquidity difficulties and reduced profits in construction . In 
December 1966 this form of bank cre dit stood at $957 million, or 
17.5 per cent of all bank loans . 
1 
L . F. Goodstadt, 'Competition - By Agre em nt', FEER, 17 October 
1963, p . 164 . 
2 
L.F. Goodst a dt , ' Competitors in Developm nt', FEER , 10 October 1963, 
p.119. 
3 
See a bove p.107 . 
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( ii) Capital inflow 
Real estate has attract d mu h - in one estimate 'more than 
1 
half ' - of the post-war apital inflow into Hong Kong. In part 
this refl cts t h attractive r turn available on real estate 
investment, but there is also a strong preference for property 
investment on t he part of many overseas Chinese, who hav 
provided the large part of oreign investment in Hong Kong and who 
have frequent ly been debarred from purchasing land in the country 
in which they reside. The overs as Chinese funds have been invested 
in family companies, lent to d velopers by way of mortgage loan and 
used to purchase flats in multi-title estates. There has been some 
capital inflow from t he advanc d countries, such as t he Mobil Oil 
group's investment . 
(iii) Unorganised market 
Considerable funds have been lent to developers from the 
unorganised market. A significant part of the profits earned by 
traders during the early part of the Korean War was apparently 
2 invested in real estate dev lopment. A 1963 survey found that 38 
per cent of construction companies obtained their finance from 
private individuals only while another 37 per cent of companies were 
financed partly from privat . d. "d 1 3 1.n 1.v1. ua s. Because of the security 
off red and the relatively quick turnover of funds, real estate 
developers appear to have b n better placed in most years to 
obtain funds from the unorganised market than other sectors of the 
economy, 
1 
2 
Advance payments have also provided funds for construction: 
Liberal regulations governing t h multiple ownership of 
buildings have ... helped to finance the building industry. 
Along with the vertical development of buildings in Hong 
FEER, 28 January, 1965, p,188. 
FEER, 30 March, 1961, p.627, and 25 November 1964, pp . 696-7. 
3 
L. F. Goodstadt, op . cit. 
Kong, deve l oper s s t art d sell i ng sel f -contained units 
wi thin t he bu ild ing. Builders depended heav ily on 
customer cred it financing for their deve lopment s chemes 
a nd many b uildings were sold 'on paper ' b f ore 
construct i on a c tually began. There we r e instances 
where 70% of a bu ilding was sold, people having pa id 
deposit s t wo years previously , before construc tion had 
eve n s t a r ted . Th is method of fina ncing helped initial 
fina nc ing , a nd t he smal l i n i t ia l i nve s tmen t wi t h quick 
r e t urns q uick ly re s ul ted i n even more act ivity i n this 
fie l d.l 
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As much as $200,000 has been paid for the t itle t o a s ingle f lat , 
s ome t i me before complet i on. 2 
(iv ) Pub lic s ha r e i s s ues 
Severa l land dev l opment companies are lis t e d on t he loca l 
Stock Exc hange, and the s e comp anies raised $93 mi l lion by new 
capital is s ues in the per iod 1958 to 1966. Balance s heet 
informa tion on the t wo main development companies is given in Table 
14.3. These compan ie s have been mainly concerned with the 
development of commercial properties - one owns a large section o f 
the commerc i al distr i ct o f Hong Kong Island - but both have built 
and manage f a ctory blocks and a number of low cost and middle 
standard housing e s t a t es. 
(v) Governmen t 
The Government's i nv olvement in the provision o f low cost and 
. 3 
middle standard housing ha s been mentioned. There has been no 
attempt to provide housing a t subsidised rents: t he Government has 
argued that a d i rect subs idy4 would be both inequitable (in that 
housing cannot be pr ov i ded f or the whole popula tion) a nd undesirable 
1 
Muchael Wu, 'Housing and Land Policy', FEER, 29 August 1963, 
p.617. 
2 
Commiss i oner of Rating a nd Va luation, Annual Report, 1962-3, 
p .17 . 
3 
See abov pp. 232 - 5. 
4 
An i ndi ct 
at less t h nth 
bs i dy is p ov i ded in that land i s made ava ilable 
market va l ue and loans are gra nt ed for long periods 
at relat i vely low inter st ra tes. 
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Table 14.3 
HONG KONG LAND, INVESTMENT AND AGENCY AND HONG KONG REALTY AND 
TRUST, SELECTED FINA CIAL INFORMATION, 1957 TO 1966 
( 1) Hong Kong Land Investment a nd A.genci 
195 7a 1962 
$ million 
Share capital 60 105 Reserv s 51 46 Total 111 151 
Fixed assets 113 151 
a = 31 D c mber each year 
Change 1957 to 1966 
Share capital 140 
R serves 2 
Total 142 
Capital raisings, 
1957 to 1966 
..22 
Difference 87 
(2) Hong Kong Realtl and Trust 
1957a 1962 
Share capital 
Reserves 
Total 
Fixed assets 
$ million 
6 
3 
9 
13 
a= 30 April each year 
Change 1957 to 1966 
21 
7 
29 
18 
Shar capital 16 
Reserv s 17 
Total 33 
Capital raisings, 
1957 to 1966 12 
Diff rence 21 
Sourc: Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Y ar Book. 
(by reducing commercial rents, the subsidy might discourage the 
activities of private build rs). 1 
1966 
200 
53 
253 
244 
1966 
22 
20 
41 
27 
Virtually all th £inane for Government-provided housing has 
come from public revenu. A scheme whereby applicants for low cost 
housing can secure h ir applications by making rent - in-advance 
1 
See Legislativ Council Debat s, 1965, p.78. 
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payments had contribut d some $7 million t th Gov rnment ' s low 
cost housing program y lat 1966 . 
It is no poss ible 0 discuss in other than a ost g neral way 
the use of funds in () te s c tors of the economy. 
Purchases of consumer durables are financed mainly by th 
commercial banks and th_ unorganised market, and less frequently, 
the several hire purchase companies. The finance of consumer 
spending is an unimportan t part of the financial system and has not 
interfered with the flow of funds to investment uses. 
Much of the investment in the small primary sectors of the 
economy has been provided from the Government and from welfare 
1 
funds. There has been a considerable increase in the output of 
foodstuffs over the post -war period, 2 but the rapid increases in 
population have prevented the Colony from gaining anything like 
self-sufficiency. I n a l most all cases, incomes in primary industry 
s till low. 3 are very 
Ther was a boom in hotel construction in the early 1960s. 
Some $300 million was inv sted in new hotels in six y ars to 1964 . 4 
Bank cred it financed a part of this development. A l a rge part of 
the cost of the Hong ong Hilton Hotel was provided by the Hongkong 
Bank on s curity of bonds. It was reported that investors in the 
5 Hilton sought a return of capital in ten years. City Hotels raised 
$18 million by a public shar issue in 1963. Other funds for 
investment in hotels came mainly from private sources. The $90 
million invest din t he President Hotel was provided by a syndicate 
of Chinese brothers. 6 
1 
2 
See above, pp.207-ll. 
Se Appendi es IV and XII of the Director of Agriculture and 
Fishing, Annual Report . 
3 
See, for example, L. F . Go ds tad t, 'Are the Farmers Worth It? ' 
FEER, 15 S ptember 1966. 
4 
5 
6 
FEER, 28 November 1963, pp 484-5. 
I bid. 
I b i d. 
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In other s ec tors of he conomy - or xamp l e, r e s taur ant s, 
o her entertainment a nd newspapers - th re appears t o have been 
a hea vy rel ianc on privat savings and he unorganised marke t. 
Chapter 15 
CONCLUSION 
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The development and operation of the Hong Kong financial 
system and the way in which recent economic growth has been fina nced 
have now been set out. In this Chapter we look a little more 
cl osely at the interrelation between the financial system and 
economic development - an interrelation referred to a number of 
times - and briefly discuss the relevance of the Hong Kong financial 
experience to other underdeveloped countries. 
The financial system of the pre-war economy was a relatively 
simple one, oriented to the needs of the entrepot trade. The 
dominant institutions of this financial system were the exchange 
banks and the agency houses. Through these businesses Hong Kong 
had efficient and close links with the important financial and 
commercial centres of Europe, South Asia and the Far East . The 
banks' main businessthra.igln..it the period was trade bill finance and 
exchange transfers. The agency houses as well as arranging t he 
movement of goods provided insurance, warehouse and shipping 
services. Taxes were low . Public expenditure was conf i ned mainly 
to administration, law, order and defence. Following the currency 
system of the main trading partner, the currency was silver -based. 
But the observation that the financial system was directed 
towards the needs of the entrepot trade does not mean that it was 
an unchanging one. At first the agency houses were the main 
institutions, and performed a full range of commercial and 
financial activities, but this early dominance and the houses ' 
banking functions were lost to the exchange banks. The methods 
through which the banks conducted exchange transfers and trade 
finance developed in line with the increasing complexit of Eastern 
trade, the connection of the telegraph and variations in silver 
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prices. The operations of the agency houses again changed in t h e 
1870s and 1880s, wh n many businesses ceased trading on their own 
account. Chinese-owned businesses and native banks develop d f r om 
the 1880s, compleme nting rath er than compet ing against, t h e 
established Western businesses. There were in effect two banking 
systems: the British and o t her e x patriate banks which financ d t he 
foreign merchants, and the local banks and the compradores of t he 
larger institutions, which acted as banker s to the Chinese 
community. 
The most apparent weakness of the financial structure was the 
currency system. Because it maintained a silver-based c urrency in 
a world using, increasingly, gold or managed currenc i es , Hong Kong 
had a variable exchange with the majority of i ts trading partners. 
These fluctuat ions greatly complicated exchange remittances and the 
f inance o f trade . Fur her, because the supply of banknotes wa s at 
times inflexible t here was a variable exchange rate even between 
Hong Kong and China . Bu t t hes e weaknesses in the c urre ncy s y stem, 
which were not corrected until 1935, did not prevent Hong Kong 
developing as one of the world' s great entrepots . 
In genera l t here can be l ittle question that the financia l 
system contributed to the success and growth o f Hong Kong as an 
entrepot, simply be cause the avai l a bility of a range of 
financial and commer c ial serv i ces attracted additional trade 
to the Colony. But we must ask a further question: mig h t 
the financial syste m have discouraged economic development in fields 
other than the entrepot trade? For examp le, can it be argued t hat 
the financia l system was partly responsible for the restricted 
industr ial growth of Hong Kong compared, say, with Shanghai ? We 
saw in Chapter 2 that Hong Kong financial institutions were 
willing, fr om an early stage, to lend and invest funds in fields no t 
directly conn ected with the entrepot trade: the Hongkong Bank mad e 
advances to local industr y from the 1860s; Jardine Matheson 
invested a l a rge sum in an unsuccessful attempt to set up a cot ton 
spinning industry ; and finance was found for t h e esta bl ishmen t and 
development of the shipbuilding indus try. Perhaps more relevant 
were Shanghai's severa l non-financial ad vantages, including a 
larger and more prosperous h interland, more active entr preneurs 
(the post-war development of Hong Kong was initiated by Shanghai 
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and not Cantonese entrepreneurs), and, in the pre s nt century, 
Chinese tariff protect ion . Al s o, the Hong Kong merchants had little 
incentive to establish manufa cturing businesses while there was 
scope further to expand the entrepot trade in Chinese goods. 
At first sight, the present financial system is little changed 
from that of the entrepot economy. The currency is issued under 
arrangements adopted before the Pacific War in response to t he 
collapse of the silver standard and the wartime threat by Bri tain 
and the United States to freeze the currency balances of occupied 
China. The system of issuing currency is modified only t o the extent 
that a free market in foreign currencies for a wide range of 
financial tra nsactions was 'tolerated' in 1946 and formalised in 
1967. The sterling exchange standard in a most pure form is still 
employed. And, despite the growth of the banking sector, the main 
determinant of the money supply is still the balance of payments. 
Corrnnercial banks remain t he dominant institutions of t he financial 
system . There has not been the sudden proliferation of non -bank 
financial institutions, including a relatively wide market in fixed 
interest securities and equities, that elsewhere has commonly been 
associated with economic development. There is no central bank. 
Public finance is conducted on most conversative lines and the 
Government outlook is still a laissez-faire one. There ha s been 
no attempt to use the budget as a means of stabilising the economy, 
and negligible use has been made of borrowed funds. Most businesses 
continue to rely on re tained earnings and on private sources of 
funds. 
However , on closer analys is a number of quite important 
financial deve l opmen ts becomes evident. While the commercial banks 
have maintained their dominant posi tion, the banking system has 
developed considerably in a ivities , structure and stab l l ity . 
Almos t all banks are now important as collectors of d posits. 
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Th re is a consid r ab le volume of local advances. Of cour se , ven 
bef ore the Paci f ic War he Hong Kong banks sough t local d posi ts, 
t hey function d as d positories for th savings of residents 
elsewhere i n the East, and the institutions made s ome 1 ca l 
advances f rom an early date. But the local business of the main 
institutions is now so important that the title exchange bank i s 
inappropriate, despite the considerable volume of trade finan e 
business still writt n. The banking system is more unified. Many 
Chinese residents and businesses deal with the British banks. The 
local Chinese banks are much larger and have a stronger capital, 
they have set up trade finance sections and have adopted more 
conventional standards of liquidity and security. These local 
banks now compete with the Br it ish and expatriate banks over a 
fairly wide field . Even t he small local banks have moved towards 
operations of a more conventional commercial banking nature, away 
from the money changing and money lending which dominated t heir 
activities in the entrepot economy. The banking system, too, is 
strongerandmore stable . There are fewer banks, individual 
institutions have a stronger capital and are more security - and 
liquidity-conscious, and the whole banking system is better 
regulated and controlled. 
There have been important developments in the opera tions of 
the merchant houses s ince economic and political changes on t he 
Mainland denied them t heir traditional role as middlemen of t he 
China trade. These i nstitut ions now trade mainly in imported raw 
materials and capital and consumer goods for sale in Hong Kong , 
and in the export of local manufactures. They have marketed a 
large part of the Co lony ' s output of manufactured goods since t he 
start of industrialisation. On the basis of this trade the long 
established houses have grown appreciably over the post-war period. 
Several have set up manufacturing subsidiaries. 
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There have been some c h anges also within the publ ic fi nance 
system. Dir ct taxes, introduced as a wartime measure in 1940, are 
now a permanent c harg and their level has been s light l y increased. 
Mainly because of these direct taxes, Government revenue has been 
more than respons i ve t o the recent growth in incomes. On the 
expenditure side, th main fea ture has been an increas i n spending 
on public works. The Government's entry into the field of low cost 
housing is perhaps the single most important development in t he 
public finance system. There has also been heavy public 
expenditur on water storage and there is growing Governmen t 
involvement in the provision of infrastructure. Government 
expenditure on education is considerably increased. These 
developments in the public finance system were forced on the 
Government by the fundamental demographic changes of t he past 
two decades. 
The capital market h as developed in some aspects. The 
housing finance institutions formed since the War have f inanced the 
construction of housing for a quarter of a million people. 
Co-op rative societies have been set up to assist capital formation 
in agriculture and fishing. Turnover on the stock ex hange is 
considerably increased, and for the public utilities and land 
development companies, at least, public share issues have been 
important sources of funds . 
Overall, though, changes in the structure and operation of 
existing institutions have been mor e important than the 
development of new fina ncial intermediaries and the emergence of 
a complex financial market. It is largely because the existing 
financial institutions - especially the commercial banks - have 
undertaken new f unctions and accepted a wider role that t h e financial 
system has changed so little during the post-war economic 
development. 
Another aspect of the financial system is also relevant. One 
of the most important c hara cteristics of the Hong Kong financial 
system to emerge from this study is the mobility of investment funds 
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t o t he unorgani s d ma rket and i n private hands. Profi t s earn din 
s pec ula tion in comm d i t i s and pr cious metals in t h l at 1940s 
w re i nvested in r a l estate a nd industrial developm n t s, and real 
e state prof its i n t ie 1950s w re later invested i n manu a c turing 
i ndustry. Becaus of t his mobility, funds have usually been 
quickly directed to t h e most pro f itable - i.e., t h mos t r ap i dly 
expanding - sectors of t he economy. (It also follows t ha t , more 
t ha n in most countries , productive investment has constantly to 
compete for funds wi t h speculative investment ). The gener a l s hort 
term outlook, the ab undant supply of entrepreneurs and t he 
prevalence of t he Chinese family firm have led to t h is mobil i t y o f 
pr ivate funds. 
Chapter 1 traced t he remarkable economic growth experienced i n 
Hong Kong over t he post -wa r period. In less than two decade s and 
wi t h a la i ssez-faire economic system, Hong Kong has developed from 
an entrepot tra d ing por t to a significant manufactur i ng cen t re . I t 
is worth now s unnnaris i ng t he main ways in which the fi nanc i a l system 
has actively con t r i buted t o t h is economic growth - i.e., t he ways i n 
which t he fi nancial s ector has been a 'leading factor ' i n t he 
process of economi c development. 
F i r st, the stability and convertibility of t he l ocal c ur r ency 
have been importan t i n attr acting to Hong Kong the oversea s funds 
which did much to initiate and sustain the Colony's developmen t . Of 
co urse, a part of t h is capital inflow would have taken place regardless 
of t he strength of t he Hong Kong dollar. Investmen t in Hong ong is 
th 'nea rest t h ing t o i nvestmen t in Ch ina', there is no discrimination 
in t he Col ony against investment by those of Chinese r a ce, and t he 
l a i s sez-fair e economic syst m i s attractive to foreign investors . 
But t he stable and c onvertible currency has greatly enhanced t he 
Colony 's appeal t o f oreign investors . At the very leas t , t he a se 
wi th wh ich f unds can b repatriated has compensated investors for t he 
po l i i cal risk s ur r ou ding i nvestment in Hong Kong. 
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Secondly, t h availibility of commercial bank loans an d 
advances virtually rom t h start of industrialisation - oft n o 
rela ively untri d bus i ness sand against little secur ity - has 
contributed to the rapid success of industrial development. The 
Hong Kong commercia l banks have to some degree accepted risks wh ich 
elsewhere are the responsibility of equity investors. Their libera l 
lending policy is the more surprising when one considers t ha t a larg 
part of deposits is owed to foreigners and the banks are not 
supported by official r ediscount facilities. As well as dir ctly 
assisting development, the liberal availability of industria l loans 
must have had a favourable effect on entrepreneurial outlooks. And, 
through the spread of t he banking habit the commercial banks have 
made available for investment funds earlier held in hoards of 
currency and precious metals. 
Because of the mobility of investible funds resources in Hong 
Kong have been efficiently transferred to sectors with the most 
promising return. On bo t h t he organised and unorganised markets 
investible funds appear more mobile than in many developing countries. 
Fourthly, t he availability of developed marketing networks 
though the agency ho us e s facilitated the rapid establishment of 
manufacturing businesses. 
Finally, t he public finance system has assisted economic 
development in several ways. The light tax burden has permitted 
the re - investment of a h igh proportion of business earnings and the 
quick turnover of capital . Taxes have not discouraged initiative. 
The public sector has not caused inflation or balance of payments 
difficulties. Considerable sums have been made available for the 
provision of low cost housing. 
The main weakness of the financial system is doubtless the 
restricted supply of outside long term and equity finance . It is 
long term funds rather than risk capital which has been in short 
supply in Hong ong. This weakness in the financial system has 
limited industrial dev lopment in several fields, including the 
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expansion of capita l i n tensive industries such as shipbuild i ng, it 
has restricted the activities of the housing finance institutions, 
and has, required consumer s of utility services to finance a high 
proportion of capita l expenditures. Also, there has been criticism 
that Government spending on education, health, welfare services and 
slum clearance has no t i ncreased fully in line with the corrunun i ty ' s 
rising demand for expenditure in these fields. And, as a result 
of the underdeveloped money and capital markets, local banks and 
insurance companies hold a high proportion of their assets outside 
the Colony . Because of the freedom with which funds can be 
transferred overseas, Hong Kong businesses have continually to 
compete for investible funds with foreign institutions and 
securities. 
These several weaknesses in the financial system will perhaps 
be more keenly felt in the future. The present financial system -
which is directed mainly to the finance of small business units and 
light industry - may prove increasingly inadequate as manufacturing 
industry develops and greater emphasis is placed on scale and on 
capital intensive methods of production. Should the supply of 
investible funds be less adequate in the future it will become more 
desirable that the banks and other financial institutions hold 
more of their assets locally. · The rising expectations of the larger 
and more prosperous conununity will doubtless involve the Government 
in increased expenditure on infrastructure and social services, 
which it might not be easy to finance under the present system. 
It is also possible that an institutional system in which the 
money supply depends ma inly on the balance of payments could prove 
disruptive in the f ut ure. At the same time, the growth in the 
domestic sector might give rise to locally generated increases in 
demand and prices which call for some form of stabilisation policy 
and, perhaps, the establishment of a central bank. 
There are some ways in which the Hong Kong financial experience 
is instructive to t hose concerned with the financial aspects of 
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economic d velopmen i n o t her countries. The main fea tures of the 
financial sys m s h wn in is study are t he dominant role of t h 
corrunerc ial banks and the flex ibility of their operations, t he 
importa ce o retained earnings a s a source of investible f unds, 
and t he mob i lity of unds on the unorganised market. If t he 
corrunercia l ba nk had been more restricted in their activit ies - as 
would have bee n t he ca se had comprehensive banking legislat i on 
modell d on t hat of developed countries been imposed ea rly in t e 
post -war period - or had heavier taxes restr icted the re-investment 
of business earnings, t he financial system would almost certain ly 
have f unction d les s efficiently, to the detriment of economic growth . 
This study stresses the benefits, to an economy in wh ich the main 
busines s decisions are taken by private enterprise, of a fle ible and 
enterpris i ng banking sector . We have seen, too, that e conomic 
development ne d no be assoc i ated with the emergence of a c_omplex 
and s ophis icated cap ita l and money market, largely be ause , given 
the righ t environm n t, r tained earnings can provide a ma j or source 
of dev lopment f unds and res ources can be efficien tly_ trans fe rr d 
to t he more progressives ctors on the unorganised market. Fina lly , 
the s tudy demonstrat s that a colonial sterling exchange currency 
standard n ed not be a d i sadvantageous monetary system to a 
develop i ng country. 
But there are several important differences between t he 
financial probl ms of Hong Kong and many other developing countries. 
For one t h ing, t he supply of funds has been more adequate in Hong 
Kong t han in most coun tries: a considerable volume of overseas 
funds has flowed into Hong Kong and, domestically, businesses 
have made h avy use of reta i ned earnings, the population has been 
parsimonious and t Gov rnment has pursued prudent financial 
policies . To some e tent, as we have already seen, the fi nancial 
system has contrib uted t he apparently adequate supply of funds. 
The strong curr ncy has attracted foreign capital. The local banks 
have co lle ted or pr oductive investment the funds of domestic 
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savers . Th. syst .m o publ i c ·inance has pe rmitted bus in sses to 
r e t ain a h ig propor tion o:E earnings for further investment. ut 
s veral on - .inancial . actors have also be n r l evant, inc lud ing 
the attr action o t h is predominantly Ch inese city to overs a s 
Chines and t he raditiona l thrifty nat ure of the Chinese. 
Whatev r h r :ason here i s no t the necessity to se k way s in w _ich 
the fi n ncia l sys em migh t be restructured to encourage a h igher 
rate o saving that i s · ound in many develop ing countries . 
Largely becaus o f its f inancial system, Hong Kong has not 
suffer ed rom t he ba lance of payments difficulties experienced by 
many underd ve l oped countr ies. Probably, the 100 per cen t fo r ign 
exchange backed urrency i s s ue is a less disadvantageous sys tem in 
Hong Kong t han i n most countries: the balance of payments has 
regularly b en in s urplus (thus the monetary sys t em has not imposed 
a de f l tionary b i as ), t he Colony is not dep endent on one or t wo 
expor t s wi t h variab le pr ices, and the supply of investible fund s 
has b en so large that the 'locking up' o f res ources as curr e ncy 
backing ha s no t ser ious ly r e stricted developmen t expendi tures . 
A t h ird di ffenrnc i s t he mobility of funds on the Colony' s 
unorganised ma rket which has permi tted an efficient distribution 
of capital unds despi te the r e latively narrow capital mar ke t . 
Because of t h is harac ter istic of the financial system it app ars 
less necessary to d velop a network of financial institut ions in 
Hong Kong t han in mos t countries. The usual ca se for officia l 
assistance in es tablish ing and nurturing non-bank financial 
institu tions in a pr ivate enterprise economy is that individual 
sav rs a r e not the most e ff icient investors or these individual 
savers are no t in the most profi table sectors. Through the re -
inves tm ~n of pr i vate savings and the unorganised market, privata 
investib l f und s in Hong Kong se m already highly mobile betwe n 
sectors, wh ile the r e latively quick turnover of capital ha s 
compen~a.t ed invest.ors for t he illiquidity of direc t investment and 
of l oans on he unorganised ma rke t . 
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Hong Kong is an outstanding example of an underdev loped 
country which has experienced rapid economic growth without 
planning or controls. Te f w exceptions in the laissez - fair 
system are the Government restrictions on the production of many 
textile goods, in t roduced to meet the Colony's marketing 
commitments, the Gove rnment's provision of low cost housing and 
industrial land, and the relatively minor investment incentives. 
The rapid development and industrialisation were initiated by the 
group of entrepreneurs which moved to Hong .Kong from China in the 
late 1940s. Economic growth was facilitated by the institutional 
structure - including the banks and commercial institutions -
which had developed during the entrepot economy, by an adequate 
and adaptable labour force, and by the continuing inflow of funds, 
largely from overseas Chinese. Apparently then, Hong Kong has been 
better placed than most developing countries in entrepeneurship, 
labour and capital, to achieve rapid economic growth under a 
laissez-faire economic system. These favourable circumstances have 
overcome the Colony's disadvantages of an uncertain political 
future and a lack of raw materials . It can readily be argued that 
a laissez-faire economic system is more acceptable in Hong Kong, 
with its adequate supply of entrepreneurs, a colonial Government 
and an uncertain political future, than in most countries. 
Nonetheless, awareness of the recent experience of economic growth 
in Hong Kong is instructive to students of many other - and even 
semi-planned - developing countries, at the very least because of 
the success of the industrialisation and of the speed with which 
the economic development has taken place. 
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